Issue #1966 - Remove support for Firefox Marketplace "apps"

Because UXP may be a platform, but it's not a mobile OS.

15 files changed, 5 insertions, 2192 deletions

diff --git a/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp b/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index aed0b70c1c..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1559 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#include "nsNSSCertificateDB.h"
-
-#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
-#include "CryptoTask.h"
-#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
-#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
-#include "base64.h"
-#include "certdb.h"
-#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
-#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
-#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
-#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
-#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
-#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
-#include "nsDataSignatureVerifier.h"
-#include "nsHashKeys.h"
-#include "nsIDirectoryEnumerator.h"
-#include "nsIFile.h"
-#include "nsIFileStreams.h"
-#include "nsIInputStream.h"
-#include "nsIStringEnumerator.h"
-#include "nsIZipReader.h"
-#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
-#include "nsNetUtil.h"
-#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
-#include "nsString.h"
-#include "nsTHashtable.h"
-#include "nssb64.h"
-#include "pkix/pkix.h"
-#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
-#include "plstr.h"
-#include "secmime.h"
-
-
-using namespace mozilla::pkix;
-using namespace mozilla;
-using namespace mozilla::psm;
-
-extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
-
-namespace {
-
-// Reads a maximum of 1MB from a stream into the supplied buffer.
-// The reason for the 1MB limit is because this function is used to read
-// signature-related files and we want to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of
-// an entry can be hundreds of times larger than the compressed version,
-// especially if someone has specifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to
-// consume massive amounts of disk space.
-//
-// @param stream  The input stream to read from.
-// @param buf     The buffer that we read the stream into, which must have
-//                already been allocated.
-nsresult
-ReadStream(const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream>& stream, /*out*/ SECItem& buf)
-{
-  // The size returned by Available() might be inaccurate so we need
-  // to check that Available() matches up with the actual length of
-  // the file.
-  uint64_t length;
-  nsresult rv = stream->Available(&length);
-  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Cap the maximum accepted size of signature-related files at 1MB (which is
-  // still crazily huge) to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of an entry can be
-  // hundreds of times larger than the compressed version, especially if
-  // someone has speifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to consume
-  // massive amounts of disk space.
-  static const uint32_t MAX_LENGTH = 1024 * 1024;
-  if (length > MAX_LENGTH) {
-    return NS_ERROR_FILE_TOO_BIG;
-  }
-
-  // With bug 164695 in mind we +1 to leave room for null-terminating
-  // the buffer.
-  SECITEM_AllocItem(buf, static_cast<uint32_t>(length + 1));
-
-  // buf.len == length + 1. We attempt to read length + 1 bytes
-  // instead of length, so that we can check whether the metadata for
-  // the entry is incorrect.
-  uint32_t bytesRead;
-  rv = stream->Read(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(buf.data), buf.len,
-                    &bytesRead);
-  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-  if (bytesRead != length) {
-    return NS_ERROR_FILE_CORRUPTED;
-  }
-
-  buf.data[buf.len - 1] = 0; // null-terminate
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-// Finds exactly one (signature metadata) JAR entry that matches the given
-// search pattern, and then load it. Fails if there are no matches or if
-// there is more than one match. If bugDigest is not null then on success
-// bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digeset of the entry.
-nsresult
-FindAndLoadOneEntry(nsIZipReader * zip,
-                    const nsACString & searchPattern,
-                    /*out*/ nsACString & filename,
-                    /*out*/ SECItem & buf,
-                    /*optional, out*/ Digest * bufDigest)
-{
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> files;
-  nsresult rv = zip->FindEntries(searchPattern, getter_AddRefs(files));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  bool more;
-  rv = files->HasMore(&more);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-  if (!more) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  rv = files->GetNext(filename);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  // Check if there is more than one match, if so then error!
-  rv = files->HasMore(&more);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-  if (more) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
-  rv = zip->GetInputStream(filename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  rv = ReadStream(stream, buf);
-  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  if (bufDigest) {
-    rv = bufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, buf.data, buf.len - 1);
-    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-// Verify the digest of an entry. We avoid loading the entire entry into memory
-// at once, which would require memory in proportion to the size of the largest
-// entry. Instead, we require only a small, fixed amount of memory.
-//
-// @param stream  an input stream from a JAR entry or file depending on whether
-//                it is from a signed archive or unpacked into a directory
-// @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's
-//                           contents against, from the manifest
-// @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O, which must have
-//            already been allocated. The size of this buffer is the unit
-//            size of our I/O.
-nsresult
-VerifyStreamContentDigest(nsIInputStream* stream,
-                          const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
-{
-  MOZ_ASSERT(buf.len > 0);
-  if (digestFromManifest.len != SHA1_LENGTH)
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-
-  nsresult rv;
-  uint64_t len64;
-  rv = stream->Available(&len64);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-  if (len64 > UINT32_MAX) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
-  }
-
-  UniquePK11Context digestContext(PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1));
-  if (!digestContext) {
-    return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(PR_GetError());
-  }
-
-  rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(digestContext.get()));
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  uint64_t totalBytesRead = 0;
-  for (;;) {
-    uint32_t bytesRead;
-    rv = stream->Read(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(buf.data), buf.len,
-                      &bytesRead);
-    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-    if (bytesRead == 0) {
-      break; // EOF
-    }
-
-    totalBytesRead += bytesRead;
-    if (totalBytesRead >= UINT32_MAX) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
-    }
-
-    rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestOp(digestContext.get(), buf.data, bytesRead));
-    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-  }
-
-  if (totalBytesRead != len64) {
-    // The metadata we used for Available() doesn't match the actual size of
-    // the entry.
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // Verify that the digests match.
-  Digest digest;
-  rv = digest.End(SEC_OID_SHA1, digestContext);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&digestFromManifest, &digest.get()) != SECEqual) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MODIFIED_ENTRY;
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-nsresult
-VerifyEntryContentDigest(nsIZipReader* zip, const nsACString& aFilename,
-                         const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
-{
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
-  nsresult rv = zip->GetInputStream(aFilename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
-  }
-
-  return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf);
-}
-
-// @oaram aDir       directory containing the unpacked signed archive
-// @param aFilename  path of the target file relative to aDir
-// @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's
-//                           contents against, from the manifest
-// @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O
-nsresult
-VerifyFileContentDigest(nsIFile* aDir, const nsAString& aFilename,
-                        const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
-{
-  // Find the file corresponding to the manifest path
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
-  nsresult rv = aDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(file));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // We don't know how to handle JARs with signed directory entries.
-  // It's technically possible in the manifest but makes no sense on disk.
-  // Inside an archive we just ignore them, but here we have to treat it
-  // as an error because the signed bytes never got unpacked.
-  int32_t pos = 0;
-  int32_t slash;
-  int32_t namelen = aFilename.Length();
-  if (namelen == 0 || aFilename[namelen - 1] == '/') {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // Append path segments one by one
-  do {
-    slash = aFilename.FindChar('/', pos);
-    int32_t segend = (slash == kNotFound) ? namelen : slash;
-    rv = file->Append(Substring(aFilename, pos, (segend - pos)));
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
-    }
-    pos = slash + 1;
-  }  while (pos < namelen && slash != kNotFound);
-
-  bool exists;
-  rv = file->Exists(&exists);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
-  }
-
-  bool isDir;
-  rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || isDir) {
-    // We only support signed files, not directory entries
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // Open an input stream for that file and verify it.
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
-  rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), file, -1, -1,
-                                  nsIFileInputStream::CLOSE_ON_EOF);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !stream) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
-  }
-
-  return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf);
-}
-
-// On input, nextLineStart is the start of the current line. On output,
-// nextLineStart is the start of the next line.
-nsresult
-ReadLine(/*in/out*/ const char* & nextLineStart, /*out*/ nsCString & line,
-         bool allowContinuations = true)
-{
-  line.Truncate();
-  size_t previousLength = 0;
-  size_t currentLength = 0;
-  for (;;) {
-    const char* eol = PL_strpbrk(nextLineStart, "\r\n");
-
-    if (!eol) { // Reached end of file before newline
-      eol = nextLineStart + strlen(nextLineStart);
-    }
-
-    previousLength = currentLength;
-    line.Append(nextLineStart, eol - nextLineStart);
-    currentLength = line.Length();
-
-    // The spec says "No line may be longer than 72 bytes (not characters)"
-    // in its UTF8-encoded form.
-    static const size_t lineLimit = 72;
-    if (currentLength - previousLength > lineLimit) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    // The spec says: "Implementations should support 65535-byte
-    // (not character) header values..."
-    if (currentLength > 65535) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    if (*eol == '\r') {
-      ++eol;
-    }
-    if (*eol == '\n') {
-      ++eol;
-    }
-
-    nextLineStart = eol;
-
-    if (*eol != ' ') {
-      // not a continuation
-      return NS_OK;
-    }
-
-    // continuation
-    if (!allowContinuations) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    ++nextLineStart; // skip space and keep appending
-  }
-}
-
-// The header strings are defined in the JAR specification.
-#define JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/(M|m)(ANIFEST|anifest).(MF|mf)$"
-#define JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(SF|sf)$"
-#define JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(RSA|rsa)$"
-#define JAR_META_DIR "META-INF"
-#define JAR_MF_HEADER "Manifest-Version: 1.0"
-#define JAR_SF_HEADER "Signature-Version: 1.0"
-
-nsresult
-ParseAttribute(const nsAutoCString & curLine,
-               /*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrName,
-               /*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrValue)
-{
-  // Find the colon that separates the name from the value.
-  int32_t colonPos = curLine.FindChar(':');
-  if (colonPos == kNotFound) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // set attrName to the name, skipping spaces between the name and colon
-  int32_t nameEnd = colonPos;
-  for (;;) {
-    if (nameEnd == 0) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; // colon with no name
-    }
-    if (curLine[nameEnd - 1] != ' ')
-      break;
-    --nameEnd;
-  }
-  curLine.Left(attrName, nameEnd);
-
-  // Set attrValue to the value, skipping spaces between the colon and the
-  // value. The value may be empty.
-  int32_t valueStart = colonPos + 1;
-  int32_t curLineLength = curLine.Length();
-  while (valueStart != curLineLength && curLine[valueStart] == ' ') {
-    ++valueStart;
-  }
-  curLine.Right(attrValue, curLineLength - valueStart);
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-// Parses the version line of the MF or SF header.
-nsresult
-CheckManifestVersion(const char* & nextLineStart,
-                     const nsACString & expectedHeader)
-{
-  // The JAR spec says: "Manifest-Version and Signature-Version must be first,
-  // and in exactly that case (so that they can be recognized easily as magic
-  // strings)."
-  nsAutoCString curLine;
-  nsresult rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine, false);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-  if (!curLine.Equals(expectedHeader)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-// Parses a signature file (SF) as defined in the JDK 8 JAR Specification.
-//
-// The SF file *must* contain exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute in
-// the main section. All other sections are ignored. This means that this will
-// NOT parse old-style signature files that have separate digests per entry.
-// The JDK8 x-Digest-Manifest variant is better because:
-//
-//   (1) It allows us to follow the principle that we should minimize the
-//       processing of data that we do before we verify its signature. In
-//       particular, with the x-Digest-Manifest style, we can verify the digest
-//       of MANIFEST.MF before we parse it, which prevents malicious JARs
-//       exploiting our MANIFEST.MF parser.
-//   (2) It is more time-efficient and space-efficient to have one
-//       x-Digest-Manifest instead of multiple x-Digest values.
-//
-// In order to get benefit (1), we do NOT implement the fallback to the older
-// mechanism as the spec requires/suggests. Also, for simplity's sake, we only
-// support exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute, and no other
-// algorithms.
-//
-// filebuf must be null-terminated. On output, mfDigest will contain the
-// decoded value of SHA1-Digest-Manifest.
-nsresult
-ParseSF(const char* filebuf, /*out*/ SECItem & mfDigest)
-{
-  nsresult rv;
-
-  const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
-  rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_HEADER));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv))
-    return rv;
-
-  // Find SHA1-Digest-Manifest
-  for (;;) {
-    nsAutoCString curLine;
-    rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return rv;
-    }
-
-    if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
-      // End of main section (blank line or end-of-file), and no
-      // SHA1-Digest-Manifest found.
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    nsAutoCString attrName;
-    nsAutoCString attrValue;
-    rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return rv;
-    }
-
-    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest-manifest")) {
-      rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&mfDigest, attrValue.get()));
-      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-        return rv;
-      }
-
-      // There could be multiple SHA1-Digest-Manifest attributes, which
-      // would be an error, but it's better to just skip any erroneous
-      // duplicate entries rather than trying to detect them, because:
-      //
-      //   (1) It's simpler, and simpler generally means more secure
-      //   (2) An attacker can't make us accept a JAR we would otherwise
-      //       reject just by adding additional SHA1-Digest-Manifest
-      //       attributes.
-      break;
-    }
-
-    // ignore unrecognized attributes
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-// Parses MANIFEST.MF. The filenames of all entries will be returned in
-// mfItems. buf must be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing
-// I/O.
-nsresult
-ParseMF(const char* filebuf, nsIZipReader * zip,
-        /*out*/ nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> & mfItems,
-        ScopedAutoSECItem & buf)
-{
-  nsresult rv;
-
-  const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
-
-  rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line.
-  {
-    nsAutoCString line;
-    do {
-      rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line);
-      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-        return rv;
-      }
-    } while (line.Length() > 0);
-
-    // Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless.
-    if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
-      return NS_OK;
-    }
-  }
-
-  nsAutoCString curItemName;
-  ScopedAutoSECItem digest;
-
-  for (;;) {
-    nsAutoCString curLine;
-    rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
-    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-    if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
-      // end of section (blank line or end-of-file)
-
-      if (curItemName.Length() == 0) {
-        // '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as
-        // "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute.
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      if (digest.len == 0) {
-        // We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every
-        // entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries.
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      if (mfItems.Contains(curItemName)) {
-        // Duplicate entry
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      // Verify that the entry's content digest matches the digest from this
-      // MF section.
-      rv = VerifyEntryContentDigest(zip, curItemName, digest, buf);
-      if (NS_FAILED(rv))
-        return rv;
-
-      mfItems.PutEntry(curItemName);
-
-      if (*nextLineStart == '\0') // end-of-file
-        break;
-
-      // reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next
-      // item yet.
-      curItemName.Truncate();
-      digest.reset();
-
-      continue; // skip the rest of the loop below
-    }
-
-    nsAutoCString attrName;
-    nsAutoCString attrValue;
-    rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return rv;
-    }
-
-    // Lines to look for:
-
-    // (1) Digest:
-    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest"))
-    {
-      if (digest.len > 0) // multiple SHA1 digests in section
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-
-      rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get()));
-      if (NS_FAILED(rv))
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar.
-    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name"))
-    {
-      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) // multiple names in section
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-
-      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0))
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-
-      curItemName = attrValue;
-
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute
-    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) {
-      // We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that
-      // requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid
-      // signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry.
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    // unrecognized attributes must be ignored
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-struct VerifyCertificateContext {
-  AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot;
-  UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain;
-};
-
-nsresult
-VerifyCertificate(CERTCertificate* signerCert, void* voidContext, void* pinArg)
-{
-  // TODO: null pinArg is tolerated.
-  if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert) || NS_WARN_IF(!voidContext)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
-  }
-  const VerifyCertificateContext& context =
-    *static_cast<const VerifyCertificateContext*>(voidContext);
-
-  AppTrustDomain trustDomain(context.builtChain, pinArg);
-  if (trustDomain.SetTrustedRoot(context.trustedRoot) != SECSuccess) {
-    return MapSECStatus(SECFailure);
-  }
-  Input certDER;
-  mozilla::pkix::Result rv = certDER.Init(signerCert->derCert.data,
-                                          signerCert->derCert.len);
-  if (rv != Success) {
-    return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv));
-  }
-
-  rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, Now(),
-                      EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
-                      KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
-                      KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
-                      CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
-                      nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/);
-  if (rv == mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE) {
-    // For code-signing you normally need trusted 3rd-party timestamps to
-    // handle expiration properly. The signer could always mess with their
-    // system clock so you can't trust the certificate was un-expired when
-    // the signing took place. The choice is either to ignore expiration
-    // or to enforce expiration at time of use. The latter leads to the
-    // user-hostile result that perfectly good code stops working.
-    //
-    // Our package format doesn't support timestamps (nor do we have a
-    // trusted 3rd party timestamper), but since we sign all of our apps and
-    // add-ons ourselves we can trust ourselves not to mess with the clock
-    // on the signing systems. We also have a revocation mechanism if we
-    // need it. It's OK to ignore cert expiration under these conditions.
-    //
-    // This is an invalid approach if
-    //  * we issue certs to let others sign their own packages
-    //  * mozilla::pkix returns "expired" when there are "worse" problems
-    //    with the certificate or chain.
-    // (see bug 1267318)
-    rv = Success;
-  }
-  if (rv != Success) {
-    return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv));
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-nsresult
-VerifySignature(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot, const SECItem& buffer,
-                const SECItem& detachedDigest,
-                /*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain)
-{
-  // Currently, this function is only called within the CalculateResult() method
-  // of CryptoTasks. As such, NSS should not be shut down at this point and the
-  // CryptoTask implementation should already hold a nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock.
-  // We acquire a nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock here solely to prove we did to
-  // VerifyCMSDetachedSignatureIncludingCertificate().
-  nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
-  VerifyCertificateContext context = { trustedRoot, builtChain };
-  // XXX: missing pinArg
-  return VerifyCMSDetachedSignatureIncludingCertificate(buffer, detachedDigest,
-                                                        VerifyCertificate,
-                                                        &context, nullptr,
-                                                        locker);
-}
-
-NS_IMETHODIMP
-OpenSignedAppFile(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
-                  /*out, optional */ nsIZipReader** aZipReader,
-                  /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
-{
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
-
-  if (aZipReader) {
-    *aZipReader = nullptr;
-  }
-
-  if (aSignerCert) {
-    *aSignerCert = nullptr;
-  }
-
-  nsresult rv;
-
-  static NS_DEFINE_CID(kZipReaderCID, NS_ZIPREADER_CID);
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> zip = do_CreateInstance(kZipReaderCID, &rv);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  rv = zip->Open(aJarFile);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  // Signature (RSA) file
-  nsAutoCString sigFilename;
-  ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer;
-  rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, nsLiteralCString(JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING),
-                           sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
-  }
-
-  // Signature (SF) file
-  nsAutoCString sfFilename;
-  ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer;
-  Digest sfCalculatedDigest;
-  rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING),
-                           sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  sigBuffer.type = siBuffer;
-  UniqueCERTCertList builtChain;
-  rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(),
-                       builtChain);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest;
-  rv = ParseSF(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Manifest (MF) file
-  nsAutoCString mfFilename;
-  ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
-  Digest mfCalculatedDigest;
-  rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING),
-                           mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in
-  // order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting
-  // memory.
-  ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024);
-
-  nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> items;
-
-  rv = ParseMF(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(manifestBuffer.data), zip,
-               items, buf);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Verify every entry in the file.
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> entries;
-  rv = zip->FindEntries(EmptyCString(), getter_AddRefs(entries));
-  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !entries) {
-    rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
-  }
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  for (;;) {
-    bool hasMore;
-    rv = entries->HasMore(&hasMore);
-    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-    if (!hasMore) {
-      break;
-    }
-
-    nsAutoCString entryFilename;
-    rv = entries->GetNext(entryFilename);
-    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Verifying digests for %s",
-           entryFilename.get()));
-
-    // The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the
-    // signature.
-    //
-    // XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for
-    // multiple signatures, because the metadata for the other signatures
-    // is not signed either.
-    if (entryFilename == mfFilename ||
-        entryFilename == sfFilename ||
-        entryFilename == sigFilename) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (entryFilename.Length() == 0) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    // Entries with names that end in "/" are directory entries, which are not
-    // signed.
-    //
-    // XXX: As long as we don't unpack the JAR into the filesystem, the "/"
-    // entries are harmless. But, it is not clear what the security
-    // implications of directory entries are if/when we were to unpackage the
-    // JAR into the filesystem.
-    if (entryFilename[entryFilename.Length() - 1] == '/') {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    nsCStringHashKey * item = items.GetEntry(entryFilename);
-    if (!item) {
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY;
-    }
-
-    // Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later
-    items.RemoveEntry(item);
-  }
-
-  // We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But,
-  // were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the
-  // manifest but missing from the archive?
-  if (items.Count() != 0) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
-  }
-
-  // Return the reader to the caller if they want it
-  if (aZipReader) {
-    zip.forget(aZipReader);
-  }
-
-  // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
-  // XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain.
-  if (aSignerCert) {
-    CERTCertListNode* signerCertNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
-    if (!signerCertNode || CERT_LIST_END(signerCertNode, builtChain) ||
-        !signerCertNode->cert) {
-      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
-    }
-    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
-      nsNSSCertificate::Create(signerCertNode->cert);
-    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
-    signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-nsresult
-VerifySignedManifest(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
-                     nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
-                     nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream,
-                     /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
-{
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aManifestStream);
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aSignatureStream);
-
-  if (aSignerCert) {
-    *aSignerCert = nullptr;
-  }
-
-  // Load signature file in buffer
-  ScopedAutoSECItem signatureBuffer;
-  nsresult rv = ReadStream(aSignatureStream, signatureBuffer);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-  signatureBuffer.type = siBuffer;
-
-  // Load manifest file in buffer
-  ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
-  rv = ReadStream(aManifestStream, manifestBuffer);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Calculate SHA1 digest of the manifest buffer
-  Digest manifestCalculatedDigest;
-  rv = manifestCalculatedDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1,
-                                          manifestBuffer.data,
-                                          manifestBuffer.len - 1); // buffer is null terminated
-  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Get base64 encoded string from manifest buffer digest
-  UniquePORTString
-    base64EncDigest(NSSBase64_EncodeItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0,
-                      const_cast<SECItem*>(&manifestCalculatedDigest.get())));
-  if (NS_WARN_IF(!base64EncDigest)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-  }
-
-  // Calculate SHA1 digest of the base64 encoded string
-  Digest doubleDigest;
-  rv = doubleDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1,
-                              BitwiseCast<uint8_t*, char*>(base64EncDigest.get()),
-                              strlen(base64EncDigest.get()));
-  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Verify the manifest signature (signed digest of the base64 encoded string)
-  UniqueCERTCertList builtChain;
-  rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, signatureBuffer,
-                       doubleDigest.get(), builtChain);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
-  if (aSignerCert) {
-    CERTCertListNode* signerCertNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
-    if (!signerCertNode || CERT_LIST_END(signerCertNode, builtChain) ||
-        !signerCertNode->cert) {
-      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
-    }
-    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
-      nsNSSCertificate::Create(signerCertNode->cert);
-    if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert)) {
-      return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-    }
-
-    signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-class OpenSignedAppFileTask final : public CryptoTask
-{
-public:
-  OpenSignedAppFileTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
-                        nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
-    : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
-    , mJarFile(aJarFile)
-    , mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback>(aCallback))
-  {
-  }
-
-private:
-  virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
-  {
-    return OpenSignedAppFile(mTrustedRoot, mJarFile,
-                             getter_AddRefs(mZipReader),
-                             getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
-  }
-
-  // nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that
-  // needs to be released
-  virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
-
-  virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
-  {
-    (void) mCallback->OpenSignedAppFileFinished(rv, mZipReader, mSignerCert);
-  }
-
-  const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
-  const nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> mJarFile;
-  nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback> mCallback;
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> mZipReader; // out
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
-};
-
-class VerifySignedmanifestTask final : public CryptoTask
-{
-public:
-  VerifySignedmanifestTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
-                           nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
-                           nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream,
-                           nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback)
-    : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
-    , mManifestStream(aManifestStream)
-    , mSignatureStream(aSignatureStream)
-    , mCallback(
-      new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback>(aCallback))
-  {
-  }
-
-private:
-  virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
-  {
-    return VerifySignedManifest(mTrustedRoot, mManifestStream,
-                                mSignatureStream, getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
-  }
-
-  // nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that
-  // needs to be released
-  virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
-
-  virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
-  {
-    (void) mCallback->VerifySignedManifestFinished(rv, mSignerCert);
-  }
-
-  const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
-  const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> mManifestStream;
-  const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> mSignatureStream;
-  nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback> mCallback;
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
-};
-
-} // unnamed namespace
-
-NS_IMETHODIMP
-nsNSSCertificateDB::OpenSignedAppFileAsync(
-  AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
-  nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
-{
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
-  RefPtr<OpenSignedAppFileTask> task(new OpenSignedAppFileTask(aTrustedRoot,
-                                                               aJarFile,
-                                                               aCallback));
-  return task->Dispatch("SignedJAR");
-}
-
-NS_IMETHODIMP
-nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedManifestAsync(
-  AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
-  nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream, nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback)
-{
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aManifestStream);
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSignatureStream);
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
-
-  RefPtr<VerifySignedmanifestTask> task(
-    new VerifySignedmanifestTask(aTrustedRoot, aManifestStream,
-                                 aSignatureStream, aCallback));
-  return task->Dispatch("SignedManifest");
-}
-
-
-//
-// Signature verification for archives unpacked into a file structure
-//
-
-// Finds the "*.rsa" signature file in the META-INF directory and returns
-// the name. It is an error if there are none or more than one .rsa file
-nsresult
-FindSignatureFilename(nsIFile* aMetaDir,
-                      /*out*/ nsAString& aFilename)
-{
-  nsCOMPtr<nsISimpleEnumerator> entries;
-  nsresult rv = aMetaDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries));
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIDirectoryEnumerator> files = do_QueryInterface(entries);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
-  }
-
-  bool found = false;
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
-  rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
-
-  while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && file) {
-    nsAutoString leafname;
-    rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname);
-    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
-      if (StringEndsWith(leafname, NS_LITERAL_STRING(".rsa"))) {
-        if (!found) {
-          found = true;
-          aFilename = leafname;
-        } else {
-          // second signature file is an error
-          rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-          break;
-        }
-      }
-      rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!found) {
-    rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
-  }
-
-  files->Close();
-  return rv;
-}
-
-// Loads the signature metadata file that matches the given filename in
-// the passed-in Meta-inf directory. If bufDigest is not null then on
-// success bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digest of the entry.
-nsresult
-LoadOneMetafile(nsIFile* aMetaDir,
-                const nsAString& aFilename,
-                /*out*/ SECItem& aBuf,
-                /*optional, out*/ Digest* aBufDigest)
-{
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> metafile;
-  nsresult rv = aMetaDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metafile));
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  rv = metafile->Append(aFilename);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  bool exists;
-  rv = metafile->Exists(&exists);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
-    // we can call a missing .rsa file "unsigned" but FindSignatureFilename()
-    // already found one: missing other metadata files means a broken signature.
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
-  rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), metafile);
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  rv = ReadStream(stream, aBuf);
-  stream->Close();
-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
-  if (aBufDigest) {
-    rv = aBufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, aBuf.data, aBuf.len - 1);
-    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-// Parses MANIFEST.MF and verifies the contents of the unpacked files
-// listed in the manifest.
-// The filenames of all entries will be returned in aMfItems. aBuf must
-// be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing I/O.
-nsresult
-ParseMFUnpacked(const char* aFilebuf, nsIFile* aDir,
-                /*out*/ nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey>& aMfItems,
-                ScopedAutoSECItem& aBuf)
-{
-  nsresult rv;
-
-  const char* nextLineStart = aFilebuf;
-
-  rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line.
-  {
-    nsAutoCString line;
-    do {
-      rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line);
-      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-        return rv;
-      }
-    } while (line.Length() > 0);
-
-    // Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless.
-    if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
-      return NS_OK;
-    }
-  }
-
-  nsAutoString curItemName;
-  ScopedAutoSECItem digest;
-
-  for (;;) {
-    nsAutoCString curLine;
-    rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return rv;
-    }
-
-    if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
-      // end of section (blank line or end-of-file)
-
-      if (curItemName.Length() == 0) {
-        // '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as
-        // "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute.
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      if (digest.len == 0) {
-        // We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every
-        // entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries.
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      if (aMfItems.Contains(curItemName)) {
-        // Duplicate entry
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      // Verify that the file's content digest matches the digest from this
-      // MF section.
-      rv = VerifyFileContentDigest(aDir, curItemName, digest, aBuf);
-      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-        return rv;
-      }
-
-      aMfItems.PutEntry(curItemName);
-
-      if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
-        // end-of-file
-        break;
-      }
-
-      // reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next
-      // item yet.
-      curItemName.Truncate();
-      digest.reset();
-
-      continue; // skip the rest of the loop below
-    }
-
-    nsAutoCString attrName;
-    nsAutoCString attrValue;
-    rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return rv;
-    }
-
-    // Lines to look for:
-
-    // (1) Digest:
-    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest")) {
-      if (digest.len > 0) {
-        // multiple SHA1 digests in section
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get()));
-      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar.
-    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name")) {
-      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) {
-        // multiple names in section
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0)) {
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-      }
-
-      curItemName = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(attrValue);
-
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute
-    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) {
-      // We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that
-      // requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid
-      // signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry.
-      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    // unrecognized attributes must be ignored
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-// recursively check a directory tree for files not in the list of
-// verified files we found in the manifest. For each file we find
-// Check it against the files found in the manifest. If the file wasn't
-// in the manifest then it's unsigned and we can stop looking. Otherwise
-// remove it from the collection so we can check leftovers later.
-//
-// @param aDir   Directory to check
-// @param aPath  Relative path to that directory (to check against aItems)
-// @param aItems All the files found
-// @param *Filename  signature files that won't be in the manifest
-nsresult
-CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(nsIFile* aDir,
-                         const nsString& aPath,
-                         /* in/out */ nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey>& aItems,
-                         const nsAString& sigFilename,
-                         const nsAString& sfFilename,
-                         const nsAString& mfFilename)
-{
-  nsCOMPtr<nsISimpleEnumerator> entries;
-  nsresult rv = aDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries));
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIDirectoryEnumerator> files = do_QueryInterface(entries);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
-  }
-
-  bool inMeta = StringBeginsWith(aPath, NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR));
-
-  while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
-    nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
-    rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !file) {
-      break;
-    }
-
-    nsAutoString leafname;
-    rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname);
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return rv;
-    }
-
-    nsAutoString curName(aPath + leafname);
-
-    bool isDir;
-    rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir);
-    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-      return rv;
-    }
-
-    // if it's a directory we need to recurse
-    if (isDir) {
-      curName.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("/"));
-      rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(file, curName, aItems,
-                                    sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename);
-    } else {
-      // The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the
-      // signature.
-      //
-      // XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for
-      // multiple signatures because the metadata for the other signatures
-      // is not signed either.
-      if (inMeta && ( leafname == sigFilename ||
-                      leafname == sfFilename ||
-                      leafname == mfFilename )) {
-        continue;
-      }
-
-      // make sure the current file was found in the manifest
-      nsStringHashKey* item = aItems.GetEntry(curName);
-      if (!item) {
-        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY;
-      }
-
-      // Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later
-      aItems.RemoveEntry(item);
-    }
-  }
-  files->Close();
-  return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the signature of a directory structure as if it were a
- * signed JAR file (used for unpacked JARs)
- */
-nsresult
-VerifySignedDirectory(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
-                      nsIFile* aDirectory,
-                      /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
-{
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aDirectory);
-
-  if (aSignerCert) {
-    *aSignerCert = nullptr;
-  }
-
-  // Make sure there's a META-INF directory
-
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> metaDir;
-  nsresult rv = aDirectory->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metaDir));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-  rv = metaDir->Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR));
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  bool exists;
-  rv = metaDir->Exists(&exists);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
-  }
-  bool isDirectory;
-  rv = metaDir->IsDirectory(&isDirectory);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !isDirectory) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
-  }
-
-  // Find and load the Signature (RSA) file
-
-  nsAutoString sigFilename;
-  rv = FindSignatureFilename(metaDir, sigFilename);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer;
-  rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
-  }
-
-  // Load the signature (SF) file and verify the signature.
-  // The .sf and .rsa files must have the same name apart from the extension.
-
-  nsAutoString sfFilename(Substring(sigFilename, 0, sigFilename.Length() - 3)
-                          + NS_LITERAL_STRING("sf"));
-
-  ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer;
-  Digest sfCalculatedDigest;
-  rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  sigBuffer.type = siBuffer;
-  UniqueCERTCertList builtChain;
-  rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(),
-                       builtChain);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // Get the expected manifest hash from the signed .sf file
-
-  ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest;
-  rv = ParseSF(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // Load manifest (MF) file and verify signature
-
-  nsAutoString mfFilename(NS_LITERAL_STRING("manifest.mf"));
-  ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
-  Digest mfCalculatedDigest;
-  rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  // Parse manifest and verify signed hash of all listed files
-
-  // Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in
-  // order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting
-  // memory.
-  ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024);
-
-  nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey> items;
-  rv = ParseMFUnpacked(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(manifestBuffer.data),
-                       aDirectory, items, buf);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)){
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // We've checked that everything listed in the manifest exists and is signed
-  // correctly. Now check on disk for extra (unsigned) files.
-  // Deletes found entries from items as it goes.
-  rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(aDirectory, EmptyString(), items,
-                                sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename);
-  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-    return rv;
-  }
-
-  // We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But,
-  // were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the
-  // manifest but missing from the directory tree? (There shouldn't be given
-  // ParseMFUnpacked() checking them all, but it's a cheap sanity check.)
-  if (items.Count() != 0) {
-    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
-  }
-
-  // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
-  // XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain.
-  if (aSignerCert) {
-    CERTCertListNode* signerCertNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
-    if (!signerCertNode || CERT_LIST_END(signerCertNode, builtChain) ||
-        !signerCertNode->cert) {
-      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
-    }
-    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
-      nsNSSCertificate::Create(signerCertNode->cert);
-    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
-    signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
-  }
-
-  return NS_OK;
-}
-
-class VerifySignedDirectoryTask final : public CryptoTask
-{
-public:
-  VerifySignedDirectoryTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar,
-                            nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback)
-    : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
-    , mDirectory(aUnpackedJar)
-    , mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback>(aCallback))
-  {
-  }
-
-private:
-  virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
-  {
-    return VerifySignedDirectory(mTrustedRoot,
-                                 mDirectory,
-                                 getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
-  }
-
-  // This class doesn't directly hold NSS resources so there's nothing that
-  // needs to be released
-  virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
-
-  virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
-  {
-    (void) mCallback->VerifySignedDirectoryFinished(rv, mSignerCert);
-  }
-
-  const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
-  const nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> mDirectory;
-  nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback> mCallback;
-  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
-};
-
-NS_IMETHODIMP
-nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedDirectoryAsync(
-  AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar,
-  nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback)
-{
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aUnpackedJar);
-  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
-  RefPtr<VerifySignedDirectoryTask> task(new VerifySignedDirectoryTask(aTrustedRoot,
-                                                                       aUnpackedJar,
-                                                                       aCallback));
-  return task->Dispatch("UnpackedJar");
-}
diff --git a/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp b/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 35be4ebd97..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,388 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
-#include "MainThreadUtils.h"
-#include "certdb.h"
-#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
-#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
-#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
-#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
-#include "nsIFile.h"
-#include "nsIFileStreams.h"
-#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
-#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
-#include "nsNetUtil.h"
-#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
-#include "prerror.h"
-#include "secerr.h"
-
-// Generated in Makefile.in
-#include "marketplace-prod-public.inc"
-#include "marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc"
-#include "marketplace-dev-public.inc"
-#include "marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc"
-#include "marketplace-stage.inc"
-#include "xpcshell.inc"
-// Trusted Hosted Apps Certificates
-#include "manifest-signing-root.inc"
-#include "manifest-signing-test-root.inc"
-// Add-on signing Certificates
-#include "addons-public.inc"
-#include "addons-stage.inc"
-// Privileged Package Certificates
-#include "privileged-package-root.inc"
-
-using namespace mozilla::pkix;
-
-extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
-
-static const unsigned int DEFAULT_MIN_RSA_BITS = 2048;
-static char kDevImportedDER[] =
-  "network.http.signed-packages.developer-root";
-
-namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
-
-StaticMutex AppTrustDomain::sMutex;
-UniquePtr<unsigned char[]> AppTrustDomain::sDevImportedDERData;
-unsigned int AppTrustDomain::sDevImportedDERLen = 0;
-
-AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(UniqueCERTCertList& certChain, void* pinArg)
-  : mCertChain(certChain)
-  , mPinArg(pinArg)
-  , mMinRSABits(DEFAULT_MIN_RSA_BITS)
-{
-}
-
-SECStatus
-AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot)
-{
-  SECItem trustedDER;
-
-  // Load the trusted certificate into the in-memory NSS database so that
-  // CERT_CreateSubjectCertList can find it.
-
-  switch (trustedRoot)
-  {
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdPublicRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdReviewersRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevPublicRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevReviewersRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceStageRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceStageRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceStageRoot);
-      // The staging root was generated with a 1024-bit key.
-      mMinRSABits = 1024u;
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(xpcshellRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(xpcshellRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsPublicRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(addonsPublicRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(addonsPublicRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsStageRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(addonsStageRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(addonsStageRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::PrivilegedPackageRoot:
-      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(privilegedPackageRoot);
-      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(privilegedPackageRoot);
-      break;
-
-    case nsIX509CertDB::DeveloperImportedRoot: {
-      StaticMutexAutoLock lock(sMutex);
-      if (!sDevImportedDERData) {
-        MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
-        nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file(do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/file/local;1"));
-        if (!file) {
-          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
-          return SECFailure;
-        }
-        nsresult rv = file->InitWithNativePath(
-            Preferences::GetCString(kDevImportedDER));
-        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
-          return SECFailure;
-        }
-
-        nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> inputStream;
-        NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(inputStream), file, -1, -1,
-                                   nsIFileInputStream::CLOSE_ON_EOF);
-        if (!inputStream) {
-          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
-          return SECFailure;
-        }
-
-        uint64_t length;
-        rv = inputStream->Available(&length);
-        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
-          return SECFailure;
-        }
-
-        auto data = MakeUnique<char[]>(length);
-        rv = inputStream->Read(data.get(), length, &sDevImportedDERLen);
-        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
-          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
-          return SECFailure;
-        }
-
-        MOZ_ASSERT(length == sDevImportedDERLen);
-        sDevImportedDERData.reset(
-          BitwiseCast<unsigned char*, char*>(data.release()));
-      }
-
-      trustedDER.data = sDevImportedDERData.get();
-      trustedDER.len = sDevImportedDERLen;
-      break;
-    }
-
-    default:
-      PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
-      return SECFailure;
-  }
-
-  mTrustedRoot.reset(CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
-                                             &trustedDER, nullptr, false, true));
-  if (!mTrustedRoot) {
-    return SECFailure;
-  }
-
-  return SECSuccess;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker,
-                           Time)
-
-{
-  MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
-  if (!mTrustedRoot) {
-    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
-  }
-
-  // TODO(bug 1035418): If/when mozilla::pkix relaxes the restriction that
-  // FindIssuer must only pass certificates with a matching subject name to
-  // checker.Check, we can stop using CERT_CreateSubjectCertList and instead
-  // use logic like this:
-  //
-  // 1. First, try the trusted trust anchor.
-  // 2. Secondly, iterate through the certificates that were stored in the CMS
-  //    message, passing each one to checker.Check.
-  SECItem encodedIssuerNameSECItem =
-    UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
-  UniqueCERTCertList
-    candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
-                                          &encodedIssuerNameSECItem, 0,
-                                          false));
-  if (candidates) {
-    for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
-         !CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
-      Input certDER;
-      Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
-      if (rv != Success) {
-        continue; // probably too big
-      }
-
-      bool keepGoing;
-      rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr/*additionalNameConstraints*/,
-                         keepGoing);
-      if (rv != Success) {
-        return rv;
-      }
-      if (!keepGoing) {
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return Success;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
-                             const CertPolicyId& policy,
-                             Input candidateCertDER,
-                     /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
-{
-  MOZ_ASSERT(policy.IsAnyPolicy());
-  MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
-  if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
-    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
-  }
-  if (!mTrustedRoot) {
-    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
-  }
-
-  // Handle active distrust of the certificate.
-
-  // XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
-  // information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
-  // expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion.
-  SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem =
-    UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
-  UniqueCERTCertificate candidateCert(
-    CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
-                            nullptr, false, true));
-  if (!candidateCert) {
-    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
-  }
-
-  CERTCertTrust trust;
-  if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
-    uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, trustObjectSigning);
-
-    // For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
-    // because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
-    // CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
-    // relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
-    // distrusted.
-    uint32_t relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA
-                              ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
-                              : CERTDB_TRUSTED;
-    if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
-            == CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
-      trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
-      return Success;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
-  if (CERT_CompareCerts(mTrustedRoot.get(), candidateCert.get())) {
-    trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
-    return Success;
-  }
-
-  trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
-  return Success;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item,
-                          DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
-                          /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
-                          size_t digestBufLen)
-{
-  return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration,
-                                /*optional*/ const Input*,
-                                /*optional*/ const Input*,
-                                /*optional*/ const Input*)
-{
-  // We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
-  // certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
-  return Success;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certChain, Time time,
-                             const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy)
-{
-  SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certChain,
-                                                            mCertChain);
-  if (srv != SECSuccess) {
-    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
-  }
-  return Success;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm,
-                                              EndEntityOrCA,
-                                              Time)
-{
-  // TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
-  return Success;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
-  EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits)
-{
-  if (modulusSizeInBits < mMinRSABits) {
-    return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
-  }
-  return Success;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
-                                           Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
-{
-  // TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
-  return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-                                       mPinArg);
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
-                                            NamedCurve curve)
-{
-  switch (curve) {
-    case NamedCurve::secp256r1: // fall through
-    case NamedCurve::secp384r1: // fall through
-    case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
-      return Success;
-  }
-
-  return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
-                                        Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
-{
-  return VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-                                    mPinArg);
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(Time /*notBefore*/, Time /*notAfter*/,
-                                          EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
-                                          KeyPurposeId /*keyPurpose*/)
-{
-  return Success;
-}
-
-Result
-AppTrustDomain::NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(Time /*notBefore*/,
-                                                /*out*/ bool& matches)
-{
-  matches = false;
-  return Success;
-}
-
-void
-AppTrustDomain::NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension /*extension*/,
-                                       Input /*extensionData*/)
-{
-}
-
-} } // namespace mozilla::psm
diff --git a/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.h b/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e4a8ec5e50..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#ifndef AppTrustDomain_h
-#define AppTrustDomain_h
-
-#include "pkix/pkixtypes.h"
-#include "mozilla/StaticMutex.h"
-#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
-#include "nsDebug.h"
-#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
-#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
-
-namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
-
-class AppTrustDomain final : public mozilla::pkix::TrustDomain
-{
-public:
-  typedef mozilla::pkix::Result Result;
-
-  AppTrustDomain(UniqueCERTCertList& certChain, void* pinArg);
-
-  SECStatus SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot);
-
-  virtual Result GetCertTrust(mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
-                              const mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId& policy,
-                              mozilla::pkix::Input candidateCertDER,
-                              /*out*/ mozilla::pkix::TrustLevel& trustLevel)
-                              override;
-  virtual Result FindIssuer(mozilla::pkix::Input encodedIssuerName,
-                            IssuerChecker& checker,
-                            mozilla::pkix::Time time) override;
-  virtual Result CheckRevocation(mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
-                                 const mozilla::pkix::CertID& certID,
-                                 mozilla::pkix::Time time,
-                                 mozilla::pkix::Duration validityDuration,
-                    /*optional*/ const mozilla::pkix::Input* stapledOCSPresponse,
-                    /*optional*/ const mozilla::pkix::Input* aiaExtension,
-                    /*optional*/ const mozilla::pkix::Input* sctExtension) override;
-  virtual Result IsChainValid(const mozilla::pkix::DERArray& certChain,
-                              mozilla::pkix::Time time,
-                              const mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy) override;
-  virtual Result CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(
-                   mozilla::pkix::DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
-                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
-                   mozilla::pkix::Time notBefore) override;
-  virtual Result CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
-                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
-                   unsigned int modulusSizeInBits) override;
-  virtual Result VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(
-                   const mozilla::pkix::SignedDigest& signedDigest,
-                   mozilla::pkix::Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) override;
-  virtual Result CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(
-                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
-                   mozilla::pkix::NamedCurve curve) override;
-  virtual Result VerifyECDSASignedDigest(
-                   const mozilla::pkix::SignedDigest& signedDigest,
-                   mozilla::pkix::Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) override;
-  virtual Result CheckValidityIsAcceptable(
-                   mozilla::pkix::Time notBefore, mozilla::pkix::Time notAfter,
-                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
-                   mozilla::pkix::KeyPurposeId keyPurpose) override;
-  virtual Result NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(
-                   mozilla::pkix::Time notBefore,
-                   /*out*/ bool& matches) override;
-  virtual void NoteAuxiliaryExtension(
-                   mozilla::pkix::AuxiliaryExtension extension,
-                   mozilla::pkix::Input extensionData) override;
-  virtual Result DigestBuf(mozilla::pkix::Input item,
-                           mozilla::pkix::DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
-                           /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
-                           size_t digestBufLen) override;
-
-private:
-  /*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& mCertChain;
-  void* mPinArg; // non-owning!
-  UniqueCERTCertificate mTrustedRoot;
-  unsigned int mMinRSABits;
-
-  static StaticMutex sMutex;
-  static UniquePtr<unsigned char[]> sDevImportedDERData;
-  static unsigned int sDevImportedDERLen;
-};
-
-} } // namespace mozilla::psm
-
-#endif // AppTrustDomain_h
diff --git a/security/apps/addons-public.crt b/security/apps/addons-public.crt
deleted file mode 100644
index 6ab711b996..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/addons-public.crt
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/addons-stage.crt b/security/apps/addons-stage.crt
deleted file mode 100644
index 73e48cadfe..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/addons-stage.crt
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/gen_cert_header.py b/security/apps/gen_cert_header.py
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ffe25cf4e..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/gen_cert_header.py
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-
-import binascii
-
-def _file_byte_generator(filename):
-  with open(filename, "rb") as f:
-    contents = f.read()
-
-    # Treat empty files the same as a file containing a lone 0;
-    # a single-element array will fail cert verifcation just as an
-    # empty array would.
-    if not contents:
-      return ['\0']
-
-    return contents
-
-def _create_header(array_name, cert_bytes):
-  hexified = ["0x" + binascii.hexlify(byte) for byte in cert_bytes]
-  substs = { 'array_name': array_name, 'bytes': ', '.join(hexified) }
-  return "const uint8_t %(array_name)s[] = {\n%(bytes)s\n};\n" % substs
-
-# Create functions named the same as the data arrays that we're going to
-# write to the headers, so we don't have to duplicate the names like so:
-#
-#   def arrayName(header, cert_filename):
-#     header.write(_create_header("arrayName", cert_filename))
-array_names = [
-  'marketplaceProdPublicRoot',
-  'marketplaceProdReviewersRoot',
-  'marketplaceDevPublicRoot',
-  'marketplaceDevReviewersRoot',
-  'marketplaceStageRoot',
-  'trustedAppPublicRoot',
-  'trustedAppTestRoot',
-  'xpcshellRoot',
-  'addonsPublicRoot',
-  'addonsStageRoot',
-  'privilegedPackageRoot',
-]
-
-for n in array_names:
-  # Make sure the lambda captures the right string.
-  globals()[n] = lambda header, cert_filename, name=n: header.write(_create_header(name, _file_byte_generator(cert_filename)))
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-dev-public.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-dev-public.crt
deleted file mode 100644
index 490b8682b7..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/marketplace-dev-public.crt
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b8bde9337..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-prod-public.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-prod-public.crt
deleted file mode 100644
index 85c2fed92a..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/marketplace-prod-public.crt
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt
deleted file mode 100644
index 53be8c81ed..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-stage.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-stage.crt
deleted file mode 100644
index 84504f3574..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/marketplace-stage.crt
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/moz.build b/security/apps/moz.build
deleted file mode 100644
index 365379881b..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/moz.build
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-
-UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
-    'AppSignatureVerification.cpp',
-    'AppTrustDomain.cpp',
-]
-
-FINAL_LIBRARY = 'xul'
-
-LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
-    '/security/certverifier',
-    '/security/manager/ssl',
-    '/security/pkix/include',
-]
-
-DEFINES['NSS_ENABLE_ECC'] = 'True'
-for var in ('DLL_PREFIX', 'DLL_SUFFIX'):
-    DEFINES[var] = '"%s"' % CONFIG[var]
-
-test_ssl_path = '/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit'
-
-headers_arrays_certs = [
-    ('marketplace-prod-public.inc', 'marketplaceProdPublicRoot', 'marketplace-prod-public.crt'),
-    ('marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc', 'marketplaceProdReviewersRoot', 'marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt'),
-    ('marketplace-dev-public.inc', 'marketplaceDevPublicRoot', 'marketplace-dev-public.crt'),
-    ('marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc', 'marketplaceDevReviewersRoot', 'marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt'),
-    ('marketplace-stage.inc', 'marketplaceStageRoot', 'marketplace-stage.crt'),
-    ('manifest-signing-root.inc', 'trustedAppPublicRoot', 'trusted-app-public.der'),
-    ('manifest-signing-test-root.inc', 'trustedAppTestRoot', test_ssl_path + '/test_signed_manifest/trusted_ca1.der'),
-    ('xpcshell.inc', 'xpcshellRoot', test_ssl_path + '/test_signed_apps/trusted_ca1.der'),
-    ('addons-public.inc', 'addonsPublicRoot', 'addons-public.crt'),
-    ('addons-stage.inc', 'addonsStageRoot', 'addons-stage.crt'),
-    ('privileged-package-root.inc', 'privilegedPackageRoot', 'privileged-package-root.der'),
-]
-
-for header, array_name, cert in headers_arrays_certs:
-    GENERATED_FILES += [header]
-    h = GENERATED_FILES[header]
-    h.script = 'gen_cert_header.py:' + array_name
-    h.inputs = [cert]
diff --git a/security/apps/privileged-package-root.der b/security/apps/privileged-package-root.der
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f77af5823..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/privileged-package-root.der
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/apps/trusted-app-public.der b/security/apps/trusted-app-public.der
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29bb2..0000000000
--- a/security/apps/trusted-app-public.der
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsIX509CertDB.idl b/security/manager/ssl/nsIX509CertDB.idl
index 44d8e0588c..1dbef22fbd 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsIX509CertDB.idl
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsIX509CertDB.idl
@@ -265,74 +265,11 @@ interface nsIX509CertDB : nsISupports {
    */
   nsIX509Cert constructX509(in string certDER, in unsigned long length);
 
-  /**
-   *  Verifies the signature on the given JAR file to verify that it has a
-   *  valid signature.  To be considered valid, there must be exactly one
-   *  signature on the JAR file and that signature must have signed every
-   *  entry. Further, the signature must come from a certificate that
-   *  is trusted for code signing.
-   *
-   *  On success, NS_OK, a nsIZipReader, and the trusted certificate that
-   *  signed the JAR are returned.
-   *
-   *  On failure, an error code is returned.
-   *
-   *  This method returns a nsIZipReader, instead of taking an nsIZipReader
-   *  as input, to encourage users of the API to verify the signature as the
-   *  first step in opening the JAR.
-   */
-  const AppTrustedRoot AppMarketplaceProdPublicRoot = 1;
-  const AppTrustedRoot AppMarketplaceProdReviewersRoot = 2;
-  const AppTrustedRoot AppMarketplaceDevPublicRoot = 3;
-  const AppTrustedRoot AppMarketplaceDevReviewersRoot = 4;
-  const AppTrustedRoot AppMarketplaceStageRoot = 5;
-  const AppTrustedRoot AppXPCShellRoot = 6;
-  const AppTrustedRoot AddonsPublicRoot = 7;
-  const AppTrustedRoot AddonsStageRoot = 8;
-  const AppTrustedRoot PrivilegedPackageRoot = 9;
-  /*
-   * If DeveloperImportedRoot is set as trusted root, a CA from local file
-   * system will be imported. Only used when preference
-   * "network.http.packaged-apps-developer-mode" is set.
-   * The path of the CA is specified by preference
-   * "network.http.packaged-apps-developer-trusted-root".
-   */
-  const AppTrustedRoot DeveloperImportedRoot = 10;
-  void openSignedAppFileAsync(in AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot,
-                              in nsIFile aJarFile,
-                              in nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback callback);
-
-  /**
-   *  Verifies the signature on a directory representing an unpacked signed
-   *  JAR file. To be considered valid, there must be exactly one signature
-   *  on the directory structure and that signature must have signed every
-   *  entry. Further, the signature must come from a certificate that
-   *  is trusted for code signing.
-   *
-   *  On success NS_OK and the trusted certificate that signed the
-   *  unpacked JAR are returned.
-   *
-   *  On failure, an error code is returned.
-   */
-  void verifySignedDirectoryAsync(in AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot,
-                                  in nsIFile aUnpackedDir,
-                                  in nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback callback);
-
-  /**
-   * Given streams containing a signature and a manifest file, verifies
-   * that the signature is valid for the manifest. The signature must
-   * come from a certificate that is trusted for code signing and that
-   * was issued by the given trusted root.
-   *
-   *  On success, NS_OK and the trusted certificate that signed the
-   *  Manifest are returned.
-   *
-   *  On failure, an error code is returned.
-   */
-  void verifySignedManifestAsync(in AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot,
-                                 in nsIInputStream aManifestStream,
-                                 in nsIInputStream aSignatureStream,
-                                 in nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback callback);
+  // Flags to indicate the type of cert root for signed extensions
+  // This can probably be removed eventually.
+  const AppTrustedRoot AddonsPublicRoot = 1;
+  const AppTrustedRoot AddonsStageRoot = 2;
+  const AppTrustedRoot PrivilegedPackageRoot = 3;
 
   /*
    * Add a cert to a cert DB from a binary string.