diff options
author | adeshkp <adeshkp@users.noreply.github.com> | 2019-01-12 06:20:31 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | adeshkp <adeshkp@users.noreply.github.com> | 2019-01-12 06:20:31 -0500 |
commit | af29df9d80d70163d9ace8fbdd1cd3723f93bd6e (patch) | |
tree | eced0f22032c4f01229ac0a18b9ffb6219cea309 /security | |
parent | 571457967f39d2d59abf93e73bccfff0449fcf4f (diff) | |
download | aura-central-af29df9d80d70163d9ace8fbdd1cd3723f93bd6e.tar.gz |
Telemetry: Remove stubs and related code
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp | 41 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp | 47 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp | 90 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp | 450 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/moz.build | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp | 47 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp | 93 |
14 files changed, 18 insertions, 837 deletions
diff --git a/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp index 2957a269f..1139ecae5 100644 --- a/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp +++ b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp @@ -333,7 +333,6 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, /*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus, /*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus, /*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult, - /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo, /*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo) { MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Top of VerifyCert\n")); @@ -423,7 +422,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, originAttributes, - builtChain, nullptr, nullptr); + builtChain, nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::digitalSignature, @@ -484,19 +483,13 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, continue; } - // Because of the try-strict and fallback approach, we have to clear any - // previously noted telemetry information - if (pinningTelemetryInfo) { - pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset(); - } - NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, evOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, mPinningMode, MIN_RSA_BITS, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV, sha1ModeConfigurations[i], mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, - originAttributes, builtChain, pinningTelemetryInfo, + originAttributes, builtChain, hostname); rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time, KeyUsage::digitalSignature,// (EC)DHE @@ -572,11 +565,6 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, continue; } - // invalidate any telemetry info relating to failed chains - if (pinningTelemetryInfo) { - pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset(); - } - NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, @@ -585,7 +573,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, sha1ModeConfigurations[j], mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, originAttributes, builtChain, - pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname); + hostname); rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time, KeyUsage::digitalSignature,//(EC)DHE KeyUsage::keyEncipherment,//RSA @@ -647,8 +635,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed, mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, - originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr, - nullptr); + originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::keyCertSign, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, @@ -664,8 +651,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, - originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr, - nullptr); + originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::digitalSignature, @@ -692,8 +678,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, - originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr, - nullptr); + originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA @@ -717,8 +702,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, - originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr, - nullptr); + originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::digitalSignature, @@ -751,8 +735,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, - originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr, - nullptr); + originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(sslTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse); @@ -764,8 +747,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, - originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr, - nullptr); + originAttributes, builtChain, nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(emailTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse); @@ -780,7 +762,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, originAttributes, builtChain, - nullptr, nullptr); + nullptr); rv = BuildCertChain(objectSigningTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse); @@ -816,7 +798,6 @@ CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(const UniqueCERTCertificate& peerCert, /*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus, /*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus, /*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult, - /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo, /*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo) { PR_ASSERT(peerCert); @@ -838,7 +819,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(const UniqueCERTCertificate& peerCert, pinarg, hostname, builtChain, flags, stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLS, originAttributes, evOidPolicy, ocspStaplingStatus, keySizeStatus, - sha1ModeResult, pinningTelemetryInfo, ctInfo); + sha1ModeResult, ctInfo); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } diff --git a/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h index d88c3f33c..fbc3adab4 100644 --- a/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h +++ b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ #include "CTVerifyResult.h" #include "OCSPCache.h" #include "ScopedNSSTypes.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" #include "pkix/pkixtypes.h" @@ -66,22 +65,6 @@ enum class SHA1ModeResult { enum class NetscapeStepUpPolicy : uint32_t; -class PinningTelemetryInfo -{ -public: - PinningTelemetryInfo() { Reset(); } - - // Should we accumulate pinning telemetry for the result? - bool accumulateResult; - Telemetry::ID certPinningResultHistogram; - int32_t certPinningResultBucket; - // Should we accumulate telemetry for the root? - bool accumulateForRoot; - int32_t rootBucket; - - void Reset() { accumulateForRoot = false; accumulateResult = false; } -}; - class CertificateTransparencyInfo { public: @@ -137,7 +120,6 @@ public: /*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus = nullptr, /*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus = nullptr, /*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult = nullptr, - /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo = nullptr, /*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo = nullptr); mozilla::pkix::Result VerifySSLServerCert( @@ -156,7 +138,6 @@ public: /*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus = nullptr, /*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus = nullptr, /*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult = nullptr, - /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo = nullptr, /*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo = nullptr); enum PinningMode { diff --git a/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp b/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp index 39f7d3e9e..5e89c2484 100644 --- a/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp +++ b/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp @@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(SECTrustType certDBTrustType, NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy, const NeckoOriginAttributes& originAttributes, UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain, - /*optional*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo, /*optional*/ const char* hostname) : mCertDBTrustType(certDBTrustType) , mOCSPFetching(ocspFetching) @@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(SECTrustType certDBTrustType, , mNetscapeStepUpPolicy(netscapeStepUpPolicy) , mOriginAttributes(originAttributes) , mBuiltChain(builtChain) - , mPinningTelemetryInfo(pinningTelemetryInfo) , mHostname(hostname) , mCertBlocklist(do_GetService(NS_CERTBLOCKLIST_CONTRACTID)) , mOCSPStaplingStatus(CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED) @@ -874,8 +872,7 @@ NSSCertDBTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certArray, Time time) (mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningEnforceTestMode); bool chainHasValidPins; nsresult nsrv = PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins( - certList, mHostname, time, enforceTestMode, chainHasValidPins, - mPinningTelemetryInfo); + certList, mHostname, time, enforceTestMode, chainHasValidPins); if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) { return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; } diff --git a/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h b/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h index 64827536c..becf29eee 100644 --- a/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h +++ b/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h @@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ public: NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy, const NeckoOriginAttributes& originAttributes, UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain, - /*optional*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo = nullptr, /*optional*/ const char* hostname = nullptr); virtual Result FindIssuer(mozilla::pkix::Input encodedIssuerName, @@ -188,7 +187,6 @@ private: NetscapeStepUpPolicy mNetscapeStepUpPolicy; const NeckoOriginAttributes& mOriginAttributes; UniqueCERTCertList& mBuiltChain; // non-owning - PinningTelemetryInfo* mPinningTelemetryInfo; const char* mHostname; // non-owning - only used for pinning checks nsCOMPtr<nsICertBlocklist> mCertBlocklist; CertVerifier::OCSPStaplingStatus mOCSPStaplingStatus; diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp index 1f34c880b..ffee8ba48 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp +++ b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.cpp @@ -4,11 +4,9 @@ #include "PublicKeyPinningService.h" -#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h" #include "mozilla/Base64.h" #include "mozilla/Casting.h" #include "mozilla/Logging.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "nsISiteSecurityService.h" #include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h" #include "nsSiteSecurityService.h" @@ -233,8 +231,7 @@ FindPinningInformation(const char* hostname, mozilla::pkix::Time time, static nsresult CheckPinsForHostname(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, const char* hostname, bool enforceTestMode, mozilla::pkix::Time time, - /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins, - /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo) + /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins) { chainHasValidPins = false; if (!certList) { @@ -265,47 +262,11 @@ CheckPinsForHostname(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, const char* hostname, return rv; } chainHasValidPins = enforceTestModeResult; - Telemetry::ID histogram = staticFingerprints->mIsMoz - ? Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_RESULTS - : Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_RESULTS; if (staticFingerprints->mTestMode) { - histogram = staticFingerprints->mIsMoz - ? Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_TEST_RESULTS - : Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_TEST_RESULTS; if (!enforceTestMode) { chainHasValidPins = true; } } - // We can collect per-host pinning violations for this host because it is - // operationally critical to Firefox. - if (pinningTelemetryInfo) { - if (staticFingerprints->mId != kUnknownId) { - int32_t bucket = staticFingerprints->mId * 2 - + (enforceTestModeResult ? 1 : 0); - histogram = staticFingerprints->mTestMode - ? Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_TEST_RESULTS_BY_HOST - : Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_MOZ_RESULTS_BY_HOST; - pinningTelemetryInfo->certPinningResultBucket = bucket; - } else { - pinningTelemetryInfo->certPinningResultBucket = - enforceTestModeResult ? 1 : 0; - } - pinningTelemetryInfo->accumulateResult = true; - pinningTelemetryInfo->certPinningResultHistogram = histogram; - } - - // We only collect per-CA pinning statistics upon failures. - CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList); - // Only log telemetry if the certificate list is non-empty. - if (!CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) { - if (!enforceTestModeResult && pinningTelemetryInfo) { - int32_t binNumber = RootCABinNumber(&rootNode->cert->derCert); - if (binNumber != ROOT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN ) { - pinningTelemetryInfo->accumulateForRoot = true; - pinningTelemetryInfo->rootBucket = binNumber; - } - } - } MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("pkpin: Pin check %s for %s host '%s' (mode=%s)\n", @@ -322,8 +283,7 @@ PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, const char* hostname, mozilla::pkix::Time time, bool enforceTestMode, - /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins, - /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo) + /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins) { chainHasValidPins = false; if (!certList) { @@ -334,8 +294,7 @@ PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, } nsAutoCString canonicalizedHostname(CanonicalizeHostname(hostname)); return CheckPinsForHostname(certList, canonicalizedHostname.get(), - enforceTestMode, time, chainHasValidPins, - pinningTelemetryInfo); + enforceTestMode, time, chainHasValidPins); } nsresult diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h index f42376b52..09fdd8474 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h +++ b/security/manager/ssl/PublicKeyPinningService.h @@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ public: const char* hostname, mozilla::pkix::Time time, bool enforceTestMode, - /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins, - /*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo); + /*out*/ bool& chainHasValidPins); /** * Sets chainMatchesPinset to true if there is any intersection between the * certificate list and the pins specified in the aSHA256keys array. diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp deleted file mode 100644 index 3f9ea3eb6..000000000 --- a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ -/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ -/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public - * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this - * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ - -#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h" - -#include "mozilla/Logging.h" -#include "RootHashes.inc" // Note: Generated by genRootCAHashes.js -#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h" -#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h" - -namespace mozilla { namespace psm { - -mozilla::LazyLogModule gPublicKeyPinningTelemetryLog("PublicKeyPinningTelemetryService"); - -// Used in the BinarySearch method, this does a memcmp between the pointer -// provided to its construtor and whatever the binary search is looking for. -// -// This implementation assumes everything to be of HASH_LEN, so it should not -// be used generically. -class BinaryHashSearchArrayComparator -{ -public: - explicit BinaryHashSearchArrayComparator(const uint8_t* aTarget, size_t len) - : mTarget(aTarget) - { - NS_ASSERTION(len == HASH_LEN, "Hashes should be of the same length."); - } - - int operator()(const CertAuthorityHash val) const { - return memcmp(mTarget, val.hash, HASH_LEN); - } - -private: - const uint8_t* mTarget; -}; - -// Perform a hash of the provided cert, then search in the RootHashes.inc data -// structure for a matching bin number. -int32_t -RootCABinNumber(const SECItem* cert) -{ - Digest digest; - - // Compute SHA256 hash of the certificate - nsresult rv = digest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, cert->data, cert->len); - if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { - return ROOT_CERTIFICATE_HASH_FAILURE; - } - - // Compare against list of stored hashes - size_t idx; - - MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningTelemetryLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("pkpinTelem: First bytes %02hx %02hx %02hx %02hx\n", - digest.get().data[0], digest.get().data[1], digest.get().data[2], digest.get().data[3])); - - if (mozilla::BinarySearchIf(ROOT_TABLE, 0, ArrayLength(ROOT_TABLE), - BinaryHashSearchArrayComparator(static_cast<uint8_t*>(digest.get().data), - digest.get().len), - &idx)) { - - MOZ_LOG(gPublicKeyPinningTelemetryLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("pkpinTelem: Telemetry index was %lu, bin is %d\n", - idx, ROOT_TABLE[idx].binNumber)); - return (int32_t) ROOT_TABLE[idx].binNumber; - } - - // Didn't match. - return ROOT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; -} - - -// Attempt to increment the appropriate bin in the provided Telemetry probe ID. If -// there was a hash failure, we do nothing. -void -AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(mozilla::Telemetry::ID probe, - const CERTCertificate* cert) -{ - int32_t binId = RootCABinNumber(&cert->derCert); - - if (binId != ROOT_CERTIFICATE_HASH_FAILURE) { - Accumulate(probe, binId); - } -} - -} // namespace psm -} // namespace mozilla diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h b/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h deleted file mode 100644 index 05dbb4e44..000000000 --- a/security/manager/ssl/RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ -/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ -/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public - * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this - * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ - -#ifndef RootCertificateTelemetryUtils_h -#define RootCertificateTelemetryUtils_h - -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" -#include "certt.h" - -namespace mozilla { namespace psm { - -// Note: New CAs will show up as UNKNOWN_ROOT until -// RootHashes.inc is updated to include them. 0 is reserved by -// genRootCAHashes.js for the unknowns. -#define ROOT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 0 -#define ROOT_CERTIFICATE_HASH_FAILURE -1 - -int32_t -RootCABinNumber(const SECItem* cert); - -void -AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(mozilla::Telemetry::ID probe, const CERTCertificate* cert); - -} // namespace psm -} // namespace mozilla - -#endif // RootCertificateTelemetryUtils_h diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp index 757534955..af985eb92 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp +++ b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp @@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ #include "ExtendedValidation.h" #include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h" #include "PSMRunnable.h" -#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h" #include "ScopedNSSTypes.h" #include "SharedCertVerifier.h" #include "SharedSSLState.h" @@ -112,7 +111,6 @@ #include "mozilla/Casting.h" #include "mozilla/Mutex.h" #include "mozilla/RefPtr.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" #include "mozilla/Unused.h" #include "mozilla/net/DNS.h" @@ -150,11 +148,6 @@ namespace { // do not use a nsCOMPtr to avoid static initializer/destructor nsIThreadPool* gCertVerificationThreadPool = nullptr; -// We avoid using a mutex for the success case to avoid lock-related -// performance issues. However, we do use a lock in the error case to simplify -// the code, since performance in the error case is not important. -Mutex* gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = nullptr; - // We add a mutex to serialize PKCS11 database operations Mutex* gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr; @@ -173,7 +166,6 @@ Mutex* gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr; void InitializeSSLServerCertVerificationThreads() { - gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = new Mutex("SSLVerificationTelemetryMutex"); gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = new Mutex("SSLVerificationPK11Mutex"); // TODO: tuning, make parameters preferences // XXX: instantiate nsThreadPool directly, to make this more bulletproof. @@ -207,10 +199,6 @@ void StopSSLServerCertVerificationThreads() gCertVerificationThreadPool->Shutdown(); NS_RELEASE(gCertVerificationThreadPool); } - if (gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex) { - delete gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex; - gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = nullptr; - } if (gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex) { delete gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex; gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr; @@ -244,8 +232,6 @@ public: SSLServerCertVerificationResult(nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, PRErrorCode errorCode, - Telemetry::ID telemetryID = Telemetry::HistogramCount, - uint32_t telemetryValue = -1, SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType = PlainErrorMessage); @@ -255,8 +241,6 @@ private: public: const PRErrorCode mErrorCode; const SSLErrorMessageType mErrorMessageType; - const Telemetry::ID mTelemetryID; - const uint32_t mTelemetryValue; }; class CertErrorRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase @@ -297,63 +281,6 @@ private: const uint32_t mProviderFlags; }; -// A probe value of 1 means "no error". -uint32_t -MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode) -{ - switch (errorCode) - { - case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: return 2; - case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: return 3; - case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: return 4; - case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: return 5; - case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: return 6; - case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: return 7; - case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED: return 8; - case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: return 9; - case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: return 10; - case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_CA_CERT_USED_AS_END_ENTITY: return 11; - case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA: return 12; - case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE: return 13; - case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE: return 14; - case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: - return 15; - case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: return 16; - case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME: return 17; - } - NS_WARNING("Unknown certificate error code. Does MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue " - "handle everything in DetermineCertOverrideErrors?"); - return 0; -} - -static uint32_t -MapCertErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode) -{ - uint32_t probeValue; - switch (errorCode) - { - // see security/pkix/include/pkix/Result.h -#define MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP(name, value, nss_name) case nss_name: probeValue = value; break; - MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP_LIST -#undef MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP - default: return 0; - } - - // Since FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is 0x800, fatal error values are much larger than - // non-fatal error values. To conserve space, we remap these so they start at - // (decimal) 90 instead of 0x800. Currently there are ~50 non-fatal errors - // mozilla::pkix might return, so saving space for 90 should be sufficient - // (similarly, there are 4 fatal errors, so saving space for 10 should also - // be sufficient). - static_assert(FATAL_ERROR_FLAG == 0x800, - "mozilla::pkix::FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is not what we were expecting"); - if (probeValue & FATAL_ERROR_FLAG) { - probeValue ^= FATAL_ERROR_FLAG; - probeValue += 90; - } - return probeValue; -} - SECStatus DetermineCertOverrideErrors(const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert, const char* hostName, @@ -562,19 +489,6 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides() } if (!remaining_display_errors) { - // This can double- or triple-count one certificate with multiple - // different types of errors. Since this is telemetry and we just - // want a ballpark answer, we don't care. - if (mErrorCodeTrust != 0) { - uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTrust); - } - if (mErrorCodeMismatch != 0) { - uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeMismatch); - } - if (mErrorCodeTime != 0) { - uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTime); - } - // all errors are covered by override rules, so let's accept the cert MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("[%p][%p] All errors covered by override rules\n", @@ -621,8 +535,6 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides() SSLServerCertVerificationResult* result = new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, errorCodeToReport, - Telemetry::HistogramCount, - -1, OverridableCertErrorMessage); LogInvalidCertError(mInfoObject, @@ -656,8 +568,6 @@ CreateCertErrorRunnable(CertVerifier& certVerifier, MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject); MOZ_ASSERT(cert); - uint32_t probeValue = MapCertErrorToProbeValue(defaultErrorCodeToReport); - uint32_t collected_errors = 0; PRErrorCode errorCodeTrust = 0; PRErrorCode errorCodeMismatch = 0; @@ -861,334 +771,6 @@ BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy(nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, return SECFailure; } -void -AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(const char* commonName, - bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames) -{ - if (!commonNameInSubjectAltNames) { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: common name '%s' not in subject alt. names " - "(or the subject alt. names extension is not present)\n", - commonName)); - } -} - -// Returns true if and only if commonName ends with altName (minus its leading -// "*"). altName has already been checked to be of the form "*.<something>". -// commonName may be NULL. -static bool -TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(const char* commonName, - const nsACString& altName) -{ - return commonName && - StringEndsWith(nsDependentCString(commonName), Substring(altName, 1)); -} - -// Gathers telemetry on Baseline Requirements 9.2.1 (Subject Alternative -// Names Extension) and 9.2.2 (Subject Common Name Field). -// Specifically: -// - whether or not the subject common name field is present -// - whether or not the subject alternative names extension is present -// - if there is a malformed entry in the subject alt. names extension -// - if there is an entry in the subject alt. names extension corresponding -// to the subject common name -// Telemetry is only gathered for certificates that chain to a trusted root -// in Mozilla's Root CA program. -// certList consists of a validated certificate chain. The end-entity -// certificate is first and the root (trust anchor) is last. -void -GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) -{ - CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList); - CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList); - PR_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) || - CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList))); - if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) || - CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) { - return; - } - CERTCertificate* cert = endEntityNode->cert; - PR_ASSERT(cert); - if (!cert) { - return; - } - UniquePORTString commonName(CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject)); - // This only applies to certificates issued by authorities in our root - // program. - CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert; - PR_ASSERT(rootCert); - if (!rootCert) { - return; - } - bool isBuiltIn = false; - Result result = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn); - if (result != Success || !isBuiltIn) { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: root certificate for '%s' is not a built-in root " - "(or IsCertBuiltInRoot failed)\n", commonName.get())); - return; - } - ScopedAutoSECItem altNameExtension; - SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, - &altNameExtension); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: no subject alt names extension for '%s'\n", - commonName.get())); - AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false); - return; - } - - UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE)); - CERTGeneralName* subjectAltNames = - CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena.get(), &altNameExtension); - if (!subjectAltNames) { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: could not decode subject alt names for '%s'\n", - commonName.get())); - AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false); - return; - } - - CERTGeneralName* currentName = subjectAltNames; - bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames = false; - bool nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false; - bool malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false; - bool nonFQDNPresent = false; - do { - nsAutoCString altName; - if (currentName->type == certDNSName) { - altName.Assign(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>( - currentName->name.other.data), - currentName->name.other.len); - nsDependentCString altNameWithoutWildcard(altName, 0); - if (StringBeginsWith(altNameWithoutWildcard, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("*."))) { - altNameWithoutWildcard.Rebind(altName, 2); - commonNameInSubjectAltNames |= - TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(commonName.get(), altName); - } - // net_IsValidHostName appears to return true for valid IP addresses, - // which would be invalid for a DNS name. - // Note that the net_IsValidHostName check will catch things like - // "a.*.example.com". - if (!net_IsValidHostName(altNameWithoutWildcard) || - net_IsValidIPv4Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length()) || - net_IsValidIPv6Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length())) { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: DNSName '%s' not valid (for '%s')\n", - altName.get(), commonName.get())); - malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true; - } - if (!altName.Contains('.')) { - nonFQDNPresent = true; - } - } else if (currentName->type == certIPAddress) { - // According to DNS.h, this includes space for the null-terminator - char buf[net::kNetAddrMaxCStrBufSize] = { 0 }; - PRNetAddr addr; - if (currentName->name.other.len == 4) { - addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET; - memcpy(&addr.inet.ip, currentName->name.other.data, - currentName->name.other.len); - if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v4) not valid (for '%s')\n", - commonName.get())); - malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true; - } else { - altName.Assign(buf); - } - } else if (currentName->name.other.len == 16) { - addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET6; - memcpy(&addr.ipv6.ip, currentName->name.other.data, - currentName->name.other.len); - if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v6) not valid (for '%s')\n", - commonName.get())); - malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true; - } else { - altName.Assign(buf); - } - } else { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: IPAddress not valid (for '%s')\n", - commonName.get())); - malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true; - } - } else { - MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, - ("BR telemetry: non-DNSName, non-IPAddress present for '%s'\n", - commonName.get())); - nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true; - } - if (commonName && altName.Equals(commonName.get())) { - commonNameInSubjectAltNames = true; - } - currentName = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(currentName); - } while (currentName && currentName != subjectAltNames); - - AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), - commonNameInSubjectAltNames); -} - -// Gather telemetry on whether the end-entity cert for a server has the -// required TLS Server Authentication EKU, or any others -void -GatherEKUTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) -{ - CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList); - CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList); - PR_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) || - CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList))); - if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) || - CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) { - return; - } - CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert; - PR_ASSERT(endEntityCert); - if (!endEntityCert) { - return; - } - - // Only log telemetry if the root CA is built-in - CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert; - PR_ASSERT(rootCert); - if (!rootCert) { - return; - } - bool isBuiltIn = false; - Result rv = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn); - if (rv != Success || !isBuiltIn) { - return; - } - - // Find the EKU extension, if present - bool foundEKU = false; - SECOidTag oidTag; - CERTCertExtension* ekuExtension = nullptr; - for (size_t i = 0; endEntityCert->extensions && endEntityCert->extensions[i]; - i++) { - oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&endEntityCert->extensions[i]->id); - if (oidTag == SEC_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { - foundEKU = true; - ekuExtension = endEntityCert->extensions[i]; - } - } - - if (!foundEKU) { - return; - } - - // Parse the EKU extension - UniqueCERTOidSequence ekuSequence( - CERT_DecodeOidSequence(&ekuExtension->value)); - if (!ekuSequence) { - return; - } - - // Search through the available EKUs - bool foundServerAuth = false; - bool foundOther = false; - for (SECItem** oids = ekuSequence->oids; oids && *oids; oids++) { - oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(*oids); - if (oidTag == SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_SERVER_AUTH) { - foundServerAuth = true; - } else { - foundOther = true; - } - } -} - -// Gathers telemetry on which CA is the root of a given cert chain. -// If the root is a built-in root, then the telemetry makes a count -// by root. Roots that are not built-in are counted in one bin. -void -GatherRootCATelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) -{ - CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList); - PR_ASSERT(rootNode); - if (!rootNode) { - return; - } - PR_ASSERT(!CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)); - if (CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) { - return; - } - CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert; - PR_ASSERT(rootCert); - if (!rootCert) { - return; - } - AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_SUCCESS_BY_CA, - rootCert); -} - -// These time are appoximate, i.e., doesn't account for leap seconds, etc -const uint64_t ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS = (7 * (24 * 60 *60)); -const uint64_t ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS = 52; - -// Gathers telemetry on the certificate lifetimes we observe in the wild -void -GatherEndEntityTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) -{ - CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList); - MOZ_ASSERT(endEntityNode && !CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList)); - if (!endEntityNode || CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList)) { - return; - } - - CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert; - PR_ASSERT(endEntityCert); - if (!endEntityCert) { - return; - } - - PRTime notBefore; - PRTime notAfter; - - if (CERT_GetCertTimes(endEntityCert, ¬Before, ¬After) != SECSuccess) { - return; - } - - PR_ASSERT(notAfter > notBefore); - if (notAfter <= notBefore) { - return; - } - - uint64_t durationInWeeks = (notAfter - notBefore) - / PR_USEC_PER_SEC - / ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS; - - if (durationInWeeks > (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS)) { - durationInWeeks = (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS) + 1; - } -} - -// There are various things that we want to measure about certificate -// chains that we accept. This is a single entry point for all of them. -void -GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) -{ - GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(certList); - GatherEKUTelemetry(certList); - GatherRootCATelemetry(certList); - GatherEndEntityTelemetry(certList); -} - -void -GatherTelemetryForSingleSCT(const ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp& sct) -{ -/* STUB */ -} - -void -GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, - const CertificateTransparencyInfo& info) -{ -/* STUB */ -} - // Note: Takes ownership of |peerCertChain| if SECSuccess is not returned. SECStatus AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier, @@ -1214,7 +796,6 @@ AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier, CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED; KeySizeStatus keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked; SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked; - PinningTelemetryInfo pinningTelemetryInfo; CertificateTransparencyInfo certificateTransparencyInfo; int flags = 0; @@ -1233,22 +814,14 @@ AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier, &evOidPolicy, &ocspStaplingStatus, &keySizeStatus, &sha1ModeResult, - &pinningTelemetryInfo, &certificateTransparencyInfo); - uint32_t evStatus = (rv != Success) ? 0 // 0 = Failure - : (evOidPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ? 1 // 1 = DV - : 2; // 2 = EV - if (rv == Success) { // Certificate verification succeeded. Delete any potential record of // certificate error bits. RememberCertErrorsTable::GetInstance().RememberCertHasError(infoObject, nullptr, SECSuccess); - GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(certList); - GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(certList, - certificateTransparencyInfo); // The connection may get terminated, for example, if the server requires // a client cert. Let's provide a minimal SSLStatus @@ -1363,11 +936,6 @@ SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run() if (mInfoObject->isAlreadyShutDown()) { error = SEC_ERROR_USER_CANCELLED; } else { - Telemetry::ID successTelemetry - = Telemetry::SSL_SUCCESFUL_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX; - Telemetry::ID failureTelemetry - = Telemetry::SSL_INITIAL_FAILED_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX; - // Reset the error code here so we can detect if AuthCertificate fails to // set the error code if/when it fails. PR_SetError(0, 0); @@ -1378,21 +946,15 @@ SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run() MOZ_ASSERT(mPeerCertChain || rv != SECSuccess, "AuthCertificate() should take ownership of chain on failure"); if (rv == SECSuccess) { - uint32_t interval = (uint32_t) ((TimeStamp::Now() - mJobStartTime).ToMilliseconds()); RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationResult> restart( - new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0, - successTelemetry, interval)); + new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0)); restart->Dispatch(); return NS_OK; } // Note: the interval is not calculated once as PR_GetError MUST be called - // before any other function call + // before any other function call error = PR_GetError(); - { - TimeStamp now = TimeStamp::Now(); - MutexAutoLock telemetryMutex(*gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex); - } if (error != 0) { RefPtr<CertErrorRunnable> runnable( CreateCertErrorRunnable(*mCertVerifier, error, mInfoObject, mCert, @@ -1614,19 +1176,11 @@ AuthCertificateHook(void* arg, PRFileDesc* fd, PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer) SSLServerCertVerificationResult::SSLServerCertVerificationResult( nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, PRErrorCode errorCode, - Telemetry::ID telemetryID, uint32_t telemetryValue, SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType) : mInfoObject(infoObject) , mErrorCode(errorCode) , mErrorMessageType(errorMessageType) - , mTelemetryID(telemetryID) - , mTelemetryValue(telemetryValue) { -// We accumulate telemetry for (only) successful validations on the main thread -// to avoid adversely affecting performance by acquiring the mutex that we use -// when accumulating the telemetry for unsuccessful validations. Unsuccessful -// validations times are accumulated elsewhere. -MOZ_ASSERT(telemetryID == Telemetry::HistogramCount || errorCode == 0); } void diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/moz.build b/security/manager/ssl/moz.build index 19e1b4f4b..8c8d25dcc 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/moz.build +++ b/security/manager/ssl/moz.build @@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ UNIFIED_SOURCES += [ 'PSMContentListener.cpp', 'PSMRunnable.cpp', 'PublicKeyPinningService.cpp', - 'RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.cpp', 'SecretDecoderRing.cpp', 'SharedSSLState.cpp', 'SSLServerCertVerification.cpp', diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp index 9196e200c..0af761d7e 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp +++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ #include "cryptohi.h" #include "keyhi.h" #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "nsIContent.h" #include "nsIDOMHTMLSelectElement.h" #include "nsIGenKeypairInfoDlg.h" @@ -395,13 +394,6 @@ loser: return rv; } - -void -GatherKeygenTelemetry(uint32_t keyGenMechanism, int keysize, char* curve) -{ -/* STUB */ -} - nsresult nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetPublicKey(const nsAString& aValue, const nsAString& aChallenge, @@ -639,8 +631,6 @@ nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetPublicKey(const nsAString& aValue, CopyASCIItoUTF16(keystring.get(), aOutPublicKey); rv = NS_OK; - - GatherKeygenTelemetry(keyGenMechanism, keysize, keyparamsString); loser: if (srv != SECSuccess) { if ( privateKey ) { diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp index b8f1b0eb7..dda936d8c 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp +++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" #include "mozilla/Casting.h" #include "mozilla/RefPtr.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h" #include "mozilla/Unused.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" @@ -1072,37 +1071,6 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart) return SECSuccess; } -static void -AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::ID probe, uint32_t bits) -{ - unsigned int value = bits < 512 ? 1 : bits == 512 ? 2 - : bits < 768 ? 3 : bits == 768 ? 4 - : bits < 1024 ? 5 : bits == 1024 ? 6 - : bits < 1280 ? 7 : bits == 1280 ? 8 - : bits < 1536 ? 9 : bits == 1536 ? 10 - : bits < 2048 ? 11 : bits == 2048 ? 12 - : bits < 3072 ? 13 : bits == 3072 ? 14 - : bits < 4096 ? 15 : bits == 4096 ? 16 - : bits < 8192 ? 17 : bits == 8192 ? 18 - : bits < 16384 ? 19 : bits == 16384 ? 20 - : 0; -} - -// XXX: This attempts to map a bit count to an ECC named curve identifier. In -// the vast majority of situations, we only have the Suite B curves available. -// In that case, this mapping works fine. If we were to have more curves -// available, the mapping would be ambiguous since there could be multiple -// named curves for a given size (e.g. secp256k1 vs. secp256r1). We punt on -// that for now. See also NSS bug 323674. -static void -AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::ID probe, uint32_t bits) -{ - unsigned int value = bits == 256 ? 23 // P-256 - : bits == 384 ? 24 // P-384 - : bits == 521 ? 25 // P-521 - : 0; // Unknown -} - // In the case of session resumption, the AuthCertificate hook has been bypassed // (because we've previously successfully connected to our peer). That being the // case, we unfortunately don't know if the peer's server certificate verified @@ -1216,11 +1184,6 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) { rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)); MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess); if (rv == SECSuccess) { - // Get the protocol version for telemetry - // 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2 - unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF; - MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0); - SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo; rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo, sizeof cipherInfo); @@ -1231,16 +1194,10 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) { if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) { switch (channelInfo.keaType) { case ssl_kea_rsa: - AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL, - channelInfo.keaKeyBits); break; case ssl_kea_dh: - AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_DHE_KEY_SIZE_FULL, - channelInfo.keaKeyBits); break; case ssl_kea_ecdh: - AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_ECDHE_CURVE_FULL, - channelInfo.keaKeyBits); break; default: MOZ_CRASH("impossible KEA"); @@ -1252,12 +1209,8 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) { switch (channelInfo.authType) { case ssl_auth_rsa: case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: - AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL, - channelInfo.authKeyBits); break; case ssl_auth_ecdsa: - AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ECDSA_CURVE_FULL, - channelInfo.authKeyBits); break; default: MOZ_CRASH("impossible auth algorithm"); diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp index f580f2bcb..4d6c3963f 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp +++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #include "mozilla/Services.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h" #include "mozilla/SyncRunnable.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "mozilla/Unused.h" #include "nsAppDirectoryServiceDefs.h" #include "nsCRT.h" @@ -785,13 +784,6 @@ nsNSSComponent::UnloadFamilySafetyRoot() // 2: detect Family Safety mode and import the root const char* kFamilySafetyModePref = "security.family_safety.mode"; -// The telemetry gathered by this function is as follows: -// 0-2: the value of the Family Safety mode pref -// 3: detecting Family Safety mode failed -// 4: Family Safety was not enabled -// 5: Family Safety was enabled -// 6: failed to import the Family Safety root -// 7: successfully imported the root void nsNSSComponent::MaybeEnableFamilySafetyCompatibility() { @@ -1564,15 +1556,6 @@ CipherSuiteChangeObserver::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, void nsNSSComponent::setValidationOptions(bool isInitialSetting, const MutexAutoLock& lock) { - // This preference controls whether we do OCSP fetching and does not affect - // OCSP stapling. - // 0 = disabled, 1 = enabled - int32_t ocspEnabled = Preferences::GetInt("security.OCSP.enabled", - OCSP_ENABLED_DEFAULT); - - bool ocspRequired = ocspEnabled && - Preferences::GetBool("security.OCSP.require", false); - bool ocspStaplingEnabled = Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true); PublicSSLState()->SetOCSPStaplingEnabled(ocspStaplingEnabled); diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp index d2549c52d..aec3dec12 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp +++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #include "mozilla/Logging.h" #include "mozilla/Move.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "nsArray.h" #include "nsArrayUtils.h" #include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h" @@ -244,21 +243,6 @@ nsNSSSocketInfo::NoteTimeUntilReady() void nsNSSSocketInfo::SetHandshakeCompleted() { - if (!mHandshakeCompleted) { - enum HandshakeType { - Resumption = 1, - FalseStarted = 2, - ChoseNotToFalseStart = 3, - NotAllowedToFalseStart = 4, - }; - - HandshakeType handshakeType = !IsFullHandshake() ? Resumption - : mFalseStarted ? FalseStarted - : mFalseStartCallbackCalled ? ChoseNotToFalseStart - : NotAllowedToFalseStart; - } - - // Remove the plain text layer as it is not needed anymore. // The plain text layer is not always present - so its not a fatal error // if it cannot be removed @@ -1050,29 +1034,6 @@ class SSLErrorRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase namespace { -uint32_t tlsIntoleranceTelemetryBucket(PRErrorCode err) -{ - // returns a numeric code for where we track various errors in telemetry - // only errors that cause version fallback are tracked, - // so this is also used to determine which errors can cause version fallback - switch (err) { - case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT: return 1; - case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ: return 2; - case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT: return 3; - case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT: return 4; - case SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT: return 6; - case SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP: return 7; - case SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION: return 10; - case SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT: return 11; - case SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE: return 13; - case SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT: return 14; - case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR: return 16; - case PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR: return 17; - case SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT: return 18; - default: return 0; - } -} - bool retryDueToTLSIntolerance(PRErrorCode err, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo) { @@ -1097,13 +1058,6 @@ retryDueToTLSIntolerance(PRErrorCode err, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo) // this as a hard failure, but forget any intolerance so that later attempts // don't use this version (i.e., range.max) and trigger the error again. - // First, track the original cause of the version fallback. This uses the - // same buckets as the telemetry below, except that bucket 0 will include - // all cases where there wasn't an original reason. - PRErrorCode originalReason = - helpers.getIntoleranceReason(socketInfo->GetHostName(), - socketInfo->GetPort()); - helpers.forgetIntolerance(socketInfo->GetHostName(), socketInfo->GetPort()); @@ -1139,29 +1093,14 @@ retryDueToTLSIntolerance(PRErrorCode err, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo) return false; } - uint32_t reason = tlsIntoleranceTelemetryBucket(err); - if (reason == 0) { - return false; - } - - Telemetry::ID pre; - Telemetry::ID post; switch (range.max) { case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3: - pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS13_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE; - post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS13_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST; break; case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: - pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS12_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE; - post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS12_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST; break; case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1: - pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS11_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE; - post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS11_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST; break; case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0: - pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS10_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE; - post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS10_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST; break; default: MOZ_CRASH("impossible TLS version"); @@ -1187,34 +1126,6 @@ static_assert((PR_MAX_ERROR - PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) <= 128, static_assert((mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE - mozilla::pkix::END_OF_LIST) < 31, "too many moz::pkix errors"); -static void -reportHandshakeResult(int32_t bytesTransferred, bool wasReading, PRErrorCode err) -{ - uint32_t bucket; - - // A negative bytesTransferred or a 0 read are errors. - if (bytesTransferred > 0) { - bucket = 0; - } else if ((bytesTransferred == 0) && !wasReading) { - // PR_Write() is defined to never return 0, but let's make sure. - // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_Write. - MOZ_ASSERT(false); - bucket = 671; - } else if (IS_SSL_ERROR(err)) { - bucket = err - SSL_ERROR_BASE; - MOZ_ASSERT(bucket > 0); // SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_ONLY_SERVER isn't used. - } else if (IS_SEC_ERROR(err)) { - bucket = (err - SEC_ERROR_BASE) + 256; - } else if ((err >= PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) && (err < PR_MAX_ERROR)) { - bucket = (err - PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) + 512; - } else if ((err >= mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE) && - (err < mozilla::pkix::ERROR_LIMIT)) { - bucket = (err - mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE) + 640; - } else { - bucket = 671; - } -} - int32_t checkHandshake(int32_t bytesTransfered, bool wasReading, PRFileDesc* ssl_layer_fd, nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo) @@ -1292,10 +1203,6 @@ checkHandshake(int32_t bytesTransfered, bool wasReading, // set the HandshakePending attribute to false so that we don't try the logic // above again in a subsequent transfer. if (handleHandshakeResultNow) { - // Report the result once for each handshake. Note that this does not - // get handshakes which are cancelled before any reads or writes - // happen. - reportHandshakeResult(bytesTransfered, wasReading, originalError); socketInfo->SetHandshakeNotPending(); } |