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author | wolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com> | 2018-01-28 10:25:49 +0100 |
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committer | wolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com> | 2018-02-08 12:53:40 +0100 |
commit | acbd84f5741451d67e0fbaa3b85fdafc85dab5f9 (patch) | |
tree | 17539cacb7e8dc90f85bf76e9a8c8bf0653b7d6a | |
parent | b62fce0dc0c77a5788c331db32b3996e4020e2a5 (diff) | |
download | uxp-acbd84f5741451d67e0fbaa3b85fdafc85dab5f9.tar.gz |
Check for integer overflow in AesTask::DoCrypto() (DiD)
After calling mResult.SetLength(mData.Length() + 16) we should check
that the integer addition didn't overflow. It seems at the moment
impossible to create ArrayBuffers of size >= 0x0xfffffff0, however
adding a check here doesn't hurt.
mResult.Length() is passed to the PK11 API functions as a
maxOut parameter and should be checked by the
softoken crypto algorithm implementations.
AES-ECB and AES-GCM seem to do that correctly.
-rw-r--r-- | dom/crypto/WebCryptoTask.cpp | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dom/crypto/WebCryptoTask.cpp b/dom/crypto/WebCryptoTask.cpp index 57a7da186c..f5fc7b5bc9 100644 --- a/dom/crypto/WebCryptoTask.cpp +++ b/dom/crypto/WebCryptoTask.cpp @@ -716,6 +716,11 @@ private: return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR; } + // Check whether the integer addition would overflow. + if (std::numeric_limits<CryptoBuffer::size_type>::max() - 16 < mData.Length()) { + return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR; + } + // Initialize the output buffer (enough space for padding / a full tag) uint32_t dataLen = mData.Length(); uint32_t maxLen = dataLen + 16; |