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authorMario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>2017-06-23 20:07:23 +0200
committerWilly Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>2017-06-24 08:32:06 +0700
commite5517c1db9c7f5937b48cd95d49e715c83335c3d (patch)
tree40ca46d9b08b4247f036819fb32b5fbc34270125 /system/xen/xsa
parent78963fb4fa21eb490dd39b9efb6a6a8bdfda4b3a (diff)
downloadslackbuilds-e5517c1db9c7f5937b48cd95d49e715c83335c3d.tar.gz
system/xen: XSA 216-225 update.
Signed-off-by: Mario Preksavec <mario@slackware.hr>
Diffstat (limited to 'system/xen/xsa')
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa216-qemuu.patch113
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa217.patch41
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0001-gnttab-fix-unmap-pin-accounting-race.patch102
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0002-gnttab-Avoid-potential-double-put-of-maptrack-entry.patch231
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0003-gnttab-correct-maptrack-table-accesses.patch84
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa219-4.8.patch151
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa220-4.8.patch94
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa221.patch194
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa222-1.patch124
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa222-2-4.8.patch405
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa223.patch54
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0001-gnttab-Fix-handling-of-dev_bus_addr-during-unmap.patch111
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0002-gnttab-never-create-host-mapping-unless-asked-to.patch42
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0003-gnttab-correct-logic-to-get-page-references-during-m.patch186
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0004-gnttab-__gnttab_unmap_common_complete-is-all-or-noth.patch319
-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa225.patch35
16 files changed, 2286 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa216-qemuu.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa216-qemuu.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd4d90d2ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa216-qemuu.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: xen/disk: don't leak stack data via response ring
+
+Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
+the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other (Linux)
+backends do. Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are
+actually identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
+
+This is XSA-216.
+
+Reported-by: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
+Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+---
+v2: Add QEMU_PACKED to fix handling 32-bit guests by 64-bit qemu.
+
+--- a/hw/block/xen_blkif.h
++++ b/hw/block/xen_blkif.h
+@@ -14,9 +14,6 @@
+ struct blkif_common_request {
+ char dummy;
+ };
+-struct blkif_common_response {
+- char dummy;
+-};
+
+ /* i386 protocol version */
+ #pragma pack(push, 4)
+@@ -36,13 +33,7 @@ struct blkif_x86_32_request_discard {
+ blkif_sector_t sector_number; /* start sector idx on disk (r/w only) */
+ uint64_t nr_sectors; /* # of contiguous sectors to discard */
+ };
+-struct blkif_x86_32_response {
+- uint64_t id; /* copied from request */
+- uint8_t operation; /* copied from request */
+- int16_t status; /* BLKIF_RSP_??? */
+-};
+ typedef struct blkif_x86_32_request blkif_x86_32_request_t;
+-typedef struct blkif_x86_32_response blkif_x86_32_response_t;
+ #pragma pack(pop)
+
+ /* x86_64 protocol version */
+@@ -62,20 +53,14 @@ struct blkif_x86_64_request_discard {
+ blkif_sector_t sector_number; /* start sector idx on disk (r/w only) */
+ uint64_t nr_sectors; /* # of contiguous sectors to discard */
+ };
+-struct blkif_x86_64_response {
+- uint64_t __attribute__((__aligned__(8))) id;
+- uint8_t operation; /* copied from request */
+- int16_t status; /* BLKIF_RSP_??? */
+-};
+ typedef struct blkif_x86_64_request blkif_x86_64_request_t;
+-typedef struct blkif_x86_64_response blkif_x86_64_response_t;
+
+ DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_common, struct blkif_common_request,
+- struct blkif_common_response);
++ struct blkif_response);
+ DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_32, struct blkif_x86_32_request,
+- struct blkif_x86_32_response);
++ struct blkif_response QEMU_PACKED);
+ DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_64, struct blkif_x86_64_request,
+- struct blkif_x86_64_response);
++ struct blkif_response);
+
+ union blkif_back_rings {
+ blkif_back_ring_t native;
+--- a/hw/block/xen_disk.c
++++ b/hw/block/xen_disk.c
+@@ -769,31 +769,30 @@ static int blk_send_response_one(struct
+ struct XenBlkDev *blkdev = ioreq->blkdev;
+ int send_notify = 0;
+ int have_requests = 0;
+- blkif_response_t resp;
+- void *dst;
+-
+- resp.id = ioreq->req.id;
+- resp.operation = ioreq->req.operation;
+- resp.status = ioreq->status;
++ blkif_response_t *resp;
+
+ /* Place on the response ring for the relevant domain. */
+ switch (blkdev->protocol) {
+ case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_NATIVE:
+- dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.native, blkdev->rings.native.rsp_prod_pvt);
++ resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.native,
++ blkdev->rings.native.rsp_prod_pvt);
+ break;
+ case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_32:
+- dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_32_part,
+- blkdev->rings.x86_32_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
++ resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_32_part,
++ blkdev->rings.x86_32_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
+ break;
+ case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_64:
+- dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_64_part,
+- blkdev->rings.x86_64_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
++ resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_64_part,
++ blkdev->rings.x86_64_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
+ break;
+ default:
+- dst = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+- memcpy(dst, &resp, sizeof(resp));
++
++ resp->id = ioreq->req.id;
++ resp->operation = ioreq->req.operation;
++ resp->status = ioreq->status;
++
+ blkdev->rings.common.rsp_prod_pvt++;
+
+ RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&blkdev->rings.common, send_notify);
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa217.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa217.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d4eb01f23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa217.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/mm: disallow page stealing from HVM domains
+
+The operation's success can't be controlled by the guest, as the device
+model may have an active mapping of the page. If we nevertheless
+permitted this operation, we'd have to add further TLB flushing to
+prevent scenarios like
+
+"Domains A (HVM), B (PV), C (PV); B->target==A
+ Steps:
+ 1. B maps page X from A as writable
+ 2. B unmaps page X without a TLB flush
+ 3. A sends page X to C via GNTTABOP_transfer
+ 4. C maps page X as pagetable (potentially causing a TLB flush in C,
+ but not in B)
+
+ At this point, X would be mapped as a pagetable in C while being
+ writable through a stale TLB entry in B."
+
+A similar scenario could be constructed for A using XENMEM_exchange and
+some arbitrary PV domain C then having this page allocated.
+
+This is XSA-217.
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -4449,6 +4449,9 @@ int steal_page(
+ bool_t drop_dom_ref = 0;
+ const struct domain *owner = dom_xen;
+
++ if ( paging_mode_external(d) )
++ return -1;
++
+ spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
+
+ if ( is_xen_heap_page(page) || ((owner = page_get_owner(page)) != d) )
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0001-gnttab-fix-unmap-pin-accounting-race.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0001-gnttab-fix-unmap-pin-accounting-race.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecdf0943ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0001-gnttab-fix-unmap-pin-accounting-race.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 25263d50f1440e3c1ff7782892e81f2612bcfce1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 12:22:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] gnttab: fix unmap pin accounting race
+
+Once all {writable} mappings of a grant entry have been unmapped, the
+hypervisor informs the guest that the grant entry has been released by
+clearing the _GTF_{reading,writing} usage flags in the guest's grant
+table as appropriate.
+
+Unfortunately, at the moment, the code that updates the accounting
+happens in a different critical section than the one which updates the
+usage flags; this means that under the right circumstances, there may be
+a window in time after the hypervisor reported the grant as being free
+during which the grant referee still had access to the page.
+
+Move the grant accounting code into the same critical section as the
+reporting code to make sure this kind of race can't happen.
+
+This is part of XSA-218.
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/common/grant_table.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index e2c4097..d80bd49 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -1150,15 +1150,8 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ PIN_FAIL(act_release_out, GNTST_general_error,
+ "Bad frame number doesn't match gntref. (%lx != %lx)\n",
+ op->frame, act->frame);
+- if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_device_map )
+- {
+- ASSERT(act->pin & (GNTPIN_devw_mask | GNTPIN_devr_mask));
+- op->map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_device_map;
+- if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly )
+- act->pin -= GNTPIN_devr_inc;
+- else
+- act->pin -= GNTPIN_devw_inc;
+- }
++
++ op->map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_device_map;
+ }
+
+ if ( (op->host_addr != 0) && (op->flags & GNTMAP_host_map) )
+@@ -1168,12 +1161,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ op->flags)) < 0 )
+ goto act_release_out;
+
+- ASSERT(act->pin & (GNTPIN_hstw_mask | GNTPIN_hstr_mask));
+ op->map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_host_map;
+- if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly )
+- act->pin -= GNTPIN_hstr_inc;
+- else
+- act->pin -= GNTPIN_hstw_inc;
+ }
+
+ act_release_out:
+@@ -1266,6 +1254,12 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ else
+ put_page_and_type(pg);
+ }
++
++ ASSERT(act->pin & (GNTPIN_devw_mask | GNTPIN_devr_mask));
++ if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly )
++ act->pin -= GNTPIN_devr_inc;
++ else
++ act->pin -= GNTPIN_devw_inc;
+ }
+
+ if ( (op->host_addr != 0) && (op->flags & GNTMAP_host_map) )
+@@ -1274,7 +1268,9 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Suggests that __gntab_unmap_common failed in
+- * replace_grant_host_mapping() so nothing further to do
++ * replace_grant_host_mapping() or IOMMU handling, so nothing
++ * further to do (short of re-establishing the mapping in the
++ * latter case).
+ */
+ goto act_release_out;
+ }
+@@ -1285,6 +1281,12 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ put_page_type(pg);
+ put_page(pg);
+ }
++
++ ASSERT(act->pin & (GNTPIN_hstw_mask | GNTPIN_hstr_mask));
++ if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly )
++ act->pin -= GNTPIN_hstr_inc;
++ else
++ act->pin -= GNTPIN_hstw_inc;
+ }
+
+ if ( (op->map->flags & (GNTMAP_device_map|GNTMAP_host_map)) == 0 )
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0002-gnttab-Avoid-potential-double-put-of-maptrack-entry.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0002-gnttab-Avoid-potential-double-put-of-maptrack-entry.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b07c978b3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0002-gnttab-Avoid-potential-double-put-of-maptrack-entry.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+From bb6d476b09e635baf5e9fb22540ab7c3530d1d98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 12:05:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] gnttab: Avoid potential double-put of maptrack entry
+
+Each grant mapping for a particular domain is tracked by an in-Xen
+"maptrack" entry. This entry is is referenced by a "handle", which is
+given to the guest when it calls gnttab_map_grant_ref().
+
+There are two types of mapping a particular handle can refer to:
+GNTMAP_host_map and GNTMAP_device_map. A given
+gnttab_unmap_grant_ref() call can remove either only one or both of
+these entries. When a particular handle has no entries left, it must
+be freed.
+
+gnttab_unmap_grant_ref() loops through its grant unmap request list
+twice. It first removes entries from any host pagetables and (if
+appropraite) iommus; then it does a single domain TLB flush; then it
+does the clean-up, including telling the granter that entries are no
+longer being used (if appropriate).
+
+At the moment, it's during the first pass that the maptrack flags are
+cleared, but the second pass that the maptrack entry is freed.
+
+Unfortunately this allows the following race, which results in a
+double-free:
+
+ A: (pass 1) clear host_map
+ B: (pass 1) clear device_map
+ A: (pass 2) See that maptrack entry has no mappings, free it
+ B: (pass 2) See that maptrack entry has no mappings, free it #
+
+Unfortunately, unlike the active entry pinning update, we can't simply
+move the maptrack flag changes to the second half, because the
+maptrack flags are used to determine if iommu entries need to be
+added: a domain's iommu must never have fewer permissions than the
+maptrack flags indicate, or a subsequent map_grant_ref() might fail to
+add the necessary iommu entries.
+
+Instead, free the maptrack entry in the first pass if there are no
+further mappings.
+
+This is part of XSA-218.
+
+Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich.com>
+Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/common/grant_table.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index d80bd49..ba10e76 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ struct gnttab_unmap_common {
+ /* Shared state beteen *_unmap and *_unmap_complete */
+ u16 flags;
+ unsigned long frame;
+- struct grant_mapping *map;
+ struct domain *rd;
++ grant_ref_t ref;
+ };
+
+ /* Number of unmap operations that are done between each tlb flush */
+@@ -1079,6 +1079,8 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ struct grant_table *lgt, *rgt;
+ struct active_grant_entry *act;
+ s16 rc = 0;
++ struct grant_mapping *map;
++ bool put_handle = false;
+
+ ld = current->domain;
+ lgt = ld->grant_table;
+@@ -1092,11 +1094,11 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ return;
+ }
+
+- op->map = &maptrack_entry(lgt, op->handle);
++ map = &maptrack_entry(lgt, op->handle);
+
+ grant_read_lock(lgt);
+
+- if ( unlikely(!read_atomic(&op->map->flags)) )
++ if ( unlikely(!read_atomic(&map->flags)) )
+ {
+ grant_read_unlock(lgt);
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Zero flags for handle (%d).\n", op->handle);
+@@ -1104,7 +1106,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ return;
+ }
+
+- dom = op->map->domid;
++ dom = map->domid;
+ grant_read_unlock(lgt);
+
+ if ( unlikely((rd = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL) )
+@@ -1129,16 +1131,43 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+
+ grant_read_lock(rgt);
+
+- op->flags = read_atomic(&op->map->flags);
+- if ( unlikely(!op->flags) || unlikely(op->map->domid != dom) )
++ op->rd = rd;
++ op->ref = map->ref;
++
++ /*
++ * We can't assume there was no racing unmap for this maptrack entry,
++ * and hence we can't assume map->ref is valid for rd. While the checks
++ * below (with the active entry lock held) will reject any such racing
++ * requests, we still need to make sure we don't attempt to acquire an
++ * invalid lock.
++ */
++ smp_rmb();
++ if ( unlikely(op->ref >= nr_grant_entries(rgt)) )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Unstable handle %u\n", op->handle);
+ rc = GNTST_bad_handle;
+- goto unmap_out;
++ goto unlock_out;
+ }
+
+- op->rd = rd;
+- act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, op->map->ref);
++ act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, op->ref);
++
++ /*
++ * Note that we (ab)use the active entry lock here to protect against
++ * multiple unmaps of the same mapping here. We don't want to hold lgt's
++ * lock, and we only hold rgt's lock for reading (but the latter wouldn't
++ * be the right one anyway). Hence the easiest is to rely on a lock we
++ * hold anyway; see docs/misc/grant-tables.txt's "Locking" section.
++ */
++
++ op->flags = read_atomic(&map->flags);
++ smp_rmb();
++ if ( unlikely(!op->flags) || unlikely(map->domid != dom) ||
++ unlikely(map->ref != op->ref) )
++ {
++ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Unstable handle %#x\n", op->handle);
++ rc = GNTST_bad_handle;
++ goto act_release_out;
++ }
+
+ if ( op->frame == 0 )
+ {
+@@ -1151,7 +1180,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ "Bad frame number doesn't match gntref. (%lx != %lx)\n",
+ op->frame, act->frame);
+
+- op->map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_device_map;
++ map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_device_map;
+ }
+
+ if ( (op->host_addr != 0) && (op->flags & GNTMAP_host_map) )
+@@ -1161,14 +1190,23 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ op->flags)) < 0 )
+ goto act_release_out;
+
+- op->map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_host_map;
++ map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_host_map;
++ }
++
++ if ( !(map->flags & (GNTMAP_device_map|GNTMAP_host_map)) )
++ {
++ map->flags = 0;
++ put_handle = true;
+ }
+
+ act_release_out:
+ active_entry_release(act);
+- unmap_out:
++ unlock_out:
+ grant_read_unlock(rgt);
+
++ if ( put_handle )
++ put_maptrack_handle(lgt, op->handle);
++
+ if ( rc == GNTST_okay && gnttab_need_iommu_mapping(ld) )
+ {
+ unsigned int kind;
+@@ -1205,7 +1243,6 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ grant_entry_header_t *sha;
+ struct page_info *pg;
+ uint16_t *status;
+- bool_t put_handle = 0;
+
+ if ( rd == NULL )
+ {
+@@ -1226,13 +1263,13 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ if ( rgt->gt_version == 0 )
+ goto unlock_out;
+
+- act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, op->map->ref);
+- sha = shared_entry_header(rgt, op->map->ref);
++ act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, op->ref);
++ sha = shared_entry_header(rgt, op->ref);
+
+ if ( rgt->gt_version == 1 )
+ status = &sha->flags;
+ else
+- status = &status_entry(rgt, op->map->ref);
++ status = &status_entry(rgt, op->ref);
+
+ if ( unlikely(op->frame != act->frame) )
+ {
+@@ -1289,9 +1326,6 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ act->pin -= GNTPIN_hstw_inc;
+ }
+
+- if ( (op->map->flags & (GNTMAP_device_map|GNTMAP_host_map)) == 0 )
+- put_handle = 1;
+-
+ if ( ((act->pin & (GNTPIN_devw_mask|GNTPIN_hstw_mask)) == 0) &&
+ !(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
+ gnttab_clear_flag(_GTF_writing, status);
+@@ -1304,11 +1338,6 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ unlock_out:
+ grant_read_unlock(rgt);
+
+- if ( put_handle )
+- {
+- op->map->flags = 0;
+- put_maptrack_handle(ld->grant_table, op->handle);
+- }
+ rcu_unlock_domain(rd);
+ }
+
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0003-gnttab-correct-maptrack-table-accesses.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0003-gnttab-correct-maptrack-table-accesses.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60e1583f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa218-0003-gnttab-correct-maptrack-table-accesses.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 29f04a077972e07c86c9e911005220f6d691ffa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 12:05:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] gnttab: correct maptrack table accesses
+
+In order to observe a consistent (limit,pointer-table) pair, the reader
+needs to either hold the maptrack lock (in line with documentation) or
+both sides need to order their accesses suitably (the writer side
+barrier was removed by commit dff515dfea ["gnttab: use per-VCPU
+maptrack free lists"], and a read side barrier has never been there).
+
+Make the writer publish a new table page before limit (for bounds
+checks to work), and new list head last (for racing maptrack_entry()
+invocations to work). At the same time add read barriers to lockless
+readers.
+
+Additionally get_maptrack_handle() must not assume ->maptrack_head to
+not change behind its back: Another handle may be put (updating only
+->maptrack_tail) and then got or stolen (updating ->maptrack_head).
+
+This is part of XSA-218.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+---
+ xen/common/grant_table.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index ba10e76..627947a 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
+ struct grant_table *lgt)
+ {
+ struct vcpu *curr = current;
+- int i;
++ unsigned int i, head;
+ grant_handle_t handle;
+ struct grant_mapping *new_mt;
+
+@@ -451,17 +451,20 @@ get_maptrack_handle(
+ new_mt[i].ref = handle + i + 1;
+ new_mt[i].vcpu = curr->vcpu_id;
+ }
+- new_mt[i - 1].ref = curr->maptrack_head;
+
+ /* Set tail directly if this is the first page for this VCPU. */
+ if ( curr->maptrack_tail == MAPTRACK_TAIL )
+ curr->maptrack_tail = handle + MAPTRACK_PER_PAGE - 1;
+
+- write_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head, handle + 1);
+-
+ lgt->maptrack[nr_maptrack_frames(lgt)] = new_mt;
++ smp_wmb();
+ lgt->maptrack_limit += MAPTRACK_PER_PAGE;
+
++ do {
++ new_mt[i - 1].ref = read_atomic(&curr->maptrack_head);
++ head = cmpxchg(&curr->maptrack_head, new_mt[i - 1].ref, handle + 1);
++ } while ( head != new_mt[i - 1].ref );
++
+ spin_unlock(&lgt->maptrack_lock);
+
+ return handle;
+@@ -727,6 +730,7 @@ static unsigned int mapkind(
+ for ( handle = 0; !(kind & MAPKIND_WRITE) &&
+ handle < lgt->maptrack_limit; handle++ )
+ {
++ smp_rmb();
+ map = &maptrack_entry(lgt, handle);
+ if ( !(map->flags & (GNTMAP_device_map|GNTMAP_host_map)) ||
+ map->domid != rd->domain_id )
+@@ -1094,6 +1098,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ return;
+ }
+
++ smp_rmb();
+ map = &maptrack_entry(lgt, op->handle);
+
+ grant_read_lock(lgt);
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa219-4.8.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa219-4.8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68c4677da3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa219-4.8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+From 3986b845e87c3f963227ece86bb633450761ec18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 14:47:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/shadow: Hold references for the duration of emulated
+ writes
+
+The (misnamed) emulate_gva_to_mfn() function translates a linear address to an
+mfn, but releases its page reference before returning the mfn to its caller.
+
+sh_emulate_map_dest() uses the results of one or two translations to construct
+a virtual mapping to the underlying frames, completes an emulated
+write/cmpxchg, then unmaps the virtual mappings.
+
+The page references need holding until the mappings are unmapped, or the
+frames can change ownership before the writes occurs.
+
+This is XSA-219
+
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+index ced2313..13305d2 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+@@ -1703,7 +1703,10 @@ static unsigned int shadow_get_allocation(struct domain *d)
+ /**************************************************************************/
+ /* Handling guest writes to pagetables. */
+
+-/* Translate a VA to an MFN, injecting a page-fault if we fail. */
++/*
++ * Translate a VA to an MFN, injecting a page-fault if we fail. If the
++ * mapping succeeds, a reference will be held on the underlying page.
++ */
+ #define BAD_GVA_TO_GFN (~0UL)
+ #define BAD_GFN_TO_MFN (~1UL)
+ #define READONLY_GFN (~2UL)
+@@ -1751,16 +1754,15 @@ static mfn_t emulate_gva_to_mfn(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
+ ASSERT(mfn_valid(mfn));
+
+ v->arch.paging.last_write_was_pt = !!sh_mfn_is_a_page_table(mfn);
+- /*
+- * Note shadow cannot page out or unshare this mfn, so the map won't
+- * disappear. Otherwise, caller must hold onto page until done.
+- */
+- put_page(page);
+
+ return mfn;
+ }
+
+-/* Check that the user is allowed to perform this write. */
++/*
++ * Check that the user is allowed to perform this write. If a mapping is
++ * returned, page references will be held on sh_ctxt->mfn[0] and
++ * sh_ctxt->mfn[1] iff !INVALID_MFN.
++ */
+ void *sh_emulate_map_dest(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
+ unsigned int bytes,
+ struct sh_emulate_ctxt *sh_ctxt)
+@@ -1768,13 +1770,6 @@ void *sh_emulate_map_dest(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
+ struct domain *d = v->domain;
+ void *map;
+
+- sh_ctxt->mfn[0] = emulate_gva_to_mfn(v, vaddr, sh_ctxt);
+- if ( !mfn_valid(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]) )
+- return ((mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]) == BAD_GVA_TO_GFN) ?
+- MAPPING_EXCEPTION :
+- (mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]) == READONLY_GFN) ?
+- MAPPING_SILENT_FAIL : MAPPING_UNHANDLEABLE);
+-
+ #ifndef NDEBUG
+ /* We don't emulate user-mode writes to page tables. */
+ if ( has_hvm_container_domain(d)
+@@ -1787,6 +1782,17 @@ void *sh_emulate_map_dest(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
+ }
+ #endif
+
++ sh_ctxt->mfn[0] = emulate_gva_to_mfn(v, vaddr, sh_ctxt);
++ if ( !mfn_valid(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]) )
++ {
++ switch ( mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]) )
++ {
++ case BAD_GVA_TO_GFN: return MAPPING_EXCEPTION;
++ case READONLY_GFN: return MAPPING_SILENT_FAIL;
++ default: return MAPPING_UNHANDLEABLE;
++ }
++ }
++
+ /* Unaligned writes mean probably this isn't a pagetable. */
+ if ( vaddr & (bytes - 1) )
+ sh_remove_shadows(d, sh_ctxt->mfn[0], 0, 0 /* Slow, can fail. */ );
+@@ -1803,6 +1809,7 @@ void *sh_emulate_map_dest(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
+ * Cross-page emulated writes are only supported for HVM guests;
+ * PV guests ought to know better.
+ */
++ put_page(mfn_to_page(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]));
+ return MAPPING_UNHANDLEABLE;
+ }
+ else
+@@ -1810,17 +1817,26 @@ void *sh_emulate_map_dest(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
+ /* This write crosses a page boundary. Translate the second page. */
+ sh_ctxt->mfn[1] = emulate_gva_to_mfn(v, vaddr + bytes - 1, sh_ctxt);
+ if ( !mfn_valid(sh_ctxt->mfn[1]) )
+- return ((mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[1]) == BAD_GVA_TO_GFN) ?
+- MAPPING_EXCEPTION :
+- (mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[1]) == READONLY_GFN) ?
+- MAPPING_SILENT_FAIL : MAPPING_UNHANDLEABLE);
++ {
++ put_page(mfn_to_page(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]));
++ switch ( mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[1]) )
++ {
++ case BAD_GVA_TO_GFN: return MAPPING_EXCEPTION;
++ case READONLY_GFN: return MAPPING_SILENT_FAIL;
++ default: return MAPPING_UNHANDLEABLE;
++ }
++ }
+
+ /* Cross-page writes mean probably not a pagetable. */
+ sh_remove_shadows(d, sh_ctxt->mfn[1], 0, 0 /* Slow, can fail. */ );
+
+ map = vmap(sh_ctxt->mfn, 2);
+ if ( !map )
++ {
++ put_page(mfn_to_page(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]));
++ put_page(mfn_to_page(sh_ctxt->mfn[1]));
+ return MAPPING_UNHANDLEABLE;
++ }
+ map += (vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ }
+
+@@ -1890,10 +1906,12 @@ void sh_emulate_unmap_dest(struct vcpu *v, void *addr, unsigned int bytes,
+ }
+
+ paging_mark_dirty(v->domain, mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]));
++ put_page(mfn_to_page(sh_ctxt->mfn[0]));
+
+ if ( unlikely(mfn_valid(sh_ctxt->mfn[1])) )
+ {
+ paging_mark_dirty(v->domain, mfn_x(sh_ctxt->mfn[1]));
++ put_page(mfn_to_page(sh_ctxt->mfn[1]));
+ vunmap((void *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
+ }
+ else
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa220-4.8.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa220-4.8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a1ecd0d6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa220-4.8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86: avoid leaking PKRU and BND* between vCPU-s
+
+PKRU is explicitly "XSAVE-managed but not XSAVE-enabled", so guests
+might access the register (via {RD,WR}PKRU) without setting XCR0.PKRU.
+Force context switching as well as migrating the register as soon as
+CR4.PKE is being set the first time.
+
+For MPX (BND<n>, BNDCFGU, and BNDSTATUS) the situation is less clear,
+and the SDM has not entirely consistent information for that case.
+While experimentally the instructions don't change register state as
+long as the two XCR0 bits aren't both 1, be on the safe side and enable
+both if BNDCFGS.EN is being set the first time.
+
+This is XSA-220.
+
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+@@ -311,10 +311,39 @@ int hvm_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u6
+
+ bool hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 val)
+ {
+- return hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs &&
+- is_canonical_address(val) &&
+- !(val & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) &&
+- hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs(v, val);
++ if ( !hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs ||
++ !is_canonical_address(val) ||
++ (val & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) )
++ return false;
++
++ /*
++ * While MPX instructions are supposed to be gated on XCR0.BND*, let's
++ * nevertheless force the relevant XCR0 bits on when the feature is being
++ * enabled in BNDCFGS.
++ */
++ if ( (val & IA32_BNDCFGS_ENABLE) &&
++ !(v->arch.xcr0_accum & (XSTATE_BNDREGS | XSTATE_BNDCSR)) )
++ {
++ uint64_t xcr0 = get_xcr0();
++ int rc;
++
++ if ( v != current )
++ return false;
++
++ rc = handle_xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK,
++ xcr0 | XSTATE_BNDREGS | XSTATE_BNDCSR);
++
++ if ( rc )
++ {
++ HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_1, "Failed to force XCR0.BND*: %d", rc);
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ if ( handle_xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xcr0) )
++ /* nothing, best effort only */;
++ }
++
++ return hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs(v, val);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -2477,6 +2506,27 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value, boo
+ paging_update_paging_modes(v);
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * {RD,WR}PKRU are not gated on XCR0.PKRU and hence an oddly behaving
++ * guest may enable the feature in CR4 without enabling it in XCR0. We
++ * need to context switch / migrate PKRU nevertheless.
++ */
++ if ( (value & X86_CR4_PKE) && !(v->arch.xcr0_accum & XSTATE_PKRU) )
++ {
++ int rc = handle_xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK,
++ get_xcr0() | XSTATE_PKRU);
++
++ if ( rc )
++ {
++ HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_1, "Failed to force XCR0.PKRU: %d", rc);
++ goto gpf;
++ }
++
++ if ( handle_xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK,
++ get_xcr0() & ~XSTATE_PKRU) )
++ /* nothing, best effort only */;
++ }
++
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+
+ gpf:
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa221.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7fec96668
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: evtchn: avoid NULL derefs
+
+Commit fbbd5009e6 ("evtchn: refactor low-level event channel port ops")
+added a de-reference of the struct evtchn pointer for a port without
+first making sure the bucket pointer is non-NULL. This de-reference is
+actually entirely unnecessary, as all relevant callers (beyond the
+problematic do_poll()) already hold the port number in their hands, and
+the actual leaf functions need nothing else.
+
+For FIFO event channels there's a second problem in that the ordering
+of reads and updates to ->num_evtchns and ->event_array[] was so far
+undefined (the read side isn't always holding the domain's event lock).
+Add respective barriers.
+
+This is XSA-221.
+
+Reported-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ int pirq_guest_unmask(struct domain *d)
+ {
+ pirq = pirqs[i]->pirq;
+ if ( pirqs[i]->masked &&
+- !evtchn_port_is_masked(d, evtchn_from_port(d, pirqs[i]->evtchn)) )
++ !evtchn_port_is_masked(d, pirqs[i]->evtchn) )
+ pirq_guest_eoi(pirqs[i]);
+ }
+ } while ( ++pirq < d->nr_pirqs && n == ARRAY_SIZE(pirqs) );
+@@ -2244,7 +2244,6 @@ static void dump_irqs(unsigned char key)
+ int i, irq, pirq;
+ struct irq_desc *desc;
+ irq_guest_action_t *action;
+- struct evtchn *evtchn;
+ struct domain *d;
+ const struct pirq *info;
+ unsigned long flags;
+@@ -2287,11 +2286,10 @@ static void dump_irqs(unsigned char key)
+ d = action->guest[i];
+ pirq = domain_irq_to_pirq(d, irq);
+ info = pirq_info(d, pirq);
+- evtchn = evtchn_from_port(d, info->evtchn);
+ printk("%u:%3d(%c%c%c)",
+ d->domain_id, pirq,
+- (evtchn_port_is_pending(d, evtchn) ? 'P' : '-'),
+- (evtchn_port_is_masked(d, evtchn) ? 'M' : '-'),
++ evtchn_port_is_pending(d, info->evtchn) ? 'P' : '-',
++ evtchn_port_is_masked(d, info->evtchn) ? 'M' : '-',
+ (info->masked ? 'M' : '-'));
+ if ( i != action->nr_guests )
+ printk(",");
+--- a/xen/common/event_2l.c
++++ b/xen/common/event_2l.c
+@@ -61,16 +61,20 @@ static void evtchn_2l_unmask(struct doma
+ }
+ }
+
+-static bool_t evtchn_2l_is_pending(struct domain *d,
+- const struct evtchn *evtchn)
++static bool_t evtchn_2l_is_pending(struct domain *d, evtchn_port_t port)
+ {
+- return test_bit(evtchn->port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending));
++ unsigned int max_ports = BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) * BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d);
++
++ ASSERT(port < max_ports);
++ return port < max_ports && test_bit(port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending));
+ }
+
+-static bool_t evtchn_2l_is_masked(struct domain *d,
+- const struct evtchn *evtchn)
++static bool_t evtchn_2l_is_masked(struct domain *d, evtchn_port_t port)
+ {
+- return test_bit(evtchn->port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_mask));
++ unsigned int max_ports = BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) * BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d);
++
++ ASSERT(port < max_ports);
++ return port >= max_ports || test_bit(port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_mask));
+ }
+
+ static void evtchn_2l_print_state(struct domain *d,
+--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
++++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
+@@ -1380,8 +1380,8 @@ static void domain_dump_evtchn_info(stru
+
+ printk(" %4u [%d/%d/",
+ port,
+- !!evtchn_port_is_pending(d, chn),
+- !!evtchn_port_is_masked(d, chn));
++ evtchn_port_is_pending(d, port),
++ evtchn_port_is_masked(d, port));
+ evtchn_port_print_state(d, chn);
+ printk("]: s=%d n=%d x=%d",
+ chn->state, chn->notify_vcpu_id, chn->xen_consumer);
+--- a/xen/common/event_fifo.c
++++ b/xen/common/event_fifo.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ static inline event_word_t *evtchn_fifo_
+ if ( unlikely(port >= d->evtchn_fifo->num_evtchns) )
+ return NULL;
+
++ /*
++ * Callers aren't required to hold d->event_lock, so we need to synchronize
++ * with add_page_to_event_array().
++ */
++ smp_rmb();
++
+ p = port / EVTCHN_FIFO_EVENT_WORDS_PER_PAGE;
+ w = port % EVTCHN_FIFO_EVENT_WORDS_PER_PAGE;
+
+@@ -287,24 +293,22 @@ static void evtchn_fifo_unmask(struct do
+ evtchn_fifo_set_pending(v, evtchn);
+ }
+
+-static bool_t evtchn_fifo_is_pending(struct domain *d,
+- const struct evtchn *evtchn)
++static bool_t evtchn_fifo_is_pending(struct domain *d, evtchn_port_t port)
+ {
+ event_word_t *word;
+
+- word = evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(d, evtchn->port);
++ word = evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(d, port);
+ if ( unlikely(!word) )
+ return 0;
+
+ return test_bit(EVTCHN_FIFO_PENDING, word);
+ }
+
+-static bool_t evtchn_fifo_is_masked(struct domain *d,
+- const struct evtchn *evtchn)
++static bool_t evtchn_fifo_is_masked(struct domain *d, evtchn_port_t port)
+ {
+ event_word_t *word;
+
+- word = evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(d, evtchn->port);
++ word = evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(d, port);
+ if ( unlikely(!word) )
+ return 1;
+
+@@ -593,6 +597,10 @@ static int add_page_to_event_array(struc
+ return rc;
+
+ d->evtchn_fifo->event_array[slot] = virt;
++
++ /* Synchronize with evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(). */
++ smp_wmb();
++
+ d->evtchn_fifo->num_evtchns += EVTCHN_FIFO_EVENT_WORDS_PER_PAGE;
+
+ /*
+--- a/xen/common/schedule.c
++++ b/xen/common/schedule.c
+@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static long do_poll(struct sched_poll *s
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = 0;
+- if ( evtchn_port_is_pending(d, evtchn_from_port(d, port)) )
++ if ( evtchn_port_is_pending(d, port) )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+--- a/xen/include/xen/event.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/event.h
+@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ struct evtchn_port_ops {
+ void (*set_pending)(struct vcpu *v, struct evtchn *evtchn);
+ void (*clear_pending)(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn);
+ void (*unmask)(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn);
+- bool_t (*is_pending)(struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn);
+- bool_t (*is_masked)(struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn);
++ bool_t (*is_pending)(struct domain *d, evtchn_port_t port);
++ bool_t (*is_masked)(struct domain *d, evtchn_port_t port);
+ /*
+ * Is the port unavailable because it's still being cleaned up
+ * after being closed?
+@@ -175,15 +175,15 @@ static inline void evtchn_port_unmask(st
+ }
+
+ static inline bool_t evtchn_port_is_pending(struct domain *d,
+- const struct evtchn *evtchn)
++ evtchn_port_t port)
+ {
+- return d->evtchn_port_ops->is_pending(d, evtchn);
++ return d->evtchn_port_ops->is_pending(d, port);
+ }
+
+ static inline bool_t evtchn_port_is_masked(struct domain *d,
+- const struct evtchn *evtchn)
++ evtchn_port_t port)
+ {
+- return d->evtchn_port_ops->is_masked(d, evtchn);
++ return d->evtchn_port_ops->is_masked(d, port);
+ }
+
+ static inline bool_t evtchn_port_is_busy(struct domain *d, evtchn_port_t port)
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa222-1.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa222-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f1290b6a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa222-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Subject: xen/memory: Fix return value handing of guest_remove_page()
+
+Despite the description in mm.h, guest_remove_page() previously returned 0 for
+paging errors.
+
+Switch guest_remove_page() to having regular 0/-error semantics, and propagate
+the return values from clear_mmio_p2m_entry() and mem_sharing_unshare_page()
+to the callers (although decrease_reservation() is the only caller which
+currently cares).
+
+This is part of XSA-222.
+
+Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
+index 52879e7..a40bc1c 100644
+--- a/xen/common/memory.c
++++ b/xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn)
+ p2m_type_t p2mt;
+ #endif
+ mfn_t mfn;
++ int rc;
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ mfn = get_gfn_query(d, gmfn, &p2mt);
+@@ -282,13 +283,15 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn)
+ put_page(page);
+ }
+ p2m_mem_paging_drop_page(d, gmfn, p2mt);
+- return 1;
++
++ return 0;
+ }
+ if ( p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct )
+ {
+- clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gmfn, mfn, 0);
++ rc = clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gmfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K);
+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+- return 1;
++
++ return rc;
+ }
+ #else
+ mfn = gfn_to_mfn(d, _gfn(gmfn));
+@@ -298,21 +301,25 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn)
+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Domain %u page number %lx invalid\n",
+ d->domain_id, gmfn);
+- return 0;
++
++ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ if ( p2m_is_shared(p2mt) )
+ {
+- /* Unshare the page, bail out on error. We unshare because
+- * we might be the only one using this shared page, and we
+- * need to trigger proper cleanup. Once done, this is
+- * like any other page. */
+- if ( mem_sharing_unshare_page(d, gmfn, 0) )
++ /*
++ * Unshare the page, bail out on error. We unshare because we
++ * might be the only one using this shared page, and we need to
++ * trigger proper cleanup. Once done, this is like any other page.
++ */
++ rc = mem_sharing_unshare_page(d, gmfn, 0);
++ if ( rc )
+ {
+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+ (void)mem_sharing_notify_enomem(d, gmfn, 0);
+- return 0;
++
++ return rc;
+ }
+ /* Maybe the mfn changed */
+ mfn = get_gfn_query_unlocked(d, gmfn, &p2mt);
+@@ -325,7 +332,8 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn)
+ {
+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad page free for domain %u\n", d->domain_id);
+- return 0;
++
++ return -ENXIO;
+ }
+
+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info) )
+@@ -348,7 +356,7 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn)
+ put_page(page);
+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+
+- return 1;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ static void decrease_reservation(struct memop_args *a)
+@@ -392,7 +400,7 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct memop_args *a)
+ continue;
+
+ for ( j = 0; j < (1 << a->extent_order); j++ )
+- if ( !guest_remove_page(a->domain, gmfn + j) )
++ if ( guest_remove_page(a->domain, gmfn + j) )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/xen/include/xen/mm.h b/xen/include/xen/mm.h
+index 88de3c1..b367930 100644
+--- a/xen/include/xen/mm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/mm.h
+@@ -553,9 +553,8 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(struct domain *d, unsigned int space,
+ union xen_add_to_physmap_batch_extra extra,
+ unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn);
+
+-/* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error, negative if the ring
+- * for event propagation is full in the presence of paging */
+-int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn);
++/* Returns 0 on success, or negative on error. */
++int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn);
+
+ #define RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL 0x00000001
+ #define RAM_TYPE_RESERVED 0x00000002
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa222-2-4.8.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa222-2-4.8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2825d2a061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa222-2-4.8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: guest_physmap_remove_page() needs its return value checked
+
+Callers, namely such subsequently freeing the page, must not blindly
+assume success - the function may namely fail when needing to shatter a
+super page, but there not being memory available for the then needed
+intermediate page table.
+
+As it happens, guest_remove_page() callers now also all check the
+return value.
+
+Furthermore a missed put_gfn() on an error path in gnttab_transfer() is
+also being taken care of.
+
+This is part of XSA-222.
+
+Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
+@@ -1340,13 +1340,14 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(unsigned
+ {
+ gfn_t gfn = _gfn(addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ struct domain *d = current->domain;
++ int rc;
+
+ if ( new_addr != 0 || (flags & GNTMAP_contains_pte) )
+ return GNTST_general_error;
+
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gfn, _mfn(mfn), 0);
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gfn, _mfn(mfn), 0);
+
+- return GNTST_okay;
++ return rc ? GNTST_general_error : GNTST_okay;
+ }
+
+ int is_iomem_page(unsigned long mfn)
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+@@ -1211,11 +1211,10 @@ int guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domai
+ return p2m_insert_mapping(d, gfn, (1 << page_order), mfn, t);
+ }
+
+-void guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+- gfn_t gfn,
+- mfn_t mfn, unsigned int page_order)
++int guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t mfn,
++ unsigned int page_order)
+ {
+- p2m_remove_mapping(d, gfn, (1 << page_order), mfn);
++ return p2m_remove_mapping(d, gfn, (1 << page_order), mfn);
+ }
+
+ static int p2m_alloc_table(struct domain *d)
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+@@ -808,7 +808,15 @@ int arch_domain_soft_reset(struct domain
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit_put_gfn;
+ }
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
++
++ ret = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
++ if ( ret )
++ {
++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "Failed to remove Dom%d's shared_info frame %lx\n",
++ d->domain_id, gfn);
++ free_domheap_page(new_page);
++ goto exit_put_gfn;
++ }
+
+ ret = guest_physmap_add_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(page_to_mfn(new_page)),
+ PAGE_ORDER_4K);
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+@@ -427,7 +427,9 @@ static __init void pvh_add_mem_mapping(s
+ if ( !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn + i, mfn + i) )
+ {
+ omfn = get_gfn_query_unlocked(d, gfn + i, &t);
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn + i), omfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K);
++ if ( guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn + i), omfn,
++ PAGE_ORDER_4K) )
++ /* nothing, best effort only */;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
+@@ -267,8 +267,9 @@ bool_t is_ioreq_server_page(struct domai
+ static void hvm_remove_ioreq_gmfn(
+ struct domain *d, struct hvm_ioreq_page *iorp)
+ {
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(iorp->gmfn),
+- _mfn(page_to_mfn(iorp->page)), 0);
++ if ( guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(iorp->gmfn),
++ _mfn(page_to_mfn(iorp->page)), 0) )
++ domain_crash(d);
+ clear_page(iorp->va);
+ }
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -4276,7 +4276,11 @@ static int replace_grant_p2m_mapping(
+ type, mfn_x(old_mfn), frame);
+ return GNTST_general_error;
+ }
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(frame), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
++ if ( guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(frame), PAGE_ORDER_4K) )
++ {
++ put_gfn(d, gfn);
++ return GNTST_general_error;
++ }
+
+ put_gfn(d, gfn);
+ return GNTST_okay;
+@@ -4798,7 +4802,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+ struct page_info *page = NULL;
+ unsigned long gfn = 0; /* gcc ... */
+ unsigned long prev_mfn, mfn = 0, old_gpfn;
+- int rc;
++ int rc = 0;
+ p2m_type_t p2mt;
+
+ switch ( space )
+@@ -4872,25 +4876,30 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+ {
+ if ( is_xen_heap_mfn(prev_mfn) )
+ /* Xen heap frames are simply unhooked from this phys slot. */
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gpfn, _mfn(prev_mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gpfn, _mfn(prev_mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
+ else
+ /* Normal domain memory is freed, to avoid leaking memory. */
+- guest_remove_page(d, gfn_x(gpfn));
++ rc = guest_remove_page(d, gfn_x(gpfn));
+ }
+ /* In the XENMAPSPACE_gmfn case we still hold a ref on the old page. */
+ put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gpfn));
+
++ if ( rc )
++ goto put_both;
++
+ /* Unmap from old location, if any. */
+ old_gpfn = get_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn);
+ ASSERT( old_gpfn != SHARED_M2P_ENTRY );
+ if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn || space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_range )
+ ASSERT( old_gpfn == gfn );
+ if ( old_gpfn != INVALID_M2P_ENTRY )
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(old_gpfn), _mfn(mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(old_gpfn), _mfn(mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
+
+ /* Map at new location. */
+- rc = guest_physmap_add_page(d, gpfn, _mfn(mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
++ if ( !rc )
++ rc = guest_physmap_add_page(d, gpfn, _mfn(mfn), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
+
++ put_both:
+ /* In the XENMAPSPACE_gmfn, we took a ref of the gfn at the top */
+ if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn || space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_range )
+ put_gfn(d, gfn);
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+@@ -2925,10 +2925,12 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom,
+ {
+ if ( is_xen_heap_mfn(mfn_x(prev_mfn)) )
+ /* Xen heap frames are simply unhooked from this phys slot */
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(tdom, _gfn(gpfn), prev_mfn, 0);
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(tdom, _gfn(gpfn), prev_mfn, 0);
+ else
+ /* Normal domain memory is freed, to avoid leaking memory. */
+- guest_remove_page(tdom, gpfn);
++ rc = guest_remove_page(tdom, gpfn);
++ if ( rc )
++ goto put_both;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Create the new mapping. Can't use guest_physmap_add_page() because it
+@@ -2941,6 +2943,7 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom,
+ "gpfn:%lx mfn:%lx fgfn:%lx td:%d fd:%d\n",
+ gpfn, mfn_x(mfn), fgfn, tdom->domain_id, fdom->domain_id);
+
++ put_both:
+ put_page(page);
+
+ /*
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -1768,6 +1768,7 @@ gnttab_transfer(
+ for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
+ {
+ bool_t okay;
++ int rc;
+
+ if (i && hypercall_preempt_check())
+ return i;
+@@ -1818,27 +1819,33 @@ gnttab_transfer(
+ goto copyback;
+ }
+
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gop.mfn), _mfn(mfn), 0);
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gop.mfn), _mfn(mfn), 0);
+ gnttab_flush_tlb(d);
++ if ( rc )
++ {
++ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO,
++ "gnttab_transfer: can't remove GFN %"PRI_xen_pfn" (MFN %lx)\n",
++ gop.mfn, mfn);
++ gop.status = GNTST_general_error;
++ goto put_gfn_and_copyback;
++ }
+
+ /* Find the target domain. */
+ if ( unlikely((e = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(gop.domid)) == NULL) )
+ {
+- put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: can't find domain %d\n",
+ gop.domid);
+- page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
+- free_domheap_page(page);
+ gop.status = GNTST_bad_domain;
+- goto copyback;
++ goto put_gfn_and_copyback;
+ }
+
+ if ( xsm_grant_transfer(XSM_HOOK, d, e) )
+ {
+- put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
+ gop.status = GNTST_permission_denied;
+ unlock_and_copyback:
+ rcu_unlock_domain(e);
++ put_gfn_and_copyback:
++ put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
+ page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
+ free_domheap_page(page);
+ goto copyback;
+@@ -1887,12 +1894,8 @@ gnttab_transfer(
+ "Transferee (d%d) has no headroom (tot %u, max %u)\n",
+ e->domain_id, e->tot_pages, e->max_pages);
+
+- rcu_unlock_domain(e);
+- put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
+- page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
+- free_domheap_page(page);
+ gop.status = GNTST_general_error;
+- goto copyback;
++ goto unlock_and_copyback;
+ }
+
+ /* Okay, add the page to 'e'. */
+@@ -1921,13 +1924,8 @@ gnttab_transfer(
+
+ if ( drop_dom_ref )
+ put_domain(e);
+- rcu_unlock_domain(e);
+-
+- put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
+- page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
+- free_domheap_page(page);
+ gop.status = GNTST_general_error;
+- goto copyback;
++ goto unlock_and_copyback;
+ }
+
+ page_list_add_tail(page, &e->page_list);
+--- a/xen/common/memory.c
++++ b/xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -272,8 +272,12 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+ mfn = get_gfn_query(d, gmfn, &p2mt);
+ if ( unlikely(p2m_is_paging(p2mt)) )
+ {
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gmfn), mfn, 0);
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gmfn), mfn, 0);
+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
++
++ if ( rc )
++ return rc;
++
+ /* If the page hasn't yet been paged out, there is an
+ * actual page that needs to be released. */
+ if ( p2mt == p2m_ram_paging_out )
+@@ -337,7 +341,9 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+ return -ENXIO;
+ }
+
+- if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info) )
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gmfn), mfn, 0);
++
++ if ( !rc && test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info) )
+ put_page_and_type(page);
+
+ /*
+@@ -348,16 +354,14 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+ * For this purpose (and to match populate_physmap() behavior), the page
+ * is kept allocated.
+ */
+- if ( !is_domain_direct_mapped(d) &&
++ if ( !rc && !is_domain_direct_mapped(d) &&
+ test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &page->count_info) )
+ put_page(page);
+
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gmfn), mfn, 0);
+-
+ put_page(page);
+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+
+- return 0;
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ static void decrease_reservation(struct memop_args *a)
+@@ -592,7 +596,8 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
+ gfn = mfn_to_gmfn(d, mfn);
+ /* Pages were unshared above */
+ BUG_ON(SHARED_M2P(gfn));
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(mfn), 0);
++ if ( guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(mfn), 0) )
++ domain_crash(d);
+ put_page(page);
+ }
+
+@@ -1151,8 +1156,8 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN
+ page = get_page_from_gfn(d, xrfp.gpfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
+ if ( page )
+ {
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(xrfp.gpfn),
+- _mfn(page_to_mfn(page)), 0);
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(xrfp.gpfn),
++ _mfn(page_to_mfn(page)), 0);
+ put_page(page);
+ }
+ else
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/smmu.c
+@@ -2786,9 +2786,7 @@ static int __must_check arm_smmu_unmap_p
+ if ( !is_domain_direct_mapped(d) )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+- guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(gfn), 0);
+-
+- return 0;
++ return guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gfn), _mfn(gfn), 0);
+ }
+
+ static const struct iommu_ops arm_smmu_iommu_ops = {
+--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
+@@ -268,10 +268,6 @@ static inline int guest_physmap_add_page
+ return guest_physmap_add_entry(d, gfn, mfn, page_order, p2m_ram_rw);
+ }
+
+-void guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+- gfn_t gfn,
+- mfn_t mfn, unsigned int page_order);
+-
+ mfn_t gfn_to_mfn(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn);
+
+ /*
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+@@ -561,10 +561,6 @@ static inline int guest_physmap_add_page
+ return guest_physmap_add_entry(d, gfn, mfn, page_order, p2m_ram_rw);
+ }
+
+-/* Remove a page from a domain's p2m table */
+-int guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+- gfn_t gfn, mfn_t mfn, unsigned int page_order);
+-
+ /* Set a p2m range as populate-on-demand */
+ int guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
+ unsigned int order);
+--- a/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/p2m-common.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+ #ifndef _XEN_P2M_COMMON_H
+ #define _XEN_P2M_COMMON_H
+
++#include <xen/mm.h>
+ #include <public/vm_event.h>
+
+ /*
+@@ -33,6 +34,11 @@ typedef enum {
+ /* NOTE: Assumed to be only 4 bits right now on x86. */
+ } p2m_access_t;
+
++/* Remove a page from a domain's p2m table */
++int __must_check
++guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t mfn,
++ unsigned int page_order);
++
+ /* Map MMIO regions in the p2m: start_gfn and nr describe the range in
+ * * the guest physical address space to map, starting from the machine
+ * * frame number mfn. */
+--- a/xen/include/xen/mm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/mm.h
+@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(struct dom
+ unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn);
+
+ /* Returns 0 on success, or negative on error. */
+-int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn);
++int __must_check guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn);
+
+ #define RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL 0x00000001
+ #define RAM_TYPE_RESERVED 0x00000002
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa223.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa223.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42f116b70c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa223.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Subject: arm: vgic: Don't update the LR when the IRQ is not enabled
+
+gic_raise_inflight_irq will be called if the IRQ is already inflight
+(i.e the IRQ is injected to the guest). If the IRQ is already already in
+the LRs, then the associated LR will be updated.
+
+To know if the interrupt is already in the LR, the function check if the
+interrupt is queued. However, if the interrupt is not enabled then the
+interrupt may not be queued nor in the LR. So gic_update_one_lr may be
+called (if we inject on the current vCPU) and read the LR.
+
+Because the interrupt is not in the LR, Xen will either read:
+ * LR 0 if the interrupt was never injected before
+ * LR 255 (GIC_INVALID_LR) if the interrupt was injected once. This
+ is because gic_update_one_lr will reset p->lr.
+
+Reading LR 0 will result to potentially update the wrong interrupt and
+not keep the LRs in sync with Xen.
+
+Reading LR 255 will result to:
+ * Crash Xen on GICv3 as the LR index is bigger than supported (see
+ gicv3_ich_read_lr).
+ * Read/write always GICH_LR + 255 * 4 that is not part of the memory
+ mapped.
+
+The problem can be prevented by checking whether the interrupt is
+enabled in gic_raise_inflight_irq before calling gic_update_one_lr.
+
+A follow-up of this patch is expected to mitigate the issue in the
+future.
+
+This is XSA-223.
+
+Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+---
+ xen/arch/arm/gic.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/gic.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/gic.c
+@@ -417,6 +417,10 @@ void gic_raise_inflight_irq(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int virtual_irq)
+
+ ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&v->arch.vgic.lock));
+
++ /* Don't try to update the LR if the interrupt is disabled */
++ if ( !test_bit(GIC_IRQ_GUEST_ENABLED, &n->status) )
++ return;
++
+ if ( list_empty(&n->lr_queue) )
+ {
+ if ( v == current )
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0001-gnttab-Fix-handling-of-dev_bus_addr-during-unmap.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0001-gnttab-Fix-handling-of-dev_bus_addr-during-unmap.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a55f86b07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0001-gnttab-Fix-handling-of-dev_bus_addr-during-unmap.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 9808ed0b1ebc3a5d2aa08a9ff91fcf3ecb42bc9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 16:24:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] gnttab: Fix handling of dev_bus_addr during unmap
+
+If a grant has been mapped with the GNTTAB_device_map flag, calling
+grant_unmap_ref() with dev_bus_addr set to zero should cause the
+GNTTAB_device_map part of the mapping to be left alone.
+
+Unfortunately, at the moment, op->dev_bus_addr is implicitly checked
+before clearing the map and adjusting the pin count, but only the bits
+above 12; and it is not checked at all before dropping page
+references. This means a guest can repeatedly make such a call to
+cause the reference count to drop to zero, causing the page to be
+freed and re-used, even though it's still mapped in its pagetables.
+
+To fix this, always check op->dev_bus_addr explicitly for being
+non-zero, as well as op->flag & GNTMAP_device_map, before doing
+operations on the device_map.
+
+While we're here, make the logic a bit cleaner:
+
+* Always initialize op->frame to zero and set it from act->frame, to reduce the
+chance of untrusted input being used
+
+* Explicitly check the full dev_bus_addr against act->frame <<
+ PAGE_SHIFT, rather than ignoring the lower 12 bits
+
+This is part of XSA-224.
+
+Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/common/grant_table.c | 23 +++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index ba10e76..2671761 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -1085,8 +1085,6 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ ld = current->domain;
+ lgt = ld->grant_table;
+
+- op->frame = (unsigned long)(op->dev_bus_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+-
+ if ( unlikely(op->handle >= lgt->maptrack_limit) )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad handle (%d).\n", op->handle);
+@@ -1169,16 +1167,14 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ goto act_release_out;
+ }
+
+- if ( op->frame == 0 )
+- {
+- op->frame = act->frame;
+- }
+- else
++ op->frame = act->frame;
++
++ if ( op->dev_bus_addr )
+ {
+- if ( unlikely(op->frame != act->frame) )
++ if ( unlikely(op->dev_bus_addr != pfn_to_paddr(act->frame)) )
+ PIN_FAIL(act_release_out, GNTST_general_error,
+- "Bad frame number doesn't match gntref. (%lx != %lx)\n",
+- op->frame, act->frame);
++ "Bus address doesn't match gntref (%"PRIx64" != %"PRIpaddr")\n",
++ op->dev_bus_addr, pfn_to_paddr(act->frame));
+
+ map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_device_map;
+ }
+@@ -1271,7 +1267,8 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ else
+ status = &status_entry(rgt, op->ref);
+
+- if ( unlikely(op->frame != act->frame) )
++ if ( op->dev_bus_addr &&
++ unlikely(op->dev_bus_addr != pfn_to_paddr(act->frame)) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Suggests that __gntab_unmap_common failed early and so
+@@ -1282,7 +1279,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+
+ pg = mfn_to_page(op->frame);
+
+- if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_device_map )
++ if ( op->dev_bus_addr && (op->flags & GNTMAP_device_map) )
+ {
+ if ( !is_iomem_page(act->frame) )
+ {
+@@ -1353,6 +1350,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_grant_ref(
+ /* Intialise these in case common contains old state */
+ common->new_addr = 0;
+ common->rd = NULL;
++ common->frame = 0;
+
+ __gnttab_unmap_common(common);
+ op->status = common->status;
+@@ -1417,6 +1415,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_and_replace(
+ /* Intialise these in case common contains old state */
+ common->dev_bus_addr = 0;
+ common->rd = NULL;
++ common->frame = 0;
+
+ __gnttab_unmap_common(common);
+ op->status = common->status;
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0002-gnttab-never-create-host-mapping-unless-asked-to.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0002-gnttab-never-create-host-mapping-unless-asked-to.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bea0214db0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0002-gnttab-never-create-host-mapping-unless-asked-to.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 2d6357522946bd5a105066db8079e5dd46cb3047 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 15:21:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] gnttab: never create host mapping unless asked to
+
+We shouldn't create a host mapping unless asked to even in the case of
+mapping a granted MMIO page. In particular the mapping wouldn't be torn
+down when processing the matching unmap request.
+
+This is part of XSA-224.
+
+Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/common/grant_table.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index 2671761..5baae24 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -907,10 +907,13 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
+ goto undo_out;
+ }
+
+- rc = create_grant_host_mapping(
+- op->host_addr, frame, op->flags, cache_flags);
+- if ( rc != GNTST_okay )
+- goto undo_out;
++ if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_host_map )
++ {
++ rc = create_grant_host_mapping(op->host_addr, frame, op->flags,
++ cache_flags);
++ if ( rc != GNTST_okay )
++ goto undo_out;
++ }
+ }
+ else if ( owner == rd || owner == dom_cow )
+ {
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0003-gnttab-correct-logic-to-get-page-references-during-m.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0003-gnttab-correct-logic-to-get-page-references-during-m.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f2d26d5fff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0003-gnttab-correct-logic-to-get-page-references-during-m.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+From 4e718be6f59526927d5cd31ecd80c5c758dca3f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 15:21:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] gnttab: correct logic to get page references during map
+ requests
+
+The rules for reference counting are somewhat complicated:
+
+* Each of GNTTAB_host_map and GNTTAB_device_map need their own
+reference count
+
+* If the mapping is writeable:
+ - GNTTAB_host_map needs a type count under only some conditions
+ - GNTTAB_device_map always needs a type count
+
+If the mapping succeeds, we need to keep all of these; if the mapping
+fails, we need to release whatever references we have acquired so far.
+
+Additionally, the code that does a lot of this calculation "inherits"
+a reference as part of the process of finding out who the owner is.
+
+Finally, if the grant is mapped as writeable (without the
+GNTMAP_readonly flag), but the hypervisor cannot grab a
+PGT_writeable_page type, the entire operation should fail.
+
+Unfortunately, the current code has several logic holes:
+
+* If a grant is mapped only GNTTAB_device_map, and with a writeable
+ mapping, but in conditions where a *host* type count is not
+ necessary, the code will fail to grab the necessary type count.
+
+* If a grant is mapped both GNTTAB_device_map and GNTTAB_host_map,
+ with a writeable mapping, in conditions where the host type count is
+ not necessary, *and* where the page cannot be changed to type
+ PGT_writeable, the condition will not be detected.
+
+In both cases, this means that on success, the type count will be
+erroneously reduced when the grant is unmapped. In the second case,
+the type count will be erroneously reduced on the failure path as
+well. (In the first case the failure path logic has the same hole
+as the reference grabbing logic.)
+
+Additionally, the return value of get_page() is not checked; but this
+may fail even if the first get_page() succeeded due to a reference
+counting overflow.
+
+First of all, simplify the restoration logic by explicitly counting
+the reference and type references acquired.
+
+Consider each mapping type separately, explicitly marking the
+'incoming' reference as used so we know when we need to grab a second
+one.
+
+Finally, always check the return value of get_page[_type]() and go to
+the failure path if appropriate.
+
+This is part of XSA-224.
+
+Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/common/grant_table.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index 5baae24..d07b931 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -754,12 +754,12 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
+ struct grant_table *lgt, *rgt;
+ struct vcpu *led;
+ int handle;
+- unsigned long frame = 0, nr_gets = 0;
++ unsigned long frame = 0;
+ struct page_info *pg = NULL;
+ int rc = GNTST_okay;
+ u32 old_pin;
+ u32 act_pin;
+- unsigned int cache_flags;
++ unsigned int cache_flags, refcnt = 0, typecnt = 0;
+ struct active_grant_entry *act = NULL;
+ struct grant_mapping *mt;
+ grant_entry_header_t *shah;
+@@ -885,11 +885,17 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
+ else
+ owner = page_get_owner(pg);
+
++ if ( owner )
++ refcnt++;
++
+ if ( !pg || (owner == dom_io) )
+ {
+ /* Only needed the reference to confirm dom_io ownership. */
+ if ( pg )
++ {
+ put_page(pg);
++ refcnt--;
++ }
+
+ if ( paging_mode_external(ld) )
+ {
+@@ -917,27 +923,38 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
+ }
+ else if ( owner == rd || owner == dom_cow )
+ {
+- if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op, ld, rd) )
++ if ( (op->flags & GNTMAP_device_map) && !(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
+ {
+ if ( (owner == dom_cow) ||
+ !get_page_type(pg, PGT_writable_page) )
+ goto could_not_pin;
++ typecnt++;
+ }
+
+- nr_gets++;
+ if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_host_map )
+ {
+- rc = create_grant_host_mapping(op->host_addr, frame, op->flags, 0);
+- if ( rc != GNTST_okay )
+- goto undo_out;
+-
++ /*
++ * Only need to grab another reference if device_map claimed
++ * the other one.
++ */
+ if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_device_map )
+ {
+- nr_gets++;
+- (void)get_page(pg, rd);
+- if ( !(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
+- get_page_type(pg, PGT_writable_page);
++ if ( !get_page(pg, rd) )
++ goto could_not_pin;
++ refcnt++;
++ }
++
++ if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op, ld, rd) )
++ {
++ if ( (owner == dom_cow) ||
++ !get_page_type(pg, PGT_writable_page) )
++ goto could_not_pin;
++ typecnt++;
+ }
++
++ rc = create_grant_host_mapping(op->host_addr, frame, op->flags, 0);
++ if ( rc != GNTST_okay )
++ goto undo_out;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+@@ -946,8 +963,6 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
+ if ( !rd->is_dying )
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Could not pin grant frame %lx\n",
+ frame);
+- if ( owner != NULL )
+- put_page(pg);
+ rc = GNTST_general_error;
+ goto undo_out;
+ }
+@@ -1010,18 +1025,11 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
+ return;
+
+ undo_out:
+- if ( nr_gets > 1 )
+- {
+- if ( !(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
+- put_page_type(pg);
+- put_page(pg);
+- }
+- if ( nr_gets > 0 )
+- {
+- if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op, ld, rd) )
+- put_page_type(pg);
++ while ( typecnt-- )
++ put_page_type(pg);
++
++ while ( refcnt-- )
+ put_page(pg);
+- }
+
+ grant_read_lock(rgt);
+
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0004-gnttab-__gnttab_unmap_common_complete-is-all-or-noth.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0004-gnttab-__gnttab_unmap_common_complete-is-all-or-noth.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c1bd40bec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa224-0004-gnttab-__gnttab_unmap_common_complete-is-all-or-noth.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+From d27237abe37e45a1f245e23484062b09ff3477ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 16:25:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] gnttab: __gnttab_unmap_common_complete() is
+ all-or-nothing
+
+All failures have to be detected in __gnttab_unmap_common(), the
+completion function must not skip part of its processing. In particular
+the GNTMAP_device_map related putting of page references and adjustment
+of pin count must not occur if __gnttab_unmap_common() signaled an
+error. Furthermore the function must not make adjustments to global
+state (here: clearing GNTTAB_device_map) before all possibly failing
+operations have been performed.
+
+There's one exception for IOMMU related failures: As IOMMU manipulation
+occurs after GNTMAP_*_map have been cleared already, the related page
+reference and pin count adjustments need to be done nevertheless. A
+fundamental requirement for the correctness of this is that
+iommu_{,un}map_page() crash any affected DomU in case of failure.
+
+The version check appears to be pointless (or could perhaps be a
+BUG_ON() or ASSERT()), but for the moment also move it.
+
+This is part of XSA-224.
+
+Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/common/grant_table.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h | 2 +-
+ xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h | 5 +-
+ 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index d07b931..7ea68b1 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ struct gnttab_unmap_common {
+ int16_t status;
+
+ /* Shared state beteen *_unmap and *_unmap_complete */
+- u16 flags;
++ u16 done;
+ unsigned long frame;
+ struct domain *rd;
+ grant_ref_t ref;
+@@ -944,7 +944,8 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
+ refcnt++;
+ }
+
+- if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op, ld, rd) )
++ if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly,
++ ld, rd) )
+ {
+ if ( (owner == dom_cow) ||
+ !get_page_type(pg, PGT_writable_page) )
+@@ -1091,6 +1092,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ struct active_grant_entry *act;
+ s16 rc = 0;
+ struct grant_mapping *map;
++ unsigned int flags;
+ bool put_handle = false;
+
+ ld = current->domain;
+@@ -1140,6 +1142,20 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+
+ grant_read_lock(rgt);
+
++ if ( rgt->gt_version == 0 )
++ {
++ /*
++ * This ought to be impossible, as such a mapping should not have
++ * been established (see the nr_grant_entries(rgt) bounds check in
++ * __gnttab_map_grant_ref()). Doing this check only in
++ * __gnttab_unmap_common_complete() - as it used to be done - would,
++ * however, be too late.
++ */
++ rc = GNTST_bad_gntref;
++ flags = 0;
++ goto unlock_out;
++ }
++
+ op->rd = rd;
+ op->ref = map->ref;
+
+@@ -1155,6 +1171,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Unstable handle %u\n", op->handle);
+ rc = GNTST_bad_handle;
++ flags = 0;
+ goto unlock_out;
+ }
+
+@@ -1168,9 +1185,9 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ * hold anyway; see docs/misc/grant-tables.txt's "Locking" section.
+ */
+
+- op->flags = read_atomic(&map->flags);
++ flags = read_atomic(&map->flags);
+ smp_rmb();
+- if ( unlikely(!op->flags) || unlikely(map->domid != dom) ||
++ if ( unlikely(!flags) || unlikely(map->domid != dom) ||
+ unlikely(map->ref != op->ref) )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Unstable handle %#x\n", op->handle);
+@@ -1180,24 +1197,27 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+
+ op->frame = act->frame;
+
+- if ( op->dev_bus_addr )
+- {
+- if ( unlikely(op->dev_bus_addr != pfn_to_paddr(act->frame)) )
+- PIN_FAIL(act_release_out, GNTST_general_error,
+- "Bus address doesn't match gntref (%"PRIx64" != %"PRIpaddr")\n",
+- op->dev_bus_addr, pfn_to_paddr(act->frame));
+-
+- map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_device_map;
+- }
++ if ( op->dev_bus_addr &&
++ unlikely(op->dev_bus_addr != pfn_to_paddr(act->frame)) )
++ PIN_FAIL(act_release_out, GNTST_general_error,
++ "Bus address doesn't match gntref (%"PRIx64" != %"PRIpaddr")\n",
++ op->dev_bus_addr, pfn_to_paddr(act->frame));
+
+- if ( (op->host_addr != 0) && (op->flags & GNTMAP_host_map) )
++ if ( op->host_addr && (flags & GNTMAP_host_map) )
+ {
+ if ( (rc = replace_grant_host_mapping(op->host_addr,
+ op->frame, op->new_addr,
+- op->flags)) < 0 )
++ flags)) < 0 )
+ goto act_release_out;
+
+ map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_host_map;
++ op->done |= GNTMAP_host_map | (flags & GNTMAP_readonly);
++ }
++
++ if ( op->dev_bus_addr && (flags & GNTMAP_device_map) )
++ {
++ map->flags &= ~GNTMAP_device_map;
++ op->done |= GNTMAP_device_map | (flags & GNTMAP_readonly);
+ }
+
+ if ( !(map->flags & (GNTMAP_device_map|GNTMAP_host_map)) )
+@@ -1234,7 +1254,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
+ }
+
+ /* If just unmapped a writable mapping, mark as dirtied */
+- if ( rc == GNTST_okay && !(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
++ if ( rc == GNTST_okay && !(flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
+ gnttab_mark_dirty(rd, op->frame);
+
+ op->status = rc;
+@@ -1251,13 +1271,9 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ struct page_info *pg;
+ uint16_t *status;
+
+- if ( rd == NULL )
++ if ( !op->done )
+ {
+- /*
+- * Suggests that __gntab_unmap_common failed in
+- * rcu_lock_domain_by_id() or earlier, and so we have nothing
+- * to complete
+- */
++ /* __gntab_unmap_common() didn't do anything - nothing to complete. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -1267,8 +1283,6 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ rgt = rd->grant_table;
+
+ grant_read_lock(rgt);
+- if ( rgt->gt_version == 0 )
+- goto unlock_out;
+
+ act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, op->ref);
+ sha = shared_entry_header(rgt, op->ref);
+@@ -1278,72 +1292,50 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common_complete(struct gnttab_unmap_common *op)
+ else
+ status = &status_entry(rgt, op->ref);
+
+- if ( op->dev_bus_addr &&
+- unlikely(op->dev_bus_addr != pfn_to_paddr(act->frame)) )
+- {
+- /*
+- * Suggests that __gntab_unmap_common failed early and so
+- * nothing further to do
+- */
+- goto act_release_out;
+- }
+-
+ pg = mfn_to_page(op->frame);
+
+- if ( op->dev_bus_addr && (op->flags & GNTMAP_device_map) )
++ if ( op->done & GNTMAP_device_map )
+ {
+ if ( !is_iomem_page(act->frame) )
+ {
+- if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly )
++ if ( op->done & GNTMAP_readonly )
+ put_page(pg);
+ else
+ put_page_and_type(pg);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT(act->pin & (GNTPIN_devw_mask | GNTPIN_devr_mask));
+- if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly )
++ if ( op->done & GNTMAP_readonly )
+ act->pin -= GNTPIN_devr_inc;
+ else
+ act->pin -= GNTPIN_devw_inc;
+ }
+
+- if ( (op->host_addr != 0) && (op->flags & GNTMAP_host_map) )
++ if ( op->done & GNTMAP_host_map )
+ {
+- if ( op->status != 0 )
++ if ( !is_iomem_page(op->frame) )
+ {
+- /*
+- * Suggests that __gntab_unmap_common failed in
+- * replace_grant_host_mapping() or IOMMU handling, so nothing
+- * further to do (short of re-establishing the mapping in the
+- * latter case).
+- */
+- goto act_release_out;
+- }
+-
+- if ( !is_iomem_page(op->frame) )
+- {
+- if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op, ld, rd) )
++ if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op->done & GNTMAP_readonly,
++ ld, rd) )
+ put_page_type(pg);
+ put_page(pg);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT(act->pin & (GNTPIN_hstw_mask | GNTPIN_hstr_mask));
+- if ( op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly )
++ if ( op->done & GNTMAP_readonly )
+ act->pin -= GNTPIN_hstr_inc;
+ else
+ act->pin -= GNTPIN_hstw_inc;
+ }
+
+ if ( ((act->pin & (GNTPIN_devw_mask|GNTPIN_hstw_mask)) == 0) &&
+- !(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
++ !(op->done & GNTMAP_readonly) )
+ gnttab_clear_flag(_GTF_writing, status);
+
+ if ( act->pin == 0 )
+ gnttab_clear_flag(_GTF_reading, status);
+
+- act_release_out:
+ active_entry_release(act);
+- unlock_out:
+ grant_read_unlock(rgt);
+
+ rcu_unlock_domain(rd);
+@@ -1359,6 +1351,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_grant_ref(
+ common->handle = op->handle;
+
+ /* Intialise these in case common contains old state */
++ common->done = 0;
+ common->new_addr = 0;
+ common->rd = NULL;
+ common->frame = 0;
+@@ -1424,6 +1417,7 @@ __gnttab_unmap_and_replace(
+ common->handle = op->handle;
+
+ /* Intialise these in case common contains old state */
++ common->done = 0;
+ common->dev_bus_addr = 0;
+ common->rd = NULL;
+ common->frame = 0;
+@@ -3385,7 +3379,9 @@ gnttab_release_mappings(
+ if ( gnttab_release_host_mappings(d) &&
+ !is_iomem_page(act->frame) )
+ {
+- if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(map, d, rd) )
++ if ( gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type((map->flags &
++ GNTMAP_readonly),
++ d, rd) )
+ put_page_type(pg);
+ put_page(pg);
+ }
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
+index eb02423..bc4d61a 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
+@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ void gnttab_clear_flag(unsigned long nr, uint16_t *addr);
+ int create_grant_host_mapping(unsigned long gpaddr,
+ unsigned long mfn, unsigned int flags, unsigned int
+ cache_flags);
+-#define gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op, d, rd) (0)
++#define gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(ro, ld, rd) (0)
+ int replace_grant_host_mapping(unsigned long gpaddr, unsigned long mfn,
+ unsigned long new_gpaddr, unsigned int flags);
+ void gnttab_mark_dirty(struct domain *d, unsigned long l);
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
+index 8c9bbcf..9ca631c 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
+@@ -58,9 +58,8 @@ static inline void gnttab_clear_flag(unsigned int nr, uint16_t *st)
+ }
+
+ /* Foreign mappings of HHVM-guest pages do not modify the type count. */
+-#define gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(op, ld, rd) \
+- (!((op)->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) && \
+- (((ld) == (rd)) || !paging_mode_external(rd)))
++#define gnttab_host_mapping_get_page_type(ro, ld, rd) \
++ (!(ro) && (((ld) == (rd)) || !paging_mode_external(rd)))
+
+ /* Done implicitly when page tables are destroyed. */
+ #define gnttab_release_host_mappings(domain) ( paging_mode_external(domain) )
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa225.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa225.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..900487a631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/xen/xsa/xsa225.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From b0547f9c9707e0dc473601a166da32dfec1f526e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 15:35:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] xen/arm: vgic: Sanitize target mask used to send SGI
+
+The current function vgic_to_sgi does not sanitize the target mask and
+may therefore get an invalid vCPU ID. This will result to an out of
+bound access of d->vcpu[...] as there is no check whether the vCPU ID is
+within the maximum supported by the guest.
+
+This was introduced by commit ea37fd2111 "xen/arm: split vgic driver
+into generic and vgic-v2 driver".
+
+Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+---
+ xen/arch/arm/vgic.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/vgic.c b/xen/arch/arm/vgic.c
+index 83569b09e7..c6c6f8cb66 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/vgic.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/vgic.c
+@@ -399,7 +399,8 @@ bool vgic_to_sgi(struct vcpu *v, register_t sgir, enum gic_sgi_mode irqmode,
+ for_each_set_bit( i, &bitmap, sizeof(target->list) * 8 )
+ {
+ vcpuid = base + i;
+- if ( d->vcpu[vcpuid] == NULL || !is_vcpu_online(d->vcpu[vcpuid]) )
++ if ( vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || d->vcpu[vcpuid] == NULL ||
++ !is_vcpu_online(d->vcpu[vcpuid]) )
+ {
+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "VGIC: write r=%"PRIregister" \
+ target->list=%hx, wrong CPUTargetList \n",
+--
+2.11.0
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-12-11 09:53:25 +0000