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-rw-r--r--components/htmlfive/nsHtml5TreeOpExecutor.cpp56
-rw-r--r--dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.cpp18
-rw-r--r--dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.h4
-rw-r--r--dom/html/HTMLFormElement.cpp3
-rw-r--r--dom/html/HTMLSharedElement.cpp3
-rw-r--r--dom/media/mediasource/TrackBuffersManager.cpp6
-rw-r--r--dom/performance/PerformanceResourceTiming.h4
-rw-r--r--system/network/base/nsPACMan.cpp5
-rw-r--r--system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.cpp87
-rw-r--r--system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.h1
-rw-r--r--system/platform-prefs.js19
-rw-r--r--system/security/content/nsCSPContext.cpp7
-rw-r--r--system/security/content/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl11
-rw-r--r--xpcom/glue/nsTArray.h6
14 files changed, 175 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/components/htmlfive/nsHtml5TreeOpExecutor.cpp b/components/htmlfive/nsHtml5TreeOpExecutor.cpp
index 8cf22d804..c79af5321 100644
--- a/components/htmlfive/nsHtml5TreeOpExecutor.cpp
+++ b/components/htmlfive/nsHtml5TreeOpExecutor.cpp
@@ -1019,9 +1019,63 @@ nsHtml5TreeOpExecutor::SetSpeculationBase(const nsAString& aURL)
return;
}
const nsCString& charset = mDocument->GetDocumentCharacterSet();
- DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(mSpeculationBaseURI), aURL,
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newBaseURI;
+ nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(newBaseURI), aURL,
charset.get(), mDocument->GetDocumentURI());
NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "Failed to create a URI");
+ if (!newBaseURI) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!CSPService::sCSPEnabled) {
+ // If CSP is not enabled, just pass back the URI
+ mSpeculationBaseURI = newBaseURI;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ NS_ASSERTION(NS_IsMainThread(), "Wrong thread!");
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = mDocument->NodePrincipal();
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMDocument> domDoc = do_QueryInterface(mDocument);
+
+ // Check the document's CSP usually delivered via the CSP header.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> documentCsp;
+ rv = principal->EnsureCSP(domDoc, getter_AddRefs(documentCsp));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv);
+ if (documentCsp) {
+ // base-uri should not fallback to the default-src and preloads should not
+ // trigger violation reports.
+ bool cspPermitsBaseURI = true;
+ rv = documentCsp->Permits(
+ newBaseURI,
+ nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE,
+ true /* aSpecific */,
+ false /* aSendViolationReports */,
+ &cspPermitsBaseURI);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !cspPermitsBaseURI) {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Also check the CSP discovered from the <meta> tag during speculative
+ // parsing.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCsp;
+ rv = principal->EnsurePreloadCSP(domDoc, getter_AddRefs(preloadCsp));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv);
+ if (preloadCsp) {
+ bool cspPermitsBaseURI = true;
+ rv = preloadCsp->Permits(
+ newBaseURI,
+ nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE,
+ true /* aSpecific */,
+ false /* aSendViolationReports */,
+ &cspPermitsBaseURI);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !cspPermitsBaseURI) {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ mSpeculationBaseURI = newBaseURI;
}
void
diff --git a/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.cpp b/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.cpp
index 39c2408b7..970e4386b 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.cpp
@@ -1185,7 +1185,8 @@ nsTreeSanitizer::SanitizeAttributes(mozilla::dom::Element* aElement,
continue;
}
if (IsURL(aURLs, attrLocal)) {
- if (SanitizeURL(aElement, attrNs, attrLocal)) {
+ bool fragmentOnly = aElement->IsSVGElement(nsGkAtoms::use);
+ if (SanitizeURL(aElement, attrNs, attrLocal, fragmentOnly)) {
// in case the attribute removal shuffled the attribute order, start
// the loop again.
--ac;
@@ -1239,7 +1240,8 @@ nsTreeSanitizer::SanitizeAttributes(mozilla::dom::Element* aElement,
// else not allowed
} else if (aAllowXLink && kNameSpaceID_XLink == attrNs) {
if (nsGkAtoms::href == attrLocal) {
- if (SanitizeURL(aElement, attrNs, attrLocal)) {
+ bool fragmentOnly = aElement->IsSVGElement(nsGkAtoms::use);
+ if (SanitizeURL(aElement, attrNs, attrLocal, fragmentOnly)) {
// in case the attribute removal shuffled the attribute order, start
// the loop again.
--ac;
@@ -1273,7 +1275,8 @@ nsTreeSanitizer::SanitizeAttributes(mozilla::dom::Element* aElement,
bool
nsTreeSanitizer::SanitizeURL(mozilla::dom::Element* aElement,
int32_t aNamespace,
- nsIAtom* aLocalName)
+ nsIAtom* aLocalName,
+ bool aFragmentOnly)
{
nsAutoString value;
aElement->GetAttr(aNamespace, aLocalName, value);
@@ -1282,6 +1285,15 @@ nsTreeSanitizer::SanitizeURL(mozilla::dom::Element* aElement,
static const char* kWhitespace = "\n\r\t\b";
const nsAString& v =
nsContentUtils::TrimCharsInSet(kWhitespace, value);
+ // Fragment-only url cannot be harmful.
+ if (!v.IsEmpty() && v.First() == u'#') {
+ return false;
+ }
+ // if we allow only same-document fragment URLs, stop and remove here
+ if (aFragmentOnly) {
+ aElement->UnsetAttr(aNamespace, aLocalName, false);
+ return true;
+ }
nsIScriptSecurityManager* secMan = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager();
uint32_t flags = nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;
diff --git a/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.h b/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.h
index b4a333f61..fe4917150 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.h
+++ b/dom/base/nsTreeSanitizer.h
@@ -143,11 +143,13 @@ class MOZ_STACK_CLASS nsTreeSanitizer {
* @param aElement the element whose attribute to possibly modify
* @param aNamespace the namespace of the URL attribute
* @param aLocalName the local name of the URL attribute
+ * @param aFragmentOnly allows same-document references only
* @return true if the attribute was removed and false otherwise
*/
bool SanitizeURL(mozilla::dom::Element* aElement,
int32_t aNamespace,
- nsIAtom* aLocalName);
+ nsIAtom* aLocalName,
+ bool aFragmentOnly = false);
/**
* Checks a style rule for the presence of the 'binding' CSS property and
diff --git a/dom/html/HTMLFormElement.cpp b/dom/html/HTMLFormElement.cpp
index 2fe452bcd..c8bb52637 100644
--- a/dom/html/HTMLFormElement.cpp
+++ b/dom/html/HTMLFormElement.cpp
@@ -1721,7 +1721,8 @@ HTMLFormElement::GetActionURL(nsIURI** aActionURL,
// policy - do *not* consult default-src, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-default-src
rv = csp->Permits(actionURL, nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE,
- true, &permitsFormAction);
+ true /*aSpecific */, true /* aSendViolationReports */,
+ &permitsFormAction);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (!permitsFormAction) {
return NS_ERROR_CSP_FORM_ACTION_VIOLATION;
diff --git a/dom/html/HTMLSharedElement.cpp b/dom/html/HTMLSharedElement.cpp
index e8c75f8aa..90f9ff62e 100644
--- a/dom/html/HTMLSharedElement.cpp
+++ b/dom/html/HTMLSharedElement.cpp
@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ SetBaseURIUsingFirstBaseWithHref(nsIDocument* aDocument, nsIContent* aMustMatch)
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-default-src
bool cspPermitsBaseURI = true;
rv = csp->Permits(newBaseURI, nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE,
- true, &cspPermitsBaseURI);
+ true /* aSpecific */, true /* aSendViolationReports */,
+ &cspPermitsBaseURI);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !cspPermitsBaseURI) {
newBaseURI = nullptr;
}
diff --git a/dom/media/mediasource/TrackBuffersManager.cpp b/dom/media/mediasource/TrackBuffersManager.cpp
index da21e0b39..907ee40e8 100644
--- a/dom/media/mediasource/TrackBuffersManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/media/mediasource/TrackBuffersManager.cpp
@@ -22,15 +22,15 @@
extern mozilla::LogModule* GetMediaSourceLog();
-#define MSE_DEBUG(arg, ...) MOZ_LOG(GetMediaSourceLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, ("TrackBuffersManager(%p:%s)::%s: " arg, this, mType.get(), __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__))
-#define MSE_DEBUGV(arg, ...) MOZ_LOG(GetMediaSourceLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Verbose, ("TrackBuffersManager(%p:%s)::%s: " arg, this, mType.get(), __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__))
+#define MSE_DEBUG(arg, ...) MOZ_LOG(GetMediaSourceLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, ("TrackBuffersManager(%p)::%s: " arg, this,__func__, ##__VA_ARGS__))
+#define MSE_DEBUGV(arg, ...) MOZ_LOG(GetMediaSourceLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Verbose, ("TrackBuffersManager(%p)::%s: " arg, this, __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__))
mozilla::LogModule* GetMediaSourceSamplesLog()
{
static mozilla::LazyLogModule sLogModule("MediaSourceSamples");
return sLogModule;
}
-#define SAMPLE_DEBUG(arg, ...) MOZ_LOG(GetMediaSourceSamplesLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, ("TrackBuffersManager(%p:%s)::%s: " arg, this, mType.get(), __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__))
+#define SAMPLE_DEBUG(arg, ...) MOZ_LOG(GetMediaSourceSamplesLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, ("TrackBuffersManager(%p)::%s: " arg, this, __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__))
namespace mozilla {
diff --git a/dom/performance/PerformanceResourceTiming.h b/dom/performance/PerformanceResourceTiming.h
index b4775d432..63a8c2414 100644
--- a/dom/performance/PerformanceResourceTiming.h
+++ b/dom/performance/PerformanceResourceTiming.h
@@ -54,7 +54,9 @@ public:
void GetNextHopProtocol(nsAString& aNextHopProtocol) const
{
- aNextHopProtocol = mNextHopProtocol;
+ if (mTiming && mTiming->TimingAllowed()) {
+ aNextHopProtocol = mNextHopProtocol;
+ }
}
void SetNextHopProtocol(const nsAString& aNextHopProtocol)
diff --git a/system/network/base/nsPACMan.cpp b/system/network/base/nsPACMan.cpp
index 37d3e8b6b..f00c3cc43 100644
--- a/system/network/base/nsPACMan.cpp
+++ b/system/network/base/nsPACMan.cpp
@@ -474,6 +474,11 @@ nsPACMan::StartLoading()
void
nsPACMan::OnLoadFailure()
{
+ // We have to clear the loader to indicate that we are currently not loading PAC.
+ if (mLoader) {
+ mLoader = nullptr;
+ }
+
int32_t minInterval = 5; // 5 seconds
int32_t maxInterval = 300; // 5 minutes
diff --git a/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.cpp b/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.cpp
index 9a08bd1d7..828b8920c 100644
--- a/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.cpp
+++ b/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.cpp
@@ -3344,6 +3344,10 @@ nsCookieService::SetCookieInternal(nsIURI *aHostURI,
COOKIE_LOGFAILURE(SET_COOKIE, aHostURI, savedCookieHeader, "failed the path tests");
return newCookie;
}
+ if (!CheckHiddenPrefix(cookieAttributes)) {
+ COOKIE_LOGFAILURE(SET_COOKIE, aHostURI, savedCookieHeader, "failed the CheckHiddenPrefix tests");
+ return newCookie;
+ }
// magic prefix checks. MUST be run after CheckDomain() and CheckPath()
if (!CheckPrefixes(cookieAttributes, isHTTPS)) {
COOKIE_LOGFAILURE(SET_COOKIE, aHostURI, savedCookieHeader, "failed the prefix tests");
@@ -4042,7 +4046,7 @@ nsCookieService::CheckPrefs(nsIURI *aHostURI,
// processes domain attribute, and returns true if host has permission to set for this domain.
bool
-nsCookieService::CheckDomain(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
+nsCookieService::CheckDomain(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie,
nsIURI *aHostURI,
const nsCString &aBaseDomain,
bool aRequireHostMatch)
@@ -4057,15 +4061,15 @@ nsCookieService::CheckDomain(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
aHostURI->GetAsciiHost(hostFromURI);
// if a domain is given, check the host has permission
- if (!aCookieAttributes.host.IsEmpty()) {
+ if (!aCookie.host.IsEmpty()) {
// Tolerate leading '.' characters, but not if it's otherwise an empty host.
- if (aCookieAttributes.host.Length() > 1 &&
- aCookieAttributes.host.First() == '.') {
- aCookieAttributes.host.Cut(0, 1);
+ if (aCookie.host.Length() > 1 &&
+ aCookie.host.First() == '.') {
+ aCookie.host.Cut(0, 1);
}
// switch to lowercase now, to avoid case-insensitive compares everywhere
- ToLowerCase(aCookieAttributes.host);
+ ToLowerCase(aCookie.host);
// check whether the host is either an IP address, an alias such as
// 'localhost', an eTLD such as 'co.uk', or the empty string. in these
@@ -4073,14 +4077,14 @@ nsCookieService::CheckDomain(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
// as a non-domain one. bug 105917 originally noted the requirement to deal
// with IP addresses.
if (aRequireHostMatch)
- return hostFromURI.Equals(aCookieAttributes.host);
+ return hostFromURI.Equals(aCookie.host);
// ensure the proposed domain is derived from the base domain; and also
// that the host domain is derived from the proposed domain (per RFC2109).
- if (IsSubdomainOf(aCookieAttributes.host, aBaseDomain) &&
- IsSubdomainOf(hostFromURI, aCookieAttributes.host)) {
+ if (IsSubdomainOf(aCookie.host, aBaseDomain) &&
+ IsSubdomainOf(hostFromURI, aCookie.host)) {
// prepend a dot to indicate a domain cookie
- aCookieAttributes.host.Insert(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("."), 0);
+ aCookie.host.Insert(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("."), 0);
return true;
}
@@ -4095,7 +4099,7 @@ nsCookieService::CheckDomain(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
}
// no domain specified, use hostFromURI
- aCookieAttributes.host = hostFromURI;
+ aCookie.host = hostFromURI;
return true;
}
@@ -4121,12 +4125,12 @@ GetPathFromURI(nsIURI* aHostURI)
}
bool
-nsCookieService::CheckPath(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
+nsCookieService::CheckPath(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie,
nsIURI *aHostURI)
{
// if a path is given, check the host has permission
- if (aCookieAttributes.path.IsEmpty() || aCookieAttributes.path.First() != '/') {
- aCookieAttributes.path = GetPathFromURI(aHostURI);
+ if (aCookie.path.IsEmpty() || aCookie.path.First() != '/') {
+ aCookie.path = GetPathFromURI(aHostURI);
#if 0
} else {
@@ -4139,19 +4143,42 @@ nsCookieService::CheckPath(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
// get path from aHostURI
nsAutoCString pathFromURI;
if (NS_FAILED(aHostURI->GetPath(pathFromURI)) ||
- !StringBeginsWith(pathFromURI, aCookieAttributes.path)) {
+ !StringBeginsWith(pathFromURI, aCookie.path)) {
return false;
}
#endif
}
- if (aCookieAttributes.path.Length() > kMaxBytesPerPath ||
- aCookieAttributes.path.Contains('\t'))
+ if (aCookie.path.Length() > kMaxBytesPerPath ||
+ aCookie.path.Contains('\t'))
return false;
return true;
}
+bool
+nsCookieService::CheckHiddenPrefix(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie) {
+ // If a cookie is nameless, then its value must not start with
+ // `__Host-` or `__Secure-`
+ if (aCookie.name.Length() != 0) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ static const char kSecure[] = "__Secure-";
+ static const char kHost[] = "__Host-";
+ static const int kSecureLen = sizeof( kSecure ) - 1;
+ static const int kHostLen = sizeof( kHost ) - 1;
+
+ bool isSecure = strncmp( aCookie.value.get(), kSecure, kSecureLen ) == 0;
+ bool isHost = strncmp( aCookie.value.get(), kHost, kHostLen ) == 0;
+
+ if (isSecure || isHost) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
// CheckPrefixes
//
// Reject cookies whose name starts with the magic prefixes from
@@ -4161,7 +4188,7 @@ nsCookieService::CheckPath(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
// Must not be called until after CheckDomain() and CheckPath() have
// regularized and validated the nsCookieAttributes values!
bool
-nsCookieService::CheckPrefixes(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
+nsCookieService::CheckPrefixes(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie,
bool aSecureRequest)
{
static const char kSecure[] = "__Secure-";
@@ -4169,15 +4196,15 @@ nsCookieService::CheckPrefixes(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
static const int kSecureLen = sizeof( kSecure ) - 1;
static const int kHostLen = sizeof( kHost ) - 1;
- bool isSecure = strncmp( aCookieAttributes.name.get(), kSecure, kSecureLen ) == 0;
- bool isHost = strncmp( aCookieAttributes.name.get(), kHost, kHostLen ) == 0;
+ bool isSecure = strncmp( aCookie.value.get(), kSecure, kSecureLen ) == 0;
+ bool isHost = strncmp( aCookie.value.get(), kHost, kHostLen ) == 0;
if ( !isSecure && !isHost ) {
// not one of the magic prefixes: carry on
return true;
}
- if ( !aSecureRequest || !aCookieAttributes.isSecure ) {
+ if ( !aSecureRequest || !aCookie.isSecure ) {
// the magic prefixes may only be used from a secure request and
// the secure attribute must be set on the cookie
return false;
@@ -4190,8 +4217,8 @@ nsCookieService::CheckPrefixes(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
// them. In particular all explicit domain attributes result in a host
// that starts with a dot, and if the host doesn't start with a dot it
// correctly matches the true host.
- if ( aCookieAttributes.host[0] == '.' ||
- !aCookieAttributes.path.EqualsLiteral( "/" )) {
+ if ( aCookie.host[0] == '.' ||
+ !aCookie.path.EqualsLiteral( "/" )) {
return false;
}
}
@@ -4200,7 +4227,7 @@ nsCookieService::CheckPrefixes(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
}
bool
-nsCookieService::GetExpiry(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
+nsCookieService::GetExpiry(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie,
int64_t aServerTime,
int64_t aCurrentTime)
{
@@ -4212,10 +4239,10 @@ nsCookieService::GetExpiry(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
* Note: We need to consider accounting for network lag here, per RFC.
*/
// check for max-age attribute first; this overrides expires attribute
- if (!aCookieAttributes.maxage.IsEmpty()) {
+ if (!aCookie.maxage.IsEmpty()) {
// obtain numeric value of maxageAttribute
int64_t maxage;
- int32_t numInts = PR_sscanf(aCookieAttributes.maxage.get(), "%lld", &maxage);
+ int32_t numInts = PR_sscanf(aCookie.maxage.get(), "%lld", &maxage);
// default to session cookie if the conversion failed
if (numInts != 1) {
@@ -4224,14 +4251,14 @@ nsCookieService::GetExpiry(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
// if this addition overflows, expiryTime will be less than currentTime
// and the cookie will be expired - that's okay.
- aCookieAttributes.expiryTime = aCurrentTime + maxage;
+ aCookie.expiryTime = aCurrentTime + maxage;
// check for expires attribute
- } else if (!aCookieAttributes.expires.IsEmpty()) {
+ } else if (!aCookie.expires.IsEmpty()) {
PRTime expires;
// parse expiry time
- if (PR_ParseTimeString(aCookieAttributes.expires.get(), true, &expires) != PR_SUCCESS) {
+ if (PR_ParseTimeString(aCookie.expires.get(), true, &expires) != PR_SUCCESS) {
return true;
}
@@ -4240,7 +4267,7 @@ nsCookieService::GetExpiry(nsCookieAttributes &aCookieAttributes,
// Because if current time be set in the future, but the cookie expire
// time be set less than current time and more than server time.
// The cookie item have to be used to the expired cookie.
- aCookieAttributes.expiryTime = expires / int64_t(PR_USEC_PER_SEC);
+ aCookie.expiryTime = expires / int64_t(PR_USEC_PER_SEC);
// default to session cookie if no attributes found
} else {
diff --git a/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.h b/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.h
index 185f0b492..deb9fed33 100644
--- a/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.h
+++ b/system/network/cookie/nsCookieService.h
@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ class nsCookieService final : public nsICookieService
CookieStatus CheckPrefs(nsIURI *aHostURI, bool aIsForeign, const char *aCookieHeader);
bool CheckDomain(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie, nsIURI *aHostURI, const nsCString &aBaseDomain, bool aRequireHostMatch);
static bool CheckPath(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie, nsIURI *aHostURI);
+ static bool CheckHiddenPrefix(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie);
static bool CheckPrefixes(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie, bool aSecureRequest);
static bool GetExpiry(nsCookieAttributes &aCookie, int64_t aServerTime, int64_t aCurrentTime);
void RemoveAllFromMemory();
diff --git a/system/platform-prefs.js b/system/platform-prefs.js
index 327ef332b..16ab9201c 100644
--- a/system/platform-prefs.js
+++ b/system/platform-prefs.js
@@ -1194,19 +1194,24 @@ pref("network.protocol-handler.external-default", true); // OK to load
pref("network.protocol-handler.warn-external-default", true); // warn before load
// Prevent using external protocol handlers for these schemes
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.afp", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.data", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.disk", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.disks", false);
pref("network.protocol-handler.external.hcp", false);
-pref("network.protocol-handler.external.vbscript", false);
pref("network.protocol-handler.external.javascript", false);
-pref("network.protocol-handler.external.data", false);
-pref("network.protocol-handler.external.ms-help", false);
pref("network.protocol-handler.external.mk", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.moz-icon", false);
pref("network.protocol-handler.external.res", false);
pref("network.protocol-handler.external.shell", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.vbscript", false);
pref("network.protocol-handler.external.vnd.ms.radio", false);
-pref("network.protocol-handler.external.disk", false);
-pref("network.protocol-handler.external.disks", false);
-pref("network.protocol-handler.external.afp", false);
-pref("network.protocol-handler.external.moz-icon", false);
+#ifdef XP_WIN
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.ms-help", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.ms-msdt", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.search", false);
+pref("network.protocol-handler.external.search-ms", false);
+#endif
// Don't allow external protocol handlers for common typos
pref("network.protocol-handler.external.ttp", false); // http
diff --git a/system/security/content/nsCSPContext.cpp b/system/security/content/nsCSPContext.cpp
index ec698b91d..544fe118b 100644
--- a/system/security/content/nsCSPContext.cpp
+++ b/system/security/content/nsCSPContext.cpp
@@ -1309,6 +1309,7 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::Permits(nsIURI* aURI,
CSPDirective aDir,
bool aSpecific,
+ bool aSendViolationReports,
bool* outPermits)
{
// Can't perform check without aURI
@@ -1323,13 +1324,13 @@ nsCSPContext::Permits(nsIURI* aURI,
false, // not redirected.
false, // not a preload.
aSpecific,
- true, // send violation reports
+ aSendViolationReports,
true, // send blocked URI in violation reports
false); // not parser created
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
- CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::Permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, isAllowed: %s",
- aURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), aDir,
+ CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::Permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %s, isAllowed: %s",
+ aURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir),
*outPermits ? "allow" : "deny"));
}
diff --git a/system/security/content/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl b/system/security/content/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl
index da4297f33..e76c39c44 100644
--- a/system/security/content/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl
+++ b/system/security/content/nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl
@@ -252,9 +252,6 @@ interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy : nsISerializable
/**
* Checks if a specific directive permits loading of a URI.
*
- * NOTE: Calls to this may trigger violation reports when queried, so the
- * return value should not be cached.
- *
* @param aURI
* The URI about to be loaded or used.
* @param aDir
@@ -266,11 +263,17 @@ interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy : nsISerializable
* "false" allows CSP to fall back to default-src. This function
* behaves the same for both values of canUseDefault when querying
* directives that don't fall-back.
+ * @param aSendViolationReports
+ * If `true` and the uri is not allowed then trigger violation reports.
+ * This should be `false` for caching or preloads.
* @return
* Whether or not the provided URI is allowed by CSP under the given
* directive. (block the pending operation if false).
*/
- boolean permits(in nsIURI aURI, in CSPDirective aDir, in boolean aSpecific);
+ boolean permits(in nsIURI aURI,
+ in CSPDirective aDir,
+ in boolean aSpecific,
+ in boolean aSendViolationReports);
/**
* Delegate method called by the service when sub-elements of the protected
diff --git a/xpcom/glue/nsTArray.h b/xpcom/glue/nsTArray.h
index 22d6ab7b3..03913a376 100644
--- a/xpcom/glue/nsTArray.h
+++ b/xpcom/glue/nsTArray.h
@@ -2018,6 +2018,12 @@ auto
nsTArray_Impl<E, Alloc>::ReplaceElementsAt(index_type aStart, size_type aCount,
const Item* aArray, size_type aArrayLen) -> elem_type*
{
+ if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(aStart > Length())) {
+ InvalidArrayIndex_CRASH(aStart, Length());
+ }
+ if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(aCount > Length() - aStart)) {
+ InvalidArrayIndex_CRASH(aStart + aCount, Length());
+ }
// Adjust memory allocation up-front to catch errors.
if (!ActualAlloc::Successful(this->template EnsureCapacity<ActualAlloc>(
Length() + aArrayLen - aCount, sizeof(elem_type)))) {
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.26.2) at 2024-11-09 16:17:09 +0000