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path: root/services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp
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-rw-r--r--services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp484
1 files changed, 484 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp b/services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23378f56a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,484 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsSyncJPAKE.h"
+
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "mozilla/ModuleUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/Move.h"
+#include "nsDebug.h"
+#include "nsError.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nscore.h"
+#include "pk11pub.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "secmodt.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+
+using mozilla::fallible;
+
+static bool
+hex_from_2char(const unsigned char *c2, unsigned char *byteval)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned char offset;
+ *byteval = 0;
+ for (i=0; i<2; i++) {
+ if (c2[i] >= '0' && c2[i] <= '9') {
+ offset = c2[i] - '0';
+ *byteval |= offset << 4*(1-i);
+ } else if (c2[i] >= 'a' && c2[i] <= 'f') {
+ offset = c2[i] - 'a';
+ *byteval |= (offset + 10) << 4*(1-i);
+ } else if (c2[i] >= 'A' && c2[i] <= 'F') {
+ offset = c2[i] - 'A';
+ *byteval |= (offset + 10) << 4*(1-i);
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool
+fromHex(const char * str, unsigned char * p, size_t sLen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ if (sLen & 1)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sLen / 2; ++i) {
+ if (!hex_from_2char((const unsigned char *) str + (2*i),
+ (unsigned char *) p + i)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+fromHexString(const nsACString & str, unsigned char * p, size_t pMaxLen)
+{
+ char * strData = (char *) str.Data();
+ unsigned len = str.Length();
+ NS_ENSURE_ARG(len / 2 <= pMaxLen);
+ if (!fromHex(strData, p, len)) {
+ return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+ }
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static bool
+toHexString(const unsigned char * str, unsigned len, nsACString & out)
+{
+ static const char digits[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+ if (!out.SetCapacity(2 * len, fallible))
+ return false;
+ out.SetLength(0);
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+ out.Append(digits[str[i] >> 4]);
+ out.Append(digits[str[i] & 0x0f]);
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+mapErrno()
+{
+ int err = PORT_GetError();
+ switch (err) {
+ case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ default: return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+ }
+}
+
+#define NUM_ELEM(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof (x)[0])
+
+static const char p[] =
+ "90066455B5CFC38F9CAA4A48B4281F292C260FEEF01FD61037E56258A7795A1C"
+ "7AD46076982CE6BB956936C6AB4DCFE05E6784586940CA544B9B2140E1EB523F"
+ "009D20A7E7880E4E5BFA690F1B9004A27811CD9904AF70420EEFD6EA11EF7DA1"
+ "29F58835FF56B89FAA637BC9AC2EFAAB903402229F491D8D3485261CD068699B"
+ "6BA58A1DDBBEF6DB51E8FE34E8A78E542D7BA351C21EA8D8F1D29F5D5D159394"
+ "87E27F4416B0CA632C59EFD1B1EB66511A5A0FBF615B766C5862D0BD8A3FE7A0"
+ "E0DA0FB2FE1FCB19E8F9996A8EA0FCCDE538175238FC8B0EE6F29AF7F642773E"
+ "BE8CD5402415A01451A840476B2FCEB0E388D30D4B376C37FE401C2A2C2F941D"
+ "AD179C540C1C8CE030D460C4D983BE9AB0B20F69144C1AE13F9383EA1C08504F"
+ "B0BF321503EFE43488310DD8DC77EC5B8349B8BFE97C2C560EA878DE87C11E3D"
+ "597F1FEA742D73EEC7F37BE43949EF1A0D15C3F3E3FC0A8335617055AC91328E"
+ "C22B50FC15B941D3D1624CD88BC25F3E941FDDC6200689581BFEC416B4B2CB73";
+static const char q[] =
+ "CFA0478A54717B08CE64805B76E5B14249A77A4838469DF7F7DC987EFCCFB11D";
+static const char g[] =
+ "5E5CBA992E0A680D885EB903AEA78E4A45A469103D448EDE3B7ACCC54D521E37"
+ "F84A4BDD5B06B0970CC2D2BBB715F7B82846F9A0C393914C792E6A923E2117AB"
+ "805276A975AADB5261D91673EA9AAFFEECBFA6183DFCB5D3B7332AA19275AFA1"
+ "F8EC0B60FB6F66CC23AE4870791D5982AAD1AA9485FD8F4A60126FEB2CF05DB8"
+ "A7F0F09B3397F3937F2E90B9E5B9C9B6EFEF642BC48351C46FB171B9BFA9EF17"
+ "A961CE96C7E7A7CC3D3D03DFAD1078BA21DA425198F07D2481622BCE45969D9C"
+ "4D6063D72AB7A0F08B2F49A7CC6AF335E08C4720E31476B67299E231F8BD90B3"
+ "9AC3AE3BE0C6B6CACEF8289A2E2873D58E51E029CAFBD55E6841489AB66B5B4B"
+ "9BA6E2F784660896AFF387D92844CCB8B69475496DE19DA2E58259B090489AC8"
+ "E62363CDF82CFD8EF2A427ABCD65750B506F56DDE3B988567A88126B914D7828"
+ "E2B63A6D7ED0747EC59E0E0A23CE7D8A74C1D2C2A7AFB6A29799620F00E11C33"
+ "787F7DED3B30E1A22D09F1FBDA1ABBBFBF25CAE05A13F812E34563F99410E73B";
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP nsSyncJPAKE::Round1(const nsACString & aSignerID,
+ nsACString & aGX1,
+ nsACString & aGV1,
+ nsACString & aR1,
+ nsACString & aGX2,
+ nsACString & aGV2,
+ nsACString & aR2)
+{
+ nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+ if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(round == JPAKENotStarted);
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(key == nullptr);
+
+ static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanisms[] = {
+ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256,
+ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256,
+ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256
+ };
+
+ UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanisms,
+ NUM_ELEM(mechanisms),
+ nullptr));
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(slot != nullptr);
+
+ CK_BYTE pBuf[(NUM_ELEM(p) - 1) / 2];
+ CK_BYTE qBuf[(NUM_ELEM(q) - 1) / 2];
+ CK_BYTE gBuf[(NUM_ELEM(g) - 1) / 2];
+
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1;
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(fromHex(p, pBuf, (NUM_ELEM(p) - 1)));
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(fromHex(q, qBuf, (NUM_ELEM(q) - 1)));
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(fromHex(g, gBuf, (NUM_ELEM(g) - 1)));
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = {
+ { CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID, (CK_BYTE *) aSignerID.Data(),
+ aSignerID.Length() },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType },
+ { CKA_PRIME, pBuf, sizeof pBuf },
+ { CKA_SUBPRIME, qBuf, sizeof qBuf },
+ { CKA_BASE, gBuf, sizeof gBuf }
+ };
+
+ CK_BYTE gx1Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2];
+ CK_BYTE gv1Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2];
+ CK_BYTE r1Buf [NUM_ELEM(p) / 2];
+ CK_BYTE gx2Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2];
+ CK_BYTE gv2Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2];
+ CK_BYTE r2Buf [NUM_ELEM(p) / 2];
+ CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params rp = {
+ { gx1Buf, sizeof gx1Buf, gv1Buf, sizeof gv1Buf, r1Buf, sizeof r1Buf },
+ { gx2Buf, sizeof gx2Buf, gv2Buf, sizeof gv2Buf, r2Buf, sizeof r2Buf }
+ };
+ SECItem paramsItem;
+ paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &rp;
+ paramsItem.len = sizeof rp;
+ key = UniquePK11SymKey(
+ PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(slot.get(), CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256,
+ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256, &paramsItem,
+ keyTemplate, NUM_ELEM(keyTemplate), nullptr));
+ nsresult rv = key != nullptr
+ ? NS_OK
+ : mapErrno();
+ if (rv == NS_OK) {
+ NS_ENSURE_TRUE(toHexString(rp.gx1.pGX, rp.gx1.ulGXLen, aGX1) &&
+ toHexString(rp.gx1.pGV, rp.gx1.ulGVLen, aGV1) &&
+ toHexString(rp.gx1.pR, rp.gx1.ulRLen, aR1) &&
+ toHexString(rp.gx2.pGX, rp.gx2.ulGXLen, aGX2) &&
+ toHexString(rp.gx2.pGV, rp.gx2.ulGVLen, aGV2) &&
+ toHexString(rp.gx2.pR, rp.gx2.ulRLen, aR2),
+ NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
+ round = JPAKEBeforeRound2;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP nsSyncJPAKE::Round2(const nsACString & aPeerID,
+ const nsACString & aPIN,
+ const nsACString & aGX3,
+ const nsACString & aGV3,
+ const nsACString & aR3,
+ const nsACString & aGX4,
+ const nsACString & aGV4,
+ const nsACString & aR4,
+ nsACString & aA,
+ nsACString & aGVA,
+ nsACString & aRA)
+{
+ nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+ if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(round == JPAKEBeforeRound2);
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(key != nullptr);
+ NS_ENSURE_ARG(!aPeerID.IsEmpty());
+
+ /* PIN cannot be equal to zero when converted to a bignum. NSS 3.12.9 J-PAKE
+ assumes that the caller has already done this check. Future versions of
+ NSS J-PAKE will do this check internally. See Bug 609068 Comment 4 */
+ bool foundNonZero = false;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < aPIN.Length(); ++i) {
+ if (aPIN[i] != 0) {
+ foundNonZero = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ NS_ENSURE_ARG(foundNonZero);
+
+ CK_BYTE gx3Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gv3Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], r3Buf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2];
+ CK_BYTE gx4Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gv4Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], r4Buf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2];
+ CK_BYTE gxABuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gvABuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], rABuf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2];
+ nsresult rv = fromHexString(aGX3, gx3Buf, sizeof gx3Buf);
+ if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGV3, gv3Buf, sizeof gv3Buf);
+ if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aR3, r3Buf, sizeof r3Buf);
+ if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGX4, gx4Buf, sizeof gx4Buf);
+ if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGV4, gv4Buf, sizeof gv4Buf);
+ if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aR4, r4Buf, sizeof r4Buf);
+ if (rv != NS_OK)
+ return rv;
+
+ CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params rp;
+ rp.pSharedKey = (CK_BYTE *) aPIN.Data();
+ rp.ulSharedKeyLen = aPIN.Length();
+ rp.gx3.pGX = gx3Buf; rp.gx3.ulGXLen = aGX3.Length() / 2;
+ rp.gx3.pGV = gv3Buf; rp.gx3.ulGVLen = aGV3.Length() / 2;
+ rp.gx3.pR = r3Buf; rp.gx3.ulRLen = aR3 .Length() / 2;
+ rp.gx4.pGX = gx4Buf; rp.gx4.ulGXLen = aGX4.Length() / 2;
+ rp.gx4.pGV = gv4Buf; rp.gx4.ulGVLen = aGV4.Length() / 2;
+ rp.gx4.pR = r4Buf; rp.gx4.ulRLen = aR4 .Length() / 2;
+ rp.A.pGX = gxABuf; rp.A .ulGXLen = sizeof gxABuf;
+ rp.A.pGV = gvABuf; rp.A .ulGVLen = sizeof gxABuf;
+ rp.A.pR = rABuf; rp.A .ulRLen = sizeof gxABuf;
+
+ // Bug 629090: NSS 3.12.9 J-PAKE fails to check that gx^4 != 1, so check here.
+ bool gx4Good = false;
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < rp.gx4.ulGXLen; ++i) {
+ if (rp.gx4.pGX[i] > 1 || (rp.gx4.pGX[i] != 0 && i < rp.gx4.ulGXLen - 1)) {
+ gx4Good = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ NS_ENSURE_ARG(gx4Good);
+
+ SECItem paramsItem;
+ paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &rp;
+ paramsItem.len = sizeof rp;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = {
+ { CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID, (CK_BYTE *) aPeerID.Data(), aPeerID.Length(), },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType }
+ };
+ UniquePK11SymKey newKey(PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(key.get(),
+ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256,
+ &paramsItem,
+ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0,
+ keyTemplate,
+ NUM_ELEM(keyTemplate),
+ false));
+ if (newKey != nullptr) {
+ if (toHexString(rp.A.pGX, rp.A.ulGXLen, aA) &&
+ toHexString(rp.A.pGV, rp.A.ulGVLen, aGVA) &&
+ toHexString(rp.A.pR, rp.A.ulRLen, aRA)) {
+ round = JPAKEAfterRound2;
+ key = Move(newKey);
+ return NS_OK;
+ } else {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = mapErrno();
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+setBase64(const unsigned char * data, unsigned len, nsACString & out)
+{
+ nsresult rv = NS_OK;
+ const char * base64 = BTOA_DataToAscii(data, len);
+
+ if (base64 != nullptr) {
+ size_t len = PORT_Strlen(base64);
+ if (out.SetCapacity(len, fallible)) {
+ out.SetLength(0);
+ out.Append(base64, len);
+ } else {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ PORT_Free((void*) base64);
+ } else {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+base64KeyValue(PK11SymKey * key, nsACString & keyString)
+{
+ nsresult rv = NS_OK;
+ if (PK11_ExtractKeyValue(key) == SECSuccess) {
+ const SECItem * value = PK11_GetKeyData(key);
+ rv = value != nullptr && value->data != nullptr && value->len > 0
+ ? setBase64(value->data, value->len, keyString)
+ : NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+ } else {
+ rv = mapErrno();
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+extractBase64KeyValue(UniquePK11SymKey & keyBlock, CK_ULONG bitPosition,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE destMech, int keySize,
+ nsACString & keyString)
+{
+ SECItem paramsItem;
+ paramsItem.data = (CK_BYTE *) &bitPosition;
+ paramsItem.len = sizeof bitPosition;
+ PK11SymKey * key = PK11_Derive(keyBlock.get(), CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY,
+ &paramsItem, destMech,
+ CKA_SIGN, keySize);
+ if (key == nullptr)
+ return mapErrno();
+ nsresult rv = base64KeyValue(key, keyString);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP nsSyncJPAKE::Final(const nsACString & aB,
+ const nsACString & aGVB,
+ const nsACString & aRB,
+ const nsACString & aHKDFInfo,
+ nsACString & aAES256Key,
+ nsACString & aHMAC256Key)
+{
+ nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+ if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ static const unsigned AES256_KEY_SIZE = 256 / 8;
+ static const unsigned HMAC_SHA256_KEY_SIZE = 256 / 8;
+ CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS aesBitPosition = 0;
+ CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS hmacBitPosition = aesBitPosition + (AES256_KEY_SIZE * 8);
+
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(round == JPAKEAfterRound2);
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(key != nullptr);
+
+ CK_BYTE gxBBuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gvBBuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], rBBuf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2];
+ nsresult rv = fromHexString(aB, gxBBuf, sizeof gxBBuf);
+ if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGVB, gvBBuf, sizeof gvBBuf);
+ if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aRB, rBBuf, sizeof rBBuf);
+ if (rv != NS_OK)
+ return rv;
+
+ CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams rp;
+ rp.B.pGX = gxBBuf; rp.B.ulGXLen = aB .Length() / 2;
+ rp.B.pGV = gvBBuf; rp.B.ulGVLen = aGVB.Length() / 2;
+ rp.B.pR = rBBuf; rp.B.ulRLen = aRB .Length() / 2;
+ SECItem paramsItem;
+ paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &rp;
+ paramsItem.len = sizeof rp;
+ UniquePK11SymKey keyMaterial(PK11_Derive(key.get(), CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256,
+ &paramsItem, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0));
+ UniquePK11SymKey keyBlock;
+
+ if (keyMaterial == nullptr)
+ rv = mapErrno();
+
+ if (rv == NS_OK) {
+ CK_NSS_HKDFParams hkdfParams;
+ hkdfParams.bExtract = CK_TRUE;
+ hkdfParams.pSalt = nullptr;
+ hkdfParams.ulSaltLen = 0;
+ hkdfParams.bExpand = CK_TRUE;
+ hkdfParams.pInfo = (CK_BYTE *) aHKDFInfo.Data();
+ hkdfParams.ulInfoLen = aHKDFInfo.Length();
+ paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &hkdfParams;
+ paramsItem.len = sizeof hkdfParams;
+ keyBlock = UniquePK11SymKey(
+ PK11_Derive(keyMaterial.get(), CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, &paramsItem,
+ CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, CKA_DERIVE,
+ AES256_KEY_SIZE + HMAC_SHA256_KEY_SIZE));
+ if (keyBlock == nullptr)
+ rv = mapErrno();
+ }
+
+ if (rv == NS_OK) {
+ rv = extractBase64KeyValue(keyBlock, aesBitPosition, CKM_AES_CBC,
+ AES256_KEY_SIZE, aAES256Key);
+ }
+ if (rv == NS_OK) {
+ rv = extractBase64KeyValue(keyBlock, hmacBitPosition, CKM_SHA256_HMAC,
+ HMAC_SHA256_KEY_SIZE, aHMAC256Key);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == NS_OK) {
+ SECStatus srv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(keyMaterial.get());
+ NS_ENSURE_TRUE(srv == SECSuccess, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
+ SECItem * keyMaterialBytes = PK11_GetKeyData(keyMaterial.get());
+ NS_ENSURE_TRUE(keyMaterialBytes != nullptr, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+NS_GENERIC_FACTORY_CONSTRUCTOR(nsSyncJPAKE)
+NS_DEFINE_NAMED_CID(NS_SYNCJPAKE_CID);
+
+nsSyncJPAKE::nsSyncJPAKE() : round(JPAKENotStarted), key(nullptr) { }
+
+nsSyncJPAKE::~nsSyncJPAKE()
+{
+ nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+ if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
+ return;
+ }
+ destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference();
+ shutdown(ShutdownCalledFrom::Object);
+}
+
+void
+nsSyncJPAKE::virtualDestroyNSSReference()
+{
+ destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference();
+}
+
+void
+nsSyncJPAKE::destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference()
+{
+ key = nullptr;
+}
+
+static const mozilla::Module::CIDEntry kServicesCryptoCIDs[] = {
+ { &kNS_SYNCJPAKE_CID, false, nullptr, nsSyncJPAKEConstructor },
+ { nullptr }
+};
+
+static const mozilla::Module::ContractIDEntry kServicesCryptoContracts[] = {
+ { NS_SYNCJPAKE_CONTRACTID, &kNS_SYNCJPAKE_CID },
+ { nullptr }
+};
+
+static const mozilla::Module kServicesCryptoModule = {
+ mozilla::Module::kVersion,
+ kServicesCryptoCIDs,
+ kServicesCryptoContracts
+};
+
+NSMODULE_DEFN(nsServicesCryptoModule) = &kServicesCryptoModule;