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authorMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
committerMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
commit5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch)
tree10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
parent49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff)
downloaduxp-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.gz
Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c13350
1 files changed, 13350 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..186ce23f3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13350 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * SSL3 Protocol
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/* TODO(ekr): Implement HelloVerifyRequest on server side. OK for now. */
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "ssl3ext.h"
+#include "ssl3exthandle.h"
+#include "prtime.h"
+#include "prinrval.h"
+#include "prerror.h"
+#include "pratom.h"
+#include "prthread.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "nssoptions.h"
+
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB
+#include "zlib.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS
+#define PK11_SETATTRS(x, id, v, l) \
+ (x)->type = (id); \
+ (x)->pValue = (v); \
+ (x)->ulValueLen = (l);
+#endif
+
+static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot);
+static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms);
+static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss,
+ SECItem *suites,
+ SECItem *comps,
+ sslSessionID *sid);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss,
+ const SECItem *sidBytes,
+ int *retErrCode);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss,
+ SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length,
+ SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr);
+static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
+
+static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen,
+ int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input,
+ int inputLen);
+
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType);
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash);
+PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
+
+#define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */
+#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000
+
+/* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of
+ * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement.
+ * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites
+ * in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c)
+ *
+ * Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher
+ * suites to this list.
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = {
+ /* cipher_suite policy enabled isPresent */
+ /* Special TLS 1.3 suites. */
+ { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE },
+ { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE },
+ { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE },
+
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around
+ * bug 946147.
+ */
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,SSL_ALLOWED,PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ /* RSA */
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ /* ciphersuites with no encryption */
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* This is the default supported set of signature schemes. The order of the
+ * hashes here is all that is important, since that will (sometimes) determine
+ * which hash we use. The key pair (i.e., cert) is the primary thing that
+ * determines what we use and this doesn't affect how we select key pairs. The
+ * order of signature types is based on the same rules for ordering we use for
+ * cipher suites just for consistency.
+ */
+static const SSLSignatureScheme defaultSignatureSchemes[] = {
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha1
+};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes) <=
+ MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES);
+
+/* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+void
+ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency()
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) {
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+/* This list of SSL3 compression methods is sorted in descending order of
+ * precedence (desirability). It only includes compression methods we
+ * implement.
+ */
+static const SSLCompressionMethod ssl_compression_methods[] = {
+#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB
+ ssl_compression_deflate,
+#endif
+ ssl_compression_null
+};
+
+static const unsigned int ssl_compression_method_count =
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_compression_methods);
+
+/* compressionEnabled returns true iff the compression algorithm is enabled
+ * for the given SSL socket. */
+static PRBool
+ssl_CompressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression)
+{
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
+
+ if (compression == ssl_compression_null) {
+ return PR_TRUE; /* Always enabled */
+ }
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* We can't easily check that the client didn't attempt TLS 1.3,
+ * so this will have to do. */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ version = ss->version;
+ } else {
+ version = ss->vrange.max;
+ }
+ if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB
+ if (compression == ssl_compression_deflate) {
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return ss->opt.enableDeflate;
+ }
+#endif
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = {
+ ct_RSA_sign,
+ ct_ECDSA_sign,
+ ct_DSS_sign,
+};
+
+/* This global item is used only in servers. It is is initialized by
+** SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest().
+*/
+CERTDistNames *ssl3_server_ca_list = NULL;
+static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats;
+
+/* Record protection algorithms, indexed by SSL3BulkCipher.
+ *
+ * The |max_records| field (|mr| below) is set to a number that is higher than
+ * recommended in some literature (esp. TLS 1.3) because we currently abort the
+ * connection when this limit is reached and we want to ensure that we only
+ * rarely hit this limit. See bug 1268745 for details.
+ */
+#define MR_MAX RECORD_SEQ_MAX /* 2^48-1 */
+#define MR_128 (0x5aULL << 28) /* For AES and similar. */
+#define MR_LOW (1ULL << 20) /* For weak ciphers. */
+/* clang-format off */
+static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = {
+ /* |--------- Lengths ---------| */
+ /* cipher calg : s : */
+ /* : e b n */
+ /* oid short_name mr : l o */
+ /* k r o t n */
+ /* e e i c a c */
+ /* y t type v k g e */
+ {cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER, "NULL", MR_MAX},
+ {cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_RC4, "RC4", MR_LOW},
+ {cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_DES_CBC, "DES-CBC", MR_LOW},
+ {cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24,24, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "3DES-EDE-CBC", MR_LOW},
+ {cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, "AES-128", MR_128},
+ {cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC, "AES-256", MR_128},
+ {cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, "Camellia-128", MR_128},
+ {cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, "Camellia-256", MR_128},
+ {cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_SEED_CBC, "SEED-CBC", MR_128},
+ {cipher_aes_128_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8,
+ SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM, "AES-128-GCM", MR_128},
+ {cipher_aes_256_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 32,32, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8,
+ SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM, "AES-256-GCM", MR_128},
+ {cipher_chacha20, calg_chacha20, 32,32, type_aead, 12, 0,16, 0,
+ SEC_OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, "ChaCha20-Poly1305", MR_MAX},
+ {cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, "missing", 0U},
+};
+
+static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] =
+{ /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */
+ /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */
+ {kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0},
+ {kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA},
+ {kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS},
+ {kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA},
+ {kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS},
+ {kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA},
+ {kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON},
+ {kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA},
+ {kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA},
+ {kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA},
+ {kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA},
+ {kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON},
+ {kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK},
+ {kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK},
+ {kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY},
+};
+
+/* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */
+static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] =
+{
+/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */
+/* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */
+
+ {TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+
+
+/* New TLS cipher suites */
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384},
+
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384},
+ {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384},
+
+ {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+
+ {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none},
+
+ {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none},
+
+ {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256},
+ {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384},
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE auth_alg_defs[] = {
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_null */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt */
+ CKM_DSA, /* ? _SHA1 */ /* ssl_auth_dsa */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_kea (unused) */
+ CKM_ECDSA, /* ssl_auth_ecdsa */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_sign */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_pss */
+ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, /* ssl_auth_psk (just check for HKDF) */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM /* ssl_auth_tls13_any */
+};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(auth_alg_defs) == ssl_auth_size);
+
+static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = {
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_null */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_kea_rsa */
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_fortezza (unused) */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_psk */
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh_psk */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_tls13_any */
+};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kea_alg_defs) == ssl_kea_size);
+
+typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr {
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech;
+} SSLCipher2Mech;
+
+/* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */
+static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = {
+ /* calg, cmech */
+ { calg_null, (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L },
+ { calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 },
+ { calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC },
+ { calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC },
+ { calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC },
+ { calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC },
+ { calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 },
+ { calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC },
+ { calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC },
+ { calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC },
+ { calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM },
+ { calg_chacha20, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 },
+ /* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */
+};
+
+#define mmech_invalid (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L
+#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC
+#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC
+#define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC
+#define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
+#define mmech_sha256_hmac CKM_SHA256_HMAC
+#define mmech_sha384_hmac CKM_SHA384_HMAC
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */
+ /* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */
+ /* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */
+ { mac_null, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 , 0},
+ { mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 },
+ { mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1},
+ {hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 0, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5},
+ {hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 0, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1},
+ {hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256},
+ { mac_aead, mmech_invalid, 0, 0, 0 },
+ {hmac_sha384, mmech_sha384_hmac, 0, SHA384_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384}
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+const PRUint8 tls13_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E,
+ 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 };
+const PRUint8 tls12_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E,
+ 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00 };
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random) ==
+ sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random));
+
+/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of
+ * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey
+ * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is
+ * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field
+ * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes.
+ *
+ * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits
+ * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params
+ * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS
+ * supports arbitrary curves.
+ */
+#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504
+
+typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr {
+ PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */
+ PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */
+ PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */
+ PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */
+ PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */
+ /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */
+} ECCWrappedKeyInfo;
+
+CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_Alg2Mech(SSLCipherAlgorithm calg)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
+ return alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
+}
+
+#if defined(TRACE)
+
+static char *
+ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType)
+{
+ char *rv;
+ static char line[40];
+
+ switch (msgType) {
+ case hello_request:
+ rv = "hello_request (0)";
+ break;
+ case client_hello:
+ rv = "client_hello (1)";
+ break;
+ case server_hello:
+ rv = "server_hello (2)";
+ break;
+ case hello_verify_request:
+ rv = "hello_verify_request (3)";
+ break;
+ case new_session_ticket:
+ rv = "session_ticket (4)";
+ break;
+ case hello_retry_request:
+ rv = "hello_retry_request (6)";
+ break;
+ case encrypted_extensions:
+ rv = "encrypted_extensions (8)";
+ break;
+ case certificate:
+ rv = "certificate (11)";
+ break;
+ case server_key_exchange:
+ rv = "server_key_exchange (12)";
+ break;
+ case certificate_request:
+ rv = "certificate_request (13)";
+ break;
+ case server_hello_done:
+ rv = "server_hello_done (14)";
+ break;
+ case certificate_verify:
+ rv = "certificate_verify (15)";
+ break;
+ case client_key_exchange:
+ rv = "client_key_exchange (16)";
+ break;
+ case finished:
+ rv = "finished (20)";
+ break;
+ default:
+ sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType);
+ rv = line;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType)
+{
+ char *rv;
+ static char line[40];
+
+ switch (msgType) {
+ case content_change_cipher_spec:
+ rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)";
+ break;
+ case content_alert:
+ rv = "alert (21)";
+ break;
+ case content_handshake:
+ rv = "handshake (22)";
+ break;
+ case content_application_data:
+ rv = "application_data (23)";
+ break;
+ default:
+ sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType);
+ rv = line;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+SSL3Statistics *
+SSL_GetStatistics(void)
+{
+ return &ssl3stats;
+}
+
+typedef struct tooLongStr {
+#if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+ PRInt32 low;
+ PRInt32 high;
+#else
+ PRInt32 high;
+ PRInt32 low;
+#endif
+} tooLong;
+
+void
+SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long *x)
+{
+ if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) {
+ PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x);
+ } else {
+ tooLong *tl = (tooLong *)x;
+ if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0)
+ PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high);
+ }
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(
+ ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite,
+ const SSLVersionRange *vrange)
+{
+ switch (cipherSuite) {
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 &&
+ vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and
+ * point formats.*/
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 &&
+ vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ default:
+ return vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ }
+}
+
+/* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */
+/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */
+const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *
+ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite)
+{
+ int cipher_suite_def_len =
+ sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) {
+ if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite)
+ return &cipher_suite_defs[i];
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */
+/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */
+static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *
+ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(ssl3CipherSuite suite,
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite)
+ return &suites[i];
+ }
+ /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *
+ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites)
+{
+ return ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(suite,
+ CONST_CAST(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg, suites));
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
+ if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] &&
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == keaType) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_KEAEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType)
+{
+ switch (keaType) {
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ case ssl_kea_dh_psk: {
+ if (ss->sec.isServer && !ss->opt.enableServerDhe) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* If the server requires named FFDHE groups, then the client
+ * must have included an FFDHE group. peerSupportsFfdheGroups
+ * is set to true in ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(). */
+ if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups &&
+ !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* We can use the weak DH group if all of these are true:
+ * 1. We don't require named groups.
+ * 2. The peer doesn't support named groups.
+ * 3. This isn't TLS 1.3.
+ * 4. The weak group is enabled. */
+ if (!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups &&
+ !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups &&
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ !ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) {
+ /* The client enables DHE cipher suites even if no DHE groups
+ * are enabled. Only if this isn't TLS 1.3 and named groups
+ * are not required. */
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_dh);
+ }
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh_psk:
+ return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh);
+
+ case ssl_kea_tls13_any:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ case ssl_kea_fortezza:
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_HasCert(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType)
+{
+ PRCList *cursor;
+ if (authType == ssl_auth_null || authType == ssl_auth_psk || authType == ssl_auth_tls13_any) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts);
+ cursor != &ss->serverCerts;
+ cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
+ sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor;
+ if (cert->certType.authType != authType) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!cert->serverKeyPair ||
+ !cert->serverKeyPair->privKey ||
+ !cert->serverCertChain) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* When called from ssl3_config_match_init(), all the EC curves will be
+ * enabled, so this will essentially do nothing (unless we implement
+ * curve configuration). However, once we have seen the
+ * supported_groups extension and this is called from config_match(),
+ * this will filter out certificates with an unsupported curve. */
+ if ((authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa ||
+ authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa ||
+ authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) &&
+ !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->certType.namedCurve)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+const ssl3BulkCipherDef *
+ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(bulk_cipher_defs));
+ PORT_Assert(bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg].cipher == cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg);
+ return &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg];
+}
+
+/* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match
+ * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens,
+ * regardless of policy or user preference.
+ * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3.
+ */
+int
+ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def;
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech;
+ SSLAuthType authType;
+ SSLKEAType keaType;
+ int i;
+ int numPresent = 0;
+ int numEnabled = 0;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss);
+ if (!ss) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
+ if (suite->enabled) {
+ ++numEnabled;
+ /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle
+ * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition.
+ */
+ cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite);
+ if (!cipher_def) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ continue;
+ }
+ cipher_alg = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(cipher_def)->calg;
+ cipher_mech = ssl3_Alg2Mech(cipher_alg);
+
+ /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */
+ suite->isPresent = PR_TRUE;
+
+ authType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].authKeyType;
+ if (authType != ssl_auth_null && authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any) {
+ if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, authType)) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[authType])) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ keaType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType;
+ if (keaType != ssl_kea_null &&
+ keaType != ssl_kea_tls13_any &&
+ !PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[keaType])) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_alg != calg_null &&
+ !PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (suite->isPresent) {
+ ++numPresent;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0);
+ if (numPresent <= 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED);
+ }
+ return numPresent;
+}
+
+/* Return PR_TRUE if suite is usable. This if the suite is permitted by policy,
+ * enabled, has a certificate (as needed), has a viable key agreement method, is
+ * usable with the negotiated TLS version, and is otherwise usable. */
+static PRBool
+config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy,
+ const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def;
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
+
+ PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (!suite->enabled || !suite->isPresent)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ if ((suite->policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) ||
+ (suite->policy > policy))
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss != NULL);
+ cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite);
+ PORT_Assert(cipher_def != NULL);
+ kea_def = &kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg];
+ PORT_Assert(kea_def != NULL);
+ if (!ssl_KEAEnabled(ss, kea_def->exchKeyType)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, kea_def->authKeyType)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite->cipher_suite, vrange);
+}
+
+/* Return the number of cipher suites that are usable. */
+/* called from ssl3_SendClientHello */
+static int
+count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy)
+{
+ int i, count = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, &ss->vrange, ss))
+ count++;
+ }
+ if (count <= 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ }
+ return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Null compression, mac and encryption functions
+ */
+static SECStatus
+Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, int inputLen)
+{
+ if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) {
+ *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *outputLen = inputLen;
+ if (input != output)
+ PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL3 Utility functions
+ */
+
+/* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the
+ * highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the
+ * highest enabled version.
+ *
+ * If allowLargerPeerVersion is true, peerVersion is the peer's highest
+ * enabled version rather than the peer's selected version.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion,
+ PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion)
+{
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
+ (peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->version = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max);
+ PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, ss->version));
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Used by the client when the server produces a version number.
+ * This reads, validates, and normalizes the value. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, unsigned int *len,
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion *version)
+{
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion v;
+ PRInt32 temp;
+
+ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, len);
+ if (temp < 0) {
+ return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
+ if (temp == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, protocol_version);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (temp == tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
+ v = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ } else {
+ v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
+ }
+#else
+ v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
+#endif
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* If this fails, we get 0 back and the next check to fails. */
+ v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange));
+ if (ss->vrange.min > v || ss->vrange.max < v) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
+ (v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
+ : handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *version = v;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random->rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key,
+ SECItem *buf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ PRBool useRsaPss = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+ SECItem hashItem;
+
+ buf->data = NULL;
+
+ switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(key)) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ doDerEncode = isTLS;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
+
+ if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
+ int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
+
+ SECItem *params = NULL;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
+ SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
+ (unsigned char *)&pssParams,
+ sizeof(pssParams) };
+
+ if (signatureLen <= 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
+ buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
+ if (!buf->data)
+ goto done; /* error code was set. */
+
+ if (useRsaPss) {
+ pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len;
+ params = &pssParamsItem;
+ mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem);
+ } else {
+ SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg);
+ rv = SGN_Digest(key, hashOID, buf, &hashItem);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ } else if (doDerEncode) {
+ SECItem derSig = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
+ rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */
+ *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */
+ } else if (derSig.data) {
+ PORT_Free(derSig.data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char *)buf->data, buf->len));
+done:
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data);
+ buf->data = NULL;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SSL3Hashes *hash,
+ SECItem *buf)
+{
+ SECKEYPublicKey *key;
+ SECItem *signature = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem hashItem;
+ SECOidTag encAlg;
+ SECOidTag hashAlg;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ PRBool isRsaPssScheme = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes",
+ buf->data, buf->len));
+
+ key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashAlg = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg);
+ switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key)) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) {
+ scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5;
+ }
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ||
+ buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) {
+ signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key));
+ if (!signature) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ buf = signature;
+ }
+ if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) {
+ scheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case ecKey:
+ encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part.
+ * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1
+ * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with
+ * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) {
+ scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified",
+ hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
+
+ if (isRsaPssScheme ||
+ hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN ||
+ SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key) == dsaKey) {
+ /* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded.
+ * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code
+ * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when
+ * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify.
+ */
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
+
+ SECItem *params = NULL;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
+ SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
+ (unsigned char *)&pssParams,
+ sizeof(pssParams) };
+
+ if (isRsaPssScheme) {
+ pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len;
+ params = &pssParamsItem;
+ mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem, pwArg);
+ } else {
+ rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg,
+ pwArg);
+ }
+ if (signature) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ }
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
+#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ PORT_SetError(0);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
+/* Called from ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash
+ * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange.
+ *
+ * hashAlg: ssl_hash_none indicates the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg,
+ PRUint8 *hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen,
+ SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECOidTag hashOID;
+
+ if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg);
+ hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID);
+ if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashOID, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sslSocket *ss, SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes,
+ SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, PRBool padY)
+{
+ PRUint8 *hashBuf;
+ PRUint8 *pBuf;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ unsigned int bufLen, yLen;
+ PRUint8 buf[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096 / 8 + 2 + 4096 / 8];
+
+ PORT_Assert(dh_p.data);
+ PORT_Assert(dh_g.data);
+ PORT_Assert(dh_Ys.data);
+
+ yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len;
+ bufLen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH +
+ 2 + dh_p.len +
+ 2 + dh_g.len +
+ 2 + yLen;
+ if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) {
+ hashBuf = buf;
+ } else {
+ hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
+ if (!hashBuf) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ memcpy(hashBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(pBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_p.len, 2, pBuf);
+ memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len);
+ pBuf += dh_p.len;
+ pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_g.len, 2, pBuf);
+ memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len);
+ pBuf += dh_g.len;
+ pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(yLen, 2, pBuf);
+ if (padY && dh_p.len > dh_Ys.len) {
+ memset(pBuf, 0, dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len);
+ pBuf += dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len;
+ }
+ /* If we're padding Y, dh_Ys can't be longer than dh_p. */
+ PORT_Assert(!padY || dh_p.len >= dh_Ys.len);
+ memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len);
+ pBuf += dh_Ys.len;
+ PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen);
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen));
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result",
+ hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result",
+ hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
+ } else {
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result",
+ hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL)
+ PORT_Free(hashBuf);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called twice, only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */
+static void
+ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat)
+{
+ if (mat->write_key != NULL) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key);
+ mat->write_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key);
+ mat->write_mac_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE);
+ mat->write_mac_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and
+** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs()
+** ssl3_DestroySSL3Info
+** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock.
+*/
+void
+ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName)
+{
+ /* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */
+ if (spec->encodeContext) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(spec->encodeContext, PR_TRUE);
+ spec->encodeContext = NULL;
+ }
+ if (spec->decodeContext) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(spec->decodeContext, PR_TRUE);
+ spec->decodeContext = NULL;
+ }
+ if (spec->destroyCompressContext && spec->compressContext) {
+ spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1);
+ spec->compressContext = NULL;
+ }
+ if (spec->destroyDecompressContext && spec->decompressContext) {
+ spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1);
+ spec->decompressContext = NULL;
+ }
+ if (spec->master_secret != NULL) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret);
+ spec->master_secret = NULL;
+ }
+ spec->msItem.data = NULL;
+ spec->msItem.len = 0;
+ ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client);
+ ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server);
+ spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
+ spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite.
+** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material.
+** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello()
+** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock.
+** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
+ SSL3MACAlgorithm mac;
+ SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea;
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ss->ssl3.prSpec);
+
+ /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */
+ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
+ /* SSL records are not being MACed. */
+ cwSpec->version = ss->version;
+ }
+
+ pwSpec->version = ss->version;
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite));
+
+ suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite);
+ if (suite_def == NULL) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */
+ PORT_Assert(suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4);
+ }
+
+ kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg;
+ mac = suite_def->mac_alg;
+ if (mac <= ssl_mac_sha && mac != ssl_mac_null && isTLS)
+ mac += 2;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suite_def;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea];
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea);
+
+ pwSpec->cipher_def = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite_def);
+
+ pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac];
+ PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac);
+
+ pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
+ pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
+
+ pwSpec->mac_size = pwSpec->mac_def->mac_size;
+
+ pwSpec->compression_method = ss->ssl3.hs.compression;
+ pwSpec->compressContext = NULL;
+ pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL;
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral);
+ PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_aead);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB
+#define SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE sizeof(z_stream)
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_MapZlibError(int zlib_error)
+{
+ switch (zlib_error) {
+ case Z_OK:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DeflateInit(void *void_context)
+{
+ z_stream *context = void_context;
+ context->zalloc = NULL;
+ context->zfree = NULL;
+ context->opaque = NULL;
+
+ return ssl3_MapZlibError(deflateInit(context, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION));
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_InflateInit(void *void_context)
+{
+ z_stream *context = void_context;
+ context->zalloc = NULL;
+ context->zfree = NULL;
+ context->opaque = NULL;
+ context->next_in = NULL;
+ context->avail_in = 0;
+
+ return ssl3_MapZlibError(inflateInit(context));
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DeflateCompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len,
+ int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ z_stream *context = void_context;
+
+ if (!inlen) {
+ *out_len = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in;
+ context->avail_in = inlen;
+ context->next_out = out;
+ context->avail_out = maxout;
+ if (deflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (context->avail_out == 0) {
+ /* We ran out of space! */
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Ran out of buffer while compressing",
+ SSL_GETPID()));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DeflateDecompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len,
+ int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ z_stream *context = void_context;
+
+ if (!inlen) {
+ *out_len = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in;
+ context->avail_in = inlen;
+ context->next_out = out;
+ context->avail_out = maxout;
+ if (inflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DestroyCompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused)
+{
+ deflateEnd(void_context);
+ PORT_Free(void_context);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused)
+{
+ inflateEnd(void_context);
+ PORT_Free(void_context);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */
+
+/* Initialize the compression functions and contexts for the given
+ * CipherSpec. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_InitCompressionContext(ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec)
+{
+ /* Setup the compression functions */
+ switch (pwSpec->compression_method) {
+ case ssl_compression_null:
+ pwSpec->compressor = NULL;
+ pwSpec->decompressor = NULL;
+ pwSpec->compressContext = NULL;
+ pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL;
+ pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
+ pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
+ break;
+#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB
+ case ssl_compression_deflate:
+ pwSpec->compressor = ssl3_DeflateCompress;
+ pwSpec->decompressor = ssl3_DeflateDecompress;
+ pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE);
+ pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE);
+ pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext;
+ pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext;
+ ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext);
+ ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext);
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* This function should probably be moved to pk11wrap and be named
+ * PK11_ParamFromIVAndEffectiveKeyBits
+ */
+static SECItem *
+ssl3_ParamFromIV(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mtype, SECItem *iv, CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits)
+{
+ SECItem *param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mtype, iv);
+ if (param && param->data && param->len >= sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS)) {
+ switch (mtype) {
+ case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_RC2_ECB:
+ case CKM_RC2_CBC:
+ case CKM_RC2_MAC:
+ case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
+ case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
+ *(CK_RC2_PARAMS *)param->data = ulEffectiveBits;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return param;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data
+ * which is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |out| and returns
+ * its length. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the
+ * definition of the AEAD additional data.
+ *
+ * TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which
+ * pseudo-header defintiion to use should be decided based on the version of
+ * the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT
+ * based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed
+ * to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version|
+ * argument should be the record's version value.
+ */
+static unsigned int
+ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(unsigned char *out,
+ sslSequenceNumber seq_num,
+ SSL3ContentType type,
+ PRBool includesVersion,
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version,
+ PRBool isDTLS,
+ int length)
+{
+ out[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 56);
+ out[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 48);
+ out[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 40);
+ out[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 32);
+ out[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 24);
+ out[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 16);
+ out[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 8);
+ out[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 0);
+ out[8] = type;
+
+ /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */
+ if (!includesVersion) {
+ out[9] = MSB(length);
+ out[10] = LSB(length);
+ return 11;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */
+ if (isDTLS) {
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version;
+
+ dtls_version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version);
+ out[9] = MSB(dtls_version);
+ out[10] = LSB(dtls_version);
+ } else {
+ out[9] = MSB(version);
+ out[10] = LSB(version);
+ }
+ out[11] = MSB(length);
+ out[12] = LSB(length);
+ return 13;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
+ PRBool doDecrypt,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ int *outlen,
+ int maxout,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ int inlen,
+ const unsigned char *additionalData,
+ int additionalDataLen)
+{
+ SECItem param;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ unsigned char nonce[12];
+ unsigned int uOutLen;
+ CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
+
+ const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].tag_size;
+ const int explicitNonceLen =
+ bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].explicit_nonce_size;
+
+ /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the
+ * nonce is formed. */
+ memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 4);
+ if (doDecrypt) {
+ memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen);
+ in += explicitNonceLen;
+ inlen -= explicitNonceLen;
+ *outlen = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */
+ memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
+ memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
+ out += explicitNonceLen;
+ maxout -= explicitNonceLen;
+ *outlen = explicitNonceLen;
+ }
+
+ param.type = siBuffer;
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&gcmParams;
+ param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
+ gcmParams.pIv = nonce;
+ gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce);
+ gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; /* const cast */
+ gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen;
+ gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8;
+
+ if (doDecrypt) {
+ rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, &param, out, &uOutLen,
+ maxout, in, inlen);
+ } else {
+ rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, &param, out, &uOutLen,
+ maxout, in, inlen);
+ }
+ *outlen += (int)uOutLen;
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt,
+ unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ const unsigned char *additionalData,
+ int additionalDataLen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ SECItem param;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ unsigned int uOutLen;
+ unsigned char nonce[12];
+ CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS aeadParams;
+
+ const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_chacha20].tag_size;
+
+ /* See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04#section-2
+ * for details of how the nonce is formed. */
+ PORT_Memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 12);
+
+ /* XOR the last 8 bytes of the IV with the sequence number. */
+ PORT_Assert(additionalDataLen >= 8);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+ nonce[4 + i] ^= additionalData[i];
+ }
+
+ param.type = siBuffer;
+ param.len = sizeof(aeadParams);
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&aeadParams;
+ memset(&aeadParams, 0, sizeof(aeadParams));
+ aeadParams.pNonce = nonce;
+ aeadParams.ulNonceLen = sizeof(nonce);
+ aeadParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData;
+ aeadParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen;
+ aeadParams.ulTagLen = tagSize;
+
+ if (doDecrypt) {
+ rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &param,
+ out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
+ } else {
+ rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &param,
+ out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
+ }
+ *outlen = (int)uOutLen;
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec.
+ * Master Secret already is derived.
+ * Caller holds Spec write lock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
+ PK11Context *serverContext = NULL;
+ PK11Context *clientContext = NULL;
+ SECItem *param;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech;
+ CK_ULONG macLength;
+ CK_ULONG effKeyBits;
+ SECItem iv;
+ SECItem mac_param;
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def;
+ macLength = pwSpec->mac_size;
+ calg = cipher_def->calg;
+ PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
+
+ pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
+ pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
+
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
+ pwSpec->encode = NULL;
+ pwSpec->decode = NULL;
+ pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
+ pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
+ switch (calg) {
+ case calg_aes_gcm:
+ pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM;
+ break;
+ case calg_chacha20:
+ pwSpec->aead = ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Now setup the MAC contexts,
+ ** crypto contexts are setup below.
+ */
+
+ mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech;
+ mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength;
+ mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength);
+ mac_param.type = 0;
+
+ pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
+ mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param);
+ if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
+ mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param);
+ if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Now setup the crypto contexts.
+ */
+
+ if (calg == calg_null) {
+ pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher;
+ pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg);
+ effKeyBits = cipher_def->key_size * BPB;
+
+ /*
+ * build the server context
+ */
+ iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv;
+ iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size;
+ param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits);
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism,
+ (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT
+ : CKA_DECRYPT),
+ pwSpec->server.write_key, param);
+ iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len);
+ if (iv.data)
+ PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ if (serverContext == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * build the client context
+ */
+ iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv;
+ iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size;
+
+ param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits);
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism,
+ (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT
+ : CKA_ENCRYPT),
+ pwSpec->client.write_key, param);
+ iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len);
+ if (iv.data)
+ PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ if (clientContext == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp;
+ pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp;
+
+ pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext;
+ pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext;
+
+ serverContext = NULL;
+ clientContext = NULL;
+
+ ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+fail:
+ if (serverContext != NULL)
+ PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE);
+ if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
+ }
+ if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+HASH_HashType
+ssl3_GetTls12HashType(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ return HASH_AlgNULL;
+ }
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash) {
+ case ssl_hash_sha384:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ case ssl_hash_sha256:
+ case ssl_hash_none:
+ /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */
+ return HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return HASH_AlgSHA256;
+}
+
+/* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts
+ * for the pending Cipher Spec.
+ * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart)
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart)
+ * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate.
+ * NULL pms means re-use old master_secret.
+ *
+ * If the old master secret is reused, pms is NULL and the master secret is
+ * already in pwSpec->master_secret.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+
+ if (pms || (!pwSpec->msItem.len && !pwSpec->master_secret)) {
+ rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */
+ }
+ }
+ if (pwSpec->master_secret) {
+ rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss);
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Generic behaviors -- common to all crypto methods */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) {
+ /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many
+ * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The
+ * spec says you should be discarding the connection
+ * and start over, so not much we can do here. */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */
+ pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1;
+ pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num =
+ (sslSequenceNumber)pwSpec->epoch << 48;
+
+ dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords);
+ }
+
+done:
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
+ */
+static const unsigned char mac_pad_1[60] = {
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+static const unsigned char mac_pad_2[60] = {
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord()
+** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PRBool useServerMacKey,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ unsigned int headerLen,
+ const SSL3Opaque *input,
+ int inputLength,
+ unsigned char *outbuf,
+ unsigned int *outLength)
+{
+ const ssl3MACDef *mac_def;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength));
+
+ mac_def = spec->mac_def;
+ if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
+ *outLength = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ PK11Context *mac_context =
+ (useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context
+ : spec->client.write_mac_context);
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, header, headerLen);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength));
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord()
+ * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ * originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PRBool useServerMacKey,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ unsigned int headerLen,
+ const SSL3Opaque *input,
+ int inputLen,
+ int originalLen,
+ unsigned char *outbuf,
+ unsigned int *outLen)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType;
+ CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params;
+ SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PK11SymKey *key;
+
+ PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->mac_size);
+ PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen);
+
+ if (spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
+ *outLen = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
+ if (spec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
+ }
+
+ params.macAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech;
+ params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen;
+ params.pHeader = (unsigned char *)header; /* const cast */
+ params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen;
+
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&params;
+ param.len = sizeof(params);
+ param.type = 0;
+
+ inputItem.data = (unsigned char *)input;
+ inputItem.len = inputLen;
+ inputItem.type = 0;
+
+ outputItem.data = outbuf;
+ outputItem.len = *outLen;
+ outputItem.type = 0;
+
+ key = spec->server.write_mac_key;
+ if (!useServerMacKey) {
+ key = spec->client.write_mac_key;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, &param, &outputItem, &inputItem);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) {
+ /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC() expects the MAC to have been removed
+ * from the input length already. */
+ return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey,
+ header, headerLen,
+ input, inputLen - spec->mac_size,
+ outbuf, outLen);
+ }
+
+ *outLen = 0;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
+ *outLen = outputItem.len;
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE;
+
+ /* we only care if we are doing client auth */
+ if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* get the slot */
+ slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID);
+ if (slot == NULL ||
+ !PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) ||
+ (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) {
+ isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (slot) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ return isPresent;
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
+ PRBool isServer,
+ PRBool isDTLS,
+ PRBool capRecordVersion,
+ SSL3ContentType type,
+ const SSL3Opaque *pIn,
+ PRUint32 contentLen,
+ sslBuffer *wrBuf)
+{
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 macLen = 0;
+ PRUint32 fragLen;
+ PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0;
+ unsigned int ivLen = 0;
+ unsigned char pseudoHeader[13];
+ unsigned int pseudoHeaderLen;
+
+ cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def;
+
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from
+ * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically
+ * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous
+ * record.
+ */
+ ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
+ if (ivLen > wrBuf->space) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(wrBuf->buf, ivLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext,
+ wrBuf->buf, /* output */
+ (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* outlen */
+ ivLen, /* max outlen */
+ wrBuf->buf, /* input */
+ ivLen); /* input len */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || wrBuf->len != ivLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cwSpec->compressor) {
+ int outlen;
+ rv = cwSpec->compressor(cwSpec->compressContext, wrBuf->buf + ivLen,
+ &outlen, wrBuf->space - ivLen, pIn, contentLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ pIn = wrBuf->buf + ivLen;
+ contentLen = outlen;
+ }
+
+ pseudoHeaderLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
+ pseudoHeader, cwSpec->write_seq_num, type,
+ cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->version,
+ isDTLS, contentLen);
+ PORT_Assert(pseudoHeaderLen <= sizeof(pseudoHeader));
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
+ const int nonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size;
+ const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size;
+
+ if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = cwSpec->aead(
+ isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client,
+ PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */
+ wrBuf->buf, /* output */
+ (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* out len */
+ wrBuf->space, /* max out */
+ pIn, contentLen, /* input */
+ pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Add the MAC
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, isServer, pseudoHeader,
+ pseudoHeaderLen, pIn, contentLen,
+ wrBuf->buf + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ p1Len = contentLen;
+ p2Len = macLen;
+ fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */
+ PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024);
+
+ /*
+ * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher)
+ * then Encrypt it
+ */
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ unsigned char *pBuf;
+ int padding_length;
+ int i;
+
+ oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size;
+ /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */
+ padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 - ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1));
+ fragLen += padding_length + 1;
+ PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0);
+
+ /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */
+ pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[ivLen + fragLen - 1];
+ for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) {
+ *pBuf-- = padding_length;
+ }
+ /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */
+ p2Len = fragLen - p1Len;
+ }
+ if (p1Len < 256) {
+ oddLen = p1Len;
+ p1Len = 0;
+ } else {
+ p1Len -= oddLen;
+ }
+ if (oddLen) {
+ p2Len += oddLen;
+ PORT_Assert((cipher_def->block_size < 2) ||
+ (p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0);
+ memmove(wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen);
+ }
+ if (p1Len > 0) {
+ int cipherBytesPart1 = -1;
+ rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext,
+ wrBuf->buf + ivLen, /* output */
+ &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */
+ p1Len, /* max outlen */
+ pIn,
+ p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == (int)p1Len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != (int)p1Len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart1;
+ }
+ if (p2Len > 0) {
+ int cipherBytesPart2 = -1;
+ rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext,
+ wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len,
+ &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */
+ p2Len, /* max outlen */
+ wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len,
+ p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == (int)p2Len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != (int)p2Len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
+ PRBool capRecordVersion, SSL3ContentType type,
+ const SSL3Opaque *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf)
+{
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def;
+ PRUint16 headerLen;
+ sslBuffer protBuf;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version = cwSpec->version;
+ PRBool isTLS13;
+ PRUint8 *ptr = wrBuf->buf;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) {
+ PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ headerLen = TLS13_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH_SHORT;
+ } else {
+ headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+ protBuf.buf = wrBuf->buf + headerLen;
+ protBuf.len = 0;
+ protBuf.space = wrBuf->space - headerLen;
+
+ PORT_Assert(cipher_def->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX);
+ if ((cwSpec->write_seq_num & RECORD_SEQ_MAX) >= cipher_def->max_records) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx",
+ SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->write_seq_num));
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ isTLS13 = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, protBuf.buf, (int *)&protBuf.len, protBuf.space,
+ pIn, contentLen);
+#else
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, type, pIn, contentLen, &protBuf);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer,
+ IS_DTLS(ss), capRecordVersion, type,
+ pIn, contentLen, &protBuf);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error was set */
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(protBuf.len <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + (isTLS13 ? 256 : 1024));
+ wrBuf->len = protBuf.len + headerLen;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) {
+ PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); /* Decoder not yet implemented. */
+ (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(0x8000 | protBuf.len, 2, ptr);
+ } else {
+#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ if (isTLS13 && cipher_def->calg != ssl_calg_null) {
+ *ptr++ = content_application_data;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ *ptr++ = type;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ version = isTLS13 ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 : version;
+ version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version);
+
+ ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr);
+ ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(cwSpec->write_seq_num, 8, ptr);
+ } else {
+ if (capRecordVersion || isTLS13) {
+ version = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, version);
+ }
+ ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr);
+ }
+ (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(protBuf.len, 2, ptr);
+ }
+ ++cwSpec->write_seq_num;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Process the plain text before sending it.
+ * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent
+ * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the
+ * output (write) buffer.
+ * Returns SECFailure on a hard IO error, memory error, or crypto error.
+ * Does NOT return SECWouldBlock.
+ *
+ * Notes on the use of the private ssl flags:
+ * (no private SSL flags)
+ * Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext
+ * If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK,
+ * or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty,
+ * then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf,
+ * and continue to do that for all succssive records until all
+ * bytes are used.
+ * ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER
+ * As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces
+ * all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer.
+ * ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS)
+ * Forces the use of the provided epoch
+ * ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION
+ * Caps the record layer version number of TLS ClientHello to { 3, 1 }
+ * (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore
+ * ClientHello.client_version and use the record layer version number
+ * (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when negotiating protocol versions. In
+ * addition, if the record layer version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 }
+ * (TLS 1.1) or higher, these servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly,
+ * some F5 BIG-IP servers hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a
+ * version greater than { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this
+ * flag to work around such servers.
+ */
+PRInt32
+ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss,
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, /* non-NULL for DTLS retransmits */
+ SSL3ContentType type,
+ const SSL3Opaque *pIn, /* input buffer */
+ PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */
+ PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRInt32 totalSent = 0;
+ PRBool capRecordVersion;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type),
+ nIn));
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Suppress write, fatal alert already sent",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ capRecordVersion = ((flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION) != 0);
+
+ if (capRecordVersion) {
+ /* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION can only be used with the
+ * TLS initial ClientHello. */
+ PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
+ PORT_Assert(type == content_handshake);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.initialized == PR_FALSE) {
+ /* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record
+ ** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're
+ ** trying to send an alert.
+ */
+ PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert);
+ rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check for Token Presence */
+ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ while (nIn > 0) {
+ PRUint32 contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ unsigned int spaceNeeded;
+ unsigned int numRecords;
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/
+
+ if (nIn > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV &&
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
+ type == content_application_data &&
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block /* CBC mode */) {
+ /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record,
+ * as explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h
+ */
+ numRecords = 2;
+ } else {
+ numRecords = 1;
+ }
+
+ spaceNeeded = contentLen + (numRecords * SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE);
+ if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ spaceNeeded += ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size;
+ }
+ if (spaceNeeded > wrBuf->space) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded));
+ goto spec_locked_loser; /* sslBuffer_Grow set error code. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (numRecords == 2) {
+ sslBuffer secondRecord;
+ rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type,
+ pIn, 1, wrBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto spec_locked_loser;
+
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [1/2]:",
+ wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len));
+
+ secondRecord.buf = wrBuf->buf + wrBuf->len;
+ secondRecord.len = 0;
+ secondRecord.space = wrBuf->space - wrBuf->len;
+
+ rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type,
+ pIn + 1, contentLen - 1, &secondRecord);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [2/2]:",
+ secondRecord.buf, secondRecord.len));
+ wrBuf->len += secondRecord.len;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (cwSpec) {
+ /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of DTLS handshake
+ * messages. */
+ PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) &&
+ (type == content_handshake ||
+ type == content_change_cipher_spec));
+ } else {
+ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, !IS_DTLS(ss) && capRecordVersion,
+ type, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:",
+ wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len));
+ }
+ }
+
+ spec_locked_loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ pIn += contentLen;
+ nIn -= contentLen;
+ PORT_Assert(nIn >= 0);
+
+ /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext,
+ * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet,
+ * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved.
+ */
+ if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) ||
+ (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
+
+ rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ wrBuf->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */
+
+ if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
+ PRInt32 sent;
+ ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
+ sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
+ if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
+ flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (wrBuf->len > 0) {
+ PRInt32 sent;
+ ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
+ sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len,
+ flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK);
+ if (sent < 0) {
+ if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */
+ sent = 0;
+ }
+ wrBuf->len -= sent;
+ if (wrBuf->len) {
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */
+ PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and
+ * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext.
+ */
+ rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ totalSent += contentLen;
+ }
+ return totalSent;
+}
+
+#define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024
+
+/* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record.
+ * Returns "len" or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock, nor SECSuccess.
+ */
+int
+ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in,
+ PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ PRInt32 totalSent = 0;
+ PRInt32 discarded = 0;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ /* These flags for internal use only */
+ PORT_Assert(!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT));
+ if (len < 0 || !in) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER &&
+ !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) {
+ PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
+ PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) {
+ PORT_Assert(in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered));
+ if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ in++;
+ len--;
+ discarded = 1;
+ }
+ while (len > totalSent) {
+ PRInt32 sent, toSend;
+
+ if (totalSent > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a
+ * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in
+ * the middle of a large application data write. (See
+ * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.)
+ */
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+ toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ /*
+ * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require
+ * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above.
+ */
+ sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_application_data,
+ in + totalSent, toSend, flags);
+ if (sent < 0) {
+ if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
+ break;
+ }
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
+ }
+ totalSent += sent;
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
+ /* must be a non-blocking socket */
+ PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
+ /* Must be non-blocking. */
+ PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
+ if (totalSent > 0) {
+ ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1];
+ }
+
+ totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1;
+ if (totalSent <= 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ totalSent = SECFailure;
+ }
+ return totalSent;
+ }
+ ss->appDataBuffered = 0;
+ return totalSent + discarded;
+}
+
+/* Attempt to send buffered handshake messages.
+ * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock.
+ * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
+ *
+ * Depending on whether we are doing DTLS or not, this either calls
+ *
+ * - ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages if non-DTLS
+ * - dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages if DTLS
+ *
+ * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(),
+ * ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(),
+ * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(),
+ * ssl3_SendFinished(),
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
+ } else {
+ return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record.
+ * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock.
+ * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_FlushHandshake
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER |
+ ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION;
+ PRInt32 count = -1;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /* only these flags are allowed */
+ PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags));
+ if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_handshake,
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf,
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags);
+ if (count < 0) {
+ int err = PORT_GetError();
+ PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ }
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else if ((unsigned int)count < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) {
+ /* short write should never happen */
+ PORT_Assert((unsigned int)count >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when
+ * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request.
+ * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth.
+ * SECSuccess otherwise.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
+
+ /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't
+ * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no
+ * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure
+ * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the
+ * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we
+ * know the server is paying attention to the certificate.
+ */
+ if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
+ (!ss->firstHsDone &&
+ (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) {
+ PRFileDesc *lower;
+
+ ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate);
+
+ lower = ss->fd->lower;
+#ifdef _WIN32
+ lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND);
+#else
+ lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH);
+#endif
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ * Alerts
+ */
+
+/*
+** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks.
+** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <-
+** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <-
+** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord.
+** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord
+** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <-
+** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <-
+** ssl3_HandleServerHello <-
+** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <-
+** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <-
+** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <-
+** ssl3_HandleClientHello <-
+** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <-
+** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <-
+** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <-
+** ssl3_HandleCertificate <-
+** ssl3_HandleFinished <-
+** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <-
+** ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage <-
+** ssl3_HandleRecord <-
+**
+*/
+SECStatus
+SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc)
+{
+ PRUint8 bytes[2];
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
+
+ bytes[0] = level;
+ bytes[1] = desc;
+
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ if (level == alert_fatal) {
+ if (!ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ }
+ }
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PRInt32 sent;
+ sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_alert, bytes, 2,
+ (desc == no_certificate) ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0);
+ rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
+ }
+ if (level == alert_fatal) {
+ ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+ PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
+ : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
+ : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+void
+ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode errCode)
+{
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate;
+ PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS;
+
+ switch (errCode) {
+ case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
+ desc = unsupported_certificate;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ desc = certificate_expired;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+ desc = certificate_revoked;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE:
+ desc = certificate_unknown;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired;
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ default:
+ desc = bad_certificate;
+ break;
+ }
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode));
+
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send decode_error alert. Set generic error number.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
+ ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error
+ : illegal_parameter);
+ PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
+ : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
+** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
+{
+ SSL3AlertLevel level;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc;
+ int error;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ if (buf->len != 2) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0];
+ desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1];
+ buf->len = 0;
+ SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
+
+ switch (desc) {
+ case close_notify:
+ ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1;
+ error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unexpected_message:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case bad_record_mac:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decryption_failed_RESERVED:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case record_overflow:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decompression_failure:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case handshake_failure:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case no_certificate:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case bad_certificate:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unsupported_certificate:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_revoked:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_expired:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_unknown:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case illegal_parameter:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case inappropriate_fallback:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
+ break;
+
+ /* All alerts below are TLS only. */
+ case unknown_ca:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case access_denied:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decode_error:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decrypt_error:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case export_restriction:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case protocol_version:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case insufficient_security:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case internal_error:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case user_canceled:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case no_renegotiation:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT;
+ break;
+
+ /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */
+ case missing_extension:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unsupported_extension:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_unobtainable:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unrecognized_name:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case bad_certificate_status_response:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case bad_certificate_hash_value:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case end_of_early_data:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_ALERT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) &&
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello)) {
+ /* TLS 1.3 requires all but "end of data" alerts to be
+ * treated as fatal. */
+ switch (desc) {
+ case close_notify:
+ case user_canceled:
+ case end_of_early_data:
+ break;
+ default:
+ level = alert_fatal;
+ }
+ }
+ if (level == alert_fatal) {
+ if (!ss->opt.noCache) {
+ ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ }
+ if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) &&
+ (desc == handshake_failure)) {
+ /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure
+ * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers.
+ */
+ error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (desc == end_of_early_data) {
+ return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss);
+ }
+ if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) {
+ /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
+ rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change Cipher Specs
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone,
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello,
+ * and ssl3_HandleFinished
+ *
+ * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
+ * and pending write spec pointers.
+ */
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRInt32 sent;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1,
+ ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ if (sent < 0) {
+ return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* swap the pending and current write specs. */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+
+ ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ /* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */
+ /* If we are really through with the old cipher spec
+ * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) {
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/);
+ } else {
+ /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final
+ * message got lost */
+ rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss);
+ }
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
+** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
+ *
+ * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
+ * and pending write spec pointers.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec;
+ SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
+ SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ if (ws != wait_change_cipher) {
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order "
+ "DTLS change_cipher_spec",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ buf->len = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* Handshake messages should not span ChangeCipherSpec. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (buf->len != 1) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0];
+ if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) {
+ /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */
+ (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ buf->len = 0;
+
+ /* Swap the pending and current read specs. */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/
+ prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
+
+ ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec
+ * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) {
+ ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash)
+{
+ switch (hash) {
+ case ssl_hash_sha256:
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
+ case ssl_hash_sha384:
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA384;
+ case ssl_hash_sha512:
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA512;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
+}
+
+/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType)
+{
+ switch (hashType) {
+ case ssl_hash_sha512:
+ return CKM_SHA512;
+ case ssl_hash_sha384:
+ return CKM_SHA384;
+ case ssl_hash_sha256:
+ case ssl_hash_none:
+ /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */
+ return CKM_SHA256;
+ case ssl_hash_sha1:
+ return CKM_SHA_1;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return CKM_SHA256;
+}
+
+/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ return ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash);
+}
+
+static SSLHashType
+ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash == ssl_hash_none) {
+ return ssl_hash_sha256;
+ }
+ return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash;
+}
+
+/* This method completes the derivation of the MS from the PMS.
+**
+** 1. Derive the MS, if possible, else return an error.
+**
+** 2. Check the version if |pms_version| is non-zero and if wrong,
+** return an error.
+**
+** 3. If |msp| is nonzero, return MS in |*msp|.
+
+** Called from:
+** ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt
+** tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(sslSocket *ss,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive,
+ CK_VERSION *pms_version,
+ SECItem *params, CK_FLAGS keyFlags,
+ PK11SymKey *pms, PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *ms = NULL;
+
+ ms = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive,
+ params, key_derive,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
+ if (!ms) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (pms_version && ss->opt.detectRollBack) {
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version;
+ client_version = pms_version->major << 8 | pms_version->minor;
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version);
+ }
+
+ if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) {
+ /* Destroy MS. Version roll-back detected. */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ms);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (msp) {
+ *msp = ms;
+ } else {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ms);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Compute the ordinary (pre draft-ietf-tls-session-hash) master
+ ** secret and return it in |*msp|.
+ **
+ ** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
+ PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
+ unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ PRBool isTLS12 =
+ (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ /*
+ * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
+ * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size
+ * data into a 48-byte value, and does not expect to return the version.
+ */
+ PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh));
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
+ SECItem params;
+ CK_FLAGS keyFlags;
+ CK_VERSION pms_version;
+ CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL;
+ /* master_params may be used as a CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS */
+ CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
+ unsigned int master_params_len;
+
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ if (isDH)
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ } else if (isTLS) {
+ if (isDH)
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ } else {
+ if (isDH)
+ master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!isDH) {
+ pms_version_ptr = &pms_version;
+ }
+
+ master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ master_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+ } else {
+ /* prfHashMechanism is not relevant with this PRF */
+ master_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+ }
+
+ params.data = (unsigned char *)&master_params;
+ params.len = master_params_len;
+
+ return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive,
+ pms_version_ptr, &params,
+ keyFlags, pms, msp);
+}
+
+/* Compute the draft-ietf-tls-session-hash master
+** secret and return it in |*msp|.
+**
+** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret
+*/
+static SECStatus
+tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
+ PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS extended_master_params;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ /*
+ * Determine whether to use the DH/ECDH or RSA derivation modes.
+ */
+ /*
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Verify that the slot can handle this key expansion
+ * mode. Bug 1198298 */
+ PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh));
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
+ SECItem params;
+ const CK_FLAGS keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ CK_VERSION pms_version;
+ CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (isDH) {
+ master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ } else {
+ master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ pms_version_ptr = &pms_version;
+ }
+
+ if (pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ /* TLS 1.2+ */
+ extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ } else {
+ /* TLS < 1.2 */
+ extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF;
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ }
+
+ extended_master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr;
+ extended_master_params.pSessionHash = hashes.u.raw;
+ extended_master_params.ulSessionHashLen = hashes.len;
+
+ params.data = (unsigned char *)&extended_master_params;
+ params.len = sizeof extended_master_params;
+
+ return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive,
+ pms_version_ptr, &params,
+ keyFlags, pms, msp);
+}
+
+/* Wrapper method to compute the master secret and return it in |*msp|.
+**
+** Called from ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
+ PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(pms != NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ return tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp);
+ } else {
+ return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp);
+ }
+}
+
+/* This method uses PKCS11 to derive the MS from the PMS, where PMS
+** is a PKCS11 symkey. We call ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret to do the
+** computations and then modify the pwSpec->state as a side effect.
+**
+** This is used in all cases except the "triple bypass" with RSA key
+** exchange.
+**
+** Called from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec. prSpec is pwSpec.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PK11SymKey *ms = NULL;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ if (pms) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, pms, &ms);
+ pwSpec->master_secret = ms;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret
+ * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure.
+ *
+ * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(),
+ * which in turn is called from
+ * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart)
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart)
+ * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock.
+ * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that.
+ *
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
+ unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ PRBool isTLS12 =
+ (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ int keySize;
+ CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; /* may be used as a
+ * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS */
+ unsigned int key_material_params_len;
+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism;
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+ SECItem params;
+ PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null);
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ if (!pwSpec->master_secret) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /*
+ * generate the key material
+ */
+ key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB;
+ key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB;
+ key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB;
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */
+ key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
+ memset(pwSpec->client.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
+ memset(pwSpec->server.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
+ }
+
+ key_material_params.bIsExport = PR_FALSE;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys;
+
+ returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv;
+ returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv;
+ keySize = cipher_def->key_size;
+
+ if (skipKeysAndIVs) {
+ keySize = 0;
+ key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0;
+ key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
+ returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL;
+ returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ calg = cipher_def->calg;
+ bulk_mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg);
+
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
+ } else if (isTLS) {
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
+ } else {
+ key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
+ }
+
+ params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params;
+ params.len = key_material_params_len;
+
+ /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and
+ * DERIVE by DEFAULT */
+ symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, &params,
+ bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize);
+ if (!symKey) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we
+ * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both
+ * mac's map to the same keytype.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey);
+
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */
+ pwSpec->client.write_mac_key =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ pwSpec->server.write_mac_key =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ if (!skipKeysAndIVs) {
+ pwSpec->client.write_key =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ pwSpec->server.write_key =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ }
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (symKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in
+ * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. Called from
+ * ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(), tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(),
+ * and ssl3_HandleServerHello. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown);
+ if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_record;
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha);
+ /*
+ * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these
+ * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots
+ * that the master secret will wind up in ...
+ */
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ /* determine the hash from the prf */
+ const SECOidData *hash_oid =
+ SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss));
+
+ /* Get the PKCS #11 mechanism for the Hash from the cipher suite (prf_hash)
+ * Convert that to the OidTag. We can then use that OidTag to create our
+ * PK11Context */
+ PORT_Assert(hash_oid != NULL);
+ if (hash_oid == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single;
+
+ if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or
+ * created successfully. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo;
+
+ if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) {
+ if (ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handshake messages
+ */
+/* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes()
+** ssl3_AppendHandshake()
+** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
+** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage()
+** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ /* With TLS 1.3, and versions TLS.1.1 and older, we keep the hash(es)
+ * always up to date. However, we must initially buffer the handshake
+ * messages, until we know what to do.
+ * If ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_unknown,
+ * it means we know what to do. We calculate (hash our input),
+ * and we stop appending to the buffer.
+ *
+ * With TLS 1.2, we always append all handshake messages,
+ * and never update the hash, because the hash function we must use for
+ * certificate_verify might be different from the hash function we use
+ * when signing other handshake hashes. */
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown ||
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l);
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "handshake hash input:", b, l));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * Append Handshake functions.
+ * All these functions set appropriate error codes.
+ * Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code.
+ **************************************************************************/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes)
+{
+ unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)void_src;
+ int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); /* protects sendBuf. */
+
+ if (!bytes)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH,
+ PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes)));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
+ room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char *)void_src, bytes));
+ rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */
+
+ while (bytes > room) {
+ if (room > 0)
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src,
+ room);
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room;
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+ bytes -= room;
+ src += room;
+ room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space;
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0);
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes);
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint8 b[4];
+ PRUint8 *p = b;
+
+ PORT_Assert(lenSize <= 4 && lenSize > 0);
+ if (lenSize < 4 && num >= (1L << (lenSize * 8))) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ switch (lenSize) {
+ case 4:
+ *p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff;
+ case 3:
+ *p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff;
+ case 2:
+ *p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff;
+ case 1:
+ *p = num & 0xff;
+ }
+ SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID()));
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize);
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
+ sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Opaque *src, PRInt32 bytes, PRInt32 lenSize)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert((bytes < (1 << 8) && lenSize == 1) ||
+ (bytes < (1L << 16) && lenSize == 2) ||
+ (bytes < (1L << 24) && lenSize == 3));
+
+ SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID()));
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+ SSL_TRC(60, ("data:"));
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes);
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it.
+ * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call
+ * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary.
+ */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t)));
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the
+ * transmission code, if necessary */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++;
+
+ /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+
+ /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * Consume Handshake functions.
+ *
+ * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks,
+ * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock
+ **************************************************************************/
+
+/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
+ * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v".
+ * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes.
+ *
+ * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert,
+ * and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably
+ * override the generic error code by setting another.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b,
+ PRUint32 *length)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes);
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
+ *b += bytes;
+ *length -= bytes;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
+ * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an
+ * integer in network byte order. Returns the received value.
+ * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure.
+ * This value is indistinguishable from the equivalent received value.
+ * Only positive numbers are to be received this way.
+ * Thus, the largest value that may be sent this way is 0x7fffffff.
+ * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
+ */
+PRInt32
+ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b,
+ PRUint32 *length)
+{
+ PRUint8 *buf = *b;
+ int i;
+ PRInt32 num = 0;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof num);
+
+ if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
+ num = (num << 8) + buf[i];
+ *b += bytes;
+ *length -= bytes;
+ return num;
+}
+
+/* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is
+ * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes"
+ * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value
+ * of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length,
+ * is returned in the SECItem i.
+ *
+ * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure.
+ * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
+ *
+ * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies
+ * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here
+ * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to
+ * point to the values in the buffer **b.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRInt32 bytes,
+ SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length)
+{
+ PRInt32 count;
+
+ PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3);
+ i->len = 0;
+ i->data = NULL;
+ i->type = siBuffer;
+ count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, b, length);
+ if (count < 0) { /* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (count > 0) {
+ if ((PRUint32)count > *length) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+ i->data = *b;
+ i->len = count;
+ *b += count;
+ *length -= count;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Helper function to encode an unsigned integer into a buffer. */
+PRUint8 *
+ssl_EncodeUintX(PRUint64 value, unsigned int bytes, PRUint8 *to)
+{
+ PRUint64 encoded;
+
+ PORT_Assert(bytes > 0 && bytes <= sizeof(encoded));
+
+ encoded = PR_htonll(value);
+ memcpy(to, ((unsigned char *)(&encoded)) + (sizeof(encoded) - bytes), bytes);
+ return to + bytes;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value.
+ * If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned.
+ *
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
+SECOidTag
+ssl3_HashTypeToOID(SSLHashType hashType)
+{
+ switch (hashType) {
+ case ssl_hash_sha1:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ case ssl_hash_sha256:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ case ssl_hash_sha384:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ case ssl_hash_sha512:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+SSLHashType
+ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
+ return ssl_hash_sha1;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256:
+ return ssl_hash_sha256;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
+ return ssl_hash_sha384;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
+ return ssl_hash_sha512;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
+ return ssl_hash_none; /* Special for TLS 1.0/1.1. */
+ case ssl_sig_none:
+ case ssl_sig_ed25519:
+ case ssl_sig_ed448:
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return ssl_hash_none;
+}
+
+KeyType
+ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
+ return rsaKey;
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
+ return ecKey;
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1:
+ return dsaKey;
+ case ssl_sig_none:
+ case ssl_sig_ed25519:
+ case ssl_sig_ed448:
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return nullKey;
+}
+
+static SSLNamedGroup
+ssl_NamedGroupForSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+ return ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1;
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+ return ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1;
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+ return ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Validate that the signature scheme works for the given key.
+ * If |allowSha1| is set, we allow the use of SHA-1.
+ * If |matchGroup| is set, we also check that the group and hash match. */
+static PRBool
+ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(PRBool allowSha1, PRBool matchGroup,
+ KeyType keyType,
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup,
+ SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (keyType != ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(scheme)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!allowSha1 && ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme) == ssl_hash_sha1) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (keyType != ecKey) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!ecGroup) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* If |allowSha1| is present and the scheme is ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1, it's OK.
+ * This scheme isn't bound to a specific group. */
+ if (allowSha1 && (scheme == ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1)) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!matchGroup) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return ecGroup->name == ssl_NamedGroupForSignatureScheme(scheme);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency checks that the signature
+ * algorithm identifier in |sigAndHash| is consistent with the public key in
+ * |cert|. It also checks the hash algorithm against the configured signature
+ * algorithms. If all the tests pass, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise,
+ * PORT_SetError is called and SECFailure is returned. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(
+ sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, CERTCertificate *cert)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *group = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *key;
+ KeyType keyType;
+ PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key);
+ if (keyType == ecKey) {
+ group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(key);
+ }
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
+
+ /* If we're a client, check that the signature algorithm matches the signing
+ * key type of the cipher suite. */
+ if (!isTLS13 &&
+ !ss->sec.isServer &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType != keyType) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */
+ if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(!isTLS13 /* allowSha1 */,
+ isTLS13 /* matchGroup */,
+ keyType, group, scheme)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ if (scheme == ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
+ case ssl_sig_none:
+ case ssl_sig_ed25519:
+ case ssl_sig_ed448:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ default:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme reads a SSLSignatureScheme (formerly
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm) structure from |b| and puts the resulting value
+ * into |out|. |b| and |length| are updated accordingly.
+ *
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
+SECStatus
+ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b,
+ PRUint32 *length, SSLSignatureScheme *out)
+{
+ PRInt32 tmp;
+
+ tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length);
+ if (tmp < 0) {
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */
+ }
+ if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *out = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * end of Consume Handshake functions.
+ **************************************************************************/
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
+ SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PK11Context *hashContext = PK11_CreateDigestContext(
+ ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg));
+
+ if (!hashContext) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hashContext);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(hashContext, buf, len);
+ }
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hashContext, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
+ sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
+ }
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg;
+ }
+ PK11_DestroyContext(hashContext, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point.
+ * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify
+ * ssl3_SendFinished
+ * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage
+ *
+ * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock.
+ * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock.
+ * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.)
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss,
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */
+ SSL3Hashes *hashes, /* output goes here. */
+ PRUint32 sender)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ unsigned int outLength;
+ SSL3Opaque md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ SSL3Opaque sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
+ PK11Context *h;
+ unsigned int stateLen;
+ unsigned char stackBuf[1024];
+ unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
+
+ h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
+ stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf,
+ sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen);
+ if (stateBuf == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ goto tls12_loser;
+ }
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
+ sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto tls12_loser;
+ }
+
+ hashes->hashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ tls12_loser:
+ if (stateBuf) {
+ if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (stateBuf != stackBuf) {
+ PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len,
+ ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss),
+ hashes);
+ } else {
+ PK11Context *md5;
+ PK11Context *sha = NULL;
+ unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL;
+ unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen;
+ unsigned char md5StackBuf[256];
+ unsigned char shaStackBuf[512];
+
+ md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf,
+ sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen);
+ if (md5StateBuf == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5;
+
+ shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf,
+ sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen);
+ if (shaStateBuf == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
+
+ if (!isTLS) {
+ /* compute hashes for SSL3. */
+ unsigned char s[4];
+
+ if (!spec->master_secret) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24);
+ s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16);
+ s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8);
+ s[3] = (unsigned char)sender;
+
+ if (sender != 0) {
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4);
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4));
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
+ mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength));
+
+ if (sender != 0) {
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4);
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4));
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
+ mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength));
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
+ mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH);
+ }
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
+
+ if (!isTLS) {
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
+ mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ }
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
+
+ hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ loser:
+ if (md5StateBuf) {
+ if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) !=
+ SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) {
+ PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen);
+ }
+ }
+ if (shaStateBuf) {
+ if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) !=
+ SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) {
+ PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * end of Handshake Hash functions.
+ * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes.
+ **************************************************************************/
+
+#ifdef TRACE
+#define CHTYPE(t) \
+ case client_hello_##t: \
+ return #t;
+
+static const char *
+ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(sslClientHelloType type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ CHTYPE(initial);
+ CHTYPE(retry);
+ CHTYPE(retransmit); /* DTLS only */
+ CHTYPE(renegotiation); /* TLS <= 1.2 only */
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return NULL;
+}
+#undef CHTYPE
+#endif
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(),
+ * ssl3_RedoHandshake()
+ * ssl_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session)
+ * dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE)
+ *
+ * The |type| argument indicates what is going on here:
+ * - client_hello_initial is set for the very first ClientHello
+ * - client_hello_retry indicates that this is a second attempt after receiving
+ * a HelloRetryRequest (in TLS 1.3)
+ * - client_hello_retransmit is used in DTLS when resending
+ * - client_hello_renegotiation is used to renegotiate (in TLS <1.3)
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int i;
+ int length;
+ int num_suites;
+ int actual_count = 0;
+ PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE, fallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE;
+ PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0;
+ unsigned paddingExtensionLen;
+ unsigned numCompressionMethods;
+ PRUint16 version;
+ PRInt32 flags;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send %s ClientHello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd, ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(type)));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled");
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are responding to a HelloRetryRequest, don't reinitialize. We need
+ * to maintain the handshake hashes. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ PORT_Assert(type == client_hello_retry);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* These must be reset every handshake. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0;
+ PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || type != client_hello_retransmit);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData);
+
+ /* How many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */
+ num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
+ if (!num_suites) {
+ return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * During a renegotiation, ss->clientHelloVersion will be used again to
+ * work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled.
+ */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ PORT_Assert(type != client_hello_initial);
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
+ ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup
+ * handles expired entries and other details.
+ * XXX If we've been called from ssl_BeginClientHandshake, then
+ * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful.
+ */
+ sid = (ss->opt.noCache) ? NULL
+ : ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url);
+
+ /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists,
+ * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ...
+ * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds
+ * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc.
+ */
+ if (sid) {
+ PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE;
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+
+ /* Check that the cipher suite we need is enabled. */
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite,
+ ss->cipherSuites);
+ PORT_Assert(suite);
+ if (!suite || !config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that we can recover the master secret. */
+ if (sidOK && sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) {
+ slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
+ }
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ } else {
+ PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL;
+ if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
+ ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
+ ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL)) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (wrapKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ slot = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that
+ ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been
+ ** removed, etc.
+ */
+ if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (sidOK) {
+ /* Set version based on the sid. */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ /*
+ * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
+ * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
+ * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
+ * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
+ * continue to use the client_version used in the initial
+ * ClientHello when renegotiating.
+ *
+ * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still
+ * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that
+ * sid->version is bounded within
+ * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we
+ * can't use sid.
+ */
+ if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min &&
+ sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) {
+ version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
+ } else {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Check sid->version is OK first.
+ * Previously, we would cap the version based on sid->version,
+ * but that prevents negotiation of a higher version if the
+ * previous session was reduced (e.g., with version fallback)
+ */
+ if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min ||
+ sid->version > ss->vrange.max) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ } else {
+ version = ss->vrange.max;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sidOK) {
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ sid = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sid) {
+ requestingResume = PR_TRUE;
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength));
+
+ ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy;
+ } else {
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses);
+
+ /*
+ * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
+ * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
+ * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
+ * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
+ * continue to use the client_version used in the initial
+ * ClientHello when renegotiating.
+ */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
+ } else {
+ version = ss->vrange.max;
+ }
+
+ sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
+ if (!sid) {
+ return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */
+ }
+ /* ss->version isn't set yet, but the sid needs a sane value. */
+ sid->version = version;
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
+ /* SSL records are not being MACed. */
+ cwSpec->version = version;
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) {
+ ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* decrement ref count, free if zero */
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+
+ /* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0. On initial handshake, prepend SCSV,
+ * only if TLS is disabled.
+ */
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) {
+ /* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders,
+ * to suppress sending of empty RI extension.
+ */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to
+ * prevent races with other resumption connections that receive a
+ * NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced.
+ * Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it
+ * is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold
+ * the lock across the calls to ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders.
+ */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ type == client_hello_initial) {
+ rv = tls13_SetupClientHello(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) {
+ PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */
+ PRInt32 extLen;
+
+ extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL);
+ if (extLen < 0) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ total_exten_len += extLen;
+
+ if (total_exten_len > 0)
+ total_exten_len += 2;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
+ }
+
+ /* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */
+ num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy);
+ if (!num_suites) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */
+ }
+
+ fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && (!requestingResume ||
+ version < sid->version);
+ /* make room for SCSV */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
+ ++num_suites;
+ }
+ if (fallbackSCSV) {
+ ++num_suites;
+ }
+
+ /* count compression methods */
+ numCompressionMethods = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) {
+ if (ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i]))
+ numCompressionMethods++;
+ }
+
+ length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH +
+ 1 + (sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ ? 0
+ : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) +
+ 2 + num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) +
+ 1 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len;
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ length += 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len;
+ }
+
+ /* A padding extension may be included to ensure that the record containing
+ * the ClientHello doesn't have a length between 256 and 511 bytes
+ * (inclusive). Initial, ClientHello records with such lengths trigger bugs
+ * in F5 devices.
+ *
+ * This is not done for DTLS, for renegotiation, or when there are no
+ * extensions. */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && isTLS && !ss->firstHsDone && total_exten_len) {
+ paddingExtensionLen = ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(length);
+ total_exten_len += paddingExtensionLen;
+ length += paddingExtensionLen;
+ } else {
+ paddingExtensionLen = 0;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ /* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around
+ * the Windows SChannel bug described above. */
+ PORT_Assert(version == ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ }
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = PR_MIN(version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ PRUint16 dtlsVersion;
+
+ dtlsVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, dtlsVersion, 2);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+
+ /* Generate a new random if this is the first attempt. */
+ if (type == client_hello_initial) {
+ rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+
+ if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
+ ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
+ else
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
+ ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
+ /* Add the actual SCSV */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ actual_count++;
+ }
+ if (fallbackSCSV) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV,
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ actual_count++;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
+ if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) {
+ actual_count++;
+ if (actual_count > num_suites) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ /* set error card removal/insertion error */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite,
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if cards were removed or inserted between count_cipher_suites and
+ * generating our list, detect the error here rather than send it off to
+ * the server.. */
+ if (actual_count != num_suites) {
+ /* Card removal/insertion error */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, numCompressionMethods, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) {
+ if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i]))
+ continue;
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i], 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (total_exten_len) {
+ PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2;
+ PRInt32 extLen;
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ extLen = ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(ss, paddingExtensionLen, maxBytes);
+ if (extLen < 0) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ maxBytes -= extLen;
+
+ extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL);
+ if (extLen < 0) {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ maxBytes -= extLen;
+
+ PORT_Assert(!maxBytes);
+ }
+
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) {
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
+ /* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */
+ TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
+ xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
+ ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn;
+ }
+
+ flags = 0;
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone && !IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+
+ if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set already. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a
+ * complete ssl3 Hello Request.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (sid) {
+ ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation);
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#define UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM 0x7fffffff
+
+static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = {
+ CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ CKM_CAST5_ECB,
+ CKM_DES_ECB,
+ CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS,
+ CKM_IDEA_ECB,
+ CKM_CAST3_ECB,
+ CKM_CAST_ECB,
+ CKM_RC5_ECB,
+ CKM_RC2_ECB,
+ CKM_CDMF_ECB,
+ CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
+ CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64,
+ CKM_AES_ECB,
+ CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB,
+ CKM_SEED_ECB,
+ UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM
+};
+
+static int
+ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
+{
+ const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *pMech = wrapMechanismList;
+
+ while (mech != *pMech && *pMech != UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) {
+ ++pMech;
+ }
+ return (*pMech == UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) ? -1
+ : (pMech - wrapMechanismList);
+}
+
+static PK11SymKey *
+ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(
+ SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey,
+ SSLAuthType authType,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech,
+ void *pwArg)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
+ SECItem wrappedKey;
+ PK11SymKey *Ks;
+ SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey;
+ ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped;
+
+ /* found the wrapping key on disk. */
+ PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech);
+ PORT_Assert(pWswk->authType == authType);
+ if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech ||
+ pWswk->authType != authType) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
+ wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
+ wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen;
+ PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
+
+ switch (authType) {
+
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt:
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey =
+ PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey,
+ masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa:
+ /*
+ * For ssl_auth_ecd*, we first create an EC public key based on
+ * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next,
+ * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and
+ * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
+ * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e.,
+ * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key.
+ *
+ * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined
+ * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
+ */
+ ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
+ ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <=
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
+
+ if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
+ ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen >
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var +
+ ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
+
+ wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen;
+ wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
+ ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
+
+ /* Derive Ks using ECDH */
+ Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
+ NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (Ks == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL,
+ &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech,
+ CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+loser:
+ return unwrappedWrappingKey;
+}
+
+/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of SymKey
+ * pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap the master
+ * secrets. There is one key for each authentication type. These Symkeys
+ * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ PK11SymKey *symWrapKey[ssl_auth_size];
+} ssl3SymWrapKey;
+
+static PZLock *symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
+static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS];
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void)
+{
+ if (symWrapKeysLock) {
+ PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (!symWrapKeysLock)
+ return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */
+ PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) {
+ for (j = 0; j < ssl_auth_size; ++j) {
+ PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey;
+ pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j];
+ if (*pSymWrapKey) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey);
+ *pSymWrapKey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks();
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void)
+{
+ symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
+ return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array.
+ * If that fails, look for one on disk.
+ * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk,
+ * Put the new key in the in-memory array.
+ *
+ * Note that this function performs some fairly inadvisable functions with
+ * certificate private keys. ECDSA keys are used with ECDH; similarly, RSA
+ * signing keys are used to encrypt. Bug 1248320.
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+ssl3_GetWrappingKey(sslSocket *ss,
+ PK11SlotInfo *masterSecretSlot,
+ const sslServerCert *serverCert,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech,
+ void *pwArg)
+{
+ SSLAuthType authType;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
+ int length;
+ int symWrapMechIndex;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem wrappedKey;
+ SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk;
+ PK11SymKey *Ks = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL;
+ ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped;
+
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert);
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair);
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey);
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey);
+ if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverKeyPair ||
+ !serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey ||
+ !serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL; /* hmm */
+ }
+ authType = serverCert->certType.authType;
+ svrPrivKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey;
+
+ symWrapMechIndex = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech);
+ PORT_Assert(symWrapMechIndex >= 0);
+ if (symWrapMechIndex < 0)
+ return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */
+
+ pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[authType];
+
+ ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE);
+
+ PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
+
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey;
+ if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) {
+ if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) {
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+ *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */
+ /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */
+ if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, authType, &wswk)) {
+ /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey =
+ ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, authType,
+ masterWrapMech, pwArg);
+ if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
+ goto install;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */
+ goto loser;
+
+ length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech);
+ /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
+ * It's ambiguous.
+ */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL,
+ length, pwArg);
+ if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey,
+ * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key.
+ */
+ PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */
+
+ svrPubKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey;
+ wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
+ wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
+ wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
+
+ PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
+ if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */
+ switch (authType) {
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt:
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */
+ asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey,
+ unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa:
+ /*
+ * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH
+ * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and
+ * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
+ * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks,
+ * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate
+ * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all
+ * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in
+ * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as
+ * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) == ecKey);
+ if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != ecKey) {
+ /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(
+ &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL);
+ if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the key size in bits */
+ if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) {
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len <
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
+ if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >=
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Derive Ks using ECDH */
+ Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
+ NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (Ks == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)(wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
+ ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size;
+ ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len;
+ PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len);
+
+ ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
+ PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen,
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
+
+ wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN -
+ (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen);
+ wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
+ ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
+
+ /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */
+ rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks,
+ unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer
+ * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset
+ */
+ ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len;
+
+ ec_cleanup:
+ if (privWrapKey)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey);
+ if (pubWrapKey)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey);
+ if (Ks)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
+ asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM);
+
+ wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech;
+ wswk.symWrapMechIndex = symWrapMechIndex;
+ wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism;
+ wswk.authType = authType;
+ wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len;
+
+ /* put it on disk. */
+ /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set,
+ * then abandon the value we just computed and
+ * use the one we got from the disk.
+ */
+ if (ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk)) {
+ /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk
+ * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard
+ * the key we just created and unwrap this new one.
+ */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+
+ unwrappedWrappingKey =
+ ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, authType,
+ masterWrapMech, pwArg);
+ }
+
+install:
+ if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
+ *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+ }
+
+loser:
+done:
+ PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ return unwrappedWrappingKey;
+}
+
+#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE
+/* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2|
+ * bytes to |out|. */
+static void
+hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length)
+{
+ static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+ *(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4];
+ *(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15];
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem enc_pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PRBool isTLS;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */
+ enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
+ enc_pms.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len);
+ if (enc_pms.data == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */
+ }
+
+ /* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */
+ rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE
+ if (ssl_keylog_iob) {
+ SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms);
+ if (extractRV == SECSuccess) {
+ SECItem *keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms);
+ if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) {
+#ifdef TRACE
+ if (ssl_trace >= 100) {
+ ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret",
+ keyData->data, keyData->len);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (ssl_keylog_iob && enc_pms.len >= 8 && keyData->len == 48) {
+ /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */
+
+ /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the
+ * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to
+ * fwrite. */
+ char buf[4 + 8 * 2 + 1 + 48 * 2 + 1];
+
+ strcpy(buf, "RSA ");
+ hexEncode(buf + 4, enc_pms.data, 8);
+ buf[20] = ' ';
+ hexEncode(buf + 21, keyData->data, 48);
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
+
+ fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob);
+ fflush(ssl_keylog_iob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange,
+ isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2
+ : enc_pms.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ if (isTLS) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ pms = NULL;
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (enc_pms.data != NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(enc_pms.data);
+ }
+ if (pms != NULL) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* DH shares need to be padded to the size of their prime. Some implementations
+ * require this. TLS 1.3 also requires this. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(const sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ PRBool appendLength)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int pad = pubKey->u.dh.prime.len - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len;
+
+ if (appendLength) {
+ rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ while (pad) {
+ rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ --pad;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshake(ss, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
+
+ const ssl3DHParams *params;
+ ssl3DHParams customParams;
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef;
+ static const sslNamedGroupDef customGroupDef = {
+ ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom, 0, ssl_kea_dh, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_CUSTOM, PR_FALSE
+ };
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ /* Copy DH parameters from server key */
+
+ if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != dhKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Work out the parameters. */
+ rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &svrPubKey->u.dh.prime,
+ &svrPubKey->u.dh.base,
+ &groupDef, &params);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* If we require named groups, we will have already validated the group
+ * in ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange() */
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups &&
+ !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups);
+
+ customParams.name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom;
+ customParams.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data;
+ customParams.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
+ customParams.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data;
+ customParams.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len;
+ params = &customParams;
+ groupDef = &customGroupDef;
+ }
+ ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef;
+
+ rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey;
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:",
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len));
+
+ if (isTLS)
+ target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+
+ /* Determine the PMS */
+ pms = PK11_PubDerive(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey,
+ PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE,
+ target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL);
+
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Note: send the DH share padded to avoid triggering bugs. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange,
+ params->prime.len + 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (pms)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ if (keyPair)
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECKEYPublicKey *serverKey = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) {
+ serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert);
+ if (serverKey == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey;
+ ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey);
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ rv = ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ rv = ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey);
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss,
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
+ const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes,
+ unsigned int peerSchemeCount,
+ PRBool requireSha1)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *group = NULL;
+ KeyType keyType;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PRBool slotDoesPss;
+ PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ /* We can't require SHA-1 in TLS 1.3. */
+ PORT_Assert(!(requireSha1 && isTLS13));
+ if (!pubKey || !privKey) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey);
+ if (!slot) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ slotDoesPss = PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss]);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey);
+ if (keyType == ecKey) {
+ group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(pubKey);
+ }
+
+ /* Here we look for the first local preference that the client has
+ * indicated support for in their signature_algorithms extension. */
+ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ SSLHashType hashType;
+ SECOidTag hashOID;
+ SSLSignatureScheme preferred = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i];
+ PRUint32 policy;
+
+ if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(!isTLS13 /* allowSha1 */,
+ isTLS13 /* matchGroup */,
+ keyType, group, preferred)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes when the certificate's private key slot does
+ * not support this signature mechanism. */
+ if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(preferred) && !slotDoesPss) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(preferred);
+ if (requireSha1 && (hashType != ssl_hash_sha1)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType);
+ if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) &&
+ !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ /* we ignore hashes we don't support */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < peerSchemeCount; j++) {
+ if (peerSchemes[j] == preferred) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = preferred;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme selects a signature scheme for signing the
+ * handshake. Most of this is determined by the key pair we are using.
+ * Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always used. With TLS 1.2, a
+ * client may advertise its support for signature and hash combinations. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ sslKeyPair *keyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair;
+ PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+
+ if (!isTLS12 || !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) {
+ /* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then
+ * we can assume that they support SHA-1: RFC5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. */
+ switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(keyPair->pubKey)) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1;
+ } else {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* Sets error code, if needed. */
+ return ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, keyPair->pubKey, keyPair->privKey,
+ ss->xtnData.clientSigSchemes,
+ ss->xtnData.numClientSigScheme,
+ PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes,
+ unsigned int numSchemes)
+{
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ PORT_Assert(pubKey);
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == rsaKey ||
+ SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == dsaKey) &&
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey) <= 1024) {
+ /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that
+ * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older
+ * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and
+ * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must
+ * be SHA-1.
+ */
+ rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes,
+ PR_TRUE /* requireSha1 */);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* If this fails, that's because the peer doesn't advertise SHA-1,
+ * so fall back to the full negotiation. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes,
+ PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool isTLS12;
+ SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ unsigned int len;
+ SSLHashType hashAlg;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+ } else {
+ /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */
+ hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record &&
+ hashAlg != ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len,
+ hashAlg, &hashes);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(es) */
+ }
+
+ isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+
+ rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, privKey, &buf);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing.
+ ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this.
+ ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail.
+ */
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE;
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */
+ }
+
+ len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0);
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (buf.data)
+ PORT_Free(buf.data);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary
+ * information is properly set. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite chosenSuite,
+ PRBool initHashes)
+{
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = chosenSuite;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(chosenSuite);
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg];
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite;
+
+ if (!initHashes) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* Now we've have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */
+ return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
+ * ssl3 ServerHello message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ PRInt32 temp; /* allow for consume number failure */
+ PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE;
+ int i;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion downgradeCheckVersion;
+#endif
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &ss->version);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+
+ /* We got a HelloRetryRequest, but the server didn't pick 1.3. Scream. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the server negotiated the same version as it did
+ * in the first handshake. This isn't really the best place for
+ * us to be getting this version number, but it's what we have.
+ * (1294697). */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->version != ss->ssl3.crSpec->version)) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
+ isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
+ ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+
+#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
+ /* Check the ServerHello.random per
+ * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1].
+ *
+ * TLS 1.3 clients receiving a TLS 1.2 or below ServerHello MUST check
+ * that the top eight octets are not equal to either of these values.
+ * TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also perform this check if the ServerHello
+ * indicates TLS 1.1 or below. If a match is found the client MUST
+ * abort the handshake with a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert.
+ *
+ * Disable this test during the TLS 1.3 draft version period.
+ */
+ downgradeCheckVersion = ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion ? ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion
+ : ss->vrange.max;
+
+ if (downgradeCheckVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 &&
+ downgradeCheckVersion > ss->version) {
+ /* Both sections use the same sentinel region. */
+ unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel =
+ ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand +
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random);
+ if (!PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel,
+ tls13_downgrade_random,
+ sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random)) ||
+ !PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel,
+ tls12_downgrade_random,
+ sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random))) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+ if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+ if (isTLS)
+ desc = decode_error;
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* find selected cipher suite in our list. */
+ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (temp < 0) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+ i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
+ PORT_Assert(i > 0);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
+ if (temp == suite->cipher_suite) {
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version };
+ if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is
+ * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here
+ * in order to give a more precise error code. */
+ if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(temp, &vrange)) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ break; /* failure */
+ }
+
+ suite_found = PR_TRUE;
+ break; /* success */
+ }
+ }
+ if (!suite_found) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, (ssl3CipherSuite)temp, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = internal_error;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ /* find selected compression method in our list. */
+ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (temp < 0) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+ suite_found = PR_FALSE;
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) {
+ if (temp == ssl_compression_methods[i]) {
+ if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) {
+ break; /* failure */
+ }
+ suite_found = PR_TRUE;
+ break; /* success */
+ }
+ }
+ if (!suite_found) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp;
+ } else {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null;
+ }
+
+ /* Note that if !isTLS and the extra stuff is not extensions, we
+ * do NOT goto alert_loser.
+ * There are some old SSL 3.0 implementations that do send stuff
+ * after the end of the server hello, and we deliberately ignore
+ * such stuff in the interest of maximal interoperability (being
+ * "generous in what you accept").
+ * Update: Starting in NSS 3.12.6, we handle the renegotiation_info
+ * extension in SSL 3.0.
+ */
+ if (length != 0) {
+ SECItem extensions;
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) {
+ if (isTLS)
+ goto alert_loser;
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensions.data,
+ &extensions.len, server_hello);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, &sidBytes, &errCode);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+
+loser:
+ /* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */
+ ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes,
+ int *retErrCode)
+{
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool sid_match;
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+ if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
+ (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection ||
+ ss->opt.enableRenegotiation ==
+ SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED
+ : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+
+ /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the
+ * key exchange algorithm. */
+ rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or
+ * not and if so it may match the one we sent.
+ * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so...
+ * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error.
+ */
+ sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes->len > 0 &&
+ sidBytes->len ==
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength &&
+ !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len));
+
+ if (sid_match) {
+ if (sid->version != ss->version ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ do {
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+
+ SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */
+
+ /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3]
+ *
+ * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension but the new ServerHello contains the extension, the
+ * client MUST abort the handshake.
+ */
+ if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed &&
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * o If the original session used an extended master secret but the new
+ * ServerHello does not contain the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension, the client SHOULD abort the handshake.
+ *
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Add option to refuse to resume when EMS is not
+ * used at all (bug 1176526).
+ */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.authType = sid->authType;
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits;
+
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */
+ CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0;
+
+ /* unwrap master secret */
+ slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ break; /* not considered an error. */
+ }
+ if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ break; /* not considered an error. */
+ }
+ wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
+ ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (wrapKey == NULL) {
+ break; /* not considered an error. */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
+ keyFlags =
+ CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ }
+
+ wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
+ pwSpec->master_secret =
+ PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
+ CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags);
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
+ if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
+ break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
+ pwSpec->master_secret =
+ PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ &wrappedMS, NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Got a Match */
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits);
+
+ /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */
+ if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello)
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes);
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
+
+ /* copy the peer cert from the SID */
+ if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
+ ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
+ }
+
+ /* NULL value for PMS because we are reusing the old MS */
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } while (0);
+ }
+
+ if (sid_match)
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ else
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses);
+
+ /* throw the old one away */
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE;
+ ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+
+ /* get a new sid */
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */
+ }
+
+ sid->version = ss->version;
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes->len;
+ if (sidBytes->len > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len);
+ }
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed =
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn);
+
+ /* Copy Signed Certificate Timestamps, if any. */
+ if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps,
+ &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps);
+ ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_null) {
+ /* All current cipher suites other than those with ssl_auth_null (i.e.,
+ * (EC)DH_anon_* suites) require a certificate, so use that signal. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert;
+ } else {
+ /* All the remaining cipher suites must be (EC)DH_anon_* and so
+ * must be ephemeral. Note, if we ever add PSK this might
+ * change. */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+
+loser:
+ *retErrCode = errCode;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SSLHashType hashAlg;
+ PRBool isTLS = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
+ SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme;
+
+ SECItem dh_p = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem dh_g = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem dh_Ys = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned dh_p_bits;
+ unsigned dh_g_bits;
+ PRInt32 minDH;
+
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
+ }
+ dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p);
+ if (dh_p_bits < minDH) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ /* Abort if dh_g is 0, 1, or obviously too big. */
+ dh_g_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_g);
+ if (dh_g_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_g_bits <= 1) {
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) {
+ /* If we're doing named groups, make sure it's good. */
+ rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &dh_p, &dh_g, NULL, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&dh_p, &dh_Ys)) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme,
+ ss->sec.peerCert);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme);
+ } else {
+ /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */
+ hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+ sigScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ if (length != 0) {
+ if (isTLS) {
+ desc = decode_error;
+ }
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len));
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len));
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len));
+
+ /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */
+ /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */
+ desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
+
+ /*
+ * Check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes,
+ dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, PR_FALSE /* padY */);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode =
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode =
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer
+ * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate
+ * pkcs11 slots and ID's.
+ */
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey);
+ if (peerKey == NULL) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ peerKey->arena = arena;
+ peerKey->keyType = dhKey;
+ peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
+ peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) ||
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) ||
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey;
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode));
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a
+ * complete ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ rv = ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
+ }
+ /* All Handle*ServerKeyExchange functions set the error code. */
+ return rv;
+}
+
+typedef struct dnameNode {
+ struct dnameNode *next;
+ SECItem name;
+} dnameNode;
+
+/*
+ * Parse the ca_list structure in a CertificateRequest.
+ *
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest
+ * tls13_HandleCertificateRequest
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length,
+ PLArenaPool *arena, CERTDistNames *ca_list)
+{
+ PRInt32 remaining;
+ int nnames = 0;
+ dnameNode *node;
+ int i;
+
+ remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length);
+ if (remaining < 0)
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+
+ if ((PRUint32)remaining > *length)
+ goto alert_loser;
+
+ ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode);
+ if (node == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+
+ while (remaining > 0) {
+ PRInt32 len;
+
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+
+ node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+
+ remaining -= 2;
+ if (remaining < len)
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+
+ node->name.data = *b;
+ *b += len;
+ *length -= len;
+ remaining -= len;
+ nnames++;
+ if (remaining <= 0)
+ break; /* success */
+
+ node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode);
+ node = node->next;
+ if (node == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+
+ ca_list->nnames = nnames;
+ ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames);
+ if (nnames > 0 && ca_list->names == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+
+ for (i = 0, node = (dnameNode *)ca_list->head;
+ i < nnames;
+ i++, node = node->next) {
+ ca_list->names[i] = node->name;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+no_mem:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ return SECFailure;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 ? illegal_parameter
+ : decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocket *ss, PLArenaPool *arena,
+ SSLSignatureScheme **schemesOut,
+ unsigned int *numSchemesOut,
+ unsigned char **b, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem buf;
+ SSLSignatureScheme *schemes;
+ unsigned int numSchemes = 0;
+ unsigned int max;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &buf, 2, b, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* An empty or odd-length value is invalid. */
+ if (buf.len == 0 || (buf.len & 1) != 0) {
+ ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Limit the number of schemes we read. */
+ max = PR_MIN(buf.len / 2, MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES);
+
+ if (arena) {
+ schemes = PORT_ArenaZNewArray(arena, SSLSignatureScheme, max);
+ } else {
+ schemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, max);
+ }
+ if (!schemes) {
+ ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (; max; --max) {
+ PRInt32 tmp;
+ tmp = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buf.data, &buf.len);
+ if (tmp < 0) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) {
+ schemes[numSchemes++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!numSchemes) {
+ if (!arena) {
+ PORT_Free(schemes);
+ }
+ schemes = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *schemesOut = schemes;
+ *numSchemesOut = numSchemes;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Certificate Request message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SECItem cert_types = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes = NULL;
+ unsigned int signatureSchemeCount = 0;
+ CERTDistNames ca_list;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL);
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+
+ arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, arena,
+ &signatureSchemes,
+ &signatureSchemeCount,
+ &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
+ goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, arena, &ca_list);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto done; /* alert sent in ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs */
+
+ if (length != 0)
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done;
+
+ rv = ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(ss, signatureSchemes,
+ signatureSchemeCount, &ca_list);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ goto done;
+
+no_mem:
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ goto done;
+
+alert_loser:
+ if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter)
+ desc = decode_error;
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+done:
+ if (arena != NULL)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss,
+ const SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes,
+ unsigned int signatureSchemeCount,
+ CERTDistNames *ca_list)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+ /* XXX Should pass cert_types and algorithms in this call!! */
+ rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg,
+ ss->fd, ca_list,
+ &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
+ &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ } else {
+ rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */
+ }
+ switch (rv) {
+ case SECWouldBlock: /* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */
+ ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(ss);
+ break; /* not an error */
+
+ case SECSuccess:
+ /* check what the callback function returned */
+ if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) {
+ /* we are missing either the key or cert */
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) {
+ /* got a cert, but no key - free it */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) {
+ /* got a key, but no cert - free it */
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ }
+ goto send_no_certificate;
+ }
+ /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate.
+ */
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert(
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
+ certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE);
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ goto send_no_certificate;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record ||
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
+ rv = ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(ss, signatureSchemes,
+ signatureSchemeCount);
+ }
+ break; /* not an error */
+
+ case SECFailure:
+ default:
+ send_no_certificate:
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate);
+ }
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending);
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+
+ if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ } else {
+ PRBool maybeFalseStart;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
+ * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
+ * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
+ * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10;
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+
+ if (!maybeFalseStart) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+ rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd,
+ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData,
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE"
+ : "FALSE"));
+ } else {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError())));
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PRBool result;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
+ case wait_new_session_ticket:
+ case wait_change_cipher:
+ case wait_finished:
+ result = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ result = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Server Hello Done message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ /* Skipping CertificateRequest is always permitted. */
+ if (ws != wait_hello_done &&
+ ws != wait_cert_request) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone and ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
+ *
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool sendClientCert;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert &&
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL &&
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL;
+
+ /* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before
+ * sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client
+ * certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the
+ * domain we are connecting to.
+ *
+ * XXX: We should do the same for the NPN extension, but for that we
+ * need an option to give the application the ability to leak the NPN
+ * information to get better performance.
+ *
+ * During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive
+ * application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate;
+ * i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher
+ * specs agreed upon for that handshake. During a renegotiation, we may
+ * continue sending and receiving application data during the handshake
+ * interleaved with the handshake records. If we were to send the client's
+ * second round for a renegotiation before the server's certificate was
+ * authenticated, then the application data sent/received after this point
+ * would be using cipher spec that hadn't been authenticated. By waiting
+ * until the server's certificate has been authenticated during
+ * renegotiations, we ensure that renegotiations have the same property
+ * as initial handshakes; i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake
+ * before using the cipher specs agreed upon for that handshake for
+ * application data.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
+ PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget");
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending &&
+ (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
+ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound;
+ return SECWouldBlock;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) {
+ ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE;
+ rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss);
+ /* Don't send verify */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ } else if (sendClientCert) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+
+ if (sendClientCert) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+
+ /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in
+ * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information
+ * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart
+ * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from
+ * the functions that depend on this being set.
+ */
+ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+ /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
+ * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+ /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
+ * false starting before we try to flush the client second
+ * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully
+ * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished,
+ * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that
+ * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being
+ * done before its false start callback is called.
+ */
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished
+ * message are racing each other. If the certificate
+ * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in
+ * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
+ */
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because"
+ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss));
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Routines used by servers
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello()
+ */
+static SECComparison
+ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2)
+{
+ if (!name1 != !name2) {
+ return SECLessThan;
+ }
+ if (!name1) {
+ return SECEqual;
+ }
+ if (name1->type != name2->type) {
+ return SECLessThan;
+ }
+ return SECITEM_CompareItem(name1, name2);
+}
+
+/* Sets memory error when returning NULL.
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_SendClientHello()
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHello()
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello()
+ * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
+ */
+sslSessionID *
+ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid;
+
+ sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID);
+ if (sid == NULL)
+ return sid;
+
+ if (is_server) {
+ const SECItem *srvName;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/
+ srvName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (srvName->len && srvName->data) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(sid);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID);
+ sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url);
+ sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer;
+ sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port;
+ sid->references = 1;
+ sid->cached = never_cached;
+ sid->version = ss->version;
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE;
+ sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED;
+ sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = NULL;
+ sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = NULL;
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (is_server) {
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int pid = SSL_GETPID();
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES;
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff;
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2,
+ SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES - 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return sid;
+}
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello,
+ * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello().
+ */
+ kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+
+ if (kea_def->ephemeral) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert
+ : wait_client_key;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */
+static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 };
+
+static PRBool
+ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(const ssl3KEADef *kea_def)
+{
+ if (kea_def->signKeyType == dsaKey) {
+ /* TODO: Fix session tickets for DSS. The server code rejects the
+ * session ticket received from the client. Bug 1174677 */
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Select a cipher suite.
+**
+** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
+** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello().
+**
+** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client
+** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS
+** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure
+** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all,
+** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export
+** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites
+** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we
+** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites,
+ PRBool initHashes)
+{
+ int j;
+ int i;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j];
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version };
+ if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
+ return ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, initHashes);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call the SNI config hook.
+ *
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello
+ * tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
+#error("No longer allowed to set SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS")
+#endif
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) {
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec
+ * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */
+ PRBool passed = PR_TRUE;
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName.data) {
+ passed = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/
+ if (!passed) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sniSocketConfig)
+ do { /* not a loop */
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */
+ if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
+ /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */
+ ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd,
+ ss->xtnData.sniNameArr,
+ ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize,
+ ss->sniSocketConfigArg);
+ }
+ if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
+ /* Application does not know the name or was not able to
+ * properly reconfigure the socket. */
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = unrecognized_name;
+ break;
+ } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) {
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem pwsNameBuf = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem *pwsName = &pwsNameBuf;
+ SECItem *cwsName;
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pwsName->data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ if (cwsName->data) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if ((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
+ /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it
+ * and save the name. */
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem *name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret];
+ int configedCiphers;
+ SECItem *pwsName;
+
+ /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */
+ /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (pwsName->data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ configedCiphers = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
+ if (configedCiphers <= 0) {
+ /* no ciphers are working/supported */
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Need to tell the client that application has picked
+ * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket.
+ */
+ ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_server_name_xtn,
+ ssl3_SendServerNameXtn);
+ } else {
+ /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */
+ PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize);
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (0);
+ ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData);
+ if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
+ /* desc and errCode should be set. */
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+ PRCList *cursor;
+
+ /* If the client didn't include the supported groups extension, assume just
+ * P-256 support and disable all the other ECDHE groups. This also affects
+ * ECDHE group selection, but this function is called first. */
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) {
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
+ if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] &&
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh &&
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->name != ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1) {
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* This picks the first certificate that has:
+ * a) the right authentication method, and
+ * b) the right named curve (EC only)
+ *
+ * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all
+ * based on what order they are configured in. */
+ for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts);
+ cursor != &ss->serverCerts;
+ cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
+ sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor;
+ if (cert->certType.authType != kea_def->authKeyType) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa ||
+ cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa ||
+ cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) &&
+ !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->certType.namedCurve)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Found one. */
+ ss->sec.serverCert = cert;
+ ss->sec.authType = cert->certType.authType;
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits;
+
+ /* Don't pick a signature scheme if we aren't going to use it. */
+ if (kea_def->signKeyType == nullKey) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ return ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(ss);
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
+ * ssl3 Client Hello message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = NULL;
+ PRInt32 tmp;
+ unsigned int i;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
+ TLSExtension *versionExtension;
+ SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem cookieBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem suites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem comps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PRBool isTLS13;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0;
+
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
+ /* Refuse re-handshake when we have already negotiated TLS 1.3. */
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
+ desc = no_renegotiation;
+ level = alert_warning;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Get peer name of client */
+ rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should
+ * clear previous state.
+ */
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData);
+ ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
+ }
+
+ tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (tmp < 0)
+ goto loser; /* malformed, alert already sent */
+
+ /* Translate the version. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = version =
+ dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp);
+ } else {
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the client random data. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
+ ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the client's SID, if present. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the client's cookie, if present. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookieBytes, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the list of cipher suites. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &suites, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the list of compression methods. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &comps, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if
+ * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been
+ * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension.
+ * Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake
+ * of interoperability (and backwards compatibility).
+ */
+
+ if (length) {
+ /* Get length of hello extensions */
+ PRInt32 extension_length;
+ extension_length = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (extension_length < 0) {
+ goto loser; /* alert already sent */
+ }
+ if (extension_length != length) {
+ ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* send alert */
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+ }
+
+ versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn);
+ if (versionExtension) {
+ rv = tls13_NegotiateVersion(ss, versionExtension);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = (errCode == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION) ? protocol_version : illegal_parameter;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* The PR_MIN here ensures that we never negotiate 1.3 if the
+ * peer didn't offer "supported_versions". */
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss,
+ PR_MIN(version,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2),
+ PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
+ : handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+ isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
+
+ /* You can't resume TLS 1.3 like this. */
+ if (isTLS13 && sidBytes.len) {
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the Server Random now so it is available
+ * when we process the ClientKeyShare in TLS 1.3 */
+ rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
+ /*
+ * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1].
+ * TLS 1.3 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello with a
+ * client_version indicating TLS 1.2 or below MUST set the last eight
+ * bytes of their Random value to the bytes:
+ *
+ * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01
+ *
+ * TLS 1.2 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello with a
+ * client_version indicating TLS 1.1 or below SHOULD set the last eight
+ * bytes of their Random value to the bytes:
+ *
+ * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00
+ *
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Note this change was not added in the SSLv2
+ * compat processing code since that will most likely be removed before
+ * we ship the final version of TLS 1.3. Bug 1306672.
+ */
+ if (ss->vrange.max > ss->version) {
+ unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel =
+ ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand +
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random);
+
+ switch (ss->vrange.max) {
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ PORT_Memcpy(downgrade_sentinel,
+ tls13_downgrade_random,
+ sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random));
+ break;
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ PORT_Memcpy(downgrade_sentinel,
+ tls12_downgrade_random,
+ sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random));
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Do not change random. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Now parse the rest of the extensions. */
+ rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, client_hello);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a
+ * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */
+ if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) {
+ for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ continue;
+ desc = inappropriate_fallback;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression only include null. */
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ if (comps.len != 1 || comps.data[0] != ssl_compression_null) {
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ /* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV,
+ * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension
+ * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
+ SSL3Opaque *b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext;
+ PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
+ (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* This is a second check for TLS 1.3 and re-handshake to stop us
+ * from re-handshake up to TLS 1.3, so it happens after version
+ * negotiation. */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->firstHsDone &&
+ (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN ||
+ ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = no_renegotiation;
+ level = alert_warning;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
+ (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* We do stateful resumes only if we are in TLS < 1.3 and
+ * either of the following conditions are satisfied:
+ * (1) the client does not support the session ticket extension, or
+ * (2) the client support the session ticket extension, but sent an
+ * empty ticket.
+ */
+ if ((ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) &&
+ (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) ||
+ ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket)) {
+ if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) {
+ SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0],
+ ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1],
+ ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2],
+ ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3]));
+ if (ssl_sid_lookup) {
+ sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data,
+ sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle);
+ } else {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ss->statelessResume) {
+ /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume.
+ * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.)
+ * This branch also handles TLS 1.3 resumption-PSK.
+ */
+ sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/
+
+ if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
+ PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data,
+ sidBytes.len);
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
+ } else {
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0;
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Free a potentially leftover session ID from a previous handshake. */
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (sid != NULL) {
+ /* We've found a session cache entry for this client.
+ * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert,
+ * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache,
+ * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo),
+ * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session.
+ */
+ if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate &&
+ ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
+ (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) ||
+ ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) &&
+ !ss->firstHsDone))) {
+
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ sid = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
+ }
+
+#ifdef PARANOID
+ /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */
+ j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
+ if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */
+ errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, &comps, sid);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc);
+/* FALLTHRU */
+loser:
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss,
+ SECItem *suites,
+ SECItem *comps,
+ sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int j;
+
+ /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the
+ ** same cipher suite and compression method we picked before.
+ ** This is not a loop, despite appearances.
+ */
+ if (sid)
+ do {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+#ifdef PARANOID
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version };
+#endif
+
+ /* Check that the cached compression method is still enabled. */
+ if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression))
+ break;
+
+ /* Check that the cached compression method is in the client's list */
+ for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) {
+ if (comps->data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == comps->len)
+ break;
+
+ suite = ss->cipherSuites;
+ /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */
+ for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) {
+ if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(j > 0);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ break;
+#ifdef PARANOID
+ /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled,
+ * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled.
+ * The product policy won't change during the process lifetime.
+ * Implemented ("isPresent") shouldn't change for servers.
+ */
+ if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss))
+ break;
+#else
+ if (!suite->enabled)
+ break;
+#endif
+ /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's
+ * list. If it isn't, fall through and start a new session. */
+ for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
+ rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = internal_error;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Use the cached compression method. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.compression =
+ sid->u.ssl3.compression;
+ goto compression_found;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (0);
+/* START A NEW SESSION */
+
+#ifndef PARANOID
+ /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */
+ j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
+ if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */
+ desc = internal_error;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Select a compression algorithm. */
+ for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) {
+ SSLCompressionMethod method = (SSLCompressionMethod)comps->data[i];
+ if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, method))
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0; j < ssl_compression_method_count; j++) {
+ if (method == ssl_compression_methods[j]) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_methods[j];
+ goto compression_found;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP;
+ /* null compression must be supported */
+ goto alert_loser;
+
+compression_found:
+ suites->data = NULL;
+ comps->data = NULL;
+
+ /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid,
+ * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave
+ * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one.
+ * The exception here is attempts to resume extended_master_secret
+ * sessions without the extension, which causes an alert.
+ */
+ if (sid != NULL)
+ do {
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped key */
+ const sslServerCert *serverCert;
+
+ if (sid->version != ss->version ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.compression != ss->ssl3.hs.compression) {
+ break; /* not an error */
+ }
+
+ serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, &sid->certType);
+ if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverCert) {
+ /* A compatible certificate must not have been configured. It
+ * might not be the same certificate, but we only find that out
+ * when the ticket fails to decrypt. */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3]
+ * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension but the new ClientHello contains the extension, then the
+ * server MUST NOT perform the abbreviated handshake. Instead, it
+ * SHOULD continue with a full handshake (as described in
+ * Section 5.2) to negotiate a new session.
+ *
+ * o If the original session used the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension but the new ClientHello does not contain the extension,
+ * the server MUST abort the abbreviated handshake.
+ */
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) {
+ break; /* not an error */
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) {
+ /* Note: we do not destroy the session */
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) {
+ ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+ /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE;
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
+ PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */
+ CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0;
+
+ wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, serverCert,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+ if (!wrapKey) {
+ /* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ }
+
+ wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
+
+ /* unwrap the master secret. */
+ pwSpec->master_secret =
+ PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
+ CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
+ if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
+ break; /* not an error */
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ pwSpec->master_secret =
+ PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
+ break; /* not an error */
+ }
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+ if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
+ ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session.
+ *
+ * XXX make sure compression still matches
+ */
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits);
+ if (ss->statelessResume)
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
+
+ ss->sec.authType = sid->authType;
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits;
+
+ /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent,
+ ** but they do remember the slot we originally used, so we
+ ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket
+ ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one.
+ */
+ ss->sec.serverCert = serverCert;
+ ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(serverCert->serverCert);
+
+ /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */
+ if (sid != NULL &&
+ sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+ sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) {
+ /* Set server name from sid */
+ SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName;
+ SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (pwsName->data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = internal_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clean up sni name array */
+ ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData);
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE;
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* NULL value for PMS because we are re-using the old MS */
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (haveXmitBufLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } while (0);
+
+ if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ sid = NULL;
+ }
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses);
+
+ /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports
+ * the extension and we are unable to resume.
+ *
+ * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful
+ * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session
+ * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume,
+ * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while
+ * resuming.)
+ */
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) &&
+ ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) {
+ ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData,
+ ssl_session_ticket_xtn,
+ ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* The alert has already been sent. */
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser; /* memory error is set. */
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed =
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (haveXmitBufLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+/* FALLTHRU */
+loser:
+ if (sid && sid != ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ }
+
+ if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ if (haveXmitBufLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes
+ * in asking to use the V3 handshake.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length,
+ PRUint8 padding)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = NULL;
+ unsigned char *suites;
+ unsigned char *random;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int i;
+ int j;
+ int sid_length;
+ int suite_length;
+ int rand_length;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
+ unsigned int total = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData);
+
+ version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2];
+ if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ total += suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4];
+ total += sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6];
+ total += rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8];
+ total += padding;
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = version;
+
+ if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ /* [draft-ietf-tls-tls-11; C.3] forbids sending a TLS 1.3
+ * ClientHello using the backwards-compatible format. */
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */
+ desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
+ : handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
+
+ /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */
+ if (length != total) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, total));
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
+ random = suites + suite_length + sid_length;
+
+ if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES ||
+ rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length],
+ random, rand_length);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[0],
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH));
+ i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Select a cipher suite.
+ **
+ ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
+ ** ssl3_HandleClientHello().
+ **
+ ** See the comments about export cipher suites in ssl3_HandleClientHello().
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j];
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version };
+ if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
+ PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2];
+ if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
+ rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = internal_error;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ goto suite_found;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
+ goto alert_loser;
+
+suite_found:
+
+ /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a
+ * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */
+ if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) {
+ for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2];
+ if (suite_i == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ desc = inappropriate_fallback;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI
+ * extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
+ PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2];
+ if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
+ SSL3Opaque *b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext;
+ PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
+ (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null;
+
+ rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses);
+ sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser; /* memory error is set. */
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+ /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */
+
+ /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */
+ rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version.
+**
+** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session),
+** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session),
+** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session)
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535;
+ PRUint32 length;
+ PRInt32 extensions_len = 0;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
+ if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+ extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(
+ ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]);
+ if (extensions_len > 0)
+ extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 doesn't use the session_id or compression_method
+ * fields in the ServerHello. */
+ length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ length += 1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength);
+ }
+ length += sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite);
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ length += 1; /* Compression */
+ }
+ length += extensions_len;
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version);
+ } else {
+ version = tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(ss->version);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ /* Random already generated in ssl3_HandleClientHello */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(
+ ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ if (sid) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
+ ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ if (extensions_len) {
+ PRInt32 sent_len;
+
+ extensions_len -= 2;
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber */
+ sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len,
+ &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]);
+ PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len);
+ if (sent_len != extensions_len) {
+ if (sent_len >= 0)
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef,
+ const ssl3DHParams *params,
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair)
+{
+ SECKEYDHParams dhParam;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair;
+
+ dhParam.prime.data = params->prime.data;
+ dhParam.prime.len = params->prime.len;
+ dhParam.base.data = params->base.data;
+ dhParam.base.len = params->base.len;
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dhParam.prime.data,
+ dhParam.prime.len));
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dhParam.base.data,
+ dhParam.base.len));
+
+ /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */
+ privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL);
+ if (!privKey || !pubKey) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(groupDef, privKey, pubKey);
+ if (!pair) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *keyPair = pair;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ int length;
+ SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ SSLHashType hashAlg;
+
+ const ssl3DHParams *params;
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *certPrivateKey;
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef;
+
+ if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) {
+ /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature.
+ See bug 1170510. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_SelectDHEGroup(ss, &groupDef);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef;
+
+ params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef);
+ rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+ } else {
+ /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */
+ hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+ }
+
+ pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey;
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:",
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len));
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes,
+ pubKey->u.dh.prime,
+ pubKey->u.dh.base,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue,
+ PR_TRUE /* padY */);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ certPrivateKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey;
+ rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, certPrivateKey, &signed_hash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */
+ }
+
+ length = 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len +
+ 2 + pubKey->u.dh.base.len +
+ 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len +
+ 2 + signed_hash.len;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ length += 2;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.base.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.base.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data,
+ signed_hash.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (signed_hash.data)
+ PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_dh: {
+ return ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(ss);
+ }
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh: {
+ return ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss);
+ }
+
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ case ssl_kea_null:
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, unsigned maxLen, PRUint32 *len)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ PRUint8 *p = buf;
+
+ PORT_Assert(maxLen >= ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2);
+ if (maxLen < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ PRUint32 policy = 0;
+ SSLHashType hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]);
+ SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType);
+
+ /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes if there are no tokens to verify them. */
+ if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) &&
+ !PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss])) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) != SECSuccess) ||
+ (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ p = ssl_EncodeUintX((PRUint32)ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], 2, p);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (p == buf) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *len = p - buf;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+void
+ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, int *calen, SECItem **names,
+ int *nnames)
+{
+ SECItem *name;
+ CERTDistNames *ca_list;
+ int i;
+
+ *calen = 0;
+ *names = NULL;
+ *nnames = 0;
+
+ /* ssl3.ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */
+ ca_list = ss->ssl3.ca_list;
+ if (!ca_list) {
+ ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list != NULL) {
+ *names = ca_list->names;
+ *nnames = ca_list->nnames;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0, name = *names; i < *nnames; i++, name++) {
+ *calen += 2 + name->len;
+ }
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PRBool isTLS12;
+ const PRUint8 *certTypes;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int length;
+ SECItem *names;
+ int calen;
+ int nnames;
+ SECItem *name;
+ int i;
+ int certTypesLength;
+ PRUint8 sigAlgs[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2];
+ unsigned int sigAlgsLength = 0;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+
+ ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames);
+ certTypes = certificate_types;
+ certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types;
+
+ length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen;
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, sigAlgs, sizeof(sigAlgs), &sigAlgsLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ length += 2 + sigAlgsLength;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Certificate Verify message
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
+ SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme;
+ SSLHashType hashAlg;
+ SSL3Hashes localHashes;
+ SSL3Hashes *hashesForVerify = NULL;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 is handled by tls13_HandleCertificateVerify */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (!hashes) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ desc = internal_error;
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme,
+ ss->sec.peerCert);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = decrypt_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme);
+
+ /* Read from the message buffer, but we need to use only up to the end
+ * of the previous handshake message. The length of the transcript up to
+ * that point is saved in |hashes->u.transcriptLen|. */
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ hashes->u.transcriptLen,
+ hashAlg, &localHashes);
+
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ hashesForVerify = &localHashes;
+ } else {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE;
+ desc = decrypt_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ hashesForVerify = hashes;
+ sigScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+
+ /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */
+ rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, hashesForVerify, &signed_hash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ signed_hash.data = NULL;
+
+ if (length != 0) {
+ desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter;
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA.
+ * Then generate and return the PMS.
+ * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use
+ * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys() (above)
+ * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above)
+ * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below)
+ * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = serverKeySlot;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ SECItem param;
+ CK_VERSION version;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3];
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+ /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on
+ ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null
+ ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ calg = spec->cipher_def->calg;
+
+ /* First get an appropriate slot. */
+ mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN;
+ mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ mechanism_array[2] = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg);
+
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND);
+ return pms; /* which is NULL */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion temp;
+
+ temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ version.major = MSB(temp);
+ version.minor = LSB(temp);
+ } else {
+ version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ }
+
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&version;
+ param.len = sizeof version;
+
+ pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, &param, 0, pwArg);
+ if (!serverKeySlot)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return pms;
+}
+
+/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER
+ * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message,
+ * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message.
+ * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly
+ * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS.
+ * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection.
+ * Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure
+ * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where
+ * the failure must occur.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
+ SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length,
+ sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem enc_pms;
+ PK11SymKey *tmpPms[2] = { NULL, NULL };
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ int useFauxPms = 0;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ enc_pms.data = b;
+ enc_pms.len = length;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
+ PRInt32 kLen;
+ kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len);
+ if (kLen < 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) {
+ enc_pms.len = kLen;
+ }
+ }
+
+#define currentPms tmpPms[!useFauxPms]
+#define unusedPms tmpPms[useFauxPms]
+#define realPms tmpPms[1]
+#define fauxPms tmpPms[0]
+
+ /*
+ * Get as close to algorithm 2 from RFC 5246; Section 7.4.7.1
+ * as we can within the constraints of the PKCS#11 interface.
+ *
+ * 1. Unconditionally generate a bogus PMS (what RFC 5246
+ * calls R).
+ * 2. Attempt the RSA decryption to recover the PMS (what
+ * RFC 5246 calls M).
+ * 3. Set PMS = (M == NULL) ? R : M
+ * 4. Use ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) to attempt to derive
+ * the MS from PMS. This includes performing the version
+ * check and length check.
+ * 5. If either the initial RSA decryption failed or
+ * ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) failed, then discard
+ * M and set PMS = R. Else, discard R and set PMS = M.
+ *
+ * We do two derivations here because we can't rely on having
+ * a function that only performs the PMS version and length
+ * check. The only redundant cost is that this runs the PRF,
+ * which isn't necessary here.
+ */
+
+ /* Generate the bogus PMS (R) */
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKeyPair->privKey);
+ if (!slot) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE)) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL);
+ if (!slot) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ fauxPms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (fauxPms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer
+ * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do
+ * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the
+ * unwrapped pms will be used.
+ */
+ realPms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKeyPair->privKey, &enc_pms,
+ CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0);
+ /* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */
+ useFauxPms |= (realPms == NULL);
+
+ /* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to
+ * check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we
+ * then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this
+ * operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS
+ * since it is correctly formatted. */
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, currentPms, NULL);
+
+ /* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS and discard the
+ * FPMS. Else, select the FPMS and select the true PMS */
+ useFauxPms |= (rv != SECSuccess);
+
+ if (unusedPms) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(unusedPms);
+ }
+
+ /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, currentPms);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(currentPms);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */
+ }
+
+#undef currentPms
+#undef unusedPms
+#undef realPms
+#undef fauxPms
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
+ SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length,
+ sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ clntPubKey.keyType = dhKey;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.data;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.base.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.len;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.base.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.data;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue,
+ 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime,
+ &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ if (isTLS)
+ target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+
+ /* Determine the PMS */
+ pms = PK11_PubDerive(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL,
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+
+ if (kea_def->ephemeral) {
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair;
+ /* There should be exactly one pair. */
+ PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
+ PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) ==
+ PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
+ keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
+ serverKeyPair = keyPair->keys;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits =
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey);
+ } else {
+ serverKeyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyBits;
+ }
+
+ if (!serverKeyPair) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->pubKey);
+ PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->privKey);
+
+ ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType;
+
+ switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher;
+ } else {
+ /* PORT_SetError has been called by all the Handle*ClientKeyExchange
+ * functions above. However, not all error paths result in an alert, so
+ * this ensures that the server knows about the error. Note that if an
+ * alert was already sent, SSL3_SendAlert() is a noop. */
+ PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+ PRBool isTLS13 = PR_FALSE;
+ const SECItem *context;
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest);
+ context = &ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context;
+ len = context->len + 1;
+ isTLS13 = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context->data, context->len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewSessionTicket
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECItem ticket = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+ SECStatus rv;
+ NewSessionTicket nticket = { 0 };
+
+ rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, &ticket);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* Serialize the handshake message. Length =
+ * lifetime (4) + ticket length (2) + ticket. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket,
+ 4 + 2 + ticket.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* This is a fixed value. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT, 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* Encode the ticket. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticket.data, ticket.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (ticket.data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem ticketData;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
+ * until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in
+ * ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details.
+ */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time();
+ if (length < 4) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint =
+ (PRUint32)ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length);
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed */
+ }
+ /* If the server sent a zero-length ticket, ignore it and keep the
+ * existing ticket. */
+ if (ticketData.len != 0) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket,
+ &ticketData);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+static PRInt32 connNum = 0;
+
+static SECStatus
+get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex)
+{
+ PRFileDesc *cf;
+ char *testdir;
+ char *startat;
+ char *stopat;
+ const char *extension;
+ int fileNum;
+ PRInt32 numBytes = 0;
+ PRStatus prStatus;
+ PRFileInfo info;
+ char cfn[100];
+
+ pCertItem->data = 0;
+ if ((testdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root"));
+ extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der");
+ fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1;
+ if ((startat = PR_GetEnvSecure("START_AT")) != NULL) {
+ fileNum += atoi(startat);
+ }
+ if ((stopat = PR_GetEnvSecure("STOP_AT")) != NULL &&
+ fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) {
+ *pIndex = -1;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ sprintf(cfn, "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension);
+ cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (!cf) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info);
+ if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) {
+ PR_Close(cf);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size);
+ if (pCertItem) {
+ numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size);
+ }
+ PR_Close(cf);
+ if (numBytes != info.size) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn);
+ *pIndex = -1;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Used by both client and server.
+ * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CERTCertificateList *certChain;
+ int certChainLen = 0;
+ int i;
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ SECItem fakeCert;
+ int ndex = -1;
+#endif
+ PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned int contextLen = 0;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->sec.localCert)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* A server certificate is selected in ssl3_HandleClientHello. */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert);
+
+ certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain;
+ ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert);
+ } else {
+ certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain;
+ ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ }
+
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex);
+#endif
+
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ contextLen = 1; /* Size of the context length */
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest);
+ context = ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context;
+ contextLen += context.len;
+ }
+ }
+ if (certChain) {
+ for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
+ certChainLen += fakeCert.len + 3;
+ } else {
+ certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
+ }
+#else
+ certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate,
+ contextLen + certChainLen + 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data,
+ context.len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ if (certChain) {
+ for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data,
+ fakeCert.len, 3);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
+ certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
+ }
+#else
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
+ certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
+#endif
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Used by server only.
+ * single-stapling, send only a single cert status
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int len = 0;
+ SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL;
+ const sslServerCert *serverCert;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
+
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn))
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */
+ serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
+ if (serverCert->certStatusArray && serverCert->certStatusArray->len) {
+ statusToSend = serverCert->certStatusArray;
+ }
+ if (!statusToSend)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */
+ len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3;
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_status, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
+ statusToSend->items[0].data,
+ statusToSend->items[0].len,
+ 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain
+ * from the cert database after they've been validated.
+ */
+void
+ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena;
+ ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain;
+
+ for (; certs; certs = certs->next) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert);
+ }
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL;
+
+ if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) {
+ if (ss->sec.peerKey) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey);
+ ss->sec.peerKey = NULL;
+ }
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
+ ss->sec.peerCert = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 CertificateStatus message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* code already set */
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ PRInt32 status, len;
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+
+ /* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */
+ status = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (status != 1 /* ocsp */) {
+ ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (len != length) {
+ ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+#define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */
+ if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN) {
+ ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+#undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN
+
+ /* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */
+ SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1);
+ if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items)
+ return SECFailure; /* code already set */
+
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length);
+
+ if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE);
+ return SECFailure; /* code already set */
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length);
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length;
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Certificate message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if ((ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert) ||
+ (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert)) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleCertificate
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ ssl3CertNode *c;
+ ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL;
+ PRInt32 remaining = 0;
+ PRInt32 size;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE;
+ SECItem certItem;
+
+ ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message
+ ** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a
+ ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability.
+ */
+ if (length) {
+ remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (remaining < 0)
+ goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
+ if ((PRUint32)remaining > length)
+ goto decode_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (!remaining) {
+ if (!(isTLS && isServer)) {
+ desc = bad_certificate;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */
+ /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
+ rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
+ } else {
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */
+ }
+
+ /* First get the peer cert. */
+ remaining -= 3;
+ if (remaining < 0)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (size <= 0)
+ goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
+
+ if (remaining < size)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ certItem.data = b;
+ certItem.len = size;
+ b += size;
+ length -= size;
+ remaining -= size;
+
+ ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
+ PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
+ /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the
+ * problem was just some local problem, like memory error.
+ */
+ goto ambiguous_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Now get all of the CA certs. */
+ while (remaining > 0) {
+ remaining -= 3;
+ if (remaining < 0)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (size <= 0)
+ goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
+
+ if (remaining < size)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ certItem.data = b;
+ certItem.len = size;
+ b += size;
+ length -= size;
+ remaining -= size;
+
+ c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */
+ }
+
+ c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
+ PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (c->cert == NULL) {
+ goto ambiguous_err;
+ }
+
+ c->next = NULL;
+ if (lastCert) {
+ lastCert->next = c;
+ } else {
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c;
+ }
+ lastCert = c;
+ }
+
+ if (remaining != 0)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert);
+
+ if (!isServer &&
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+
+ambiguous_err:
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ switch (errCode) {
+ case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
+ if (isTLS) {
+ desc = internal_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
+ goto loser;
+
+decode_loser:
+ desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+
+loser:
+ (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ int errCode;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
+
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+ /*
+ * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain.
+ */
+ rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd,
+ PR_TRUE, isServer);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ if (rv != SECWouldBlock) {
+ if (ss->handleBadCert) {
+ rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
+
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert;
+
+ /* set the server authentication type and size from the value
+ ** in the cert. */
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ /* These are filled in in tls13_HandleCertificateVerify and
+ * tls13_HandleServerKeyShare. */
+ ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType;
+ ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
+ }
+ if (pubKey) {
+ KeyType pubKeyType;
+ PRInt32 minKey;
+ /* This partly fixes Bug 124230 and may cause problems for
+ * callers which depend on the old (wrong) behavior. */
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
+ pubKeyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey);
+ minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ switch (pubKeyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ rv =
+ NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey);
+ if (rv !=
+ SECSuccess) {
+ minKey =
+ SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS;
+ }
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ rv =
+ NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey);
+ if (rv !=
+ SECSuccess) {
+ minKey =
+ SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS;
+ }
+ break;
+ case dhKey:
+ rv =
+ NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey);
+ if (rv !=
+ SECSuccess) {
+ minKey =
+ SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Too small: not good enough. Send a fatal alert. */
+ /* We aren't checking EC here on the understanding that we only
+ * support curves we like, a decision that might need revisiting. */
+ if (ss->sec.authKeyBits < minKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY);
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
+ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0
+ ? insufficient_security
+ : illegal_parameter);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ pubKey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify);
+ } else {
+ /* Ephemeral suites require ServerKeyExchange. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral) {
+ /* require server_key_exchange */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key;
+ } else {
+ /* disallow server_key_exchange */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
+ /* This is static RSA key exchange so set the key exchange
+ * details to compensate for that. */
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ ss->sec.keaGroup = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Server */
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
+ } else {
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify);
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold 1stHandshakeLock.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (error != 0) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail;
+ ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) {
+ sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
+
+ if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race"
+ " with peer's finished message",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ }
+
+ rv = target(ss);
+ /* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim
+ * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent
+ * calls to SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Send/PR_Read/etc.
+ */
+ if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ } else {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with"
+ " peer's finished message",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake);
+
+ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
+ !ss->firstHsDone &&
+ !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
+ ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) {
+ /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because
+ * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still
+ * haven't received all of the server's second round yet.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
+ } else {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PRBool isServer,
+ const SSL3Hashes *hashes,
+ TLSFinished *tlsFinished)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS tls_mac_params;
+ SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PK11Context *prf_context;
+ unsigned int retLen;
+
+ if (!spec->master_secret) {
+ const char *label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished";
+ unsigned int len = 15;
+ HASH_HashType hashType = ssl3_GetTls12HashType(ss);
+ return ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(spec, label, len, hashes->u.raw,
+ hashes->len, tlsFinished->verify_data,
+ sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data, hashType);
+ }
+
+ if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF;
+ } else {
+ tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ }
+ tls_mac_params.ulMacLength = 12;
+ tls_mac_params.ulServerOrClient = isServer ? 1 : 2;
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&tls_mac_params;
+ param.len = sizeof(tls_mac_params);
+ prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_MAC, CKA_SIGN,
+ spec->master_secret, &param);
+ if (!prf_context)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, &retLen,
+ sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data);
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* The calling function must acquire and release the appropriate
+ * lock (e.g., ssl_GetSpecReadLock / ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock for
+ * ss->ssl3.crSpec).
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const char *label,
+ unsigned int labelLen, const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen,
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen, HASH_HashType tls12HashType)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ if (spec->master_secret) {
+ SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL;
+ PK11Context *prf_context;
+ unsigned int retLen;
+
+ if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256;
+ }
+ prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN,
+ spec->master_secret, &param);
+ if (!prf_context)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen);
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
+ * ssl3_HandleFinished
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int padding_len;
+ static const unsigned char padding[32] = { 0 };
+
+ if (ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0 ||
+ ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ padding_len = 32 - ((ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2) % 32);
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len +
+ 2 +
+ padding_len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.nextProto.data,
+ ss->xtnData.nextProto.len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* called from ssl3_SendFinished
+ *
+ * This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a
+ * SECStatus. */
+static void
+ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem *keyData;
+ char buf[14 /* "CLIENT_RANDOM " */ +
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 /* client_random */ +
+ 1 /* " " */ +
+ 48 * 2 /* master secret */ +
+ 1 /* new line */];
+ unsigned int j;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (!ssl_keylog_iob)
+ return;
+
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return;
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+
+ /* keyData does not need to be freed. */
+ keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret);
+ if (!keyData || !keyData->data || keyData->len != 48) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */
+
+ /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the
+ * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to
+ * fwrite. */
+
+ memcpy(buf, "CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14);
+ j = 14;
+ hexEncode(buf + j, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ j += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2;
+ buf[j++] = ' ';
+ hexEncode(buf + j, keyData->data, 48);
+ j += 48 * 2;
+ buf[j++] = '\n';
+
+ PORT_Assert(j == sizeof(buf));
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+
+ if (fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob) != 1)
+ return;
+ fflush(ssl_keylog_iob);
+ return;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello
+ * ssl3_HandleFinished
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ TLSFinished tlsFinished;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender);
+ if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS) {
+ if (isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished;
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ } else {
+ if (isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s;
+ PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s;
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes.u.s);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+
+ ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+fail:
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID.
+ * Caller holds the Spec read lock.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid,
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSLAuthType authType)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *wrappingKey = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *symKeySlot;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
+
+ symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(spec->master_secret);
+ if (!isServer) {
+ int wrapKeyIndex;
+ int incarnation;
+
+ /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex =
+ PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot);
+ PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation =
+ PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE;
+ /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before
+ * placing it in the SID cache entry. */
+ wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex,
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation,
+ pwArg);
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
+ } else {
+ int keyLength;
+ /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it.
+ * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot
+ * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection,
+ * but we will not be able to restart this session.
+ */
+ mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
+ keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism);
+ /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
+ * It's ambiguous.
+ */
+ wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL,
+ keyLength, pwArg);
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* server socket using session cache. */
+ mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
+ if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+ wrappingKey =
+ ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, ss->sec.serverCert,
+ mechanism, pwArg);
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism;
+ PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot);
+
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ SECItem wmsItem;
+
+ wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey,
+ spec->master_secret, &wmsItem);
+ /* rv is examined below. */
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len;
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Finished message from the peer.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
+ const SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!hashes) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ if (isTLS) {
+ TLSFinished tlsFinished;
+
+ if (length != sizeof(tlsFinished)) {
+#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
+ return SECFailure;
+#endif
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer,
+ hashes, &tlsFinished);
+ if (!isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof(tlsFinished);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess ||
+ 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b,
+ PR_MIN(length, ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes))) {
+#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ return SECFailure;
+#endif
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) {
+ (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes->u.s;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes->u.s;
+ PORT_Assert(hashes->len == sizeof hashes->u.s);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes->u.s;
+ if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes->u.s, b, length)) {
+ (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/
+
+ if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) ||
+ (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) {
+ PRInt32 flags = 0;
+
+ /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us
+ * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify.
+ * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the
+ * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the
+ * ServerHello message.)
+ */
+ if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) &&
+ ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) {
+ /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the
+ * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending
+ * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's
+ * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+ /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data)
+ ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the
+ ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished)
+ ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data.
+ */
+ if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) {
+ flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
+ }
+
+ if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+xmit_loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache) {
+ rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid);
+
+ /* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid.
+ * The connection continues normally however.
+ */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = rv == SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
+ PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget");
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake;
+ return SECWouldBlock;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* fill in the sid */
+ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
+ sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression;
+ sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy;
+ sid->version = ss->version;
+ sid->authType = ss->sec.authType;
+ sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType;
+ sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits;
+ sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time();
+ sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout;
+ sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ memcpy(&sid->certType, &ss->sec.serverCert->certType, sizeof(sid->certType));
+ } else {
+ sid->certType.authType = ssl_auth_null;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT &&
+ ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) {
+ if (SECITEM_CopyItem(
+ NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, &ss->xtnData.nextProto) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error already set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/
+
+ /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */
+ if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) {
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len =
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len;
+ memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len);
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE;
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid,
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType);
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs
+ * to have type sslRestartTarget.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL);
+
+ /* The first handshake is now completed. */
+ ss->handshake = NULL;
+
+ /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
+ * until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server
+ * sends a NewSessionTicket in a resumption handshake, we must wait until
+ * the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished
+ * AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid.
+ *
+ * This must be done before we call ss->sec.cache(ss->sec.ci.sid)
+ * because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also
+ * because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and
+ * ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) {
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+ ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket);
+ /* The sid took over the ticket data */
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached);
+ ss->sec.cache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake;
+
+ ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3
+ * hanshake message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
+ PRBool endOfRecord)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */
+ SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr = NULL; /* Set when hashes are computed */
+ PRUint8 hdr[4];
+ PRUint8 dtlsData[8];
+ PRBool computeHashes = PR_FALSE;
+ PRUint16 epoch;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ /*
+ * We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the
+ * current message.
+ */
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ if ((type == finished) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished)) {
+ computeHashes = PR_TRUE;
+ } else if ((type == certificate_verify) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_cert_verify)) {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ /* We cannot compute the hash yet. We must wait until we have
+ * decoded the certificate_verify message in
+ * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify, which will tell us which
+ * hash function we must use.
+ *
+ * (ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify cannot simply look at the
+ * buffer length itself, because at the time we reach it,
+ * additional handshake messages will have been added to the
+ * buffer, e.g. the certificate_verify message itself.)
+ *
+ * Therefore, we use SSL3Hashes.u.transcriptLen to save how much
+ * data there is and read directly from ss->ssl3.hs.messages
+ * when calculating the hashes.
+ *
+ * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify will detect
+ * hashType == handshake_hash_record
+ * and use that information to calculate the hash.
+ */
+ hashes.u.transcriptLen = ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len;
+ hashesPtr = &hashes;
+ } else {
+ computeHashes = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (type == certificate_verify) {
+ computeHashes = TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify);
+ } else if (type == finished) {
+ computeHashes =
+ TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request, wait_finished);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
+ if (computeHashes) {
+ SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ? ss->ssl3.crSpec
+ : ss->ssl3.prSpec;
+
+ if (type == finished) {
+ sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server;
+ rSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ hashesPtr = &hashes;
+ }
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/
+ }
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type)));
+
+ hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type;
+ hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
+ hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8);
+ hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length);
+
+ /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. Unless this is
+ * TLS 1.3 and we sent a HelloRetryRequest. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ /* We should not include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages
+ * in the handshake hashes */
+ if ((ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_request) &&
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_verify_request)) {
+ rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+
+ /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Sequence number */
+ dtlsData[0] = MSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq);
+ dtlsData[1] = LSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq);
+
+ /* Fragment offset */
+ dtlsData[2] = 0;
+ dtlsData[3] = 0;
+ dtlsData[4] = 0;
+
+ /* Fragment length */
+ dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
+ dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8);
+ dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length);
+
+ rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData,
+ sizeof(dtlsData));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+ }
+
+ /* The message body */
+ rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != certificate_status) {
+ /* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred
+ * certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage.
+ * But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did
+ * not send it then we need to validate the certificate now. If the
+ * server does send the CertificateStatus message then we will
+ * authenticate the certificate in ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECWouldBlock);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch;
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
+ case client_hello:
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case server_hello:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
+ } else {
+ rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length,
+ hashesPtr);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ (epoch != ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) && !endOfRecord) {
+ /* If we changed read cipher states, there must not be any
+ * data in the input queue. */
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv != SECFailure)) {
+ /* Increment the expected sequence number */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length, SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
+ case hello_request:
+ if (length != 0) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss);
+ break;
+
+ case hello_retry_request:
+ /* This arrives here because - as a client - we haven't received a
+ * final decision on the version from the server. */
+ rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+
+ case hello_verify_request:
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case certificate:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case certificate_status:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case server_key_exchange:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case certificate_request:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case server_hello_done:
+ if (length != 0) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss);
+ break;
+ case certificate_verify:
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
+ break;
+ case client_key_exchange:
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case new_session_ticket:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case finished:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record.
+ * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content.
+ * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
+{
+ /*
+ * There may be a partial handshake message already in the handshake
+ * state. The incoming buffer may contain another portion, or a
+ * complete message or several messages followed by another portion.
+ *
+ * Each message is made contiguous before being passed to the actual
+ * message parser.
+ */
+ sslBuffer *buf = &ss->ssl3.hs.msgState; /* do not lose the original buffer pointer */
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (buf->buf == NULL) {
+ *buf = *origBuf;
+ }
+ while (buf->len > 0) {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) {
+ PRUint8 t;
+ t = *(buf->buf++);
+ buf->len--;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4)
+ continue;
+
+#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN
+
+ /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through,
+ ** even if buf->len is zero.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new
+ * data available for this message. If it can be done right out
+ * of the original buffer, then use it from there.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
+ /* handle it from input buffer */
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len,
+ buf->len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ /* This test wants to fall through on either
+ * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
+ * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code.
+ */
+ return rv;
+ }
+ buf->buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
+ buf->len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */
+ return rv;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */
+ unsigned int bytes;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+ bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len);
+
+ /* Grow the buffer if needed */
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len,
+ buf->buf, bytes);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes;
+ buf->buf += bytes;
+ buf->len -= bytes;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+
+ /* if we have a whole message, do it */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(
+ ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len,
+ buf->len == 0);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ /* This test wants to fall through on either
+ * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
+ * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code.
+ */
+ return rv;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */
+ return rv;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } /* end loop */
+
+ origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */
+ buf->buf = NULL; /* not a leak. */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
+ * them with something else for odd compilers. */
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ((unsigned)((int)(x) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1)))
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
+
+/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if
+ * rv == SECSuccess. Otherwise it returns zero. */
+static unsigned int
+SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv)
+{
+ unsigned int good;
+ /* rv ^ SECSuccess is zero iff rv == SECSuccess. Subtracting one results
+ * in the MSB being set to one iff it was zero before. */
+ good = rv ^ SECSuccess;
+ good--;
+ return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
+}
+
+/* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char
+ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+ a -= b;
+ return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
+}
+
+/* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char
+ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+{
+ unsigned int c = a ^ b;
+ c--;
+ return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
+}
+
+/* ssl_constantTimeSelect return a if mask is 0xFF and b if mask is 0x00 */
+static unsigned char
+ssl_constantTimeSelect(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+{
+ return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
+ unsigned int blockSize,
+ unsigned int macSize)
+{
+ unsigned int paddingLength, good, t;
+ const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
+
+ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+ * time. */
+ if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1];
+ /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
+ t = plaintext->len;
+ t -= paddingLength + overhead;
+ /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
+ good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
+ /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+ t = blockSize - (paddingLength + 1);
+ good &= DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
+ plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1);
+ return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize)
+{
+ unsigned int paddingLength, good, t, toCheck, i;
+ const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
+
+ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+ * time. */
+ if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1];
+ t = plaintext->len;
+ t -= paddingLength + overhead;
+ /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
+ good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
+
+ /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then
+ * that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte.
+ * Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of
+ * padding.
+ *
+ * We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks
+ * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+ * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+ * public information so we can use it.) */
+ toCheck = 256; /* maximum amount of padding + 1. */
+ if (toCheck > plaintext->len) {
+ toCheck = plaintext->len;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) {
+ unsigned int t = paddingLength - i;
+ /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is
+ * 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */
+ unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
+ unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1 - i];
+ /* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value
+ * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
+ good &= ~(mask & (paddingLength ^ b));
+ }
+
+ /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+ * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
+ * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
+ * bits. */
+ good &= good >> 4;
+ good &= good >> 2;
+ good &= good >> 1;
+ good <<= sizeof(good) * 8 - 1;
+ good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
+
+ plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1);
+ return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
+}
+
+/* On entry:
+ * originalLength >= macSize
+ * macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH
+ * plaintext->len >= macSize
+ */
+static void
+ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
+ unsigned int originalLength,
+ SSL3Opaque *out,
+ unsigned int macSize)
+{
+ unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the
+ * MAC. */
+ unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len;
+ unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize;
+ /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+ * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
+ unsigned scanStart = 0;
+ unsigned i, j;
+ unsigned char rotateOffset;
+
+ if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1) {
+ scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1);
+ }
+
+ /* We want to compute
+ * rotateOffset = (macStart - scanStart) % macSize
+ * But the time to compute this varies based on the amount of padding. Thus
+ * we explicitely handle all mac sizes with (hopefully) constant time modulo
+ * using Barrett reduction:
+ * q := (rotateOffset * m) >> k
+ * rotateOffset -= q * n
+ * if (n <= rotateOffset) rotateOffset -= n
+ */
+ rotateOffset = macStart - scanStart;
+ /* rotateOffset < 255 + 1 + 48 = 304 */
+ if (macSize == 16) {
+ rotateOffset &= 15;
+ } else if (macSize == 20) {
+ /*
+ * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/20 - 25/2^9 ) < 1
+ * with rotateOffset <= 853
+ */
+ unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 25) >> 9;
+ rotateOffset -= q * 20;
+ rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 20),
+ 20, 0);
+ } else if (macSize == 32) {
+ rotateOffset &= 31;
+ } else if (macSize == 48) {
+ /*
+ * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/48 - 10/2^9 ) < 1
+ * with rotateOffset < 768
+ */
+ unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 10) >> 9;
+ rotateOffset -= q * 48;
+ rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 48),
+ 48, 0);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * SHA384 (macSize == 48) is the largest we support. We should never
+ * get here.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ rotateOffset = rotateOffset % macSize;
+ }
+
+ memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize);
+ for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) {
+ for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) {
+ unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart);
+ unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd);
+ unsigned char b = 0;
+ b = plaintext->buf[i];
+ rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line
+ * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */
+ memset(out, 0, macSize);
+ rotateOffset = macSize - rotateOffset;
+ rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize),
+ 0, rotateOffset);
+ for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) {
+ out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, rotateOffset);
+ }
+ rotateOffset++;
+ rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize),
+ 0, rotateOffset);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Unprotect an SSL3 record and leave the result in plaintext.
+ *
+ * If SECFailure is returned, we:
+ * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent.
+ * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code.
+ *
+ * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock.
+ * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert().
+ *
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext,
+ SSL3AlertDescription *alert)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ unsigned int good;
+ unsigned int ivLen = 0;
+ SSL3ContentType rType;
+ unsigned int minLength;
+ unsigned int originalLen = 0;
+ unsigned char header[13];
+ unsigned int headerLen;
+ SSL3Opaque hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ SSL3Opaque givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ SSL3Opaque *givenHash;
+ unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ good = ~0U;
+ minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
+ minLength++;
+ if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */
+ minLength += cipher_def->iv_size;
+ }
+ } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
+ minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size;
+ }
+
+ /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
+ * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
+ if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states
+ * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and
+ * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV
+ * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then
+ * discard it before decrypting the rest.
+ */
+ SSL3Opaque iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int decoded;
+
+ ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
+ if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) {
+ *alert = internal_error;
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen));
+
+ /* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away
+ * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block
+ * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block.
+ */
+ rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded,
+ sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen);
+
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen,
+ cText->buf->len - ivLen));
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ if (isTLS && cText->buf->len - ivLen > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) {
+ *alert = record_overflow;
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rType = cText->type;
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
+ /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the
+ * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general.
+ * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the
+ * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */
+ unsigned int decryptedLen =
+ cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size -
+ cipher_def->tag_size;
+ headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
+ header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
+ rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen);
+ PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header));
+ rv = crSpec->aead(
+ ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server,
+ PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */
+ plaintext->buf, /* out */
+ (int *)&plaintext->len, /* outlen */
+ plaintext->space, /* maxout */
+ cText->buf->buf, /* in */
+ cText->buf->len, /* inlen */
+ header, headerLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ good = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
+ rv = crSpec->decode(
+ crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
+ plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
+
+ originalLen = plaintext->len;
+
+ /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
+ const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
+
+ if (!isTLS) {
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(
+ plaintext, blockSize, macSize));
+ } else {
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(
+ plaintext, macSize));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* compute the MAC */
+ headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
+ header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
+ rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss),
+ plaintext->len - crSpec->mac_size);
+ PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header));
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
+ crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen,
+ plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen,
+ hash, &hashBytes);
+
+ ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf,
+ crSpec->mac_size);
+ givenHash = givenHashBuf;
+
+ /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC
+ * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust
+ * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we
+ * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */
+ plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */
+ plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
+ crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen,
+ plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes);
+
+ /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location
+ * is public when a stream cipher is used. */
+ givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len;
+ }
+
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
+
+ if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size ||
+ NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) {
+ /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */
+ good = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (good == 0) {
+ decrypt_loser:
+ /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+ *alert = bad_record_mac;
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the
+ * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf)
+ * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf
+ * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type,
+ * unless it's an application record.
+ *
+ * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and
+ * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL
+ * Handshake message.
+ *
+ * DOES NOT process the decrypted/decompressed application data.
+ * On return, databuf contains the decrypted/decompressed record.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake
+ * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq
+ *
+ * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock.
+ *
+ * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the
+ * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than
+ * Application Data records.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ sslSequenceNumber seq_num = 0;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec;
+ SSL3ContentType rType;
+ sslBuffer *plaintext;
+ sslBuffer temp_buf;
+ SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error;
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+
+ if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) {
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check for Token Presence */
+ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX().
+ * This implies that databuf holds a previously deciphered SSL Handshake
+ * message.
+ */
+ if (cText == NULL) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ rType = content_handshake;
+ goto process_it;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/
+ crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ PRBool sameEpoch;
+ if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, cText, &sameEpoch, &seq_num)) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
+
+ /* Maybe retransmit if needed. */
+ return dtls_MaybeRetransmitHandshake(ss, cText, sameEpoch);
+ }
+ } else {
+ seq_num = crSpec->read_seq_num + 1;
+ }
+ if (seq_num >= crSpec->cipher_def->max_records) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, seq_num));
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere
+ * other than into databuf */
+ if (crSpec->decompressor) {
+ temp_buf.buf = NULL;
+ temp_buf.space = 0;
+ plaintext = &temp_buf;
+ } else {
+ plaintext = databuf;
+ }
+
+ plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by Unprotect call below. */
+ if (plaintext->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************/
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048));
+ /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
+ /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted.
+ * Use the content type to tell whether this is should be discarded.
+ *
+ * XXX If we decide to remove the content type from encrypted records, this
+ * will become much more difficult to manage. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr &&
+ cText->type == content_application_data) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello);
+ databuf->len = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
+ plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len);
+#else
+ /* IMPORTANT: Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts
+ * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they
+ * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. */
+ if (crSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
+ crSpec->cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) {
+ /* Unencrypted TLS 1.3 records use the pre-TLS 1.3 format. */
+ rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert);
+ } else {
+ rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/
+
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) ||
+ (ss->sec.isServer &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) {
+ /* Silently drop the packet */
+ databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ int errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert);
+ /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called
+ * PORT_SetError(). */
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* SECSuccess */
+ crSpec->read_seq_num = seq_num;
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, seq_num);
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/
+
+ /*
+ * The decrypted data is now in plaintext.
+ */
+ rType = cText->type; /* This must go after decryption because TLS 1.3
+ * has encrypted content types. */
+
+ /* possibly decompress the record. If we aren't using compression then
+ * plaintext == databuf and so the uncompressed data is already in
+ * databuf. */
+ if (crSpec->decompressor) {
+ if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(
+ databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ plaintext->len +
+ SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION));
+ /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
+ /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */
+ PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = crSpec->decompressor(crSpec->decompressContext,
+ databuf->buf,
+ (int *)&databuf->len,
+ databuf->space,
+ plaintext->buf,
+ plaintext->len);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
+ isTLS ? decompression_failure
+ : bad_record_mac);
+
+ /* There appears to be a bug with (at least) Apache + OpenSSL where
+ * resumed SSLv3 connections don't actually use compression. See
+ * comments 93-95 of
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=275744
+ *
+ * So, if we get a decompression error, and the record appears to
+ * be already uncompressed, then we return a more specific error
+ * code to hopefully save somebody some debugging time in the
+ * future.
+ */
+ if (plaintext->len >= 4) {
+ unsigned int len = ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[1] << 16) |
+ ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[2] << 8) |
+ (unsigned int)plaintext->buf[3];
+ if (len == plaintext->len - 4) {
+ /* This appears to be uncompressed already */
+ err = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD;
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
+ PORT_SetError(err);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again.
+ */
+ if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this
+ ** function, not by this function.
+ */
+ if (rType == content_application_data) {
+ if (ss->firstHsDone)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ss->sec.isServer &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) {
+ return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, databuf);
+ }
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+/* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application.
+ */
+process_it:
+ /* XXX Get the xmit lock here. Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting
+ * data ang getting the xmit lock here prevents deadlocks.
+ */
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if
+ ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock.
+ */
+ switch (rType) {
+ case content_change_cipher_spec:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf);
+ break;
+ case content_alert:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf);
+ break;
+ case content_handshake:
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf);
+ } else {
+ rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf);
+ }
+ break;
+ /*
+ case content_application_data is handled before this switch
+ */
+ default:
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type));
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
+ ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization functions
+ */
+
+void
+ssl_InitSecState(sslSecurityInfo *sec)
+{
+ sec->authType = ssl_auth_null;
+ sec->authKeyBits = 0;
+ sec->signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ sec->keaType = ssl_kea_null;
+ sec->keaKeyBits = 0;
+ sec->keaGroup = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */
+/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */
+void
+ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+ spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null];
+ PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null);
+ spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null];
+ PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null);
+ spec->encode = Null_Cipher;
+ spec->decode = Null_Cipher;
+ spec->compressor = NULL;
+ spec->decompressor = NULL;
+ spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
+ spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
+ spec->mac_size = 0;
+ spec->master_secret = NULL;
+
+ spec->msItem.data = NULL;
+ spec->msItem.len = 0;
+
+ spec->client.write_key = NULL;
+ spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL;
+ spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
+
+ spec->server.write_key = NULL;
+ spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL;
+ spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
+
+ spec->write_seq_num = 0;
+ spec->read_seq_num = 0;
+ spec->epoch = 0;
+
+ spec->refCt = 128; /* Arbitrarily high number to prevent
+ * non-TLS 1.3 cipherSpecs from being
+ * GCed. This will be overwritten with
+ * a valid refCt for TLS 1.3. */
+ dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords);
+}
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord
+** ssl3_SendClientHello()
+** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
+** ssl3_HandleRecord()
+**
+** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock.
+**
+**
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.initialized)
+ return SECSuccess; /* Function should be idempotent */
+
+ ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED;
+
+ ssl_InitSecState(&ss->sec);
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[0];
+ ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[1];
+ ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.crSpec);
+ ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec);
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec->version = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version = ss->vrange.max;
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello;
+
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData);
+ PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions);
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1;
+ PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
+ dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL;
+ PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs);
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
+ PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0,
+ sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket));
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none;
+
+ ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss);
+
+ ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* record the export policy for this cipher suite */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
+ }
+ suite->policy = policy;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ PRInt32 policy;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite) {
+ policy = suite->policy;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
+ }
+ *oPolicy = policy;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* record the user preference for this suite */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
+ }
+ suite->enabled = enabled;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* return the user preference for this suite */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ PRBool pref;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite) {
+ pref = suite->enabled;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
+ }
+ *enabled = pref;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, ss->cipherSuites);
+ if (suite == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
+ }
+ suite->enabled = enabled;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefGet(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ PRBool pref;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites);
+ if (suite) {
+ pref = suite->enabled;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
+ }
+ *enabled = pref;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes,
+ unsigned int count)
+{
+ sslSocket *ss;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int supported = 0;
+
+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+ if (!ss) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!count) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) {
+ ++supported;
+ }
+ }
+ /* We don't check for duplicates, so it's possible to get too many. */
+ if (supported > MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid signature scheme %d ignored",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd, schemes[i]));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount++] = schemes[i];
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms,
+ unsigned int count)
+{
+ SSLSignatureScheme schemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ count = PR_MIN(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(schemes), count);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ schemes[i] = (algorithms[i].hashAlg << 8) | algorithms[i].sigAlg;
+ }
+ return SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(fd, schemes, count);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *schemes,
+ unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount)
+{
+ sslSocket *ss;
+
+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+ if (!ss) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!schemes || !count ||
+ maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(schemes, ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes,
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme));
+ *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignaturePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms,
+ unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount)
+{
+ sslSocket *ss;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+ if (!ss) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignaturePrefGet",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!algorithms || !count ||
+ maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ algorithms[i].hashAlg = (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
+ algorithms[i].sigAlg = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] & 0xff;
+ }
+ *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+unsigned int
+SSL_SignatureMaxCount()
+{
+ return MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES;
+}
+
+/* copy global default policy into socket. */
+void
+ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof(cipherSuites));
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, defaultSignatureSchemes,
+ sizeof(defaultSignatureSchemes));
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes);
+}
+
+/*
+** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state,
+** then start a new handshake.
+** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a
+** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done.
+**
+** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone ||
+ (ss->ssl3.initialized && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER ||
+ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (sid && flushCache) {
+ ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ /* start off a new handshake. */
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation);
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */
+void
+ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL)
+ ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) {
+ CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list);
+ }
+
+ /* clean up handshake */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) {
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages);
+ }
+
+ /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */
+ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf);
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName, PR_FALSE);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->arena, PR_FALSE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* free up the CipherSpecs */
+ ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/);
+ ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/);
+
+ /* Destroy the DTLS data */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) {
+ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Destroy remote extensions */
+ ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions);
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData);
+
+ /* Destroy TLS 1.3 cipher specs */
+ tls13_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs);
+
+ /* Destroy TLS 1.3 keys */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret);
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none;
+ /* Destroy TLS 1.3 buffered early data. */
+ tls13_DestroyEarlyData(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData);
+
+ ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+#define MAP_NULL(x) (((x) != 0) ? (x) : SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER)
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 policy = 0;
+
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policy);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || !(policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) {
+ return SECSuccess; /* do nothing */
+ }
+
+ /* disable every ciphersuite */
+ for (i = 1; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); ++i) {
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite = &cipher_suite_defs[i];
+ SECOidTag policyOid;
+
+ policyOid = MAP_NULL(kea_defs[suite->key_exchange_alg].oid);
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE);
+ ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->oid);
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) {
+ ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE);
+ ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->type != type_aead) {
+ policyOid = MAP_NULL(mac_defs[suite->mac_alg].oid);
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) {
+ ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE);
+ ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite,
+ SSL_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy();
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* End of ssl3con.c */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-09-21 19:37:58 +0000