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authorMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
committerMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
commit5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch)
tree10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /media/mtransport/transportlayerdtls.cpp
parent49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff)
downloaduxp-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.gz
Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'media/mtransport/transportlayerdtls.cpp')
-rw-r--r--media/mtransport/transportlayerdtls.cpp1262
1 files changed, 1262 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/media/mtransport/transportlayerdtls.cpp b/media/mtransport/transportlayerdtls.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55bf53f1b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/media/mtransport/transportlayerdtls.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1262 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
+ * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+// Original author: ekr@rtfm.com
+
+#include "transportlayerdtls.h"
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <queue>
+#include <sstream>
+
+#include "dtlsidentity.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Move.h"
+#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsIEventTarget.h"
+#include "nsNetCID.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "transportflow.h"
+
+
+namespace mozilla {
+
+MOZ_MTLOG_MODULE("mtransport")
+
+static PRDescIdentity transport_layer_identity = PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER;
+
+// TODO: Implement a mode for this where
+// the channel is not ready until confirmed externally
+// (e.g., after cert check).
+
+#define UNIMPLEMENTED \
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, \
+ "Call to unimplemented function "<< __FUNCTION__); \
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false); \
+ PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0)
+
+#define MAX_ALPN_LENGTH 255
+
+// We need to adapt the NSPR/libssl model to the TransportFlow model.
+// The former wants pull semantics and TransportFlow wants push.
+//
+// - A TransportLayerDtls assumes it is sitting on top of another
+// TransportLayer, which means that events come in asynchronously.
+// - NSS (libssl) wants to sit on top of a PRFileDesc and poll.
+// - The TransportLayerNSPRAdapter is a PRFileDesc containing a
+// FIFO.
+// - When TransportLayerDtls.PacketReceived() is called, we insert
+// the packets in the FIFO and then do a PR_Recv() on the NSS
+// PRFileDesc, which eventually reads off the FIFO.
+//
+// All of this stuff is assumed to happen solely in a single thread
+// (generally the SocketTransportService thread)
+struct Packet {
+ Packet() : data_(nullptr), len_(0) {}
+
+ void Assign(const void *data, int32_t len) {
+ data_.reset(new uint8_t[len]);
+ memcpy(data_.get(), data, len);
+ len_ = len;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<uint8_t[]> data_;
+ int32_t len_;
+};
+
+void TransportLayerNSPRAdapter::PacketReceived(const void *data, int32_t len) {
+ if (enabled_) {
+ input_.push(new Packet());
+ input_.back()->Assign(data, len);
+ }
+}
+
+int32_t TransportLayerNSPRAdapter::Recv(void *buf, int32_t buflen) {
+ if (input_.empty()) {
+ PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ Packet* front = input_.front();
+ if (buflen < front->len_) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Not enough buffer space to receive into");
+ PR_SetError(PR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int32_t count = front->len_;
+ memcpy(buf, front->data_.get(), count);
+
+ input_.pop();
+ delete front;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+int32_t TransportLayerNSPRAdapter::Write(const void *buf, int32_t length) {
+ if (!enabled_) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_WARNING, "Writing to disabled transport layer");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ TransportResult r = output_->SendPacket(
+ static_cast<const unsigned char *>(buf), length);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (r == TE_WOULDBLOCK) {
+ PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+ } else {
+ PR_SetError(PR_IO_ERROR, 0);
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+// Implementation of NSPR methods
+static PRStatus TransportLayerClose(PRFileDesc *f) {
+ f->dtor(f);
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerRead(PRFileDesc *f, void *buf, int32_t length) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerWrite(PRFileDesc *f, const void *buf, int32_t length) {
+ TransportLayerNSPRAdapter *io = reinterpret_cast<TransportLayerNSPRAdapter *>(f->secret);
+ return io->Write(buf, length);
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerAvailable(PRFileDesc *f) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int64_t TransportLayerAvailable64(PRFileDesc *f) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerSync(PRFileDesc *f) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerSeek(PRFileDesc *f, int32_t offset,
+ PRSeekWhence how) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int64_t TransportLayerSeek64(PRFileDesc *f, int64_t offset,
+ PRSeekWhence how) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerFileInfo(PRFileDesc *f, PRFileInfo *info) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerFileInfo64(PRFileDesc *f, PRFileInfo64 *info) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerWritev(PRFileDesc *f, const PRIOVec *iov,
+ int32_t iov_size, PRIntervalTime to) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerConnect(PRFileDesc *f, const PRNetAddr *addr,
+ PRIntervalTime to) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *TransportLayerAccept(PRFileDesc *sd, PRNetAddr *addr,
+ PRIntervalTime to) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return nullptr;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerBind(PRFileDesc *f, const PRNetAddr *addr) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerListen(PRFileDesc *f, int32_t depth) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerShutdown(PRFileDesc *f, int32_t how) {
+ // This is only called from NSS when we are the server and the client refuses
+ // to provide a certificate. In this case, the handshake is destined for
+ // failure, so we will just let this pass.
+ TransportLayerNSPRAdapter *io = reinterpret_cast<TransportLayerNSPRAdapter *>(f->secret);
+ io->SetEnabled(false);
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+// This function does not support peek, or waiting until `to`
+static int32_t TransportLayerRecv(PRFileDesc *f, void *buf, int32_t buflen,
+ int32_t flags, PRIntervalTime to) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(flags == 0);
+ if (flags != 0) {
+ PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ TransportLayerNSPRAdapter *io = reinterpret_cast<TransportLayerNSPRAdapter *>(f->secret);
+ return io->Recv(buf, buflen);
+}
+
+// Note: this is always nonblocking and assumes a zero timeout.
+static int32_t TransportLayerSend(PRFileDesc *f, const void *buf, int32_t amount,
+ int32_t flags, PRIntervalTime to) {
+ int32_t written = TransportLayerWrite(f, buf, amount);
+ return written;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerRecvfrom(PRFileDesc *f, void *buf, int32_t amount,
+ int32_t flags, PRNetAddr *addr, PRIntervalTime to) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerSendto(PRFileDesc *f, const void *buf, int32_t amount,
+ int32_t flags, const PRNetAddr *addr, PRIntervalTime to) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int16_t TransportLayerPoll(PRFileDesc *f, int16_t in_flags, int16_t *out_flags) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerAcceptRead(PRFileDesc *sd, PRFileDesc **nd,
+ PRNetAddr **raddr,
+ void *buf, int32_t amount, PRIntervalTime t) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerTransmitFile(PRFileDesc *sd, PRFileDesc *f,
+ const void *headers, int32_t hlen,
+ PRTransmitFileFlags flags, PRIntervalTime t) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerGetpeername(PRFileDesc *f, PRNetAddr *addr) {
+ // TODO: Modify to return unique names for each channel
+ // somehow, as opposed to always the same static address. The current
+ // implementation messes up the session cache, which is why it's off
+ // elsewhere
+ addr->inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
+ addr->inet.port = 0;
+ addr->inet.ip = 0;
+
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerGetsockname(PRFileDesc *f, PRNetAddr *addr) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerGetsockoption(PRFileDesc *f, PRSocketOptionData *opt) {
+ switch (opt->option) {
+ case PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking:
+ opt->value.non_blocking = PR_TRUE;
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ default:
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+// Imitate setting socket options. These are mostly noops.
+static PRStatus TransportLayerSetsockoption(PRFileDesc *f,
+ const PRSocketOptionData *opt) {
+ switch (opt->option) {
+ case PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking:
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ case PR_SockOpt_NoDelay:
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ default:
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerSendfile(PRFileDesc *out, PRSendFileData *in,
+ PRTransmitFileFlags flags, PRIntervalTime to) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static PRStatus TransportLayerConnectContinue(PRFileDesc *f, int16_t flags) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+static int32_t TransportLayerReserved(PRFileDesc *f) {
+ UNIMPLEMENTED;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static const struct PRIOMethods TransportLayerMethods = {
+ PR_DESC_LAYERED,
+ TransportLayerClose,
+ TransportLayerRead,
+ TransportLayerWrite,
+ TransportLayerAvailable,
+ TransportLayerAvailable64,
+ TransportLayerSync,
+ TransportLayerSeek,
+ TransportLayerSeek64,
+ TransportLayerFileInfo,
+ TransportLayerFileInfo64,
+ TransportLayerWritev,
+ TransportLayerConnect,
+ TransportLayerAccept,
+ TransportLayerBind,
+ TransportLayerListen,
+ TransportLayerShutdown,
+ TransportLayerRecv,
+ TransportLayerSend,
+ TransportLayerRecvfrom,
+ TransportLayerSendto,
+ TransportLayerPoll,
+ TransportLayerAcceptRead,
+ TransportLayerTransmitFile,
+ TransportLayerGetsockname,
+ TransportLayerGetpeername,
+ TransportLayerReserved,
+ TransportLayerReserved,
+ TransportLayerGetsockoption,
+ TransportLayerSetsockoption,
+ TransportLayerSendfile,
+ TransportLayerConnectContinue,
+ TransportLayerReserved,
+ TransportLayerReserved,
+ TransportLayerReserved,
+ TransportLayerReserved
+};
+
+TransportLayerDtls::~TransportLayerDtls() {
+ nspr_io_adapter_->SetEnabled(false);
+ if (timer_) {
+ timer_->Cancel();
+ }
+}
+
+nsresult TransportLayerDtls::InitInternal() {
+ // Get the transport service as an event target
+ nsresult rv;
+ target_ = do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't get socket transport service");
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ timer_ = do_CreateInstance(NS_TIMER_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't get timer");
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+
+void TransportLayerDtls::WasInserted() {
+ // Connect to the lower layers
+ if (!Setup()) {
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ }
+}
+
+
+// Set the permitted and default ALPN identifiers.
+// The default is here to allow for peers that don't want to negotiate ALPN
+// in that case, the default string will be reported from GetNegotiatedAlpn().
+// Setting the default to the empty string causes the transport layer to fail
+// if ALPN is not negotiated.
+// Note: we only support Unicode strings here, which are encoded into UTF-8,
+// even though ALPN ostensibly allows arbitrary octet sequences.
+nsresult TransportLayerDtls::SetAlpn(
+ const std::set<std::string>& alpn_allowed,
+ const std::string& alpn_default) {
+
+ alpn_allowed_ = alpn_allowed;
+ alpn_default_ = alpn_default;
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+
+nsresult TransportLayerDtls::SetVerificationAllowAll() {
+ // Defensive programming
+ if (verification_mode_ != VERIFY_UNSET)
+ return NS_ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
+
+ verification_mode_ = VERIFY_ALLOW_ALL;
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+TransportLayerDtls::SetVerificationDigest(const std::string digest_algorithm,
+ const unsigned char *digest_value,
+ size_t digest_len) {
+ // Defensive programming
+ if (verification_mode_ != VERIFY_UNSET &&
+ verification_mode_ != VERIFY_DIGEST) {
+ return NS_ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
+ }
+
+ // Note that we do not sanity check these values for length.
+ // We merely ensure they will fit into the buffer.
+ // TODO: is there a Data construct we could use?
+ if (digest_len > kMaxDigestLength)
+ return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+
+ digests_.push_back(new VerificationDigest(
+ digest_algorithm, digest_value, digest_len));
+
+ verification_mode_ = VERIFY_DIGEST;
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// These are the named groups that we will allow.
+static const SSLNamedGroup NamedGroupPreferences[] = {
+ ssl_grp_ec_curve25519,
+ ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1,
+ ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1,
+ ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048,
+ ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072
+};
+
+// TODO: make sure this is called from STS. Otherwise
+// we have thread safety issues
+bool TransportLayerDtls::Setup() {
+ CheckThread();
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (!downward_) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "DTLS layer with nothing below. This is useless");
+ return false;
+ }
+ nspr_io_adapter_ = MakeUnique<TransportLayerNSPRAdapter>(downward_);
+
+ if (!identity_) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Can't start DTLS without an identity");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (verification_mode_ == VERIFY_UNSET) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR,
+ "Can't start DTLS without specifying a verification mode");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (transport_layer_identity == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER) {
+ transport_layer_identity = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("nssstreamadapter");
+ }
+
+ UniquePRFileDesc pr_fd(PR_CreateIOLayerStub(transport_layer_identity,
+ &TransportLayerMethods));
+ MOZ_ASSERT(pr_fd != nullptr);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ return false;
+ pr_fd->secret = reinterpret_cast<PRFilePrivate *>(nspr_io_adapter_.get());
+
+ UniquePRFileDesc ssl_fd(DTLS_ImportFD(nullptr, pr_fd.get()));
+ MOZ_ASSERT(ssl_fd != nullptr); // This should never happen
+ if (!ssl_fd) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ Unused << pr_fd.release(); // ownership transfered to ssl_fd;
+
+ if (role_ == CLIENT) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_INFO, "Setting up DTLS as client");
+ rv = SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(ssl_fd.get(), GetClientAuthDataHook,
+ this);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't set identity");
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_INFO, "Setting up DTLS as server");
+ // Server side
+ rv = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(ssl_fd.get(), identity_->cert().get(),
+ identity_->privkey(),
+ identity_->auth_type());
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't set identity");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ UniqueCERTCertList zero_certs(CERT_NewCertList());
+ rv = SSL_SetTrustAnchors(ssl_fd.get(), zero_certs.get());
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't set trust anchors");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Insist on a certificate from the client
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't request certificate");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't require certificate");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Require TLS 1.1 or 1.2. Perhaps some day in the future we will allow TLS
+ // 1.0 for stream modes.
+ SSLVersionRange version_range = {
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ };
+
+ rv = SSL_VersionRangeSet(ssl_fd.get(), &version_range);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Can't disable SSLv3");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable session tickets");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_NO_CACHE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable session caching");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable deflate");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION,
+ SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable renegotiation");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable false start");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_NO_LOCKS, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable locks");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable ECDHE key reuse");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!SetupCipherSuites(ssl_fd)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_NamedGroupConfig(ssl_fd.get(), NamedGroupPreferences,
+ mozilla::ArrayLength(NamedGroupPreferences));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't set named groups");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Certificate validation
+ rv = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(ssl_fd.get(), AuthCertificateHook,
+ reinterpret_cast<void *>(this));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't set certificate validation hook");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!SetupAlpn(ssl_fd)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Now start the handshake
+ rv = SSL_ResetHandshake(ssl_fd.get(), role_ == SERVER ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't reset handshake");
+ return false;
+ }
+ ssl_fd_ = Move(ssl_fd);
+
+ // Finally, get ready to receive data
+ downward_->SignalStateChange.connect(this, &TransportLayerDtls::StateChange);
+ downward_->SignalPacketReceived.connect(this, &TransportLayerDtls::PacketReceived);
+
+ if (downward_->state() == TS_OPEN) {
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_CONNECTING);
+ Handshake();
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool TransportLayerDtls::SetupAlpn(UniquePRFileDesc& ssl_fd) const {
+ if (alpn_allowed_.empty()) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ SECStatus rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_ENABLE_NPN, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't disable NPN");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(ssl_fd.get(), SSL_ENABLE_ALPN, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't enable ALPN");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ unsigned char buf[MAX_ALPN_LENGTH];
+ size_t offset = 0;
+ for (auto tag = alpn_allowed_.begin();
+ tag != alpn_allowed_.end(); ++tag) {
+ if ((offset + 1 + tag->length()) >= sizeof(buf)) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "ALPN too long");
+ return false;
+ }
+ buf[offset++] = tag->length();
+ memcpy(buf + offset, tag->c_str(), tag->length());
+ offset += tag->length();
+ }
+ rv = SSL_SetNextProtoNego(ssl_fd.get(), buf, offset);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't set ALPN string");
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+// Ciphers we need to enable. These are on by default in standard firefox
+// builds, but can be disabled with prefs and they aren't on in our unit tests
+// since that uses NSS default configuration.
+//
+// Only override prefs to comply with MUST statements in the security-arch doc.
+// Anything outside this list is governed by the usual combination of policy
+// and user preferences.
+static const uint32_t EnabledCiphers[] = {
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+};
+
+// Disable all NSS suites modes without PFS or with old and rusty ciphersuites.
+// Anything outside this list is governed by the usual combination of policy
+// and user preferences.
+static const uint32_t DisabledCiphers[] = {
+ // Bug 1310061: disable all SHA384 ciphers until fixed
+ TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
+
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,
+};
+
+bool TransportLayerDtls::SetupCipherSuites(UniquePRFileDesc& ssl_fd) const {
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ // Set the SRTP ciphers
+ if (!srtp_ciphers_.empty()) {
+ // Note: std::vector is guaranteed to contiguous
+ rv = SSL_SetSRTPCiphers(ssl_fd.get(), &srtp_ciphers_[0],
+ srtp_ciphers_.size());
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't set SRTP cipher suite");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (const auto& cipher : EnabledCiphers) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "Enabling: " << cipher);
+ rv = SSL_CipherPrefSet(ssl_fd.get(), cipher, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO <<
+ "Unable to enable suite: " << cipher);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (const auto& cipher : DisabledCiphers) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "Disabling: " << cipher);
+
+ PRBool enabled = false;
+ rv = SSL_CipherPrefGet(ssl_fd.get(), cipher, &enabled);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO <<
+ "Unable to check if suite is enabled: " << cipher);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (enabled) {
+ rv = SSL_CipherPrefSet(ssl_fd.get(), cipher, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO <<
+ "Unable to disable suite: " << cipher);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+nsresult TransportLayerDtls::GetCipherSuite(uint16_t* cipherSuite) const {
+ CheckThread();
+ if (!cipherSuite) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "GetCipherSuite passed a nullptr");
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ if (state_ != TS_OPEN) {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+ SSLChannelInfo info;
+ SECStatus rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(ssl_fd_.get(), &info, sizeof(info));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO << "GetCipherSuite can't get channel info");
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+ }
+ *cipherSuite = info.cipherSuite;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void TransportLayerDtls::StateChange(TransportLayer *layer, State state) {
+ if (state <= state_) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Lower layer state is going backwards from ours");
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (state) {
+ case TS_NONE:
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false); // Can't happen
+ break;
+
+ case TS_INIT:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR,
+ LAYER_INFO << "State change of lower layer to INIT forbidden");
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ break;
+
+ case TS_CONNECTING:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "Lower layer is connecting.");
+ break;
+
+ case TS_OPEN:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR,
+ LAYER_INFO << "Lower layer is now open; starting TLS");
+ // Async, since the ICE layer might need to send a STUN response, and we
+ // don't want the handshake to start until that is sent.
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_CONNECTING);
+ timer_->Cancel();
+ timer_->SetTarget(target_);
+ timer_->InitWithFuncCallback(TimerCallback,
+ this,
+ 0,
+ nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT);
+ break;
+
+ case TS_CLOSED:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "Lower layer is now closed");
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_CLOSED);
+ break;
+
+ case TS_ERROR:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "Lower layer experienced an error");
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void TransportLayerDtls::Handshake() {
+ // Clear the retransmit timer
+ timer_->Cancel();
+
+ SECStatus rv = SSL_ForceHandshake(ssl_fd_.get());
+
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE,
+ LAYER_INFO << "****** SSL handshake completed ******");
+ if (!cert_ok_) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "Certificate check never occurred");
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!CheckAlpn()) {
+ // Despite connecting, the connection doesn't have a valid ALPN label.
+ // Forcibly close the connection so that the peer isn't left hanging
+ // (assuming the close_notify isn't dropped).
+ ssl_fd_ = nullptr;
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_OPEN);
+ } else {
+ int32_t err = PR_GetError();
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "Malformed DTLS message; ignoring");
+ // If this were TLS (and not DTLS), this would be fatal, but
+ // here we're required to ignore bad messages, so fall through
+ MOZ_FALLTHROUGH;
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO << "Handshake would have blocked");
+ PRIntervalTime timeout;
+ rv = DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout(ssl_fd_.get(), &timeout);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ uint32_t timeout_ms = PR_IntervalToMilliseconds(timeout);
+
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG,
+ LAYER_INFO << "Setting DTLS timeout to " << timeout_ms);
+ timer_->SetTarget(target_);
+ timer_->InitWithFuncCallback(TimerCallback,
+ this, timeout_ms,
+ nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ const char *err_msg = PR_ErrorToName(err);
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "DTLS handshake error " << err << " ("
+ << err_msg << ")");
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// Checks if ALPN was negotiated correctly and returns false if it wasn't.
+// After this returns successfully, alpn_ will be set to the negotiated
+// protocol.
+bool TransportLayerDtls::CheckAlpn() {
+ if (alpn_allowed_.empty()) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ SSLNextProtoState alpnState;
+ char chosenAlpn[MAX_ALPN_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int chosenAlpnLen;
+ SECStatus rv = SSL_GetNextProto(ssl_fd_.get(), &alpnState,
+ reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(chosenAlpn),
+ &chosenAlpnLen, sizeof(chosenAlpn));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "ALPN error");
+ return false;
+ }
+ switch (alpnState) {
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED:
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED:
+ break; // OK
+
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT:
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO << "ALPN not negotiated, "
+ << (alpn_default_.empty() ? "failing" : "selecting default"));
+ alpn_ = alpn_default_;
+ return !alpn_.empty();
+
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP:
+ // This only happens if there is a custom NPN/ALPN callback installed and
+ // that callback doesn't properly handle ALPN.
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "error in ALPN selection callback");
+ return false;
+
+ case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE:
+ MOZ_CRASH("Unexpected 0-RTT ALPN value");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Warning: NSS won't null terminate the ALPN string for us.
+ std::string chosen(chosenAlpn, chosenAlpnLen);
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO << "Selected ALPN string: " << chosen);
+ if (alpn_allowed_.find(chosen) == alpn_allowed_.end()) {
+ // Maybe our peer chose a protocol we didn't offer (when we are client), or
+ // something is seriously wrong.
+ std::ostringstream ss;
+ for (auto i = alpn_allowed_.begin(); i != alpn_allowed_.end(); ++i) {
+ ss << (i == alpn_allowed_.begin() ? " '" : ", '") << *i << "'";
+ }
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "Bad ALPN string: '" << chosen
+ << "'; permitted:" << ss.str());
+ return false;
+ }
+ alpn_ = chosen;
+ return true;
+}
+
+
+void TransportLayerDtls::PacketReceived(TransportLayer* layer,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t len) {
+ CheckThread();
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "PacketReceived(" << len << ")");
+
+ if (state_ != TS_CONNECTING && state_ != TS_OPEN) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG,
+ LAYER_INFO << "Discarding packet in inappropriate state");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // not DTLS per RFC 7983
+ if (data[0] < 20 || data[0] > 63) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nspr_io_adapter_->PacketReceived(data, len);
+
+ // If we're still connecting, try to handshake
+ if (state_ == TS_CONNECTING) {
+ Handshake();
+ }
+
+ // Now try a recv if we're open, since there might be data left
+ if (state_ == TS_OPEN) {
+ // nICEr uses a 9216 bytes buffer to allow support for jumbo frames
+ unsigned char buf[9216];
+ int32_t rv;
+ // One packet might contain several DTLS packets
+ do {
+ rv = PR_Recv(ssl_fd_.get(), buf, sizeof(buf), 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ if (rv > 0) {
+ // We have data
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "Read " << rv << " bytes from NSS");
+ SignalPacketReceived(this, buf, rv);
+ } else if (rv == 0) {
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_CLOSED);
+ } else {
+ int32_t err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ // This gets ignored
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "Receive would have blocked");
+ } else {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO << "NSS Error " << err);
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+ } while (rv > 0);
+ }
+}
+
+TransportResult TransportLayerDtls::SendPacket(const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t len) {
+ CheckThread();
+ if (state_ != TS_OPEN) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, LAYER_INFO << "Can't call SendPacket() in state "
+ << state_);
+ return TE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ int32_t rv = PR_Send(ssl_fd_.get(), data, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (rv > 0) {
+ // We have data
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "Wrote " << rv << " bytes to SSL Layer");
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_CLOSED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int32_t err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ // This gets ignored
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "Send would have blocked");
+ return TE_WOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_NOTICE, LAYER_INFO << "NSS Error " << err);
+ TL_SET_STATE(TS_ERROR);
+ return TE_ERROR;
+}
+
+SECStatus TransportLayerDtls::GetClientAuthDataHook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, "Server requested client auth");
+
+ TransportLayerDtls *stream = reinterpret_cast<TransportLayerDtls *>(arg);
+ stream->CheckThread();
+
+ if (!stream->identity_) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "No identity available");
+ PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *pRetCert = CERT_DupCertificate(stream->identity_->cert().get());
+ if (!*pRetCert) {
+ PR_SetError(PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *pRetKey = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(stream->identity_->privkey());
+ if (!*pRetKey) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(*pRetCert);
+ *pRetCert = nullptr;
+ PR_SetError(PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+nsresult TransportLayerDtls::SetSrtpCiphers(std::vector<uint16_t> ciphers) {
+ // TODO: We should check these
+ srtp_ciphers_ = ciphers;
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult TransportLayerDtls::GetSrtpCipher(uint16_t *cipher) const {
+ CheckThread();
+ if (state_ != TS_OPEN) {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+ SECStatus rv = SSL_GetSRTPCipher(ssl_fd_.get(), cipher);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, "No SRTP cipher negotiated");
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult TransportLayerDtls::ExportKeyingMaterial(const std::string& label,
+ bool use_context,
+ const std::string& context,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int outlen) {
+ CheckThread();
+ if (state_ != TS_OPEN) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Transport must be open for ExportKeyingMaterial");
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+ SECStatus rv = SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial(ssl_fd_.get(),
+ label.c_str(),
+ label.size(),
+ use_context,
+ reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(
+ context.c_str()),
+ context.size(),
+ out,
+ outlen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Couldn't export SSL keying material");
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+SECStatus TransportLayerDtls::AuthCertificateHook(void *arg,
+ PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig,
+ PRBool isServer) {
+ TransportLayerDtls *stream = reinterpret_cast<TransportLayerDtls *>(arg);
+ stream->CheckThread();
+ return stream->AuthCertificateHook(fd, checksig, isServer);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+TransportLayerDtls::CheckDigest(const RefPtr<VerificationDigest>& digest,
+ UniqueCERTCertificate& peer_cert) const {
+ unsigned char computed_digest[kMaxDigestLength];
+ size_t computed_digest_len;
+
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, LAYER_INFO << "Checking digest, algorithm="
+ << digest->algorithm_);
+ nsresult res =
+ DtlsIdentity::ComputeFingerprint(peer_cert,
+ digest->algorithm_,
+ computed_digest,
+ sizeof(computed_digest),
+ &computed_digest_len);
+ if (NS_FAILED(res)) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Could not compute peer fingerprint for digest " <<
+ digest->algorithm_);
+ // Go to end
+ PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (computed_digest_len != digest->len_) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Digest is wrong length " << digest->len_ <<
+ " should be " << computed_digest_len << " for algorithm " <<
+ digest->algorithm_);
+ PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(digest->value_, computed_digest, computed_digest_len) != 0) {
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_ERROR, "Digest does not match");
+ PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+
+SECStatus TransportLayerDtls::AuthCertificateHook(PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig,
+ PRBool isServer) {
+ CheckThread();
+ UniqueCERTCertificate peer_cert(SSL_PeerCertificate(fd));
+
+ // We are not set up to take this being called multiple
+ // times. Change this if we ever add renegotiation.
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!auth_hook_called_);
+ if (auth_hook_called_) {
+ PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ auth_hook_called_ = true;
+
+ MOZ_ASSERT(verification_mode_ != VERIFY_UNSET);
+
+ switch (verification_mode_) {
+ case VERIFY_UNSET:
+ // Break out to error exit
+ PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case VERIFY_ALLOW_ALL:
+ cert_ok_ = true;
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ case VERIFY_DIGEST:
+ {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(digests_.size() != 0);
+ // Check all the provided digests
+
+ // Checking functions call PR_SetError()
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < digests_.size(); i++) {
+ RefPtr<VerificationDigest> digest = digests_[i];
+ rv = CheckDigest(digest, peer_cert);
+
+ // Matches a digest, we are good to go
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ cert_ok_ = true;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ MOZ_CRASH(); // Can't happen
+ }
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+void TransportLayerDtls::TimerCallback(nsITimer *timer, void *arg) {
+ TransportLayerDtls *dtls = reinterpret_cast<TransportLayerDtls *>(arg);
+
+ MOZ_MTLOG(ML_DEBUG, "DTLS timer expired");
+
+ dtls->Handshake();
+}
+
+} // close namespace