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-rw-r--r--system/xen/xen.SlackBuild2
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa207.patch31
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemut.patch56
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemuu.patch54
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemut.patch54
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0001-display-cirrus-ignore-source-pitch-value-as-needed-i.patch72
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0002-cirrus-add-blit_is_unsafe-call-to-cirrus_bitblt_cput.patch60
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa210.patch41
8 files changed, 369 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
index 9694420a23..0ce84dd55a 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
+++ b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
PRGNAM=xen
VERSION=${VERSION:-4.8.0}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-2}
TAG=${TAG:-_SBo}
SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.10.0}
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa207.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa207.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6fb86fc9d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa207.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <olekstysh@gmail.com>
+Subject: IOMMU: always call teardown callback
+
+There is a possible scenario when (d)->need_iommu remains unset
+during guest domain execution. For example, when no devices
+were assigned to it. Taking into account that teardown callback
+is not called when (d)->need_iommu is unset we might have unreleased
+resourses after destroying domain.
+
+So, always call teardown callback to roll back actions
+that were performed in init callback.
+
+This is XSA-207.
+
+Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <olekstysh@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Tested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+@@ -244,8 +244,7 @@ void iommu_domain_destroy(struct domain
+ if ( !iommu_enabled || !dom_iommu(d)->platform_ops )
+ return;
+
+- if ( need_iommu(d) )
+- iommu_teardown(d);
++ iommu_teardown(d);
+
+ arch_iommu_domain_destroy(d);
+ }
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemut.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemut.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c86db0f47e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemut.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 8f63265efeb6f92e63f7e749cb26131b68b20df7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 15:22:15 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
+
+When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
+blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
+can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
+
+This is XSA-208.
+
+upstream-commit-id: 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+
+{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
+ address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
+
+[ This is CVE-2017-2615 / XSA-208 - Ian Jackson ]
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485938101-26602-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+---
+ hw/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
+index e6c3893..364e22d 100644
+--- a/hw/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -308,10 +308,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+ {
+ if (pitch < 0) {
+ int64_t min = addr
+- + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+- int32_t max = addr
+- + s->cirrus_blt_width;
+- if (min < 0 || max >= s->vram_size) {
++ + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
++ - s->cirrus_blt_width;
++ if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vram_size) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ } else {
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemuu.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemuu.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c8ad2d451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa208-qemuu.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 8f63265efeb6f92e63f7e749cb26131b68b20df7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 15:22:15 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
+
+When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
+blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
+can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
+
+This is XSA-208.
+
+upstream-commit-id: 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+
+{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
+ address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
+
+[ This is CVE-2017-2615 / XSA-208 - Ian Jackson ]
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485938101-26602-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index bdb092e..3bbe3d5 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -277,10 +277,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+ }
+ if (pitch < 0) {
+ int64_t min = addr
+- + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+- int32_t max = addr
+- + s->cirrus_blt_width;
+- if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
++ + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
++ - s->cirrus_blt_width;
++ if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vga.vram_size) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ } else {
+--
+1.8.3.1
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemut.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemut.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..444beeb2e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemut.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
+
+CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
+and blit width, at all. Oops. Fix it.
+
+Security impact: high.
+
+The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
+Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
+
+The missing blit width check allows to overflow cirrus_bltbuf,
+with the attractive target cirrus_srcptr (current cirrus_bltbuf write
+position) being located right after cirrus_bltbuf in CirrusVGAState.
+
+Due to cirrus emulation writing cirrus_bltbuf bytewise the attacker
+hasn't full control over cirrus_srcptr though, only one byte can be
+changed. Once the first byte has been modified further writes land
+elsewhere.
+
+[ This is CVE-2017-2620 / XSA-209 - Ian Jackson ]
+
+Fixed compilation by removing extra parameter to blit_is_unsafe. -iwj
+
+Reported-by: Gerd Hoffmann <ghoffman@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+---
+diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
+index e6c3893..45facb6 100644
+--- a/hw/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -900,6 +900,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+ int w;
+
++ if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
+ s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+ s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+@@ -925,6 +929,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ }
+ s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
+ }
++
++ /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
++ assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
++
+ s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+ s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
+ cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0001-display-cirrus-ignore-source-pitch-value-as-needed-i.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0001-display-cirrus-ignore-source-pitch-value-as-needed-i.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..95f1ace5b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0001-display-cirrus-ignore-source-pitch-value-as-needed-i.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 52b7f43c8fa185ab856bcaacda7abc9a6fc07f84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 10:54:38 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] display: cirrus: ignore source pitch value as needed in
+ blit_is_unsafe
+
+Commit 4299b90 added a check which is too broad, given that the source
+pitch value is not required to be initialized for solid fill operations.
+This patch refines the blit_is_unsafe() check to ignore source pitch in
+that case. After applying the above commit as a security patch, we
+noticed the SLES 11 SP4 guest gui failed to initialize properly.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
+Message-id: 20170109203520.5619-1-brogers@suse.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 7bf3707..34a6900 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+ return false;
+ }
+
+-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
++static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+ {
+ /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
+ assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
+@@ -302,6 +302,9 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
+ s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+ return true;
+ }
++ if (dst_only) {
++ return false;
++ }
+ if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+ s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+ return true;
+@@ -667,7 +670,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+
+ dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
+
+- if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
++ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+ return 0;
+
+ (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
+@@ -685,7 +688,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ {
+ cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
+
+- if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
++ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+@@ -784,7 +787,7 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+- if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
++ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+ return 0;
+
+ cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0002-cirrus-add-blit_is_unsafe-call-to-cirrus_bitblt_cput.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0002-cirrus-add-blit_is_unsafe-call-to-cirrus_bitblt_cput.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ed549f917d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa209-qemuu-0002-cirrus-add-blit_is_unsafe-call-to-cirrus_bitblt_cput.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 15268f91fbe75b38a851c458aef74e693d646ea5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 10:54:59 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to
+ cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
+
+CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
+and blit width, at all. Oops. Fix it.
+
+Security impact: high.
+
+The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
+Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
+
+The missing blit width check allows to overflow cirrus_bltbuf,
+with the attractive target cirrus_srcptr (current cirrus_bltbuf write
+position) being located right after cirrus_bltbuf in CirrusVGAState.
+
+Due to cirrus emulation writing cirrus_bltbuf bytewise the attacker
+hasn't full control over cirrus_srcptr though, only one byte can be
+changed. Once the first byte has been modified further writes land
+elsewhere.
+
+[ This is CVE-2017-2620 / XSA-209 - Ian Jackson ]
+
+Reported-by: Gerd Hoffmann <ghoffman@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 34a6900..5901250 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -865,6 +865,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+ int w;
+
++ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
+ s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+ s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+@@ -890,6 +894,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ }
+ s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
+ }
++
++ /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
++ assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
++
+ s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+ s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
+ cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa210.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa210.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0696570c08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa210.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Subject: arm/p2m: remove the page from p2m->pages list before freeing it
+
+The p2m code is using the page list field to link all the pages used
+for the stage-2 page tables. The page is added into the p2m->pages
+list just after the allocation but never removed from the list.
+
+The page list field is also used by the allocator, not removing may
+result a later Xen crash due to inconsistency (see [1]).
+
+This bug was introduced by the reworking of p2m code in commit 2ef3e36ec7
+"xen/arm: p2m: Introduce p2m_set_entry and __p2m_set_entry".
+
+[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-02/msg00524.html
+
+Reported-by: Vijaya Kumar K <Vijaya.Kumar@cavium.com>
+Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+@@ -660,6 +660,7 @@ static void p2m_free_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+ unsigned int i;
+ lpae_t *table;
+ mfn_t mfn;
++ struct page_info *pg;
+
+ /* Nothing to do if the entry is invalid. */
+ if ( !p2m_valid(entry) )
+@@ -697,7 +698,10 @@ static void p2m_free_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+ mfn = _mfn(entry.p2m.base);
+ ASSERT(mfn_valid(mfn_x(mfn)));
+
+- free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(mfn_x(mfn)));
++ pg = mfn_to_page(mfn_x(mfn));
++
++ page_list_del(pg, &p2m->pages);
++ free_domheap_page(pg);
+ }
+
+ static bool p2m_split_superpage(struct p2m_domain *p2m, lpae_t *entry,
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-11-19 14:14:29 +0000