summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/source/n
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorPatrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com>2018-12-08 04:10:45 +0000
committerEric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com>2018-12-08 08:59:44 +0100
commitad59f7ca92044da0fb856627db6df54d99855f3a (patch)
treee6d0f804b709de4e0313b0e54ceb2e0f4922a38d /source/n
parent37eaf40ce515cbb15e1b86fe5351a8e53efc0ede (diff)
downloadcurrent-ad59f7ca92044da0fb856627db6df54d99855f3a.tar.gz
Sat Dec 8 04:10:45 UTC 201820181208041045
a/btrfs-progs-v4.19.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. a/dbus-1.12.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. ap/cups-2.2.10-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. ap/cups-filters-1.21.5-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. ap/hplip-3.18.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. d/mercurial-4.8.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. d/rust-1.31.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. l/libpng-1.6.36-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. l/python-idna-2.8-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/ntp-4.2.8p12-x86_64-5.txz: Rebuilt. Fixed logrotate file. Thanks to allend and rworkman. n/php-7.2.13-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. This is a security release which also contains several minor bug fixes. For more information, see: https://php.net/ChangeLog-7.php#7.2.13 (* Security fix *) n/wpa_supplicant-2.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. x/mesa-18.3.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. x/xf86-video-i740-1.4.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. xap/mozilla-thunderbird-60.3.3-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. This is a bugfix release. For more information, see: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/thunderbird/60.3.3/releasenotes/ xfce/thunar-volman-0.9.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
Diffstat (limited to 'source/n')
-rwxr-xr-xsource/n/ntp/ntp.SlackBuild2
-rw-r--r--source/n/ntp/ntp.logrotate1
-rwxr-xr-xsource/n/php/fetch-php.sh4
-rwxr-xr-xsource/n/php/php.SlackBuild2
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch174
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch250
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch184
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch79
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch64
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch132
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch43
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch82
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt226
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config615
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch127
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch99
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch78
-rw-r--r--source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc2
-rwxr-xr-xsource/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild16
19 files changed, 590 insertions, 1590 deletions
diff --git a/source/n/ntp/ntp.SlackBuild b/source/n/ntp/ntp.SlackBuild
index a0010eb3..4765c0ca 100755
--- a/source/n/ntp/ntp.SlackBuild
+++ b/source/n/ntp/ntp.SlackBuild
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
PKGNAM=ntp
VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-4}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-5}
# Automatically determine the architecture we're building on:
if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
diff --git a/source/n/ntp/ntp.logrotate b/source/n/ntp/ntp.logrotate
index 6f2937a9..77f7d7b3 100644
--- a/source/n/ntp/ntp.logrotate
+++ b/source/n/ntp/ntp.logrotate
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/var/log/ntp {
notifempty
missingok
+ rotate 4
postrotate
[ -x /etc/rc.d/rc.ntpd ] && /etc/rc.d/rc.ntpd restart
endscript
diff --git a/source/n/php/fetch-php.sh b/source/n/php/fetch-php.sh
index b86729ae..f2df1941 100755
--- a/source/n/php/fetch-php.sh
+++ b/source/n/php/fetch-php.sh
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-lftpget http://us.php.net/distributions/php-7.2.12.tar.xz.asc
-lftpget http://us.php.net/distributions/php-7.2.12.tar.xz
+lftpget http://us.php.net/distributions/php-7.2.13.tar.xz.asc
+lftpget http://us.php.net/distributions/php-7.2.13.tar.xz
diff --git a/source/n/php/php.SlackBuild b/source/n/php/php.SlackBuild
index a6348694..2e142fd8 100755
--- a/source/n/php/php.SlackBuild
+++ b/source/n/php/php.SlackBuild
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
PKGNAM=php
VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo php-*.tar.xz | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
ALPINE=2.21
-BUILD=${BUILD:-2}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
# Automatically determine the architecture we're building on:
if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 72768486..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
-
-Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
-processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
-issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
-same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
-also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
-frames on RX side.
-
-This issue was introduced by the commit
-0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
-authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
-times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
-needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
-failed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
- src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-index 4e04169..333035f 100644
---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- {
- struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
- struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
-+ int set = 1;
-
- /*
- * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
-@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
- * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
- * does not support full AP client state.
-+ *
-+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
-+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
-+ * the same key.
- */
-- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
-+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
-+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
-+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
- hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
-+ set = 0;
-+ }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
- if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
-@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
- sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
- sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
-- sta->added_unassoc)) {
-+ set)) {
- hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
- HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
- "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
-- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
-+ set ? "set" : "add");
-
- if (sta->added_unassoc) {
- hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 3587086..707971d 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
- #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
- break;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
-+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
-+ return 0;
- }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- }
-
-
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
-+ return 0;
-+ return sm->tk_already_set;
-+}
-+
-+
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
- {
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len);
- enum wpa_event {
- WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
-- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
-+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
- };
- void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
-@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- return;
- }
-
-+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
-+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
-+ * PN in the driver */
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
- * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
- * after association has been completed. This function will be called
-@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-
- /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
- sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
-+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
- }
-
-
-@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
-
- sm->pairwise = pairwise;
- sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
-+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
- wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
-
- buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
- struct wpa_ptk PTK;
- Boolean PTK_valid;
- Boolean pairwise_set;
-+ Boolean tk_already_set;
- int keycount;
- Boolean Pair;
- struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1802d664..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
-
-Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
-(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
-not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
-attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
-sequence counter associated to the group key.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
- 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
- size_t tk_len;
- };
-
-+struct wpa_gtk {
-+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
-+ size_t gtk_len;
-+};
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+struct wpa_igtk {
-+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
-+ size_t igtk_len;
-+};
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- /* WPA IE version 1
- * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
- u8 gtk_buf[32];
-
-+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
- os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
-
-+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
-
-
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+{
-+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-+
-+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
-+ keyidx);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
-+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
-+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
-+ if (keyidx > 4095) {
-+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-+ broadcast_ether_addr,
-+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
-+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
-+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-+
-+
- static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
- {
-@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- if (ie->igtk) {
- size_t len;
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-- u16 keyidx;
-+
- len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
- return -1;
-+
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
-- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
-- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
-- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
-- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
-- igtk->igtk, len);
-- if (keyidx > 4095) {
-- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
-- return -1;
-- }
-- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-- broadcast_ether_addr,
-- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
-- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
-- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
- return -1;
-- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- */
- void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- {
-- int clear_ptk = 1;
-+ int clear_keys = 1;
-
- if (sm == NULL)
- return;
-@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- /* Prepare for the next transition */
- wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
-
-- clear_ptk = 0;
-+ clear_keys = 0;
- }
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-
-- if (clear_ptk) {
-+ if (clear_keys) {
- /*
- * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
- * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
-@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- sm->tptk_set = 0;
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
-@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
- os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
- os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
-@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
-- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
-- u16 keyidx;
--
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
-- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
-- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
--
-- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
-- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
--
-- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
-- igd.igtk, keylen);
-- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-- broadcast_ether_addr,
-- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
-- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
-- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
-- "WNM mode");
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-+
-+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
- return -1;
-- }
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- } else {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
- int rx_replay_counter_set;
- u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
-+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
-
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e2937b85..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
- Mode cases
-
-This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
-separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
-corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
-GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
-detect a possible key reconfiguration.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
-
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
-- const u8 *key_rsc)
-+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
- {
- const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
- u8 gtk_buf[32];
-
- /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
-+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
- gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
- os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
-
-- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+ if (wnm_sleep) {
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
-+ } else {
-+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+ }
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
- gtk_len, gtk_len,
- &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
-- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
-+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
-+ int wnm_sleep)
- {
- size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-
- /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
-+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
- keyidx);
-@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- return -1;
- }
-
-- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+ if (wnm_sleep) {
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
-+ } else {
-+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+ }
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- return -1;
-
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
- return -1;
- }
-
-@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
- key_rsc = null_rsc;
-
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
- wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
- goto failed;
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- sm->tptk_set = 0;
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
- os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- }
-
-@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
- os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
- os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
-@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
-
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
- gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
- "WNM mode");
-@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
- return -1;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- } else {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- int rx_replay_counter_set;
- u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
- struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 22ee2179..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
-
-Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
-and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
-trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
-
-This fixes the earlier fix in commit
-ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
-driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
-possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
-message 3/4.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index d200285..1021ccb 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
- size_t kck_len;
- size_t kek_len;
- size_t tk_len;
-+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
- };
-
- struct wpa_gtk {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- }
- sm->tptk_set = 1;
-- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
-
- kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
- kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
-@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- enum wpa_alg alg;
- const u8 *key_rsc;
-
-- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
-+ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
- return 0;
-@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-
- /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
- os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
-- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
-+ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
-
- if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
- eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
- int ptk_set, tptk_set;
- unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
-- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
- u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
- u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
- int renew_snonce;
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c19c4c71..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
-
-The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
-the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
-directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
-determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
-new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
-
-Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
-for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
- }
-
-
-+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
-+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
-+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
- {
- u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
-@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
- else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
-- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
-- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
-- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
-+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
-+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
-+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
-+ else
-+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
-+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
- case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
- break;
- case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e1bd5a57..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
-
-Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
-been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
-related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
-for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
-that behavior does not get modified.
-
-For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
-followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
-the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
-ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
-and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
-
-As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
-the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-index e424168..9eb9738 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
- u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
- } tpk;
- int tpk_set;
-+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
- int tpk_success;
- int tpk_in_progress;
-
-@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- u8 rsc[6];
- enum wpa_alg alg;
-
-+ if (peer->tk_set) {
-+ /*
-+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
-+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
-+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
-+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
-+ * not allow that to happen.
-+ */
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
-+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
-+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
-
- switch (peer->cipher) {
-@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
-+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
- rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
- "driver");
- return -1;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- peer->cipher = 0;
- peer->qos_info = 0;
- peer->wmm_capable = 0;
-- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
-+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
- peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
- os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
- os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
- wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
- return -1;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
- wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
- peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
- os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
- }
-
-
-+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
-+ if (nonce[i])
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
- const u8 *buf, size_t len)
- {
-@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
- peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
- peer->cipher = cipher;
-
-- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
-+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
-+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
- /*
- * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
- * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
-@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
- "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
- goto error;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
- }
-
- #if 0
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 85ea1d62..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
- request
-
-Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
-Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
-response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
-association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
-successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
-protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
-
- if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association");
-+ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested");
- return;
- }
-
-@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- return;
- }
-
-+ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
-+
- if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
- wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b9678f68..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
-
-The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
-the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
-case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
-pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
-be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
-even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
-Reassociation Response frame.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
- wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
- #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-
- /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
- wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
- u16 capab;
-
- sm->ft_completed = 0;
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
-
- buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
- 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
-@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
- return -1;
-@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
-+
- if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
- return -1;
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- size_t r0kh_id_len;
- u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
- int ft_completed;
-+ int ft_reassoc_completed;
- int over_the_ds_in_progress;
- u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
- int set_ptk_after_assoc;
---
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ccb5098..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-WPA packet number reuse with replayed messages and key reinstallation
-
-Published: October 16, 2017
-Identifiers:
-- CERT case ID: VU#228519
-- CVE-2017-13077
-- CVE-2017-13078
-- CVE-2017-13079
-- CVE-2017-13080
-- CVE-2017-13081
-- CVE-2017-13082
-- CVE-2017-13084 (not applicable)
-- CVE-2017-13086
-- CVE-2017-13087
-- CVE-2017-13088
-Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/
-
-
-Vulnerability
-
-A vulnerability was found in how a number of implementations can be
-triggered to reconfigure WPA/WPA2/RSN keys (TK, GTK, or IGTK) by
-replaying a specific frame that is used to manage the keys. Such
-reinstallation of the encryption key can result in two different types
-of vulnerabilities: disabling replay protection and significantly
-reducing the security of encryption to the point of allowing frames to
-be decrypted or some parts of the keys to be determined by an attacker
-depending on which cipher is used.
-
-This document focuses on the cases that apply to systems using hostapd
-(AP) or wpa_supplicant (station), but it should be noted that the
-generic vulnerability itself is applicable to other implementations and
-may have different impact in other cases.
-
-This vulnerability can in theory apply to any case where a TK (the
-pairwise/unicast encryption key used with TKIP, CCMP, GCMP), a GTK
-(group/multicast encryption key), or an IGTK (group management frame
-integrity protection key) is configured by the Authentication/Supplicant
-component to the WLAN driver/firmware taking care of the TX/RX path and
-encryption/decryption of frames.
-
-If the same key is configured multiple times, it is likely that the
-transmit and receive packet numbers (PN, IPN, RSC/TSC, etc.) are cleared
-to a smaller value (zero in case of pairwise keys, zero or at least a
-smaller value than the last used value in case of group keys). When this
-happens with the same key, this breaks replay protection on RX side and
-can result in reuse of packet numbers on TX side. The former may allow
-replaying of previously delivered packets (without the attacker being
-able to decrypt them or modify their contents) while the latter may
-result in more severe issues on the TX side due to resulting CCM nonce
-replay and related issues with GCMP and TKIP. The TX side issue may make
-it significantly easier for the attacker to decrypt frames and determine
-some parts of the keys (e.g., a Michael MIC key in case of TKIP).
-
-Impact on AP/hostapd
-
-On the AP side, this generic issue has been determined to be applicable
-in the case where hostapd is used to operate an RSN/WPA2 network with FT
-(Fast BSS Transition from IEEE 802.11r) enabled. Replaying of the
-Reassociation Request frame can be used to get the AP reinstalling the
-TK which results in the AP accepting previously delivered unicast frames
-from the station and the AP reusing previously used packet numbers
-(local TX packet number gets reset to zero). This latter issue on the TX
-side can result in CCM nonce reuse which invalidates CCMP security
-properties. In case of TKIP this can result in the attacker being able
-to determine part of the TK more easily and with GCMP, result in similar
-issues.
-
-It should be noted that the AP side issue with FT would be close to
-applying to FILS authentication (from IEEE 802.11ai) in hostapd with
-replaying of (Re)Association Request frames. However, due to a different
-handling of the repeated association processing with FILS, this would
-actually result in the station getting immediately disconnected which
-prevents this attack in practice. In addition, the FILS implementation
-in the current hostapd version is still experimental and documented as
-being discouraged in production use cases.
-
-Another area of potentially reduced security was identified when looking
-into these issues. When AP/Authenticator implementation in hostapd is
-requested to rekey the PTK without performing EAP reauthentication
-(either through local periodic rekeying or due to a request from an
-association station), the ANonce value does not get updated. This
-results in the new 4-way handshake depending on the station/supplicant
-side generating a new, unique (for the current PMK/PSK) SNonce for the
-PTK derivation to result in a new key. While a properly working
-supplicant would do so, if there is a supplicant implementation that
-does not, this combination could result in deriving the same PTK
-again. When the TK from that PTK gets configured in the driver, this
-would result in reinstalling the same key and the same issues as
-described above for the FT protocol case.
-
-Impact on station/wpa_supplicant
-
-On the station side, this generic issue has been determined to be
-applicable in the cases where wpa_supplicant processes a group key (GTK
-or IGTK) update from the AP. An attacker that is able to limit access
-to frame delivery may be able to extract two update messages and deliver
-those to the station with significant time delay between them. When
-wpa_supplicant processes the second message, it may end up reinstalling
-the same key to the driver and when doing this, clear the RX packet
-number to an old value. This would allow the attacker to replay all
-group-addressed frames that the AP sent between the time the key update
-message was originally sent and the time when the attacker forwarded the
-second frame to the station. The attacker would not be able to decrypt
-or modify the frames based on this vulnerability, though. There is an
-exception to this with older wpa_supplicant versions as noted below in
-version specific notes.
-
-For the current wpa_supplicant version (v2.6), there is also an
-additional EAPOL-Key replay sequence where an additional forged
-EAPOL-Key message can be used to bypass the existing protection for the
-pairwise key reconfiguration in a manner that ends up configuring a
-known TK that an attacker could use to decrypt any frame sent by the
-station and to inject arbitrary unicast frames. Similar issues are
-reachable in older versions as noted below.
-
-PeerKey / TDLS PeerKey
-
-As far as the related CVE-2017-13084 (reinstallation of the STK key in
-the PeerKey handshake) is concerned, it should be noted that PeerKey
-implementation in wpa_supplicant is not fully functional and the actual
-installation of the key into the driver does not work. As such, this
-item is not applicable in practice. Furthermore, the PeerKey handshake
-for IEEE 802.11e DLS is obsolete and not known to have been deployed.
-
-As far as the TDLS PeerKey handshake is concerned (CVE-2017-13086),
-wpa_supplicant implementation is already rejecting TPK M2 retries, so
-the reconfiguration issue cannot apply for it. For TPK M3, there is a
-theoretical impact. However, if that frame is replayed, the current
-wpa_supplicant implementation ends up tearing down the TDLS link
-immediately and as such, there is no real window for performing the
-attack. Furthermore, TPK M3 goes through the AP path and if RSN is used
-there, that frame has replay protection, so the attacker could not
-perform the attack. If the AP path were to use WEP, the frame could be
-replayed, though. That said, if WEP is used on the AP path, it would be
-fair to assume that there is no security in the network, so a new attack
-vector would be of small additional value.
-
-With older wpa_supplicant versions, it may be possible for an attacker
-to cause TPK M2 to be retransmitted with delay that would be able to
-trigger reinstallation of TK on the peer receiving TPK M2
-(CVE-2017-13086). This may open a short window for the attack with v2.3,
-v2.4, and v2.5; and a longer window with older versions.
-
-Vulnerable versions/configurations
-
-For the AP/Authenticator TK (unicast) reinstallation in FT protocol
-(CVE-2017-13082):
-
-hostapd v0.7.2 and newer with FT enabled (i.e., practically all versions
-that include full FT implementation). FT needs to be enabled in the
-runtime configuration to make this applicable.
-
-For the AP/Authenticator missing ANonce during PTK rekeying:
-
-All hostapd versions.
-
-For the station/Supplicant side GTK/IGTK reinstallation and TK
-configuration:
-
-All wpa_supplicant versions. The impact on older versions can be more
-severe due to earlier changes in this area: v2.3 and older can also
-reinstall the pairwise key and as such have similar impact as the AP FT
-case (CVE-2017-13077); v2.4 and v2.5 end up configuring an all-zero TK
-which breaks the normal data path, but could allow an attacker to
-decrypt all following frames from the station and to inject arbitrary
-frames to the station. In addition, a different message sequence
-involving 4-way handshake can result in configuration of an all-zero TK
-in v2.6 and the current snapshot of the development repository as of the
-publication of this advisory.
-
-
-Acknowledgments
-
-Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU
-Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue. Thanks to John A. Van
-Boxtel for finding additional issues related to this topic.
-
-
-Possible mitigation steps
-
-- For AP/hostapd and FT replay issue (CVE-2017-13082), it is possible to
- prevent the issue temporarily by disabling FT in runtime
- configuration, if needed before being able to update the
- implementations.
-
-- Merge the following commits to hostapd/wpa_supplicant and rebuild them:
-
- hostapd and replayed FT reassociation request frame (CVE-2017-13082):
- hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
-
- hostapd PTK rekeying and ANonce update:
- Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
-
- wpa_supplicant and GTK/IGTK rekeying (CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
- CVE-2017-13080, CVE-2017-13081, CVE-2017-13087, CVE-2017-13088):
- Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
- Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep Mode cases
-
- wpa_supplicant (v2.6 or newer snapshot) and known TK issue:
- Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
-
- Additional protection steps for wpa_supplicant:
- TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
- WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending request
- FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
-
- These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/
- (both against the snapshot of hostap.git master branch and rebased on
- top of the v2.6 release)
-
- For the TDLS TPK M2 retransmission issue (CVE-2017-13086) with older
- wpa_supplicant versions, consider updating to the latest version or
- merge in a commit that is present in v2.6:
- https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=dabdef9e048b17b22b1c025ad592922eab30dda8
- ('TDLS: Ignore incoming TDLS Setup Response retries')
-
-- Update to hostapd/wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available
- * it should be noted that there are number of additional changes in
- the related areas of the implementation to provide extra layer of
- protection for potential unknown issues; these changes are not
- included in this advisory as they have not been identified to be
- critical for preventing any of the identified security
- vulnerabilities; however, users of hostapd/wpa_supplicant are
- encouraged to consider merging such changes even if not fully
- moving to v2.7
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config
index 1c7f67df..bcc9f056 100644
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config
+++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config
@@ -1,44 +1,595 @@
-CONFIG_AP=y
-CONFIG_BACKEND=file
-CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y
-CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y
-CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y
-CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y
-CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y
-CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y
-CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y
-CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y
+# Example wpa_supplicant build time configuration
+#
+# This file lists the configuration options that are used when building the
+# wpa_supplicant binary. All lines starting with # are ignored. Configuration
+# option lines must be commented out complete, if they are not to be included,
+# i.e., just setting VARIABLE=n is not disabling that variable.
+#
+# This file is included in Makefile, so variables like CFLAGS and LIBS can also
+# be modified from here. In most cases, these lines should use += in order not
+# to override previous values of the variables.
+
+
+# Uncomment following two lines and fix the paths if you have installed OpenSSL
+# or GnuTLS in non-default location
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/openssl/include
+#LIBS += -L/usr/local/openssl/lib
+
+# Some Red Hat versions seem to include kerberos header files from OpenSSL, but
+# the kerberos files are not in the default include path. Following line can be
+# used to fix build issues on such systems (krb5.h not found).
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/kerberos
+
+# Driver interface for generic Linux wireless extensions
+# Note: WEXT is deprecated in the current Linux kernel version and no new
+# functionality is added to it. nl80211-based interface is the new
+# replacement for WEXT and its use allows wpa_supplicant to properly control
+# the driver to improve existing functionality like roaming and to support new
+# functionality.
CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y
+
+# Driver interface for Linux drivers using the nl80211 kernel interface
+CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y
+
+# QCA vendor extensions to nl80211
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211_QCA=y
+
+# driver_nl80211.c requires libnl. If you are compiling it yourself
+# you may need to point hostapd to your version of libnl.
+#
+#CFLAGS += -I$<path to libnl include files>
+#LIBS += -L$<path to libnl library files>
+
+# Use libnl v2.0 (or 3.0) libraries.
+#CONFIG_LIBNL20=y
+
+# Use libnl 3.2 libraries (if this is selected, CONFIG_LIBNL20 is ignored)
+CONFIG_LIBNL32=y
+
+
+# Driver interface for FreeBSD net80211 layer (e.g., Atheros driver)
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_BSD=y
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include
+#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib
+#LIBS_p += -L/usr/local/lib
+#LIBS_c += -L/usr/local/lib
+
+# Driver interface for Windows NDIS
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_NDIS=y
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/w32api/ddk
+#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib
+# For native build using mingw
+#CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS=y
+# Additional directories for cross-compilation on Linux host for mingw target
+#CFLAGS += -I/opt/mingw/mingw32/include/ddk
+#LIBS += -L/opt/mingw/mingw32/lib
+#CC=mingw32-gcc
+# By default, driver_ndis uses WinPcap for low-level operations. This can be
+# replaced with the following option which replaces WinPcap calls with NDISUIO.
+# However, this requires that WZC is disabled (net stop wzcsvc) before starting
+# wpa_supplicant.
+# CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y
+
+# Driver interface for wired Ethernet drivers
CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED=y
-CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y
-CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y
-CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y
-CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y
-CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y
-CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y
-CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y
+
+# Driver interface for MACsec capable Qualcomm Atheros drivers
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_QCA=y
+
+# Driver interface for Linux MACsec drivers
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_LINUX=y
+
+# Driver interface for the Broadcom RoboSwitch family
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_ROBOSWITCH=y
+
+# Driver interface for no driver (e.g., WPS ER only)
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_NONE=y
+
+# Solaris libraries
+#LIBS += -lsocket -ldlpi -lnsl
+#LIBS_c += -lsocket
+
+# Enable IEEE 802.1X Supplicant (automatically included if any EAP method or
+# MACsec is included)
+CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
+
+# EAP-MD5
CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y
+
+# EAP-MSCHAPv2
CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y
+
+# EAP-TLS
+CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y
+
+# EAL-PEAP
+CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y
+
+# EAP-TTLS
+CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y
+
+# EAP-FAST
+# Note: If OpenSSL is used as the TLS library, OpenSSL 1.0 or newer is needed
+# for EAP-FAST support. Older OpenSSL releases would need to be patched, e.g.,
+# with openssl-0.9.8x-tls-extensions.patch, to add the needed functions.
+CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y
+
+# EAP-GTC
+CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y
+
+# EAP-OTP
CONFIG_EAP_OTP=y
+
+# EAP-SIM (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-SIM is used)
+#CONFIG_EAP_SIM=y
+
+# EAP-PSK (experimental; this is _not_ needed for WPA-PSK)
+#CONFIG_EAP_PSK=y
+
+# EAP-pwd (secure authentication using only a password)
+#CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y
+
+# EAP-PAX
CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y
-CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y
+
+# LEAP
+CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y
+
+# EAP-AKA (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA is used)
+#CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y
+
+# EAP-AKA' (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA' is used).
+# This requires CONFIG_EAP_AKA to be enabled, too.
+#CONFIG_EAP_AKA_PRIME=y
+
+# Enable USIM simulator (Milenage) for EAP-AKA
+#CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR=y
+
+# EAP-SAKE
CONFIG_EAP_SAKE=y
-CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y
+
+# EAP-GPSK
+CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y
+# Include support for optional SHA256 cipher suite in EAP-GPSK
+CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y
+
+# EAP-TNC and related Trusted Network Connect support (experimental)
CONFIG_EAP_TNC=y
-CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y
-CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y
-CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y
-CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y
-CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y
-CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
-CONFIG_LIBNL32=y
-CONFIG_P2P=y
-CONFIG_PEERKEY=y
+
+# Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)
+CONFIG_WPS=y
+# Enable WPS external registrar functionality
+#CONFIG_WPS_ER=y
+# Disable credentials for an open network by default when acting as a WPS
+# registrar.
+#CONFIG_WPS_REG_DISABLE_OPEN=y
+# Enable WPS support with NFC config method
+#CONFIG_WPS_NFC=y
+
+# EAP-IKEv2
+CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y
+
+# EAP-EKE
+#CONFIG_EAP_EKE=y
+
+# MACsec
+#CONFIG_MACSEC=y
+
+# PKCS#12 (PFX) support (used to read private key and certificate file from
+# a file that usually has extension .p12 or .pfx)
CONFIG_PKCS12=y
-CONFIG_READLINE=y
+
+# Smartcard support (i.e., private key on a smartcard), e.g., with openssl
+# engine.
CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y
+
+# PC/SC interface for smartcards (USIM, GSM SIM)
+# Enable this if EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA is included
+#CONFIG_PCSC=y
+
+# Support HT overrides (disable HT/HT40, mask MCS rates, etc.)
+#CONFIG_HT_OVERRIDES=y
+
+# Support VHT overrides (disable VHT, mask MCS rates, etc.)
+#CONFIG_VHT_OVERRIDES=y
+
+# Development testing
+#CONFIG_EAPOL_TEST=y
+
+# Select control interface backend for external programs, e.g, wpa_cli:
+# unix = UNIX domain sockets (default for Linux/*BSD)
+# udp = UDP sockets using localhost (127.0.0.1)
+# udp6 = UDP IPv6 sockets using localhost (::1)
+# named_pipe = Windows Named Pipe (default for Windows)
+# udp-remote = UDP sockets with remote access (only for tests systems/purpose)
+# udp6-remote = UDP IPv6 sockets with remote access (only for tests purpose)
+# y = use default (backwards compatibility)
+# If this option is commented out, control interface is not included in the
+# build.
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y
+
+# Include support for GNU Readline and History Libraries in wpa_cli.
+# When building a wpa_cli binary for distribution, please note that these
+# libraries are licensed under GPL and as such, BSD license may not apply for
+# the resulting binary.
+CONFIG_READLINE=y
+
+# Include internal line edit mode in wpa_cli. This can be used as a replacement
+# for GNU Readline to provide limited command line editing and history support.
+#CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT=y
+
+# Remove debugging code that is printing out debug message to stdout.
+# This can be used to reduce the size of the wpa_supplicant considerably
+# if debugging code is not needed. The size reduction can be around 35%
+# (e.g., 90 kB).
+#CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG=y
+
+# Remove WPA support, e.g., for wired-only IEEE 802.1X supplicant, to save
+# 35-50 kB in code size.
+#CONFIG_NO_WPA=y
+
+# Remove IEEE 802.11i/WPA-Personal ASCII passphrase support
+# This option can be used to reduce code size by removing support for
+# converting ASCII passphrases into PSK. If this functionality is removed, the
+# PSK can only be configured as the 64-octet hexstring (e.g., from
+# wpa_passphrase). This saves about 0.5 kB in code size.
+#CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE=y
+
+# Disable scan result processing (ap_mode=1) to save code size by about 1 kB.
+# This can be used if ap_scan=1 mode is never enabled.
+#CONFIG_NO_SCAN_PROCESSING=y
+
+# Select configuration backend:
+# file = text file (e.g., wpa_supplicant.conf; note: the configuration file
+# path is given on command line, not here; this option is just used to
+# select the backend that allows configuration files to be used)
+# winreg = Windows registry (see win_example.reg for an example)
+CONFIG_BACKEND=file
+
+# Remove configuration write functionality (i.e., to allow the configuration
+# file to be updated based on runtime configuration changes). The runtime
+# configuration can still be changed, the changes are just not going to be
+# persistent over restarts. This option can be used to reduce code size by
+# about 3.5 kB.
+#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_WRITE=y
+
+# Remove support for configuration blobs to reduce code size by about 1.5 kB.
+#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS=y
+
+# Select program entry point implementation:
+# main = UNIX/POSIX like main() function (default)
+# main_winsvc = Windows service (read parameters from registry)
+# main_none = Very basic example (development use only)
+#CONFIG_MAIN=main
+
+# Select wrapper for operating system and C library specific functions
+# unix = UNIX/POSIX like systems (default)
+# win32 = Windows systems
+# none = Empty template
+#CONFIG_OS=unix
+
+# Select event loop implementation
+# eloop = select() loop (default)
+# eloop_win = Windows events and WaitForMultipleObject() loop
+#CONFIG_ELOOP=eloop
+
+# Should we use poll instead of select? Select is used by default.
+#CONFIG_ELOOP_POLL=y
+
+# Should we use epoll instead of select? Select is used by default.
+#CONFIG_ELOOP_EPOLL=y
+
+# Should we use kqueue instead of select? Select is used by default.
+#CONFIG_ELOOP_KQUEUE=y
+
+# Select layer 2 packet implementation
+# linux = Linux packet socket (default)
+# pcap = libpcap/libdnet/WinPcap
+# freebsd = FreeBSD libpcap
+# winpcap = WinPcap with receive thread
+# ndis = Windows NDISUIO (note: requires CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y)
+# none = Empty template
+#CONFIG_L2_PACKET=linux
+
+# Disable Linux packet socket workaround applicable for station interface
+# in a bridge for EAPOL frames. This should be uncommented only if the kernel
+# is known to not have the regression issue in packet socket behavior with
+# bridge interfaces (commit 'bridge: respect RFC2863 operational state')').
+#CONFIG_NO_LINUX_PACKET_SOCKET_WAR=y
+
+# IEEE 802.11w (management frame protection), also known as PMF
+# Driver support is also needed for IEEE 802.11w.
+CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y
+
+# Select TLS implementation
+# openssl = OpenSSL (default)
+# gnutls = GnuTLS
+# internal = Internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental)
+# linux = Linux kernel AF_ALG and internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental)
+# none = Empty template
+#CONFIG_TLS=openssl
+
+# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.1)
+# can be enabled to get a stronger construction of messages when block ciphers
+# are used. It should be noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based
+# implementation may not be compatible with TLS v1.1 message (ClientHello is
+# sent prior to negotiating which version will be used)
+#CONFIG_TLSV11=y
+
+# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.2)
+# can be enabled to enable use of stronger crypto algorithms. It should be
+# noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based implementation may not be compatible
+# with TLS v1.2 message (ClientHello is sent prior to negotiating which version
+# will be used)
+#CONFIG_TLSV12=y
+
+# Select which ciphers to use by default with OpenSSL if the user does not
+# specify them.
CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="PROFILE=SYSTEM:3DES"
+
+# If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are
+# needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of
+# LibTomMath can be used. See beginning of libtommath.c for details on benefits
+# and drawbacks of this option.
+#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH=y
+#ifndef CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH
+#LTM_PATH=/usr/src/libtommath-0.39
+#CFLAGS += -I$(LTM_PATH)
+#LIBS += -L$(LTM_PATH)
+#LIBS_p += -L$(LTM_PATH)
+#endif
+# At the cost of about 4 kB of additional binary size, the internal LibTomMath
+# can be configured to include faster routines for exptmod, sqr, and div to
+# speed up DH and RSA calculation considerably
+#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH_FAST=y
+
+# Include NDIS event processing through WMI into wpa_supplicant/wpasvc.
+# This is only for Windows builds and requires WMI-related header files and
+# WbemUuid.Lib from Platform SDK even when building with MinGW.
+#CONFIG_NDIS_EVENTS_INTEGRATED=y
+#PLATFORMSDKLIB="/opt/Program Files/Microsoft Platform SDK/Lib"
+
+# Add support for old DBus control interface
+# (fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant)
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y
+
+# Add support for new DBus control interface
+# (fi.w1.hostap.wpa_supplicant1)
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y
+
+# Add introspection support for new DBus control interface
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y
+
+# Add support for loading EAP methods dynamically as shared libraries.
+# When this option is enabled, each EAP method can be either included
+# statically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=y) or dynamically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=dyn).
+# Dynamic EAP methods are build as shared objects (eap_*.so) and they need to
+# be loaded in the beginning of the wpa_supplicant configuration file
+# (see load_dynamic_eap parameter in the example file) before being used in
+# the network blocks.
+#
+# Note that some shared parts of EAP methods are included in the main program
+# and in order to be able to use dynamic EAP methods using these parts, the
+# main program must have been build with the EAP method enabled (=y or =dyn).
+# This means that EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST cannot be added as dynamic libraries
+# unless at least one of them was included in the main build to force inclusion
+# of the shared code. Similarly, at least one of EAP-SIM/AKA must be included
+# in the main build to be able to load these methods dynamically.
+#
+# Please also note that using dynamic libraries will increase the total binary
+# size. Thus, it may not be the best option for targets that have limited
+# amount of memory/flash.
+#CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EAP_METHODS=y
+
+# IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 (Fast BSS Transition) for station mode
+#CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y
+
+# Add support for writing debug log to a file (/tmp/wpa_supplicant-log-#.txt)
+CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y
+
+# Send debug messages to syslog instead of stdout
+CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y
+# Set syslog facility for debug messages
+#CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG_FACILITY=LOG_DAEMON
+
+# Add support for sending all debug messages (regardless of debug verbosity)
+# to the Linux kernel tracing facility. This helps debug the entire stack by
+# making it easy to record everything happening from the driver up into the
+# same file, e.g., using trace-cmd.
+#CONFIG_DEBUG_LINUX_TRACING=y
+
+# Add support for writing debug log to Android logcat instead of standard
+# output
+#CONFIG_ANDROID_LOG=y
+
+# Enable privilege separation (see README 'Privilege separation' for details)
+#CONFIG_PRIVSEP=y
+
+# Enable mitigation against certain attacks against TKIP by delaying Michael
+# MIC error reports by a random amount of time between 0 and 60 seconds
+#CONFIG_DELAYED_MIC_ERROR_REPORT=y
+
+# Enable tracing code for developer debugging
+# This tracks use of memory allocations and other registrations and reports
+# incorrect use with a backtrace of call (or allocation) location.
+#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y
+# For BSD, uncomment these.
+#LIBS += -lexecinfo
+#LIBS_p += -lexecinfo
+#LIBS_c += -lexecinfo
+
+# Use libbfd to get more details for developer debugging
+# This enables use of libbfd to get more detailed symbols for the backtraces
+# generated by CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y.
+#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE_BFD=y
+# For BSD, uncomment these.
+#LIBS += -lbfd -liberty -lz
+#LIBS_p += -lbfd -liberty -lz
+#LIBS_c += -lbfd -liberty -lz
+
+# wpa_supplicant depends on strong random number generation being available
+# from the operating system. os_get_random() function is used to fetch random
+# data when needed, e.g., for key generation. On Linux and BSD systems, this
+# works by reading /dev/urandom. It should be noted that the OS entropy pool
+# needs to be properly initialized before wpa_supplicant is started. This is
+# important especially on embedded devices that do not have a hardware random
+# number generator and may by default start up with minimal entropy available
+# for random number generation.
+#
+# As a safety net, wpa_supplicant is by default trying to internally collect
+# additional entropy for generating random data to mix in with the data fetched
+# from the OS. This by itself is not considered to be very strong, but it may
+# help in cases where the system pool is not initialized properly. However, it
+# is very strongly recommended that the system pool is initialized with enough
+# entropy either by using hardware assisted random number generator or by
+# storing state over device reboots.
+#
+# wpa_supplicant can be configured to maintain its own entropy store over
+# restarts to enhance random number generation. This is not perfect, but it is
+# much more secure than using the same sequence of random numbers after every
+# reboot. This can be enabled with -e<entropy file> command line option. The
+# specified file needs to be readable and writable by wpa_supplicant.
+#
+# If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong random data (e.g., on
+# Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of random
+# data from /dev/urandom), the internal wpa_supplicant random pool can be
+# disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
+# should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on devices
+# that meet the requirements described above.
+#CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y
+
+# IEEE 802.11n (High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode)
+CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y
+
+# IEEE 802.11ac (Very High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode)
+# (depends on CONFIG_IEEE80211N)
+CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y
+
+# Wireless Network Management (IEEE Std 802.11v-2011)
+# Note: This is experimental and not complete implementation.
+#CONFIG_WNM=y
+
+# Interworking (IEEE 802.11u)
+# This can be used to enable functionality to improve interworking with
+# external networks (GAS/ANQP to learn more about the networks and network
+# selection based on available credentials).
+#CONFIG_INTERWORKING=y
+
+# Hotspot 2.0
+#CONFIG_HS20=y
+
+# Enable interface matching in wpa_supplicant
+#CONFIG_MATCH_IFACE=y
+
+# Disable roaming in wpa_supplicant
+#CONFIG_NO_ROAMING=y
+
+# AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant
+# This can be used for controlling AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant. It
+# should be noted that this is mainly aimed at simple cases like
+# WPA2-Personal while more complex configurations like WPA2-Enterprise with an
+# external RADIUS server can be supported with hostapd.
+CONFIG_AP=y
+
+# P2P (Wi-Fi Direct)
+# This can be used to enable P2P support in wpa_supplicant. See README-P2P for
+# more information on P2P operations.
+CONFIG_P2P=y
+
+# Enable TDLS support
+#CONFIG_TDLS=y
+
+# Wi-Fi Direct
+# This can be used to enable Wi-Fi Direct extensions for P2P using an external
+# program to control the additional information exchanges in the messages.
CONFIG_WIFI_DISPLAY=y
-CONFIG_WPS=y
-#CONFIG_MACSEC=y
-#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_LINUX=y
+
+# Autoscan
+# This can be used to enable automatic scan support in wpa_supplicant.
+# See wpa_supplicant.conf for more information on autoscan usage.
+#
+# Enabling directly a module will enable autoscan support.
+# For exponential module:
+#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_EXPONENTIAL=y
+# For periodic module:
+#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_PERIODIC=y
+
+# Password (and passphrase, etc.) backend for external storage
+# These optional mechanisms can be used to add support for storing passwords
+# and other secrets in external (to wpa_supplicant) location. This allows, for
+# example, operating system specific key storage to be used
+#
+# External password backend for testing purposes (developer use)
+#CONFIG_EXT_PASSWORD_TEST=y
+
+# Enable Fast Session Transfer (FST)
+#CONFIG_FST=y
+
+# Enable CLI commands for FST testing
+#CONFIG_FST_TEST=y
+
+# OS X builds. This is only for building eapol_test.
+#CONFIG_OSX=y
+
+# Automatic Channel Selection
+# This will allow wpa_supplicant to pick the channel automatically when channel
+# is set to "0".
+#
+# TODO: Extend parser to be able to parse "channel=acs_survey" as an alternative
+# to "channel=0". This would enable us to eventually add other ACS algorithms in
+# similar way.
+#
+# Automatic selection is currently only done through initialization, later on
+# we hope to do background checks to keep us moving to more ideal channels as
+# time goes by. ACS is currently only supported through the nl80211 driver and
+# your driver must have survey dump capability that is filled by the driver
+# during scanning.
+#
+# TODO: In analogy to hostapd be able to customize the ACS survey algorithm with
+# a newly to create wpa_supplicant.conf variable acs_num_scans.
+#
+# Supported ACS drivers:
+# * ath9k
+# * ath5k
+# * ath10k
+#
+# For more details refer to:
+# http://wireless.kernel.org/en/users/Documentation/acs
+#CONFIG_ACS=y
+
+# Support Multi Band Operation
+#CONFIG_MBO=y
+
+# Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS) (IEEE 802.11ai)
+# Note: This is an experimental and not yet complete implementation. This
+# should not be enabled for production use.
+#CONFIG_FILS=y
+# FILS shared key authentication with PFS
+#CONFIG_FILS_SK_PFS=y
+
+# Support RSN on IBSS networks
+# This is needed to be able to use mode=1 network profile with proto=RSN and
+# key_mgmt=WPA-PSK (i.e., full key management instead of WPA-None).
+CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y
+
+# External PMKSA cache control
+# This can be used to enable control interface commands that allow the current
+# PMKSA cache entries to be fetched and new entries to be added.
+#CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL=y
+
+# Mesh Networking (IEEE 802.11s)
+#CONFIG_MESH=y
+
+# Background scanning modules
+# These can be used to request wpa_supplicant to perform background scanning
+# operations for roaming within an ESS (same SSID). See the bgscan parameter in
+# the wpa_supplicant.conf file for more details.
+# Periodic background scans based on signal strength
+CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y
+# Learn channels used by the network and try to avoid bgscans on other
+# channels (experimental)
+#CONFIG_BGSCAN_LEARN=y
+
+# Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)
+# Experimental implementation of draft-harkins-owe-07.txt
+#CONFIG_OWE=y
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bee574a5..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-From 25b37c54a47e49d591f5752bbf0f510480402cae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
-Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2017 11:14:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] OpenSSL: Fix private key password handling with OpenSSL
- >= 1.1.0f
-
-Since OpenSSL version 1.1.0f, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the
-callback from the SSL object instead of the one from the CTX, so let's
-set the callback on both SSL and CTX. Note that
-SSL_set_default_passwd_cb*() is available only in 1.1.0.
-
-Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit f665c93e1d28fbab3d9127a8c3985cc32940824f)
----
- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
-index c4170b6..bceb8c3 100644
---- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
-+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
-@@ -2779,6 +2779,15 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
- } else
- passwd = NULL;
-
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-+ /*
-+ * In OpenSSL >= 1.1.0f SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the callback
-+ * from the SSL object. See OpenSSL commit d61461a75253.
-+ */
-+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, tls_passwd_cb);
-+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(conn->ssl, passwd);
-+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
-+ /* Keep these for OpenSSL < 1.1.0f */
- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, tls_passwd_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, passwd);
-
-@@ -2869,6 +2878,9 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
- return -1;
- }
- ERR_clear_error();
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL);
-+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
- os_free(passwd);
-
---
-2.9.3
-
-From b2887d6964a406eb5f88f4ad4e9764c468954382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 12:06:17 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] OpenSSL: Clear default_passwd_cb more thoroughly
-
-Previously, the pointer to strdup passwd was left in OpenSSL library
-default_passwd_cb_userdata and even the default_passwd_cb was left set
-on an error path. To avoid unexpected behavior if something were to
-manage to use there pointers, clear them explicitly once done with
-loading of the private key.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-(cherry picked from commit 89971d8b1e328a2f79699c953625d1671fd40384)
----
- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
-index bceb8c3..770af9e 100644
---- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
-+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
-@@ -2758,6 +2758,19 @@ static int tls_connection_engine_private_key(struct tls_connection *conn)
- }
-
-
-+static void tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSL *ssl)
-+{
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-+ if (ssl) {
-+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl, NULL);
-+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl, NULL);
-+ }
-+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
-+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
-+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, NULL);
-+}
-+
-+
- static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
- struct tls_connection *conn,
- const char *private_key,
-@@ -2874,14 +2887,12 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
- if (!ok) {
- tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
- "Failed to load private key");
-+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl);
- os_free(passwd);
- return -1;
- }
- ERR_clear_error();
--#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-- SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL);
--#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
-- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
-+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl);
- os_free(passwd);
-
- if (!SSL_check_private_key(conn->ssl)) {
-@@ -2924,13 +2935,14 @@ static int tls_global_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
- tls_read_pkcs12(data, NULL, private_key, passwd)) {
- tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
- "Failed to load private key");
-+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
- os_free(passwd);
- ERR_clear_error();
- return -1;
- }
-+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
- os_free(passwd);
- ERR_clear_error();
-- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
-
- if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)) {
- tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
---
-2.9.3
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c03e1dc..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-From 290834df69556b903b49f2a45671cc62b44f13bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 17:59:30 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] nl80211: Fix race condition in detecting MAC change
-
-Commit 3e0272ca00ce1df35b45e7d739dd7e935f13fd84 ('nl80211: Re-read MAC
-address on RTM_NEWLINK') added the detection of external changes to MAC
-address when the interface is brought up.
-
-If the interface state is changed quickly enough, wpa_supplicant may
-receive the netlink message for the !IFF_UP event when the interface
-has already been brought up and would ignore the next netlink IFF_UP
-message, missing the MAC change.
-
-Fix this by also reloading the MAC address when a !IFF_UP event is
-received with the interface up, because this implies that the
-interface went down and up again, possibly changing the address.
-
-Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
----
- src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
-index af1cb84..24fad29 100644
---- a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
-+++ b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
-@@ -933,6 +933,30 @@ nl80211_find_drv(struct nl80211_global *global, int idx, u8 *buf, size_t len)
- }
-
-
-+static void nl80211_refresh_mac(struct wpa_driver_nl80211_data *drv,
-+ int ifindex)
-+{
-+ struct i802_bss *bss;
-+ u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
-+
-+ bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifindex);
-+ if (bss &&
-+ linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock,
-+ bss->ifname, addr) < 0) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address",
-+ bss->ifname);
-+ } else if (bss && os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from "
-+ MACSTR " to " MACSTR,
-+ ifindex, bss->ifname,
-+ MAC2STR(bss->addr), MAC2STR(addr));
-+ os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+
- static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx,
- struct ifinfomsg *ifi,
- u8 *buf, size_t len)
-@@ -997,6 +1021,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx,
- namebuf[0] = '\0';
- if (if_indextoname(ifi->ifi_index, namebuf) &&
- linux_iface_up(drv->global->ioctl_sock, namebuf) > 0) {
-+ /* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */
-+ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Ignore interface down "
- "event since interface %s is up", namebuf);
- drv->ignore_if_down_event = 0;
-@@ -1044,27 +1070,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx,
- "event since interface %s is marked "
- "removed", drv->first_bss->ifname);
- } else {
-- struct i802_bss *bss;
-- u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
--
- /* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */
-- bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifi->ifi_index);
-- if (bss &&
-- linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock,
-- bss->ifname, addr) < 0) {
-- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-- "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address",
-- bss->ifname);
-- } else if (bss &&
-- os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) {
-- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-- "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from "
-- MACSTR " to " MACSTR,
-- ifi->ifi_index, bss->ifname,
-- MAC2STR(bss->addr),
-- MAC2STR(addr));
-- os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
-- }
-+ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index);
-
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Interface up");
- drv->if_disabled = 0;
---
-2.9.3
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d99be04c..00000000
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-From 0ad5893a2f1f521d44712cd395e067ccf0a397c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
-Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 01:14:28 +0200
-Subject: PAE: Validate input before pointer
-
-ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() calls ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist()
-before body_len has been checked on all segments.
-
-ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() and ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist() might
-continue and thus underflow left_len even if it finds left_len to small
-(or before checking).
-
-Additionally, ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body() might perform out of bound
-reads in this case.
-
-Fix this by checking left_len and aborting if too small early.
-
-Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
----
- src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
-index c4bfcbc..cad0292 100644
---- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
-+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
-@@ -964,21 +964,19 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
- body_len = get_mka_param_body_len(hdr);
- body_type = get_mka_param_body_type(hdr);
-
-- if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST &&
-- body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST)
-- continue;
--
-- ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body(
-- (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos);
--
-- if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + body_len + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) {
-+ if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len) + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
- "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV",
- left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN,
-- body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN);
-- continue;
-+ MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len),
-+ DEFAULT_ICV_LEN);
-+ return FALSE;
- }
-
-+ if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST &&
-+ body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST)
-+ continue;
-+
- if ((body_len % 16) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
- "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) should be a multiple of 16 octets",
-@@ -986,6 +984,9 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
- continue;
- }
-
-+ ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body(
-+ (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos);
-+
- for (i = 0; i < body_len;
- i += sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id)) {
- const struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id *peer_mi;
-@@ -3018,7 +3019,7 @@ static int ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
- "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV",
- left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN,
- body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN);
-- continue;
-+ return -1;
- }
-
- if (handled[body_type])
---
-cgit v0.12
-
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc
index b891fbbd..a6b63978 100644
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc
+++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ wpa_supplicant: component that is used in the client stations. It implements key
wpa_supplicant: negotiation with a WPA Authenticator and it controls the roaming and
wpa_supplicant: IEEE 802.11 authentication/association of the wlan driver.
wpa_supplicant:
-wpa_supplicant: More info: http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/
+wpa_supplicant: Homepage: http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/
wpa_supplicant:
wpa_supplicant:
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
index d4e56cbb..fa98162c 100755
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
+++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
PKGNAM=wpa_supplicant
VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-6}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
SRCVERSION=$(printf $VERSION | tr _ -)
@@ -85,15 +85,6 @@ find . \
\( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) \
-exec chmod 644 {} \;
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
-
# Fixup various paths in the dbus service file
zcat $CWD/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
@@ -103,11 +94,6 @@ zcat $CWD/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || ex
# Apply a few other patches from Fedora
zcat $CWD/patches/assoc-timeout.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
zcat $CWD/patches/flush-debug-output.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
-zcat $CWD/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
-
-# Support OpenSSL-1.1.x:
-zcat $CWD/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
cd wpa_supplicant