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-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch174
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch250
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch184
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch79
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch64
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch132
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch43
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch82
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt226
9 files changed, 0 insertions, 1234 deletions
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 72768486..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
-
-Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
-processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
-issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
-same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
-also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
-frames on RX side.
-
-This issue was introduced by the commit
-0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
-authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
-times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
-needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
-failed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
- src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-index 4e04169..333035f 100644
---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- {
- struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
- struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
-+ int set = 1;
-
- /*
- * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
-@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
- * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
- * does not support full AP client state.
-+ *
-+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
-+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
-+ * the same key.
- */
-- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
-+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
-+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
-+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
- hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
-+ set = 0;
-+ }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
- if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
-@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
- sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
- sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
-- sta->added_unassoc)) {
-+ set)) {
- hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
- HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
- "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
-- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
-+ set ? "set" : "add");
-
- if (sta->added_unassoc) {
- hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 3587086..707971d 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
- #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
- break;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
-+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
-+ return 0;
- }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- }
-
-
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
-+ return 0;
-+ return sm->tk_already_set;
-+}
-+
-+
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
- {
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len);
- enum wpa_event {
- WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
-- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
-+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
- };
- void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
-@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- return;
- }
-
-+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
-+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
-+ * PN in the driver */
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
- * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
- * after association has been completed. This function will be called
-@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-
- /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
- sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
-+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
- }
-
-
-@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
-
- sm->pairwise = pairwise;
- sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
-+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
- wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
-
- buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
- struct wpa_ptk PTK;
- Boolean PTK_valid;
- Boolean pairwise_set;
-+ Boolean tk_already_set;
- int keycount;
- Boolean Pair;
- struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1802d664..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
-
-Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
-(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
-not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
-attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
-sequence counter associated to the group key.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
- 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
- size_t tk_len;
- };
-
-+struct wpa_gtk {
-+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
-+ size_t gtk_len;
-+};
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+struct wpa_igtk {
-+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
-+ size_t igtk_len;
-+};
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- /* WPA IE version 1
- * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
- u8 gtk_buf[32];
-
-+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
- os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
-
-+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
-
-
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+{
-+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-+
-+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
-+ keyidx);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
-+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
-+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
-+ if (keyidx > 4095) {
-+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-+ broadcast_ether_addr,
-+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
-+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
-+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-+
-+
- static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
- {
-@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- if (ie->igtk) {
- size_t len;
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-- u16 keyidx;
-+
- len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
- return -1;
-+
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
-- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
-- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
-- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
-- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
-- igtk->igtk, len);
-- if (keyidx > 4095) {
-- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
-- return -1;
-- }
-- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-- broadcast_ether_addr,
-- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
-- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
-- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
- return -1;
-- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- */
- void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- {
-- int clear_ptk = 1;
-+ int clear_keys = 1;
-
- if (sm == NULL)
- return;
-@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- /* Prepare for the next transition */
- wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
-
-- clear_ptk = 0;
-+ clear_keys = 0;
- }
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-
-- if (clear_ptk) {
-+ if (clear_keys) {
- /*
- * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
- * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
-@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- sm->tptk_set = 0;
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
-@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
- os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
- os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
-@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
-- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
-- u16 keyidx;
--
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
-- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
-- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
--
-- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
-- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
--
-- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
-- igd.igtk, keylen);
-- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-- broadcast_ether_addr,
-- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
-- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
-- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
-- "WNM mode");
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-+
-+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
- return -1;
-- }
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- } else {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
- int rx_replay_counter_set;
- u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
-+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
-
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e2937b85..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
- Mode cases
-
-This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
-separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
-corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
-GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
-detect a possible key reconfiguration.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
-
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
-- const u8 *key_rsc)
-+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
- {
- const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
- u8 gtk_buf[32];
-
- /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
-+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
- gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
- os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
-
-- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+ if (wnm_sleep) {
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
-+ } else {
-+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+ }
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
- gtk_len, gtk_len,
- &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
-- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
-+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
-+ int wnm_sleep)
- {
- size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-
- /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
-+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
- keyidx);
-@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- return -1;
- }
-
-- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+ if (wnm_sleep) {
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
-+ } else {
-+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+ }
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- return -1;
-
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
- return -1;
- }
-
-@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
- key_rsc = null_rsc;
-
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
- wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
- goto failed;
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- sm->tptk_set = 0;
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
- os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- }
-
-@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
- os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
- os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
-@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
-
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
- gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
- "WNM mode");
-@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
- return -1;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- } else {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- int rx_replay_counter_set;
- u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
- struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 22ee2179..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
-
-Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
-and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
-trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
-
-This fixes the earlier fix in commit
-ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
-driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
-possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
-message 3/4.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index d200285..1021ccb 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
- size_t kck_len;
- size_t kek_len;
- size_t tk_len;
-+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
- };
-
- struct wpa_gtk {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- }
- sm->tptk_set = 1;
-- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
-
- kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
- kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
-@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- enum wpa_alg alg;
- const u8 *key_rsc;
-
-- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
-+ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
- return 0;
-@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-
- /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
- os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
-- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
-+ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
-
- if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
- eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
- int ptk_set, tptk_set;
- unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
-- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
- u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
- u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
- int renew_snonce;
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c19c4c71..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
-
-The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
-the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
-directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
-determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
-new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
-
-Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
-for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
- }
-
-
-+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
-+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
-+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
- {
- u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
-@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
- else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
-- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
-- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
-- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
-+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
-+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
-+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
-+ else
-+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
-+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
- case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
- break;
- case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e1bd5a57..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
-
-Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
-been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
-related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
-for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
-that behavior does not get modified.
-
-For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
-followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
-the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
-ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
-and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
-
-As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
-the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-index e424168..9eb9738 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
- u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
- } tpk;
- int tpk_set;
-+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
- int tpk_success;
- int tpk_in_progress;
-
-@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- u8 rsc[6];
- enum wpa_alg alg;
-
-+ if (peer->tk_set) {
-+ /*
-+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
-+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
-+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
-+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
-+ * not allow that to happen.
-+ */
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
-+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
-+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
-
- switch (peer->cipher) {
-@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
-+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
- rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
- "driver");
- return -1;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- peer->cipher = 0;
- peer->qos_info = 0;
- peer->wmm_capable = 0;
-- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
-+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
- peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
- os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
- os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
- wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
- return -1;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
- wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
- peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
- os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
- }
-
-
-+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
-+ if (nonce[i])
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
- const u8 *buf, size_t len)
- {
-@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
- peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
- peer->cipher = cipher;
-
-- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
-+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
-+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
- /*
- * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
- * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
-@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
- "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
- goto error;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
- }
-
- #if 0
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 85ea1d62..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
- request
-
-Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
-Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
-response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
-association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
-successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
-protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
-
- if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association");
-+ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested");
- return;
- }
-
-@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- return;
- }
-
-+ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
-+
- if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
- wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b9678f68..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
-
-The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
-the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
-case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
-pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
-be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
-even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
-Reassociation Response frame.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
- wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
- #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-
- /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
- wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
- u16 capab;
-
- sm->ft_completed = 0;
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
-
- buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
- 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
-@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
- return -1;
-@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
-+
- if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
- return -1;
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- size_t r0kh_id_len;
- u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
- int ft_completed;
-+ int ft_reassoc_completed;
- int over_the_ds_in_progress;
- u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
- int set_ptk_after_assoc;
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ccb5098..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-WPA packet number reuse with replayed messages and key reinstallation
-
-Published: October 16, 2017
-Identifiers:
-- CERT case ID: VU#228519
-- CVE-2017-13077
-- CVE-2017-13078
-- CVE-2017-13079
-- CVE-2017-13080
-- CVE-2017-13081
-- CVE-2017-13082
-- CVE-2017-13084 (not applicable)
-- CVE-2017-13086
-- CVE-2017-13087
-- CVE-2017-13088
-Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/
-
-
-Vulnerability
-
-A vulnerability was found in how a number of implementations can be
-triggered to reconfigure WPA/WPA2/RSN keys (TK, GTK, or IGTK) by
-replaying a specific frame that is used to manage the keys. Such
-reinstallation of the encryption key can result in two different types
-of vulnerabilities: disabling replay protection and significantly
-reducing the security of encryption to the point of allowing frames to
-be decrypted or some parts of the keys to be determined by an attacker
-depending on which cipher is used.
-
-This document focuses on the cases that apply to systems using hostapd
-(AP) or wpa_supplicant (station), but it should be noted that the
-generic vulnerability itself is applicable to other implementations and
-may have different impact in other cases.
-
-This vulnerability can in theory apply to any case where a TK (the
-pairwise/unicast encryption key used with TKIP, CCMP, GCMP), a GTK
-(group/multicast encryption key), or an IGTK (group management frame
-integrity protection key) is configured by the Authentication/Supplicant
-component to the WLAN driver/firmware taking care of the TX/RX path and
-encryption/decryption of frames.
-
-If the same key is configured multiple times, it is likely that the
-transmit and receive packet numbers (PN, IPN, RSC/TSC, etc.) are cleared
-to a smaller value (zero in case of pairwise keys, zero or at least a
-smaller value than the last used value in case of group keys). When this
-happens with the same key, this breaks replay protection on RX side and
-can result in reuse of packet numbers on TX side. The former may allow
-replaying of previously delivered packets (without the attacker being
-able to decrypt them or modify their contents) while the latter may
-result in more severe issues on the TX side due to resulting CCM nonce
-replay and related issues with GCMP and TKIP. The TX side issue may make
-it significantly easier for the attacker to decrypt frames and determine
-some parts of the keys (e.g., a Michael MIC key in case of TKIP).
-
-Impact on AP/hostapd
-
-On the AP side, this generic issue has been determined to be applicable
-in the case where hostapd is used to operate an RSN/WPA2 network with FT
-(Fast BSS Transition from IEEE 802.11r) enabled. Replaying of the
-Reassociation Request frame can be used to get the AP reinstalling the
-TK which results in the AP accepting previously delivered unicast frames
-from the station and the AP reusing previously used packet numbers
-(local TX packet number gets reset to zero). This latter issue on the TX
-side can result in CCM nonce reuse which invalidates CCMP security
-properties. In case of TKIP this can result in the attacker being able
-to determine part of the TK more easily and with GCMP, result in similar
-issues.
-
-It should be noted that the AP side issue with FT would be close to
-applying to FILS authentication (from IEEE 802.11ai) in hostapd with
-replaying of (Re)Association Request frames. However, due to a different
-handling of the repeated association processing with FILS, this would
-actually result in the station getting immediately disconnected which
-prevents this attack in practice. In addition, the FILS implementation
-in the current hostapd version is still experimental and documented as
-being discouraged in production use cases.
-
-Another area of potentially reduced security was identified when looking
-into these issues. When AP/Authenticator implementation in hostapd is
-requested to rekey the PTK without performing EAP reauthentication
-(either through local periodic rekeying or due to a request from an
-association station), the ANonce value does not get updated. This
-results in the new 4-way handshake depending on the station/supplicant
-side generating a new, unique (for the current PMK/PSK) SNonce for the
-PTK derivation to result in a new key. While a properly working
-supplicant would do so, if there is a supplicant implementation that
-does not, this combination could result in deriving the same PTK
-again. When the TK from that PTK gets configured in the driver, this
-would result in reinstalling the same key and the same issues as
-described above for the FT protocol case.
-
-Impact on station/wpa_supplicant
-
-On the station side, this generic issue has been determined to be
-applicable in the cases where wpa_supplicant processes a group key (GTK
-or IGTK) update from the AP. An attacker that is able to limit access
-to frame delivery may be able to extract two update messages and deliver
-those to the station with significant time delay between them. When
-wpa_supplicant processes the second message, it may end up reinstalling
-the same key to the driver and when doing this, clear the RX packet
-number to an old value. This would allow the attacker to replay all
-group-addressed frames that the AP sent between the time the key update
-message was originally sent and the time when the attacker forwarded the
-second frame to the station. The attacker would not be able to decrypt
-or modify the frames based on this vulnerability, though. There is an
-exception to this with older wpa_supplicant versions as noted below in
-version specific notes.
-
-For the current wpa_supplicant version (v2.6), there is also an
-additional EAPOL-Key replay sequence where an additional forged
-EAPOL-Key message can be used to bypass the existing protection for the
-pairwise key reconfiguration in a manner that ends up configuring a
-known TK that an attacker could use to decrypt any frame sent by the
-station and to inject arbitrary unicast frames. Similar issues are
-reachable in older versions as noted below.
-
-PeerKey / TDLS PeerKey
-
-As far as the related CVE-2017-13084 (reinstallation of the STK key in
-the PeerKey handshake) is concerned, it should be noted that PeerKey
-implementation in wpa_supplicant is not fully functional and the actual
-installation of the key into the driver does not work. As such, this
-item is not applicable in practice. Furthermore, the PeerKey handshake
-for IEEE 802.11e DLS is obsolete and not known to have been deployed.
-
-As far as the TDLS PeerKey handshake is concerned (CVE-2017-13086),
-wpa_supplicant implementation is already rejecting TPK M2 retries, so
-the reconfiguration issue cannot apply for it. For TPK M3, there is a
-theoretical impact. However, if that frame is replayed, the current
-wpa_supplicant implementation ends up tearing down the TDLS link
-immediately and as such, there is no real window for performing the
-attack. Furthermore, TPK M3 goes through the AP path and if RSN is used
-there, that frame has replay protection, so the attacker could not
-perform the attack. If the AP path were to use WEP, the frame could be
-replayed, though. That said, if WEP is used on the AP path, it would be
-fair to assume that there is no security in the network, so a new attack
-vector would be of small additional value.
-
-With older wpa_supplicant versions, it may be possible for an attacker
-to cause TPK M2 to be retransmitted with delay that would be able to
-trigger reinstallation of TK on the peer receiving TPK M2
-(CVE-2017-13086). This may open a short window for the attack with v2.3,
-v2.4, and v2.5; and a longer window with older versions.
-
-Vulnerable versions/configurations
-
-For the AP/Authenticator TK (unicast) reinstallation in FT protocol
-(CVE-2017-13082):
-
-hostapd v0.7.2 and newer with FT enabled (i.e., practically all versions
-that include full FT implementation). FT needs to be enabled in the
-runtime configuration to make this applicable.
-
-For the AP/Authenticator missing ANonce during PTK rekeying:
-
-All hostapd versions.
-
-For the station/Supplicant side GTK/IGTK reinstallation and TK
-configuration:
-
-All wpa_supplicant versions. The impact on older versions can be more
-severe due to earlier changes in this area: v2.3 and older can also
-reinstall the pairwise key and as such have similar impact as the AP FT
-case (CVE-2017-13077); v2.4 and v2.5 end up configuring an all-zero TK
-which breaks the normal data path, but could allow an attacker to
-decrypt all following frames from the station and to inject arbitrary
-frames to the station. In addition, a different message sequence
-involving 4-way handshake can result in configuration of an all-zero TK
-in v2.6 and the current snapshot of the development repository as of the
-publication of this advisory.
-
-
-Acknowledgments
-
-Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU
-Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue. Thanks to John A. Van
-Boxtel for finding additional issues related to this topic.
-
-
-Possible mitigation steps
-
-- For AP/hostapd and FT replay issue (CVE-2017-13082), it is possible to
- prevent the issue temporarily by disabling FT in runtime
- configuration, if needed before being able to update the
- implementations.
-
-- Merge the following commits to hostapd/wpa_supplicant and rebuild them:
-
- hostapd and replayed FT reassociation request frame (CVE-2017-13082):
- hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
-
- hostapd PTK rekeying and ANonce update:
- Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
-
- wpa_supplicant and GTK/IGTK rekeying (CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
- CVE-2017-13080, CVE-2017-13081, CVE-2017-13087, CVE-2017-13088):
- Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
- Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep Mode cases
-
- wpa_supplicant (v2.6 or newer snapshot) and known TK issue:
- Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
-
- Additional protection steps for wpa_supplicant:
- TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
- WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending request
- FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
-
- These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/
- (both against the snapshot of hostap.git master branch and rebased on
- top of the v2.6 release)
-
- For the TDLS TPK M2 retransmission issue (CVE-2017-13086) with older
- wpa_supplicant versions, consider updating to the latest version or
- merge in a commit that is present in v2.6:
- https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=dabdef9e048b17b22b1c025ad592922eab30dda8
- ('TDLS: Ignore incoming TDLS Setup Response retries')
-
-- Update to hostapd/wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available
- * it should be noted that there are number of additional changes in
- the related areas of the implementation to provide extra layer of
- protection for potential unknown issues; these changes are not
- included in this advisory as they have not been identified to be
- critical for preventing any of the identified security
- vulnerabilities; however, users of hostapd/wpa_supplicant are
- encouraged to consider merging such changes even if not fully
- moving to v2.7