Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 119 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/netwerk/base/security-prefs.js b/netwerk/base/security-prefs.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f42745f78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/netwerk/base/security-prefs.js
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+pref("security.tls.version.min", 1);
+pref("security.tls.version.max", 3);
+pref("security.tls.version.fallback-limit", 3);
+pref("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts", "");
+pref("security.tls.unrestricted_rc4_fallback", false);
+pref("security.tls.enable_0rtt_data", false);
+
+pref("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken", false);
+pref("security.ssl.require_safe_negotiation",  false);
+pref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true);
+pref("security.ssl.enable_false_start", true);
+pref("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn", false);
+pref("security.ssl.enable_npn", true);
+pref("security.ssl.enable_alpn", true);
+
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha256", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha256", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha256", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha256", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
+pref("security.ssl3.rsa_des_ede3_sha", true);
+
+pref("security.content.signature.root_hash",
+     "97:E8:BA:9C:F1:2F:B3:DE:53:CC:42:A4:E6:57:7E:D6:4D:F4:93:C2:47:B4:14:FE:A0:36:81:8D:38:23:56:0E");
+
+pref("security.default_personal_cert",   "Ask Every Time");
+pref("security.remember_cert_checkbox_default_setting", true);
+pref("security.ask_for_password",        0);
+pref("security.password_lifetime",       30);
+
+// The supported values of this pref are:
+// 0: disable detecting Family Safety mode and importing the root
+// 1: only attempt to detect Family Safety mode (don't import the root)
+// 2: detect Family Safety mode and import the root
+// (This is only relevant to Windows 8.1)
+pref("security.family_safety.mode", 2);
+
+pref("security.enterprise_roots.enabled", false);
+
+pref("security.OCSP.enabled", 1);
+pref("security.OCSP.require", false);
+pref("security.OCSP.GET.enabled", false);
+
+pref("security.pki.cert_short_lifetime_in_days", 10);
+// NB: Changes to this pref affect CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS telemetry.
+// See the comment in CertVerifier.cpp.
+// 3 = only allow SHA-1 for certificates issued by an imported root.
+pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
+
+// security.pki.name_matching_mode controls how the platform matches hostnames
+// to name information in TLS certificates. The possible values are:
+// 0: always fall back to the subject common name if necessary (as in, if the
+//    subject alternative name extension is either not present or does not
+//    contain any DNS names or IP addresses)
+// 1: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
+//    August 2016 if necessary
+// 2: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
+//    August 2015 if necessary
+// 3: only use name information from the subject alternative name extension
+#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
+pref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 1);
+#else
+pref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 2);
+#endif
+
+// security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy controls how the platform handles the
+// id-Netscape-stepUp OID in extended key usage extensions of CA certificates.
+// 0: id-Netscape-stepUp is always considered equivalent to id-kp-serverAuth
+// 1: it is considered equivalent when the notBefore is before 23 August 2016
+// 2: similarly, but for 23 August 2015
+// 3: it is never considered equivalent
+#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
+pref("security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy", 1);
+#else
+pref("security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy", 2);
+#endif
+
+// Configures Certificate Transparency support mode:
+// 0: Fully disabled.
+// 1: Only collect telemetry. CT qualification checks are not performed.
+pref("security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode", 0);
+
+pref("security.webauth.u2f", false);
+pref("security.webauth.u2f_enable_softtoken", false);
+pref("security.webauth.u2f_enable_usbtoken", false);
+
+pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.enabled", true);
+pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.url", "https://incoming.telemetry.mozilla.org/submit/sslreports/");
+pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.automatic", false);
+
+// Impose a maximum age on HPKP headers, to avoid sites getting permanently
+// blacking themselves out by setting a bad pin.  (60 days by default)
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-4.1
+pref("security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds", 5184000);
+
+// If a request is mixed-content, send an HSTS priming request to attempt to
+// see if it is available over HTTPS.
+pref("security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming", true);
+#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
+// Don't change the order of evaluation of mixed-content and HSTS upgrades
+pref("security.mixed_content.use_hsts", false);
+#else
+// Change the order of evaluation so HSTS upgrades happen before
+// mixed-content blocking
+pref("security.mixed_content.use_hsts", true);
+#endif