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authorMario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>2017-01-08 17:51:53 +0100
committerDavid Spencer <idlemoor@slackbuilds.org>2017-01-09 20:17:34 +0000
commitfc59ea21bafe53eb7e633d6468bfa2a75bd54976 (patch)
treee1ce20c267d0afc939ace862d4996190b9e1fab1 /system
parent9b2ee6f34d5c6b4a0e47f309defb29177de28771 (diff)
downloadslackbuilds-fc59ea21bafe53eb7e633d6468bfa2a75bd54976.tar.gz
system/xen: Updated for version 4.8.0.
Signed-off-by: Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
Diffstat (limited to 'system')
-rw-r--r--system/xen/README5
-rw-r--r--system/xen/doinst.sh2
-rw-r--r--system/xen/dom0/README.dom02
-rw-r--r--system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh2
-rw-r--r--system/xen/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff12
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xen.SlackBuild67
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xen.info18
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa191.patch152
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa192.patch64
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch68
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa194.patch144
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa195.patch45
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0001-x86-emul-Correct-the-IDT-entry-calculation-in-inject.patch61
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0002-x86-svm-Fix-injection-of-software-interrupts.patch76
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemut.patch65
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemuu.patch63
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa198.patch62
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa200-4.7.patch55
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa201-1.patch87
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa201-2.patch199
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa201-3-4.7.patch47
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa201-4.patch130
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa202.patch75
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa203-4.8.patch19
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa204-4.8.patch57
25 files changed, 206 insertions, 1371 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/README b/system/xen/README
index 7422c640a6..f5f8c96b6d 100644
--- a/system/xen/README
+++ b/system/xen/README
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ This script has a few optional dependencies:
mbootpack - creates LILO compatible kernel images
libssh2 - mostly used by libvirt, enable with USE_LIBSSH2=yes
ocaml-findlib - autodetected, builds oxenstored binary
+ spice - enable with USE_SPICE=yes
+
+Linking with the stock libraries:
+
bluez - enable with USE_BLUEZ=yes
+ gtk - enable with USE_GTK=yes
Reading material:
diff --git a/system/xen/doinst.sh b/system/xen/doinst.sh
index 98f701f9c7..51c573cb0c 100644
--- a/system/xen/doinst.sh
+++ b/system/xen/doinst.sh
@@ -28,6 +28,6 @@ find etc/rc.d -type f -name 'rc.xen*.new' \
find etc/default -type f -name 'xen*.new' \
| while read new ; do config $new ; done
-find etc/xen etc/qemu -type f -name '*.new' \
+find etc/xen -type f -name '*.new' \
| while read new ; do config $new ; done
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0 b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
index c3c24cc2dc..4ea14b1674 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/README.dom0
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Xen EFI binary.
To make things a bit easier, a copy of Xen EFI binary can be found here:
- http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen.efi.gz
+ http://slackware.hr/~mario/xen/xen-4.8.0.efi.gz
If an automatic boot to Xen kernel is desired, the binary should be renamed and
copied to the following location: /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi
diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
index 07d1a1f8b1..f6ea99ce48 100644
--- a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
+++ b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# Modified by Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
KERNEL=${KERNEL:-4.4.38}
-XEN=${XEN:-4.7.1}
+XEN=${XEN:-4.8.0}
BOOTLOADER=${BOOTLOADER:-lilo}
ROOTMOD=${ROOTMOD:-ext4}
diff --git a/system/xen/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff b/system/xen/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff
deleted file mode 100644
index 747ffadbf6..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.0/tools/Makefile.orig 2015-01-12 17:53:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.0/tools/Makefile 2015-02-16 09:19:18.999816844 +0100
-@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@
- --disable-docs \
- --disable-guest-agent \
- --python=$(PYTHON) \
-+ --sysconfdir=/etc \
-+ --@@CONF_LIBSSH2@@able-libssh2 \
-+ --@@CONF_BLUEZ@@able-bluez \
- $(CONFIG_QEMUU_EXTRA_ARGS) \
- --cpu=$(IOEMU_CPU_ARCH) \
- $(IOEMU_CONFIGURE_CROSS); \
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
index e4eabedb97..9694420a23 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
+++ b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Slackware build script for xen
-# Copyright 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 Mario Preksavec, Zagreb, Croatia
+# Copyright 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 Mario Preksavec, Zagreb, Croatia
# All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@
# ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
PRGNAM=xen
-VERSION=${VERSION:-4.7.1}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-3}
+VERSION=${VERSION:-4.8.0}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
TAG=${TAG:-_SBo}
-SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.9.2}
-OVMF=${OVMF:-52a99493cce88a9d4ec8a02d7f1bd1a1001ce60d}
-IPXE=${IPXE:-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e}
+SEABIOS=${SEABIOS:-1.10.0}
+OVMF=${OVMF:-20160905_bc54e50}
+IPXE=${IPXE:-827dd1bfee67daa683935ce65316f7e0f057fe1c}
if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
case "$( uname -m )" in
@@ -73,24 +73,37 @@ else
LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
fi
+CONF_XEN="--disable-qemu-traditional --disable-rombios"
+CONF_QEMUU="--sysconfdir=/etc"
+
+case "${BUILD_STUBDOM:-no}" in
+ yes) CONF_XEN+=" --enable-stubdom" ;;
+ *) CONF_XEN+=" --disable-stubdom" ;;
+esac
+
+case "${WITH_OVMF:-yes}" in
+ no) CONF_XEN+=" --disable-ovmf" ;;
+ *) CONF_XEN+=" --enable-ovmf" ;;
+esac
+
case "${USE_LIBSSH2:-no}" in
- yes) CONF_LIBSSH2="en" ;;
- *) CONF_LIBSSH2="dis" ;;
+ yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-libssh2" ;;
+ *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-libssh2" ;;
esac
case "${USE_BLUEZ:-no}" in
- yes) CONF_BLUEZ="en" ;;
- *) CONF_BLUEZ="dis" ;;
+ yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-bluez" ;;
+ *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-bluez" ;;
esac
-case "${BUILD_STUBDOM:-no}" in
- yes) CONF_STUBDOM="en" ;;
- *) CONF_STUBDOM="dis" ;;
+case "${USE_GTK:-no}" in
+ yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-gtk" ;;
+ *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-gtk" ;;
esac
-case "${WITH_OVMF:-yes}" in
- no) CONF_OVMF="dis" ;;
- *) CONF_OVMF="en" ;;
+case "${USE_SPICE:-no}" in
+ yes) CONF_QEMUU+=" --enable-spice" ;;
+ *) CONF_QEMUU+=" --disable-spice" ;;
esac
set -e
@@ -111,16 +124,12 @@ find -L . \
# Apply Xen Security Advisory patches
for i in $CWD/xsa/* ; do
case $i in
- *qemut*.patch) patch -d tools/qemu-xen-traditional -p1 <$i ;;
- *qemu*.patch) patch -d tools/qemu-xen -p1 <$i ;;
- *.patch) patch -p1 <$i ;;
+ *qemut*.patch) patch --verbose -d tools/qemu-xen-traditional -p1 <$i ;;
+ *qemu*.patch) patch --verbose -d tools/qemu-xen -p1 <$i ;;
+ *.patch) patch --verbose -p1 <$i ;;
esac
done
-# Don't link with libssh and bluez by default
-sed "s/@@CONF_LIBSSH2@@/$CONF_LIBSSH2/;s/@@CONF_BLUEZ@@/$CONF_BLUEZ/" \
- $CWD/patches/qemu_configure_options.diff | patch -p1
-
# Remove hardlinks
patch -p1 <$CWD/patches/symlinks_instead_of_hardlinks.diff
@@ -137,7 +146,9 @@ cp $CWD/ipxe-git-$IPXE.tar.gz tools/firmware/etherboot/_ipxe.tar.gz
ln -s seabios-dir-remote seabios-dir
make -C seabios-dir defconfig
# OVMF
- tar -xf $CWD/ovmf-git-$OVMF.tar.gz
+ tar -xf $CWD/xen-ovmf-$OVMF.tar.bz2
+ mv xen-ovmf-$OVMF ovmf-dir-remote
+ ln -s ovmf-dir-remote ovmf-dir
cp ovmf-makefile ovmf-dir/Makefile
)
cp $CWD/{lwip,zlib,newlib,pciutils,grub,gmp,tpm_emulator}-*.tar.?z* \
@@ -153,10 +164,8 @@ CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \
--localstatedir=/var \
--mandir=/usr/man \
--docdir=/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION \
- --disable-qemu-traditional \
- --disable-rombios \
- --${CONF_STUBDOM}able-stubdom \
- --${CONF_OVMF}able-ovmf \
+ $CONF_XEN \
+ --with-extra-qemuu-configure-args="$CONF_QEMUU" \
--build=$ARCH-slackware-linux
make install-xen \
@@ -173,7 +182,7 @@ make install-tools \
MANDIR=/usr/man \
DESTDIR=$PKG
-if [ "$CONF_STUBDOM" = "en" ]; then
+if [ "$BUILD_STUBDOM" = "yes" ]; then
make install-stubdom \
docdir=/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION \
DOCDIR=/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION \
diff --git a/system/xen/xen.info b/system/xen/xen.info
index 7e4f29ef5b..9ea10099d2 100644
--- a/system/xen/xen.info
+++ b/system/xen/xen.info
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
PRGNAM="xen"
-VERSION="4.7.1"
+VERSION="4.8.0"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.xenproject.org/"
-DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.7.1.tar.gz \
- http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e.tar.gz \
+DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz \
+ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-827dd1bfee67daa683935ce65316f7e0f057fe1c.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz \
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.7.1.tar.gz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2 \
http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz \
- http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/seabios-1.9.2.tar.gz \
- http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ovmf-git-52a99493cce88a9d4ec8a02d7f1bd1a1001ce60d.tar.gz"
-MD5SUM="8e258d87a1008a3200eec6989e164fa4 \
- 7496268cebf47d5c9ccb0696e3b26065 \
+ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-seabios/seabios-1.10.0.tar.gz \
+ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-ovmf/xen-ovmf-20160905_bc54e50.tar.bz2"
+MD5SUM="d738f7c741110342621cb8a4d10b0191 \
+ 71c69b5e1db9e01d5f246226eca03c22 \
36cc57650cffda9a0269493be2a169bb \
debc62758716a169df9f62e6ab2bc634 \
bf8f1f9e3ca83d732c00a79a6ef29bc4 \
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ MD5SUM="8e258d87a1008a3200eec6989e164fa4 \
7b72caf22b01464ee7d6165f2fd85f44 \
dd60683d7057917e34630b4a787932e8 \
e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8 \
- 32201f54c5fb478914d0bb2449b18454 \
- bd4b1d36212692fa4874ecad2a42abed"
+ 633ffc9df0295eeeb4182444eb0300ee \
+ 87ba85cfec3993e4ee566dc58724d8a6"
REQUIRES="acpica yajl"
DOWNLOAD_x86_64=""
MD5SUM_x86_64=""
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa191.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa191.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 956f1c97ad..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa191.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/hvm: Fix the handling of non-present segments
-
-In 32bit, the data segments may be NULL to indicate that the segment is
-ineligible for use. In both 32bit and 64bit, the LDT selector may be NULL to
-indicate that the entire LDT is ineligible for use. However, nothing in Xen
-actually checks for this condition when performing other segmentation
-checks. (Note however that limit and writeability checks are correctly
-performed).
-
-Neither Intel nor AMD specify the exact behaviour of loading a NULL segment.
-Experimentally, AMD zeroes all attributes but leaves the base and limit
-unmodified. Intel zeroes the base, sets the limit to 0xfffffff and resets the
-attributes to just .G and .D/B.
-
-The use of the segment information in the VMCB/VMCS is equivalent to a native
-pipeline interacting with the segment cache. The present bit can therefore
-have a subtly different meaning, and it is now cooked to uniformly indicate
-whether the segment is usable or not.
-
-GDTR and IDTR don't have access rights like the other segments, but for
-consistency, they are treated as being present so no special casing is needed
-elsewhere in the segmentation logic.
-
-AMD hardware does not consider the present bit for %cs and %tr, and will
-function as if they were present. They are therefore unconditionally set to
-present when reading information from the VMCB, to maintain the new meaning of
-usability.
-
-Intel hardware has a separate unusable bit in the VMCS segment attributes.
-This bit is inverted and stored in the present field, so the hvm code can work
-with architecturally-common state.
-
-This is XSA-191.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 8 ++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++++
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 4 ++++
- 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index 704fd64..deb1783 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -2512,6 +2512,10 @@ bool_t hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr(
- */
- addr = (uint32_t)(addr + reg->base);
-
-+ /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
-+ if ( !reg->attr.fields.p )
-+ goto out;
-+
- switch ( access_type )
- {
- case hvm_access_read:
-@@ -2767,6 +2771,10 @@ static int hvm_load_segment_selector(
- hvm_get_segment_register(
- v, (sel & 4) ? x86_seg_ldtr : x86_seg_gdtr, &desctab);
-
-+ /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
-+ if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p )
-+ goto fail;
-+
- /* Check against descriptor table limit. */
- if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit )
- goto fail;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-index 16427f6..4cba406 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ static void svm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
- {
- case x86_seg_cs:
- memcpy(reg, &vmcb->cs, sizeof(*reg));
-+ reg->attr.fields.p = 1;
- reg->attr.fields.g = reg->limit > 0xFFFFF;
- break;
- case x86_seg_ds:
-@@ -660,13 +661,16 @@ static void svm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
- case x86_seg_tr:
- svm_sync_vmcb(v);
- memcpy(reg, &vmcb->tr, sizeof(*reg));
-+ reg->attr.fields.p = 1;
- reg->attr.fields.type |= 0x2;
- break;
- case x86_seg_gdtr:
- memcpy(reg, &vmcb->gdtr, sizeof(*reg));
-+ reg->attr.bytes = 0x80;
- break;
- case x86_seg_idtr:
- memcpy(reg, &vmcb->idtr, sizeof(*reg));
-+ reg->attr.bytes = 0x80;
- break;
- case x86_seg_ldtr:
- svm_sync_vmcb(v);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 9a8f694..a652c52 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -1035,10 +1035,12 @@ void vmx_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
- reg->sel = sel;
- reg->limit = limit;
-
-- reg->attr.bytes = (attr & 0xff) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00);
-- /* Unusable flag is folded into Present flag. */
-- if ( attr & (1u<<16) )
-- reg->attr.fields.p = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * Fold VT-x representation into Xen's representation. The Present bit is
-+ * unconditionally set to the inverse of unusable.
-+ */
-+ reg->attr.bytes =
-+ (!(attr & (1u << 16)) << 7) | (attr & 0x7f) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00);
-
- /* Adjust for virtual 8086 mode */
- if ( v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmx_realmode && seg <= x86_seg_tr
-@@ -1118,11 +1120,11 @@ static void vmx_set_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
- }
- }
-
-- attr = ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff);
--
-- /* Not-present must mean unusable. */
-- if ( !reg->attr.fields.p )
-- attr |= (1u << 16);
-+ /*
-+ * Unfold Xen representation into VT-x representation. The unusable bit
-+ * is unconditionally set to the inverse of present.
-+ */
-+ attr = (!(attr & (1u << 7)) << 16) | ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff);
-
- /* VMX has strict consistency requirement for flag G. */
- attr |= !!(limit >> 20) << 15;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index 7a707dc..7cb6f98 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -1367,6 +1367,10 @@ protmode_load_seg(
- &desctab, ctxt)) )
- return rc;
-
-+ /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
-+ if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p )
-+ goto raise_exn;
-+
- /* Check against descriptor table limit. */
- if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit )
- goto raise_exn;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa192.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa192.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b573a132c9..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa192.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/HVM: don't load LDTR with VM86 mode attrs during task switch
-
-Just like TR, LDTR is purely a protected mode facility and hence needs
-to be loaded accordingly. Also move its loading to where it
-architecurally belongs.
-
-This is XSA-192.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -2728,17 +2728,16 @@ static void hvm_unmap_entry(void *p)
- }
-
- static int hvm_load_segment_selector(
-- enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel)
-+ enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel, unsigned int eflags)
- {
- struct segment_register desctab, cs, segr;
- struct desc_struct *pdesc, desc;
- u8 dpl, rpl, cpl;
- bool_t writable;
- int fault_type = TRAP_invalid_tss;
-- struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
- struct vcpu *v = current;
-
-- if ( regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM )
-+ if ( eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM )
- {
- segr.sel = sel;
- segr.base = (uint32_t)sel << 4;
-@@ -2986,6 +2985,8 @@ void hvm_task_switch(
- if ( rc != HVMCOPY_okay )
- goto out;
-
-+ if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt, 0) )
-+ goto out;
-
- if ( hvm_set_cr3(tss.cr3, 1) )
- goto out;
-@@ -3008,13 +3009,12 @@ void hvm_task_switch(
- }
-
- exn_raised = 0;
-- if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt) ||
-- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es) ||
-- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs) ||
-- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss) ||
-- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds) ||
-- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs) ||
-- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs) )
-+ if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es, tss.eflags) ||
-+ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs, tss.eflags) ||
-+ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss, tss.eflags) ||
-+ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds, tss.eflags) ||
-+ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs, tss.eflags) ||
-+ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs, tss.eflags) )
- exn_raised = 1;
-
- rc = hvm_copy_to_guest_virt(
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c5486efa54..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/PV: writes of %fs and %gs base MSRs require canonical addresses
-
-Commit c42494acb2 ("x86: fix FS/GS base handling when using the
-fsgsbase feature") replaced the use of wrmsr_safe() on these paths
-without recognizing that wr{f,g}sbase() use just wrmsrl() and that the
-WR{F,G}SBASE instructions also raise #GP for non-canonical input.
-
-Similarly arch_set_info_guest() needs to prevent non-canonical
-addresses from getting stored into state later to be loaded by context
-switch code. For consistency also check stack pointers and LDT base.
-DR0..3, otoh, already get properly checked in set_debugreg() (albeit
-we discard the error there).
-
-The SHADOW_GS_BASE check isn't strictly necessary, but I think we
-better avoid trying the WRMSR if we know it's going to fail.
-
-This is XSA-193.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -890,7 +890,13 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
- {
- if ( !compat )
- {
-- if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.eip) ||
-+ if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rip) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rsp) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->kernel_sp) ||
-+ (c.nat->ldt_ents && !is_canonical_address(c.nat->ldt_base)) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->fs_base) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_kernel) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_user) ||
- !is_canonical_address(c.nat->event_callback_eip) ||
- !is_canonical_address(c.nat->syscall_callback_eip) ||
- !is_canonical_address(c.nat->failsafe_callback_eip) )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -2723,19 +2723,22 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
- switch ( regs->_ecx )
- {
- case MSR_FS_BASE:
-- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
- goto fail;
- wrfsbase(msr_content);
- v->arch.pv_vcpu.fs_base = msr_content;
- break;
- case MSR_GS_BASE:
-- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
- goto fail;
- wrgsbase(msr_content);
- v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_kernel = msr_content;
- break;
- case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE:
-- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
- goto fail;
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, msr_content) )
- goto fail;
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa194.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa194.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 946bd8783d..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa194.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-From 71096b016f7fd54a72af73576948cb25cf42ebcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 15:02:00 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] libelf: fix stack memory leak when loading 32 bit symbol
- tables
-
-The 32 bit Elf structs are smaller than the 64 bit ones, which means that
-when loading them there's some padding left uninitialized at the end of each
-struct (because the size indicated in e_ehsize and e_shentsize is
-smaller than the size of elf_ehdr and elf_shdr).
-
-Fix this by introducing a new helper that is used to set
-[caller_]xdest_{base/size} and that takes care of performing the appropriate
-memset of the region. This newly introduced helper is then used to set and
-unset xdest_{base/size} in elf_load_bsdsyms. Now that the full struct
-is zeroed, there's no need to specifically zero the undefined section.
-
-This is XSA-194.
-
-Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-
-Also remove the open coded (and redundant with the earlier
-elf_memset_unchecked()) use of caller_xdest_* from elf_init().
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 14 +++-----------
- xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 11 +++++++++--
- xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 15 +++++++++------
- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
-index 4d3ae4d..bc1f87b 100644
---- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
-+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
-@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image_input, size_t
- elf->ehdr = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_ehdr, (elf_ptrval)image_input);
- elf->class = elf_uval_3264(elf, elf->ehdr, e32.e_ident[EI_CLASS]);
- elf->data = elf_uval_3264(elf, elf->ehdr, e32.e_ident[EI_DATA]);
-- elf->caller_xdest_base = NULL;
-- elf->caller_xdest_size = 0;
-
- /* Sanity check phdr. */
- offset = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_phoff) +
-@@ -284,9 +282,8 @@ do { \
- #define SYMTAB_INDEX 1
- #define STRTAB_INDEX 2
-
-- /* Allow elf_memcpy_safe to write to symbol_header. */
-- elf->caller_xdest_base = &header;
-- elf->caller_xdest_size = sizeof(header);
-+ /* Allow elf_memcpy_safe to write to header. */
-+ elf_set_xdest(elf, &header, sizeof(header));
-
- /*
- * Calculate the position of the various elements in GUEST MEMORY SPACE.
-@@ -319,11 +316,7 @@ do { \
- elf_store_field_bitness(elf, header_handle, e_phentsize, 0);
- elf_store_field_bitness(elf, header_handle, e_phnum, 0);
-
-- /* Zero the undefined section. */
-- section_handle = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_shdr,
-- ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(&header.elf_header.section[SHN_UNDEF]));
- shdr_size = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shentsize);
-- elf_memset_safe(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(section_handle), 0, shdr_size);
-
- /*
- * The symtab section header is going to reside in section[SYMTAB_INDEX],
-@@ -404,8 +397,7 @@ do { \
- }
-
- /* Remove permissions from elf_memcpy_safe. */
-- elf->caller_xdest_base = NULL;
-- elf->caller_xdest_size = 0;
-+ elf_set_xdest(elf, NULL, 0);
-
- #undef SYMTAB_INDEX
- #undef STRTAB_INDEX
-diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
-index 5a4757b..e73e729 100644
---- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
-+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
-@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@ bool elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
- return 1;
- if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->dest_base, elf->dest_size) )
- return 1;
-- if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size,
-- elf->caller_xdest_base, elf->caller_xdest_size) )
-+ if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->xdest_base, elf->xdest_size) )
- return 1;
- elf_mark_broken(elf, "out of range access");
- return 0;
-@@ -373,6 +372,14 @@ bool elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr
- return ((p_type == PT_LOAD) && (p_flags & (PF_R | PF_W | PF_X)) != 0);
- }
-
-+void elf_set_xdest(struct elf_binary *elf, void *addr, uint64_t size)
-+{
-+ elf->xdest_base = addr;
-+ elf->xdest_size = size;
-+ if ( addr != NULL )
-+ elf_memset_safe(elf, ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(addr), 0, size);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Local variables:
- * mode: C
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
-index 95b5370..cf62bc7 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
-@@ -210,13 +210,11 @@ struct elf_binary {
- uint64_t bsd_symtab_pend;
-
- /*
-- * caller's other acceptable destination
-- *
-- * Again, these are trusted and must be valid (or 0) so long
-- * as the struct elf_binary is in use.
-+ * caller's other acceptable destination.
-+ * Set by elf_set_xdest. Do not set these directly.
- */
-- void *caller_xdest_base;
-- uint64_t caller_xdest_size;
-+ void *xdest_base;
-+ uint64_t xdest_size;
-
- #ifndef __XEN__
- /* misc */
-@@ -494,5 +492,10 @@ static inline void ELF_ADVANCE_DEST(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t amount)
- }
- }
-
-+/* Specify a (single) additional destination, to which the image may
-+ * cause writes. As with dest_base and dest_size, the values provided
-+ * are trusted and must be valid so long as the struct elf_binary
-+ * is in use or until elf_set_xdest(,0,0) is called. */
-+void elf_set_xdest(struct elf_binary *elf, void *addr, uint64_t size);
-
- #endif /* __XEN_LIBELF_H__ */
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa195.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa195.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a193a5cca0..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa195.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86emul: fix huge bit offset handling
-
-We must never chop off the high 32 bits.
-
-This is XSA-195.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -2549,6 +2549,12 @@ x86_emulate(
- else
- {
- /*
-+ * Instructions such as bt can reference an arbitrary offset from
-+ * their memory operand, but the instruction doing the actual
-+ * emulation needs the appropriate op_bytes read from memory.
-+ * Adjust both the source register and memory operand to make an
-+ * equivalent instruction.
-+ *
- * EA += BitOffset DIV op_bytes*8
- * BitOffset = BitOffset MOD op_bytes*8
- * DIV truncates towards negative infinity.
-@@ -2560,14 +2566,15 @@ x86_emulate(
- src.val = (int32_t)src.val;
- if ( (long)src.val < 0 )
- {
-- unsigned long byte_offset;
-- byte_offset = op_bytes + (((-src.val-1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes-1));
-+ unsigned long byte_offset =
-+ op_bytes + (((-src.val - 1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L));
-+
- ea.mem.off -= byte_offset;
- src.val = (byte_offset << 3) + src.val;
- }
- else
- {
-- ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1);
-+ ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L);
- src.val &= (op_bytes << 3) - 1;
- }
- }
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0001-x86-emul-Correct-the-IDT-entry-calculation-in-inject.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0001-x86-emul-Correct-the-IDT-entry-calculation-in-inject.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7193e9ad5a..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0001-x86-emul-Correct-the-IDT-entry-calculation-in-inject.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/emul: Correct the IDT entry calculation in inject_swint()
-
-The logic, as introduced in c/s 36ebf14ebe "x86/emulate: support for emulating
-software event injection" is buggy. The size of an IDT entry depends on long
-mode being active, not the width of the code segment currently in use.
-
-In particular, this means that a compatibility code segment which hits
-emulation for software event injection will end up using an incorrect offset
-in the IDT for DPL/Presence checking. In practice, this only occurs on old
-AMD hardware lacking NRip support; all newer AMD hardware, and all Intel
-hardware bypass this path in the emulator.
-
-While here, fix a minor issue with reading the IDT entry. The return value
-from ops->read() wasn't checked, but in reality the only failure case is if a
-pagefault occurs. This is not a realistic problem as the kernel will almost
-certainly crash with a double fault if this setup actually occured.
-
-This is part of XSA-196.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 15 +++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index 7a707dc..f74aa8f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -1630,10 +1630,16 @@ static int inject_swint(enum x86_swint_type type,
- {
- if ( !in_realmode(ctxt, ops) )
- {
-- unsigned int idte_size = (ctxt->addr_size == 64) ? 16 : 8;
-- unsigned int idte_offset = vector * idte_size;
-+ unsigned int idte_size, idte_offset;
- struct segment_register idtr;
- uint32_t idte_ctl;
-+ int lm = in_longmode(ctxt, ops);
-+
-+ if ( lm < 0 )
-+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
-+
-+ idte_size = lm ? 16 : 8;
-+ idte_offset = vector * idte_size;
-
- /* icebp sets the External Event bit despite being an instruction. */
- error_code = (vector << 3) | ECODE_IDT |
-@@ -1661,8 +1667,9 @@ static int inject_swint(enum x86_swint_type type,
- * Should strictly speaking read all 8/16 bytes of an entry,
- * but we currently only care about the dpl and present bits.
- */
-- ops->read(x86_seg_none, idtr.base + idte_offset + 4,
-- &idte_ctl, sizeof(idte_ctl), ctxt);
-+ if ( (rc = ops->read(x86_seg_none, idtr.base + idte_offset + 4,
-+ &idte_ctl, sizeof(idte_ctl), ctxt)) )
-+ goto done;
-
- /* Is this entry present? */
- if ( !(idte_ctl & (1u << 15)) )
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0002-x86-svm-Fix-injection-of-software-interrupts.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0002-x86-svm-Fix-injection-of-software-interrupts.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 26580ff809..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa196-0002-x86-svm-Fix-injection-of-software-interrupts.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/svm: Fix injection of software interrupts
-
-The non-NextRip logic in c/s 36ebf14eb "x86/emulate: support for emulating
-software event injection" was based on an older version of the AMD software
-manual. The manual was later corrected, following findings from that series.
-
-I took the original wording of "not supported without NextRIP" to mean that
-X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT was not eligible for use. It turns out that this
-is not the case, and the new wording is clearer on the matter.
-
-Despite testing the original patch series on non-NRip hardware, the
-swint-emulation XTF test case focuses on the debug vectors; it never ended up
-executing an `int $n` instruction for a vector which wasn't also an exception.
-
-During a vmentry, the use of X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION comes with a vector
-check to ensure that it is only used with exception vectors. Xen's use of
-X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION for `int $n` injection has always been buggy on AMD
-hardware.
-
-Fix this by always using X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT.
-
-Print and decode the eventinj information in svm_vmcb_dump(), as it has
-several invalid combinations which cause vmentry failures.
-
-This is part of XSA-196.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 13 +++++--------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c | 4 ++++
- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-index 4391744..76efc3e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-@@ -1231,17 +1231,14 @@ static void svm_inject_trap(const struct hvm_trap *trap)
- {
- case X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT: /* int $n */
- /*
-- * Injection type 4 (software interrupt) is only supported with
-- * NextRIP support. Without NextRIP, the emulator will have performed
-- * DPL and presence checks for us.
-+ * Software interrupts (type 4) cannot be properly injected if the
-+ * processor doesn't support NextRIP. Without NextRIP, the emulator
-+ * will have performed DPL and presence checks for us, and will have
-+ * moved eip forward if appropriate.
- */
- if ( cpu_has_svm_nrips )
-- {
- vmcb->nextrip = regs->eip + _trap.insn_len;
-- event.fields.type = X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT;
-- }
-- else
-- event.fields.type = X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION;
-+ event.fields.type = X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT;
- break;
-
- case X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION: /* icebp */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
-index ded5d19..f93dfed 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ void svm_vmcb_dump(const char *from, struct vmcb_struct *vmcb)
- vmcb->tlb_control,
- (unsigned long long)vmcb->_vintr.bytes,
- (unsigned long long)vmcb->interrupt_shadow);
-+ printk("eventinj %016"PRIx64", valid? %d, ec? %d, type %u, vector %#x\n",
-+ vmcb->eventinj.bytes, vmcb->eventinj.fields.v,
-+ vmcb->eventinj.fields.ev, vmcb->eventinj.fields.type,
-+ vmcb->eventinj.fields.vector);
- printk("exitcode = %#Lx exitintinfo = %#Lx\n",
- (unsigned long long)vmcb->exitcode,
- (unsigned long long)vmcb->exitintinfo.bytes);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemut.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemut.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 878f7d3566..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemut.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: xen: fix ioreq handling
-
-Avoid double fetches and bounds check size to avoid overflowing
-internal variables.
-
-This is XSA-197.
-
-Reported-by: yanghongke <yanghongke@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-
---- a/i386-dm/helper2.c
-+++ b/i386-dm/helper2.c
-@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_pio(CPUState *env,
- {
- uint32_t i;
-
-+ if (req->size > sizeof(unsigned long)) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "PIO: bad size (%u)\n", req->size);
-+ exit(-1);
-+ }
-+
- if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
- if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
- req->data = do_inp(env, req->addr, req->size);
-@@ -404,6 +409,11 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(CPUState *env
- {
- uint32_t i;
-
-+ if (req->size > sizeof(req->data)) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "MMIO: bad size (%u)\n", req->size);
-+ exit(-1);
-+ }
-+
- if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
- if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
- for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
-@@ -516,11 +526,13 @@ static int __handle_buffered_iopage(CPUS
- req.df = 1;
- req.type = buf_req->type;
- req.data_is_ptr = 0;
-+ xen_rmb();
- qw = (req.size == 8);
- if (qw) {
- buf_req = &buffered_io_page->buf_ioreq[(rdptr + 1) %
- IOREQ_BUFFER_SLOT_NUM];
- req.data |= ((uint64_t)buf_req->data) << 32;
-+ xen_rmb();
- }
-
- __handle_ioreq(env, &req);
-@@ -552,7 +564,11 @@ static void cpu_handle_ioreq(void *opaqu
-
- __handle_buffered_iopage(env);
- if (req) {
-- __handle_ioreq(env, req);
-+ ioreq_t copy = *req;
-+
-+ xen_rmb();
-+ __handle_ioreq(env, &copy);
-+ req->data = copy.data;
-
- if (req->state != STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS) {
- fprintf(logfile, "Badness in I/O request ... not in service?!: "
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemuu.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemuu.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f7845cffd2..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa197-qemuu.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: xen: fix ioreq handling
-
-Avoid double fetches and bounds check size to avoid overflowing
-internal variables.
-
-This is XSA-197.
-
-Reported-by: yanghongke <yanghongke@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-
---- a/xen-hvm.c
-+++ b/xen-hvm.c
-@@ -810,6 +810,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_pio(ioreq_t *req)
- trace_cpu_ioreq_pio(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
- req->data, req->count, req->size);
-
-+ if (req->size > sizeof(uint32_t)) {
-+ hw_error("PIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
-+ }
-+
- if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
- if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
- req->data = do_inp(req->addr, req->size);
-@@ -846,6 +850,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(ioreq_t *req)
- trace_cpu_ioreq_move(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
- req->data, req->count, req->size);
-
-+ if (req->size > sizeof(req->data)) {
-+ hw_error("MMIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
-+ }
-+
- if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
- if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
- for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
-@@ -1010,11 +1018,13 @@ static int handle_buffered_iopage(XenIOS
- req.df = 1;
- req.type = buf_req->type;
- req.data_is_ptr = 0;
-+ xen_rmb();
- qw = (req.size == 8);
- if (qw) {
- buf_req = &buf_page->buf_ioreq[(rdptr + 1) %
- IOREQ_BUFFER_SLOT_NUM];
- req.data |= ((uint64_t)buf_req->data) << 32;
-+ xen_rmb();
- }
-
- handle_ioreq(state, &req);
-@@ -1045,7 +1055,11 @@ static void cpu_handle_ioreq(void *opaqu
-
- handle_buffered_iopage(state);
- if (req) {
-- handle_ioreq(state, req);
-+ ioreq_t copy = *req;
-+
-+ xen_rmb();
-+ handle_ioreq(state, &copy);
-+ req->data = copy.data;
-
- if (req->state != STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Badness in I/O request ... not in service?!: "
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa198.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa198.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dbf708491e..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa198.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From 71a389ae940bc52bf897a6e5becd73fd8ede94c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 16:37:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] pygrub: Properly quote results, when returning them to the
- caller:
-
-* When the caller wants sexpr output, use `repr()'
- This is what Xend expects.
-
- The returned S-expressions are now escaped and quoted by Python,
- generally using '...'. Previously kernel and ramdisk were unquoted
- and args was quoted with "..." but without proper escaping. This
- change may break toolstacks which do not properly dequote the
- returned S-expressions.
-
-* When the caller wants "simple" output, crash if the delimiter is
- contained in the returned value.
-
- With --output-format=simple it does not seem like this could ever
- happen, because the bootloader config parsers all take line-based
- input from the various bootloader config files.
-
- With --output-format=simple0, this can happen if the bootloader
- config file contains nul bytes.
-
-This is XSA-198.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
- tools/pygrub/src/pygrub | 9 ++++++---
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
-index 40f9584..dd0c8f7 100755
---- a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
-+++ b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
-@@ -721,14 +721,17 @@ def sniff_netware(fs, cfg):
- return cfg
-
- def format_sxp(kernel, ramdisk, args):
-- s = "linux (kernel %s)" % kernel
-+ s = "linux (kernel %s)" % repr(kernel)
- if ramdisk:
-- s += "(ramdisk %s)" % ramdisk
-+ s += "(ramdisk %s)" % repr(ramdisk)
- if args:
-- s += "(args \"%s\")" % args
-+ s += "(args %s)" % repr(args)
- return s
-
- def format_simple(kernel, ramdisk, args, sep):
-+ for check in (kernel, ramdisk, args):
-+ if check is not None and sep in check:
-+ raise RuntimeError, "simple format cannot represent delimiter-containing value"
- s = ("kernel %s" % kernel) + sep
- if ramdisk:
- s += ("ramdisk %s" % ramdisk) + sep
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa200-4.7.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa200-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 69608f6fc3..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa200-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86emul: CMPXCHG8B ignores operand size prefix
-
-Otherwise besides mis-handling the instruction, the comparison failure
-case would result in uninitialized stack data being handed back to the
-guest in rDX:rAX (32 bits leaked for 32-bit guests, 96 bits for 64-bit
-ones).
-
-This is XSA-200.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/test_x86_emulator.c
-+++ b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/test_x86_emulator.c
-@@ -435,6 +435,24 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- goto fail;
- printf("okay\n");
-
-+ printf("%-40s", "Testing cmpxchg8b (%edi) [opsize]...");
-+ instr[0] = 0x66; instr[1] = 0x0f; instr[2] = 0xc7; instr[3] = 0x0f;
-+ res[0] = 0x12345678;
-+ res[1] = 0x87654321;
-+ regs.eflags = 0x200;
-+ regs.eip = (unsigned long)&instr[0];
-+ regs.edi = (unsigned long)res;
-+ rc = x86_emulate(&ctxt, &emulops);
-+ if ( (rc != X86EMUL_OKAY) ||
-+ (res[0] != 0x12345678) ||
-+ (res[1] != 0x87654321) ||
-+ (regs.eax != 0x12345678) ||
-+ (regs.edx != 0x87654321) ||
-+ ((regs.eflags&0x240) != 0x200) ||
-+ (regs.eip != (unsigned long)&instr[4]) )
-+ goto fail;
-+ printf("okay\n");
-+
- printf("%-40s", "Testing movsxbd (%%eax),%%ecx...");
- instr[0] = 0x0f; instr[1] = 0xbe; instr[2] = 0x08;
- regs.eflags = 0x200;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -4775,8 +4775,12 @@ x86_emulate(
- generate_exception_if((modrm_reg & 7) != 1, EXC_UD, -1);
- generate_exception_if(ea.type != OP_MEM, EXC_UD, -1);
- if ( op_bytes == 8 )
-+ {
- host_and_vcpu_must_have(cx16);
-- op_bytes *= 2;
-+ op_bytes = 16;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ op_bytes = 8;
-
- /* Get actual old value. */
- if ( (rc = ops->read(ea.mem.seg, ea.mem.off, old, op_bytes,
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 50983b852f..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm64: handle guest-generated EL1 asynchronous abort
-
-In current code, when the hypervisor receives an asynchronous abort
-from a guest, the hypervisor will do panic, the host will be down.
-We have to prevent such security issue, so, in this patch we crash
-the guest, when the hypervisor receives an asynchronous abort from
-the guest.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9815, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-@@ -204,9 +204,12 @@ guest_fiq_invalid:
- entry hyp=0, compat=0
- invalid BAD_FIQ
-
--guest_error_invalid:
-+guest_error:
- entry hyp=0, compat=0
-- invalid BAD_ERROR
-+ msr daifclr, #2
-+ mov x0, sp
-+ bl do_trap_guest_error
-+ exit hyp=0, compat=0
-
- guest_sync_compat:
- entry hyp=0, compat=1
-@@ -225,9 +228,12 @@ guest_fiq_invalid_compat:
- entry hyp=0, compat=1
- invalid BAD_FIQ
-
--guest_error_invalid_compat:
-+guest_error_compat:
- entry hyp=0, compat=1
-- invalid BAD_ERROR
-+ msr daifclr, #2
-+ mov x0, sp
-+ bl do_trap_guest_error
-+ exit hyp=0, compat=1
-
- ENTRY(return_to_new_vcpu32)
- exit hyp=0, compat=1
-@@ -286,12 +292,12 @@ ENTRY(hyp_traps_vector)
- ventry guest_sync // Synchronous 64-bit EL0/EL1
- ventry guest_irq // IRQ 64-bit EL0/EL1
- ventry guest_fiq_invalid // FIQ 64-bit EL0/EL1
-- ventry guest_error_invalid // Error 64-bit EL0/EL1
-+ ventry guest_error // Error 64-bit EL0/EL1
-
- ventry guest_sync_compat // Synchronous 32-bit EL0/EL1
- ventry guest_irq_compat // IRQ 32-bit EL0/EL1
- ventry guest_fiq_invalid_compat // FIQ 32-bit EL0/EL1
-- ventry guest_error_invalid_compat // Error 32-bit EL0/EL1
-+ ventry guest_error_compat // Error 32-bit EL0/EL1
-
- /*
- * struct vcpu *__context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
---- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-@@ -2723,6 +2723,21 @@ asmlinkage void do_trap_hypervisor(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- }
- }
-
-+asmlinkage void do_trap_guest_error(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+{
-+ enter_hypervisor_head(regs);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Currently, to ensure hypervisor safety, when we received a
-+ * guest-generated vSerror/vAbort, we just crash the guest to protect
-+ * the hypervisor. In future we can better handle this by injecting
-+ * a vSerror/vAbort to the guest.
-+ */
-+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest(Dom-%u) will be crashed by vSError\n",
-+ current->domain->domain_id);
-+ domain_crash_synchronous();
-+}
-+
- asmlinkage void do_trap_irq(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- enter_hypervisor_head(regs);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-2.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9bd1f8f89d..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm64: handle async aborts delivered while at EL2
-
-If EL1 generates an asynchronous abort and then traps into EL2
-(by HVC or IRQ) before the abort has been delivered, the hypervisor
-could not catch it, because the PSTATE.A bit is masked all the time
-in hypervisor. So this asynchronous abort may be slipped to next
-running guest with PSTATE.A bit unmasked.
-
-In order to avoid this, it is necessary to take the abort at EL2, by
-clearing the PSTATE.A bit. In this patch, we unmask the PSTATE.A bit
-to open a window to catch guest-generated asynchronous abort in all
-EL1 -> EL2 swich paths. If we catched such asynchronous abort in
-checking window, the hyp_error exception will be triggered and the
-abort source guest will be crashed.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9816, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-@@ -173,6 +173,43 @@ hyp_error_invalid:
- entry hyp=1
- invalid BAD_ERROR
-
-+hyp_error:
-+ /*
-+ * Only two possibilities:
-+ * 1) Either we come from the exit path, having just unmasked
-+ * PSTATE.A: change the return code to an EL2 fault, and
-+ * carry on, as we're already in a sane state to handle it.
-+ * 2) Or we come from anywhere else, and that's a bug: we panic.
-+ */
-+ entry hyp=1
-+ msr daifclr, #2
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The ELR_EL2 may be modified by an interrupt, so we have to use the
-+ * saved value in cpu_user_regs to check whether we come from 1) or
-+ * not.
-+ */
-+ ldr x0, [sp, #UREGS_PC]
-+ adr x1, abort_guest_exit_start
-+ cmp x0, x1
-+ adr x1, abort_guest_exit_end
-+ ccmp x0, x1, #4, ne
-+ mov x0, sp
-+ mov x1, #BAD_ERROR
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Not equal, the exception come from 2). It's a bug, we have to
-+ * panic the hypervisor.
-+ */
-+ b.ne do_bad_mode
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Otherwise, the exception come from 1). It happened because of
-+ * the guest. Crash this guest.
-+ */
-+ bl do_trap_guest_error
-+ exit hyp=1
-+
- /* Traps taken in Current EL with SP_ELx */
- hyp_sync:
- entry hyp=1
-@@ -189,15 +226,29 @@ hyp_irq:
-
- guest_sync:
- entry hyp=0, compat=0
-+ bl check_pending_vserror
-+ /*
-+ * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+ * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+ */
-+ cbnz x0, 1f
- msr daifclr, #2
- mov x0, sp
- bl do_trap_hypervisor
-+1:
- exit hyp=0, compat=0
-
- guest_irq:
- entry hyp=0, compat=0
-+ bl check_pending_vserror
-+ /*
-+ * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+ * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+ */
-+ cbnz x0, 1f
- mov x0, sp
- bl do_trap_irq
-+1:
- exit hyp=0, compat=0
-
- guest_fiq_invalid:
-@@ -213,15 +264,29 @@ guest_error:
-
- guest_sync_compat:
- entry hyp=0, compat=1
-+ bl check_pending_vserror
-+ /*
-+ * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+ * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+ */
-+ cbnz x0, 1f
- msr daifclr, #2
- mov x0, sp
- bl do_trap_hypervisor
-+1:
- exit hyp=0, compat=1
-
- guest_irq_compat:
- entry hyp=0, compat=1
-+ bl check_pending_vserror
-+ /*
-+ * If x0 is Non-zero, a vSError took place, the initial exception
-+ * doesn't have any significance to be handled. Exit ASAP
-+ */
-+ cbnz x0, 1f
- mov x0, sp
- bl do_trap_irq
-+1:
- exit hyp=0, compat=1
-
- guest_fiq_invalid_compat:
-@@ -270,6 +335,62 @@ return_from_trap:
- eret
-
- /*
-+ * This function is used to check pending virtual SError in the gap of
-+ * EL1 -> EL2 world switch.
-+ * The x0 register will be used to indicate the results of detection.
-+ * x0 -- Non-zero indicates a pending virtual SError took place.
-+ * x0 -- Zero indicates no pending virtual SError took place.
-+ */
-+check_pending_vserror:
-+ /*
-+ * Save elr_el2 to check whether the pending SError exception takes
-+ * place while we are doing this sync exception.
-+ */
-+ mrs x0, elr_el2
-+
-+ /* Synchronize against in-flight ld/st */
-+ dsb sy
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Unmask PSTATE asynchronous abort bit. If there is a pending
-+ * SError, the EL2 error exception will happen after PSTATE.A
-+ * is cleared.
-+ */
-+ msr daifclr, #4
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This is our single instruction exception window. A pending
-+ * SError is guaranteed to occur at the earliest when we unmask
-+ * it, and at the latest just after the ISB.
-+ *
-+ * If a pending SError occurs, the program will jump to EL2 error
-+ * exception handler, and the elr_el2 will be set to
-+ * abort_guest_exit_start or abort_guest_exit_end.
-+ */
-+abort_guest_exit_start:
-+
-+ isb
-+
-+abort_guest_exit_end:
-+ /* Mask PSTATE asynchronous abort bit, close the checking window. */
-+ msr daifset, #4
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Compare elr_el2 and the saved value to check whether we are
-+ * returning from a valid exception caused by pending SError.
-+ */
-+ mrs x1, elr_el2
-+ cmp x0, x1
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Not equal, the pending SError exception took place, set
-+ * x0 to non-zero.
-+ */
-+ cset x0, ne
-+
-+ ret
-+
-+/*
- * Exception vectors.
- */
- .macro ventry label
-@@ -287,7 +408,7 @@ ENTRY(hyp_traps_vector)
- ventry hyp_sync // Synchronous EL2h
- ventry hyp_irq // IRQ EL2h
- ventry hyp_fiq_invalid // FIQ EL2h
-- ventry hyp_error_invalid // Error EL2h
-+ ventry hyp_error // Error EL2h
-
- ventry guest_sync // Synchronous 64-bit EL0/EL1
- ventry guest_irq // IRQ 64-bit EL0/EL1
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-3-4.7.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-3-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index af7fc3703e..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-3-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm: crash the guest when it traps on external abort
-
-If we spot a data or prefetch abort bearing the ESR_EL2.EA bit set, we
-know that this is an external abort, and that should crash the guest.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9817, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
-@@ -2383,6 +2383,15 @@ static void do_trap_instr_abort_guest(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
- int rc;
- register_t gva = READ_SYSREG(FAR_EL2);
-
-+ /*
-+ * If this bit has been set, it means that this instruction abort is caused
-+ * by a guest external abort. Currently we crash the guest to protect the
-+ * hypervisor. In future one can better handle this by injecting a virtual
-+ * abort to the guest.
-+ */
-+ if ( hsr.iabt.eat )
-+ domain_crash_synchronous();
-+
- switch ( hsr.iabt.ifsc & 0x3f )
- {
- case FSC_FLT_PERM ... FSC_FLT_PERM + 3:
-@@ -2437,6 +2446,15 @@ static void do_trap_data_abort_guest(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
- return;
- }
-
-+ /*
-+ * If this bit has been set, it means that this data abort is caused
-+ * by a guest external abort. Currently we crash the guest to protect the
-+ * hypervisor. In future one can better handle this by injecting a virtual
-+ * abort to the guest.
-+ */
-+ if ( dabt.eat )
-+ domain_crash_synchronous();
-+
- info.dabt = dabt;
- #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_32
- info.gva = READ_CP32(HDFAR);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-4.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-4.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8060a5be13..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa201-4.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Subject: arm32: handle async aborts delivered while at HYP
-
-If guest generates an asynchronous abort and then traps into HYP
-(by HVC or IRQ) before the abort has been delivered, the hypervisor
-could not catch it, because the PSTATE.A bit is masked all the time
-in hypervisor. So this asynchronous abort may be slipped to next
-running guest with PSTATE.A bit unmasked.
-
-In order to avoid this, it is necessary to take the abort at HYP, by
-clearing the PSTATE.A bit. In this patch, we unmask the PSTATE.A bit
-to open a window to catch guest-generated asynchronous abort in all
-Guest -> HYP switch paths. If we caught such asynchronous abort in
-checking window, the HYP data abort exception will be triggered and
-the abort source guest will be crashed.
-
-This is CVE-2016-9818, part of XSA-201.
-
-Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -42,6 +42,61 @@ save_guest_regs:
- SAVE_BANKED(fiq)
- SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R8_fiq); SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R9_fiq); SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R10_fiq)
- SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R11_fiq); SAVE_ONE_BANKED(R12_fiq);
-+ /*
-+ * Start to check pending virtual abort in the gap of Guest -> HYP
-+ * world switch.
-+ *
-+ * Save ELR_hyp to check whether the pending virtual abort exception
-+ * takes place while we are doing this trap exception.
-+ */
-+ mrs r1, ELR_hyp
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Force loads and stores to complete before unmasking asynchronous
-+ * aborts and forcing the delivery of the exception.
-+ */
-+ dsb sy
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Unmask asynchronous abort bit. If there is a pending asynchronous
-+ * abort, the data_abort exception will happen after A bit is cleared.
-+ */
-+ cpsie a
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This is our single instruction exception window. A pending
-+ * asynchronous abort is guaranteed to occur at the earliest when we
-+ * unmask it, and at the latest just after the ISB.
-+ *
-+ * If a pending abort occurs, the program will jump to data_abort
-+ * exception handler, and the ELR_hyp will be set to
-+ * abort_guest_exit_start or abort_guest_exit_end.
-+ */
-+ .global abort_guest_exit_start
-+abort_guest_exit_start:
-+
-+ isb
-+
-+ .global abort_guest_exit_end
-+abort_guest_exit_end:
-+ /* Mask CPSR asynchronous abort bit, close the checking window. */
-+ cpsid a
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Compare ELR_hyp and the saved value to check whether we are
-+ * returning from a valid exception caused by pending virtual
-+ * abort.
-+ */
-+ mrs r2, ELR_hyp
-+ cmp r1, r2
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Not equal, the pending virtual abort exception took place, the
-+ * initial exception does not have any significance to be handled.
-+ * Exit ASAP.
-+ */
-+ bne return_from_trap
-+
- mov pc, lr
-
- #define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap) \
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/traps.c
-@@ -63,7 +63,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_trap_prefetch_abort(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-
- asmlinkage void do_trap_data_abort(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
-- do_unexpected_trap("Data Abort", regs);
-+ if ( VABORT_GEN_BY_GUEST(regs) )
-+ do_trap_guest_error(regs);
-+ else
-+ do_unexpected_trap("Data Abort", regs);
- }
-
- /*
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/processor.h
-@@ -55,6 +55,17 @@ struct cpu_user_regs
-
- uint32_t pad1; /* Doubleword-align the user half of the frame */
- };
-+
-+/* Functions for pending virtual abort checking window. */
-+void abort_guest_exit_start(void);
-+void abort_guest_exit_end(void);
-+
-+#define VABORT_GEN_BY_GUEST(r) \
-+( \
-+ ( (unsigned long)abort_guest_exit_start == (r)->pc ) || \
-+ ( (unsigned long)abort_guest_exit_end == (r)->pc ) \
-+)
-+
- #endif
-
- /* Layout as used in assembly, with src/dest registers mixed in */
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
-@@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ void vcpu_regs_user_to_hyp(struct vcpu *vcpu,
- int call_smc(register_t function_id, register_t arg0, register_t arg1,
- register_t arg2);
-
-+void do_trap_guest_error(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
-+
- #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
- #endif /* __ASM_ARM_PROCESSOR_H */
- /*
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa202.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa202.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51d38dcba5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa202.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86: force EFLAGS.IF on when exiting to PV guests
+
+Guest kernels modifying instructions in the process of being emulated
+for another of their vCPU-s may effect EFLAGS.IF to be cleared upon
+next exiting to guest context, by converting the being emulated
+instruction to CLI (at the right point in time). Prevent any such bad
+effects by always forcing EFLAGS.IF on. And to cover hypothetical other
+similar issues, also force EFLAGS.{IOPL,NT,VM} to zero.
+
+This is XSA-202.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+---
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ compat_process_trap:
+ /* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */
+ ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
+ ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
++ mov $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),%r11d
++ and UREGS_eflags(%rsp),%r11d
+ .Lcr4_orig:
+ .skip .Lcr4_alt_end - .Lcr4_alt, 0x90
+ .Lcr4_orig_end:
+@@ -144,6 +146,8 @@ ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
+ (.Lcr4_orig_end - .Lcr4_orig), \
+ (.Lcr4_alt_end - .Lcr4_alt)
+ .popsection
++ or $X86_EFLAGS_IF,%r11
++ mov %r11d,UREGS_eflags(%rsp)
+ RESTORE_ALL adj=8 compat=1
+ .Lft0: iretq
+ _ASM_PRE_EXTABLE(.Lft0, handle_exception)
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+@@ -40,28 +40,29 @@ restore_all_guest:
+ testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
+ jz iret_exit_to_guest
+
++ movq 24(%rsp),%r11 # RFLAGS
++ andq $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),%r11
++ orq $X86_EFLAGS_IF,%r11
++
+ /* Don't use SYSRET path if the return address is not canonical. */
+ movq 8(%rsp),%rcx
+ sarq $47,%rcx
+ incl %ecx
+ cmpl $1,%ecx
+- ja .Lforce_iret
++ movq 8(%rsp),%rcx # RIP
++ ja iret_exit_to_guest
+
+ cmpw $FLAT_USER_CS32,16(%rsp)# CS
+- movq 8(%rsp),%rcx # RIP
+- movq 24(%rsp),%r11 # RFLAGS
+ movq 32(%rsp),%rsp # RSP
+ je 1f
+ sysretq
+ 1: sysretl
+
+-.Lforce_iret:
+- /* Mimic SYSRET behavior. */
+- movq 8(%rsp),%rcx # RIP
+- movq 24(%rsp),%r11 # RFLAGS
+ ALIGN
+ /* No special register assumptions. */
+ iret_exit_to_guest:
++ andl $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),24(%rsp)
++ orl $X86_EFLAGS_IF,24(%rsp)
+ addq $8,%rsp
+ .Lft0: iretq
+ _ASM_PRE_EXTABLE(.Lft0, handle_exception)
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa203-4.8.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa203-4.8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9661a4c91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa203-4.8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/HVM: add missing NULL check before using VMFUNC hook
+
+This is XSA-203.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+@@ -1694,6 +1694,8 @@ static int hvmemul_vmfunc(
+ {
+ int rc;
+
++ if ( !hvm_funcs.altp2m_vcpu_emulate_vmfunc )
++ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+ rc = hvm_funcs.altp2m_vcpu_emulate_vmfunc(ctxt->regs);
+ if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+ hvmemul_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_op, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE,
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa204-4.8.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa204-4.8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..360296b2bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa204-4.8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2016 15:42:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/emul: Correct the handling of eflags with SYSCALL
+
+A singlestep #DB is determined by the resulting eflags value from the
+execution of SYSCALL, not the original eflags value.
+
+By using the original eflags value, we negate the guest kernels attempt to
+protect itself from a privilege escalation by masking TF.
+
+Have the SYSCALL emulation recalculate tf after the instruction is complete.
+
+This is XSA-204
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+index d82e85d..ff952a9 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+@@ -4561,6 +4561,23 @@ x86_emulate(
+ (rc = ops->write_segment(x86_seg_ss, &sreg, ctxt)) )
+ goto done;
+
++ /*
++ * SYSCALL (unlike most instructions) evaluates its singlestep action
++ * based on the resulting EFLG_TF, not the starting EFLG_TF.
++ *
++ * As the #DB is raised after the CPL change and before the OS can
++ * switch stack, it is a large risk for privilege escalation.
++ *
++ * 64bit kernels should mask EFLG_TF in MSR_FMASK to avoid any
++ * vulnerability. Running the #DB handler on an IST stack is also a
++ * mitigation.
++ *
++ * 32bit kernels have no ability to mask EFLG_TF at all. Their only
++ * mitigation is to use a task gate for handling #DB (or to not use
++ * enable EFER.SCE to start with).
++ */
++ tf = _regs.eflags & EFLG_TF;
++
+ break;
+ }
+
+@@ -5412,7 +5429,7 @@ x86_emulate(
+
+ *ctxt->regs = _regs;
+
+- /* Inject #DB if single-step tracing was enabled at instruction start. */
++ /* Should a singlestep #DB be raised? */
+ if ( tf && (rc == X86EMUL_OKAY) && ops->inject_hw_exception )
+ rc = ops->inject_hw_exception(EXC_DB, -1, ctxt) ? : X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
+